Extract from:
RIP 98
Appendix II
American Measures against Communication
Intelligence Publicity
Dated 5 April 1943 Pages 375-419

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JUNE 26, 1939

As early as June 26, 1939 the President of
the United States, the Honorable Franklin D. Roose-
velt had decreed that the investigation of all esp-
ionage, counter-espionage and sabotage matters would
be controlled by the F. B. I., and Army and Navy In-
telligence divisions. The directors of these agencies
were to function as a coordinating committee:

No. 1

THE WHITE HOUSE
Washington

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR-
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF WAR
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE POSTMASTER GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF THE NAVY
THE SECRETARY OF COMMERCE

Hyde Park, N.Y.
June 26, 1939.
It is my desire that the investigation of all espionage, counter-espionage, and sabotage matters be controlled and handled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the Department of Justice, the Military Intelligence Division of the War Department, and the office of Naval Intelligence of the Navy Department. The directors of these three agencies are to function as a committee to coordinate their activities.

No investigations should be conducted by any investigative agency of the Government into matters involving actually or potentially any espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage, except by the three agencies mentioned above.

I shall be glad if you will instruct the heads of all other investigative agencies than the three named, to refer immediately to the nearest office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation any data, information, or material that may come to their notice bearing directly or indirectly on espionage, counter-espionage, or sabotage.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

FEBRUARY 25, 1942

After the attack on Pearl Harbor, these three agencies came to a secret agreement which read as follows:

No. 2

February 25, 1942

SUBJECT: SECRET AGREEMENT BETWEEN MID, ONI AND FBI FOR COORDINATING SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE.
I. The undersigned, in order to reduce to writing the basic principles regulating the operation and responsibilities for Special Intelligence operations in the Western Hemisphere in accordance with the Presidential instructions of June 24, 1940, and January 16, 1942, and previous instructions referred to therein, and in harmony with the "Agreement for Coordination of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Office of Naval Intelligence and the Military Intelligence Division" dated February 9, 1942, agree upon the assignment of responsibility, as given in paragraphs II, III, and IV, for intelligence coverage in Mexico, Central America, (with the exception of the Republic of Panama), South America, the Caribbean, and Canada. Responsibility assigned to one organization in a given field carries with it the obligation to provide, by the most expeditious means possible consistent with requisite security, to the other subscribing agencies all pertinent information received in that field, but it does not imply that the responsible agency alone is interested in, or that it only will work in, that field. Close cooperation among the headquarters of the three agencies in all fields is a mutually recognized necessity.

II. MID will be responsible for:

1. A continuation of the work normally outlined for and executed by Military Attaches.

2. The collection of information needed by the military forces. To this end, authority to maintain such personnel as the War Department deems necessary for the performance of such duties is recognized.

III. ONI will be responsible for:

1. A continuation of the work normally outlined for and executed by Naval Attaches.

2. The collection of information needed by the naval forces. To this end authority to maintain such personnel as the Navy Department deems necessary for the performance of such duties is recognized.
IV. FBI will be responsible for:

1. The operation of a Special Intelligence Service in the Western Hemisphere, including Mexico, Central America, (with the exception of the Republic of Panama), South America, the Caribbean, and Canada.

2. The Special Intelligence Service will obtain, primarily through undercover operations, supplemented when necessary by open operations, economic, political, industrial, financial and subversive information. The Special Intelligence Service will obtain information concerning political movements, organizations, and individuals whose activities are prejudicial to the interest of the United States.

3. The Federal Bureau of Investigation will be responsible for the furnishing to the Military and Naval Intelligence services of all pertinent information obtained.

V. 1. In times of stress, by which is meant, times that are such as to anticipate periods of predominant military interest, the collection of and the coordination of efforts to obtain additional intelligence of interest to our armed forces, also becomes a responsibility of the military (naval) commander, who is primarily charged with the military (naval) operations conducted within his potential theater of operations.

2. The general type of military and naval information alluded to includes, amongst other items, the following: location of air fields; submarine bases; fueling stations; rendezvous for hostile military forces, land, sea and air; concentrations of munitions of war, and other supplies susceptible to military use; unusual assemblies and actions of individuals, organizations or communities; demonstrations of undue friendliness or hostility; undue interest in individuals, organizations or communities; or other information indicating preparations for or carrying on of open or surreptitious military operations.
3. In periods of predominant military interest, the Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence (Director of Naval Intelligence) will advise the Director of Naval Intelligence (Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence) and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation of the nature of information desired from those two services and shall advise the two named Directors of any coverage desired beyond the normal coverage of those agencies. The Director of Naval Intelligence (Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence) and the Federal Bureau of Investigation will undertake to perform the additional tasks requested in so far as it is practical and possible within the limitations of the facilities available. They will advise the Assistant Chief of Staff in charge of Military Intelligence (Director of Naval Intelligence) of the additional assistance, if any, which they will be able to render, and it will then be the responsibility of Military Intelligence (Office of Naval Intelligence) to take the necessary steps under its own direction to satisfy its own requirements.

4. In periods of stress (see paragraph V (1)) when additional responsibilities have been indicated in preceding paragraph for the military (naval), the FBI will have the additional responsibility of effecting delivery of any information of interest to the cognizant military (naval) commander (V(1)). Transmission of such information will be made through the most expeditious channels consistent with the requisite security of the information and its sources.

VI. Knowledge of the existence of the Special Intelligence Service is closely held, and every effort will be made to safeguard its existence and responsibilities. To that end, only a limited distribution of this document is being effected by the headquarters of the subscribing services. Recipients of copies of this document are likewise requested to comply with the letter and spirit of the instructions contained in this paragraph.
MARCH 28, 1942

In March, 1942 some very important correspondence passed between the Director of Naval Intelligence and the State Department concerning the disclosure of intercepted messages:

No. 3

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of The Chief of Naval Operations
WASHINGTON

Op-16
(SC)A6-2(2)
Serial No. 0569216

SECRET

March 28, 1942
My dear Mr. Berle:

In connection with the recent arrest of Axis agents in Brazil and the question of the disclosure of intercepted messages requisite to accomplish their prosecution, I have much appreciated your consulting me in the matter.

It occurs to me that similar occasions may arise from time to time and that perhaps, to my knowledge at least, no general policy has been established for their disposition. The advantage of such a policy may be inferred from the fact that there are some six agencies receiving and breaking down these messages at present, and any of them might, unless guided by some general instructions, take action on its own initiative, which might be contrary to the interests of the others or, more particularly, of the United States. These six agencies are the British in London, the Canadians in Ottawa, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Communications Commission, the Signal Corps, and the Coast Guard, now under the Navy Department.

It would appear desirable that, for matters within this Hemisphere, the State Department should be the determining agency as to the primary decision whether action should be taken upon a decoded intercept, or whether no action should be initiated, for the purpose either of allowing arrangements indicated in the intercept to continue, in order that we might obtain more information, or to avoid the risk of enemy knowledge of the fact that we are breaking down the code. Presumably the State Department would consult and be receptive to the wishes of the intercepting and interested agencies named.
Again the question arises, as in the recent instance, of the desirability of allowing decoded intercepts to be disclosed for purposes of prosecution. It would appear that no clear-cut decision could be reached on this, but that, admitting the general principle of withholding to a maximum degree the disclosure of any intercepts, decision on specific cases must be based upon the importance of the prosecution on the one hand, and the prospective value of further communication in the same vulnerable channels, that is the value of avoiding the risk of a shift of code, on the other hand. In this case also it would appear that consultation with the interested agencies would be desirable.

Within the United States groups, questions present themselves as to allocation of interception and of processing, and as to the optimum dissemination consistent with security. If you consider it desirable to arrange a discussion of these matters, I should be glad to see to the designation of Navy Department representatives, and I have been assured that the British and Canadian authorities interested will do likewise. It is believed that the discussion should at first be confined to the U.S. agencies, followed by a joint meeting with the British and Canadian representatives.

Very sincerely,

/s/ T. S. Wilkinson, Rear Admiral, U.S. Navy, Director of Naval Intelligence.

The Honorable A. A. Berle, Jr., Assistant Secretary of State.
March 31, 1942

Dear Admiral Wilkinson:

I acknowledge your letter of March 28 relating to the method of determining action taken upon decoded intercepts so that disclosure of such intercepts may be withheld to a maximum degree consistent with effective action.

Your courtesy in suggesting that the Department of State take the leadership in determining action is appreciated though determination on that subject may perhaps be placed before the meeting you suggest.

In line with your suggestion, I am asking that a representative, respectively, of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Federal Communications Commission, the Signal Corps of the United States Army, the Military Intelligence Division and the Coast Guard meet in my office on Thursday, April 2, at 1130 a.m. I should be obliged if you would name a representative, unless you care to come yourself.

I fully agree that consultation with the British and Canadian representatives should properly follow the determination of policy among ourselves.

I have taken the liberty of assuming that the Coast Guard, though under the Navy, might wish to be separately represented.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Adolf A. Berle, Jr.

Received ONI
011438 April 1942
APRIL 3, 1942

Conferences were held on the problem of publicizing cryptanalytical success, and the result of one meeting was the following letter.

No. 5

April 3, 1942.

Hon. Adolf A. Berle, Jr.,
Department of State,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Berle:

It is my understanding that the following is the partial agreement reached at the Intelligence Conference held in your office on April, 1942:

"No action toward the closure of international clandestine radio stations or apprehension of individuals engaged in clandestine radio communications in which there is any military or naval interest, or action requiring disclosure of intercepted communications, shall be initiated without the joint approval of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations, or their designated representatives."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ Geo. V. Strong,
Major General
Finaly, another agreement was reached by the three agencies as to the respective spheres of jurisdiction each was to possess:

No. 6

April 23, 1942

REPORT OF SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL INTELLIGENCE CONFERENCE APPOINTED TO EXPLORE THE CRYPTANALYTICAL WORK OF THE WAR DEPARTMENT, NAVY DEPARTMENT AND FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

The subcommittee met in the office of Mr. D. M. Ladd, Federal Bureau of Investigation, on the afternoon of April 21, 1942. On this occasion, there were present:

For the War Department: Colonel John T. Bissell Colonel Carter Clarke

For the Navy Department: Commander John R. Redman Commander J. N. Wenger Lieutenant Commander Alwin D. Kramer

For the Federal Bureau of Investigation: Mr. E. P. Coffey Mr. D. M. Ladd

This subcommittee took up the question of the coordination and cooperation of the cryptanalytical work of the three services and the question of the processing of coded communication intercepts. It was agreed by all representatives present that there was a definite need for some coordination in this field; and it was pointed out that one of the primary interests in this work was the desire for the security of information to the extent that such activities were being carried on, and for the purpose of retaining this knowledge in the possession of the minimum number of people.
It was further agreed that in view of the limited and talented personnel available, the available personnel should be concentrated in the fewest possible agencies rather than spread out through numerous Governmental departments; that concentration of this personnel in a few agencies would eliminate the competitive bidding for the services of such personnel. The desirability of maintaining the minimum number of units handling cryptanalytical work suggests that this work should properly be confined to those agencies which have for some years been responsible for the handling of this work; and your committee recommends that the cryptanalytical work of the Government be limited to the War Department, Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This recommendation is made because of the close relationship which has existed between these three agencies and because of the fact that these three agencies are those which are primarily interested in this work inasmuch as it is definitely investigative intelligence, and the investigative jurisdiction in national defense matters rests with these three agencies.

In view thereof, it is the recommendation of your committee that the Interdepartmental Intelligence Conference endeavor to secure the issuance of an executive order restricting the setting up of any cryptanalytical sections other than in the War Department, Navy Department, and the FBI, and the disbanding of any cryptanalytical sections other than these three which are now in existence in the Federal Government. There is attached hereto a proposed executive order in line with the recommendation of your committee.

In carrying out the provisions of the attached directive, it is believed that a Communications Intelligence Committee which will be known as the CI Committee should be established as a sub-committee of the Inter-departmental Intelligence Conference and shall be composed of one representative to be appointed by the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation. This CI Committee should
hold frequent meetings for the purpose of farm-
ing out the work to be delegated to it by other
Governmental agencies, for the purpose of elim-
inating duplication of effort and for the pur-
pose of working out policy matters. All policy
matters of procedure and dissemination should be
referred by the CI Committee to the Interdepart-
mental Intelligence Conference for appropriate
action.

FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT

Colonel John T. Bissell

Colonel Carter Clarke

FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT

Commander John R. Redman

Commander J. N. Wenger

Lt. Comdr. Alwin D. Kramer

FOR THE FBI

Mr. E. P. Coffey

Mr. D. M. Ladd

APRIL 23, 1942

Indications of the extreme caution exercised
by U. S. naval officials in the handling of commun-
ication intelligence are seen in the following
correspondence:
April 23, 1942

MEMORANDUM

From: The Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet.
Subject: Internal Distribution of Radio Intelligence Reports.

1. In the interest of preventing any information getting into the hands of the enemy in regard to the functioning of our Radio Intelligence unit, Radio Intelligence reports should be treated with the utmost secrecy and given the absolute minimum of dissemination.

2. Accordingly it is proposed to make internal distribution directly from the Radio Intelligence Section of Naval Communications to the War Plans Division (F-1) and Naval Intelligence Division (Op-16) and no other distribution of these reports as such will be made.

3. Your concurrence in this procedure is requested.

F. J. HORNE

241400

240630
From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet.
To: Vice Chief of Naval Operations
(Director or Naval Communications)

Subject: Radio Intelligence Reports, Internal Distribution of.


1. The Commander in Chief, United States Fleet is in complete accord with paragraph 1 of reference (a).

2. Present procedure requires delivery of three (3) copies of subject reports to either the Communication Officer or Assistant Communication Officer of the Commander in Chief, United States Fleet, in Room 3057. It is desired that this procedure be continued except that delivery be effected in sealed envelopes similar to the handling of "Sealed Secret" despatches.

/s/ RUSSELL WILLSON,
Chief of Staff.
JUNE 18, 1942

On May 25, and June 5, detailed reports on the findings of the above conferences were issued, copies of which are on file in Op-20-G. Our principal interest, however, is in the agreements reached by these agencies. On June 18, 1942, the Director of Naval Intelligence, in his capacity as Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee, sent the following letter to the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

No. 9

June 18, 1942.

From: The Chairman, Joint Intelligence Committee. (Rear Admiral T. S. Wilkinson, U.S.N.)
To: The Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Subject: Limitation of Cryptanalytical Activities.

1. The informal standing Committee, composed of the Heads of the three Intelligence agencies, F. B. I., M. I. S., and O. N. I., has conducted a study of present and prospective cryptanalytical activities, in order to assure the maximum security and efficiency in the conduct of this essential work.

2. The Committee concludes, in the interest of secrecy, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and most efficient use of the limited number of talented personnel skilled in cryptanalysis, that this work should be controlled and undertaken by a minimum number of agencies. In view of the fact that the Army, the Navy, and the F.B.I. now have large organizations well equipped
for and capable of handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Committee recommends that the processing of that raw material be limited to the three agencies aforementioned.

3. It is intended by the Committee that any and all necessary cryptanalytical work will be allocated among the three agencies named, so that the field can be satisfactorily covered.

4. In addition to the organizations named, it is understood that at present small cryptanalytical units exist in the offices of (1) Director of Censorship, (2) Federal Communications Commission, and (3) Coordinator of Information. It is possible that other Offices have installed or are contemplating cryptanalytical units.

5. In view of the range of the governmental agencies involved now, and possibly more in the future, it appears that Presidential approval of this be recommended and that such approval be obtained.

T. S. Wilkinson.

CC: Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Assistant Chief of Staff (G-2).
Vice Chief of Naval Operations.
Director of Naval Communications.

JUNE 20, 1942

U. S. naval authorities were so concerned over the harmful publicity about communication intelligence which had been engendered by the Midway success, that Admiral Ernest J. King, Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet, and Chief of Naval Operations, sent the following letter to the commanders of his major units:
No. 10

SECRET

Op-20-G/ir
(SC) A6-2/A8
Serial 0325520

June 20, 1942.

From: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: The Commander-in-Chief, United States Atlantic Fleet.
The Commander-in-Chief, United States Pacific Fleet.
The Commander, Southwest Pacific Force.

Subject: Control of dissemination and use of radio intelligence.

1. The extreme importance of radio intelligence as a reliable source of enemy information has been repeatedly demonstrated. From no other form of intelligence can the enemy's intentions be so positively determined.

2. In view of these facts, it is imperative that every possible precaution be taken with regard to controlling the dissemination and use of radio intelligence in order to avoid drying up its sources. Any disclosures in the past with regard to the source of radio intelligence have invariably resulted in an immediate change in the enemy's communications and the consequent loss of weeks or months of painstaking effort on the part of our radio intelligence personnel. It is recognized, of course, that radio intelligence is of no value unless proper operational use can be made of it. However, momentary tactical advantage is seldom worth the risk of compromising the source, for such compromise will stop the flow of information and thereby vitally affect operations on all fronts and in all areas.
3. In order to further the maintenance of high security in regard to radio intelligence, the following regulations for the dissemination and use of this intelligence are hereby prescribed:

(a) The utmost secrecy shall be used in dealing with decryption intelligence, i.e., information resulting from the reading of enemy encrypted despatches.

(b) Radio intelligence should be passed on to subordinate commanders only in the form of operational directives whenever practicable.

(c) When such intelligence must be given out to lower commanders as information it should be passed without any reference to its secret source and should contain, somewhere near the beginning or the message, the word "ULTRA" or the word "ZEAL".

(d) Special care must be taken in every command to insure that radio intelligence is provided with special security safeguards and is seen and handled by the absolute minimum number of persons required for its use. Cryptographic systems of the highest available security and the narrowest distribution which includes the originator and addressees shall always be used for transmitting radio intelligence.

(e) Every effort must be made to avoid indicating any connection between the source of intelligence and the outcome of operations. When action is based on radio intelligence, local commanders will insure that the action cannot be traced to this source of intelligence alone. All copies of radio intelligence messages should be destroyed by burning as soon as possible after being read. Ships at sea, where enemy action is possible, should
take particular precautions to destroy all evidences of intelligence sources in order that there may be no possibility of their falling into enemy hands.

/s/ E. J. KING

Copy to:
The Commander, South Pacific Force.
The Director of Naval Intelligence.
The Director of Naval Communications.

By Officer Courier.

JUNE 30, 1942

Since the problem of dissemination of the results of cryptanalysis was the main reason for all the preceding conference reports and correspondence, the next report will be of interest since it outlined the eventual solution:

No. 11

June 30, 1942

Subject: Report of Conference Appointed to Study Allocation of Cryptanalysis.

In accordance with your directive a conference of representatives of the War Department, the Navy Department, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation was held on June 30, 1942, at which time the conference was advised of your directive which was as follows:
"That a committee be designated composed of one representative from each service to consider the entire field of cryptanalysis to assure themselves that the three services can cover the entire field, and having assured themselves that they could cover the entire field, to avoid duplication of effort by allocation of the cryptanalysis, among the services, of those types which the respective services are best qualified to undertake. Provision should be made for pooling of effort aside from this allocation whenever circumstances require. Consideration should be given to the formation of a standing committee to pass upon any questions of allocation or pooling of efforts which may arise from time to time."

A study was made of the entire field of cryptanalytical work for the purpose of determining whether the three designated agencies, i.e., the Army, the Navy, and the FBI, were able to handle all such work.

The survey of this field reflected that this work fell generally into the following classes:

1. Diplomatic
2. Enemy Naval Operations
3. Enemy Military Operations
4. (a) Western Hemisphere Clandestine (b) International Clandestine other than Western Hemisphere
5. Trade Codes
6. (a) Army Weather (b) Navy Weather
7. Domestic Criminal
8. Voice Broadcast
9. Cover Text Communications
10. Miscellaneous
After surveying this field, it was the unanimous opinion of this conference that all of this work could be adequately handled by the cryptanalytical sections of the three interested agencies.

A study was made by the conference with reference to the question of the allocation of this work, and the conference agreed on the following allocation:

1. Diplomatic: Army
2. Enemy Naval Operations: Navy
3. Enemy Military Operations: Army
4. (a) Western Hemisphere Clandestine: FBI-Navy
   (b) International Clandestine other than Western Hemisphere: Navy
5. Trade Codes: To be assigned by committee
6. (a) Army Weather: Army
   (b) Navy Weather: Navy
7. Domestic Criminal: FBI
8. Voice Broadcast: FBI
9. Cover Text Communications: FBI
10. Miscellaneous: To be assigned by committee

*The conference felt that there was sufficient material to occupy both FBI and Navy with reference to the handling of Western Hemisphere Clandestine work inasmuch as both are presently engaged in it and have a vital interest in the results. It was suggested that the duplication in this field be eliminated by agreement among the members of the committee to be appointed.

**Inasmuch as this work involves the question of which agency possesses the proper library material applicable to the particular code, it was believed that these cases should be assigned by a standing committee, which committee should have in its possession the complete list of the code book material possessed by all three agencies.
The conference recommended that a standing committee composed of one representative from each of the three agencies (Army, Navy, FBI) be appointed, and it was recommended that the committee should be made up as follows:

1. Officer in Charge, Signal Intelligence Service of the Army.
2. Officer in Charge of the Radio Intelligence, Office of Vice Chief of Naval Operations
3. Officer in Charge of the Technical Laboratory, Federal Bureau of Investigation.

This committee is to meet at frequent intervals for an exchange of information and for the purpose of eliminating any duplication and for the purpose of passing upon any questions of allocation or pooling of efforts which might arise from time to time.

**FOR THE WAR DEPARTMENT**

Col. Carter Clarke
Col. Frank W. Bullock
Mr. William Friedman

**FOR THE NAVY DEPARTMENT**

Comdr. John R. Redman
Comdr. J. N. Wenger
Lt. Comdr. A. D. Kramer
Lt. Comdr. L. T. Jones

**FOR THE FBI**

Mr. E. P. Coffey
Mr. D. M. Ladd

**JULY 6, 1942**

Acting upon the foregoing report, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent the following memorandum to the President:
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

The Joint Chiefs of Staff are of the opinion that, in the interest of maximum security and efficiency, cryptanalytical activities should be limited to the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.

At present, small cryptanalytical units exist in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission, and the Director of Strategic Services. It is also possible that other offices have installed or are contemplating cryptanalytical units.

In the interests of secrecy, elimination of unnecessary duplication, and most efficient use of the limited number of talented personnel skilled in cryptanalysis, it is believed that this work should be controlled and undertaken by a minimum number of agencies. As the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation now have large organizations well equipped and capable of handling the processing of all the raw material currently intercepted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommend that these activities be limited to the three agencies mentioned. An agreement has been reached with regard to the allocation of this work between the Army, the Navy, and the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Presidential approval of the foregoing is respectfully requested.

(Signed)  F. J. HORNE  (Signed)  G. C. MARSHALL

E. J. KING  
Commander in Chief  
U. S. Fleet

G. C. MARSHALL  
Chief of Staff

JULY 8, 1942

President Roosevelt then issued the following memorandum to the Director of the Budget:

No. 13

SECRET

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  

July 8, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF THE BUDGET:

I am enclosing a copy of a memorandum received today from the Chief of Staff and the Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Fleet. I agree with them. Will you please have the proper instructions issued discontinuing the cryptanalytical units in the offices of the Director of Censorship, the Federal Communications Commission and the Strategic Services. If you are aware of any other agencies having services of this character, will you please have those discontinued also.

F. D. R.

Enclosure
SEPTEMBER 24, 1942

The request of an American Ambassador in South America for certain decoded material brought the following statement of policy from U. S. Naval Communication Intelligence:

MEMORANDUM FOR CAPTAIN ZACHARIAHS:

Subject: Request of Claude G. Bowers for certain decoded material.

Reference: (a) Copy of secret ltr from Admiral T. S. Wilkinson to Hon. A. A. Berle, Jr., Asst. Secretary of State, dated March 28, 1942.


1. The question of supplying decoded material for prosecution purposes has arisen from time to time, as in this case. The Radio Intelligence Section has always taken the stand that no material should be supplied and believes it essential that this policy should be continued.

2. The same question arose in connection with the closing up of clandestine stations in Brazil. Unfortunately, the matter got out of hand and it became public knowledge that the ciphers used...
by the espionage agents in that territory were being read by our government. Both the Army and the Navy became very much concerned over the situation, and a conference was called by the State Department to discuss ways and means of handling similar situations which might arise in the future. It was agreed that no action should be taken to close clandestine stations without the consent of the Chief of Staff of the Army and the Chief of Naval Operations. The idea behind this was that it might be much more valuable to the military services to obtain the information flowing through clandestine stations than to close them up. Furthermore, there was always involved, as in this case, the possibility of having to disclose the source of evidence to be used in prosecution.

3. I believe that the State Department is aware of the foregoing decision and should be guided thereby. In this connection I should like to invite your attention to reference (a), a letter to Mr. Berle, of the State Department, from Admiral Wilkinson, and also to enclosure (A), which is a copy of a letter from General Strong to Mr. Berle.

Respectfully,

J. N. WENGER

NOVEMBER 18, 1942

Recommendations for more restricted handling of communication intelligence in the Navy Department itself were now agreed to after some dangerous publicity leaks had occurred in the newspaper:
MEMORANDUM

From: Op-20-G-1.
To: Op-20.
Via: Op-20-G.
Subject: Publicity concerning radio intelligence activities.

1. On November 11th there appeared in the "Washington Post" the following statement regarding action in Guadalcanal: "Holcomb said General Vandergrift's men captured the Japanese landing code, and he knew when and where they were coming in."

2. In the November 16th issue of "Time" the following statement appeared concerning communications of a certain clandestine station in South America:

   "Its complicated coded and transposed messages were intercepted and turned over to the U. S. experts, who broke the code. From then on, officials in Washington followed carefully the work of Nazi spies in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Colombia, Mexico, and even in the U.S."

3. Bearing upon these disclosures, the following very significant statement appears in a secret Japanese message from Madrid to Tokyo, dated November 12, 1942: "From my experience of the past three years, all leakage of the war plans of the United Nations can be laid to the door of the United States."

4. The unfortunate "Chicago Tribune" affair should have taught us a good lesson but it apparently did not for the publicity continues. The work of the radio intelligence organization is extremely difficult. Its value is recognized. Only yesterday, the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific, sent a dispatch of
appreciation to the organization saying that "once again radio intelligence has enabled the fighting forces of the Pacific and Southwest Pacific to know where and when to hit the enemy."

5. If the operating forces are to continue to benefit by radio intelligence, drastic steps must be taken to prevent further disclosures of the sort mentioned in paragraphs 1 and 2 above. This action is particularly important now that we are about to undertake the analysis of other Axis communications. The new work, as pointed out in my memorandum of September 3, 1942, will involve a large expenditure of funds. The success of the undertaking will depend very largely upon our ability to maintain secrecy. Should word leak out that we are reading the enemy's communications, it is almost certain that changes will be made, possibly rendering the entire project useless. The last change resulted in inability to read these communications for about a year. During that time we have suffered very serious loss of property and life in the Atlantic, much of which might have been prevented had we been able to read the enemy's communications.

6. As it stands now, there are many people who see the results of our work whose duties do not actually require them to have the information. They read these dispatches out of mere interest or curiosity. The argument usually given against any effort to restrict dissemination is that everybody knows about radio intelligence anyway, and there is no use trying to conceal it. That the existence of radio intelligence organizations is known must be taken for granted. The results obtained by these organizations are not known, however, unless they are disclosed, as are ours. If we are not to "kill the goose that lays the golden egg," then those who need the results must take the necessary action to prevent further disclosures.
7. In order to improve the present unsatisfactory situation, it is urgently recommended that an immediate survey be made of present methods of dissemination, as well as all individuals who are given or have access to this information, with a view to reducing dissemination to the absolute minimum necessary for operations. It is also recommended that stricter compliance with COMINCH Secret Serial 0325520 of June 20, 1942, be required.

Respectfully,

/s/ J. N. WENGER

Op-20-G-1.

NOVEMBER 19, 1942

No. 16

SECRET

Op-20-G/ir. November 19, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR OP-20.

Via Op-20-1.

1. I concur fully with Commander Wenger's remarks.

2. It will probably be necessary verbally to prohibit newspapers and magazines and radio commentators from mentioning anything pertaining to enemy codes, enemy ciphers or about results of radio or other communication intelligence gained from intercepting or studying enemy communications.

3. The Army and Navy Public Relations Officers and the Office of War Information probably could verbally instruct representatives of publishers concerning such a prohibition, but I think that initial announcements by the Commander in Chief and by the Army Chief of Staff (possibly at Press conferences) would be most effective. There should preferably, however, be nothing in writing prohibit-
ing mention of enemy codes, enemy ciphers, or about radio or other communication intelligence activities.

4. No doubt the number of persons who read dispatches merely for their own information or to satisfy their curiosity can and should be reduced. This probably includes many young officers (aids and assistants) as well as a few more senior officers who have access to the offices where secret dispatches must be delivered and used.

/s/ E. E. STONE,
Op-20-G.

NOVEMBER 24, 1942

In November, 1942, the Secretary of the Navy, Honorable Frank Knox, assisted operational authorities in the campaign to keep communication intelligence safe from unwise dissemination:

No. 17

From: SecNav To: ALNAV #250

Released by: Frank Knox

Date: 24 November 1942

All officers and men are reminded of the vital necessity of restricting to those who need to know the nature of the sources of our intelligence information of the enemy.
Except as required by official business no reference should be made to interrogation of prisoners of war, captured documents, counter espionage or any other sources.

Before arrival in port following a period of combat operations personnel going on shore leave shall be specially cautioned concerning these security measures.

Action Copy
Departmental Distribution:
Lists I II III IV V VI (VIII, IX, X) VII XI XII (15)
War Department (5)

DECEMBER 11, 1942

This desirable action was followed very shortly by a letter of the Secretary of Navy, Honorable Frank Knox to the Secretary of War, Honorable Henry L. Stimson.

It contained a paragraph which was eventually sent to the Director of Censorship by the Secretary of War as a statement of policy agreed to by both the Army and Navy. The correspondence outlining this policy follows immediately:

No. 18

CONFIDENTIAL
Serial 0366820
November 30, 1942

The Honorable,
The Secretary of War.

Sir:

Referring to the "Code of Wartime Practices" for the American Press, copy attached, I recommend that action be taken to incorporate the following therein:
ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS

To the end that the enemy may not have information concerning any success we may attain in deciphering his encoded or enciphered communications, no mention should be made of available or captured enemy codes or enemy ciphers, or about the intelligence gained from intercepting and studying enemy radio messages.

If the Army concurs with the Navy in this matter, will you please take appropriate action to effect this addition to "Code of Wartime Practices" for the American Press?

Recently, two cases have been noted at the Navy Department wherein disclosures were made in publications concerning results of communication intelligence activities. It is not considered desirable in presenting the above information to the Office of Censorship to point out these or other specific cases, since to do so might emphasize them unduly. However, experience has shown that when the enemy codes and ciphers are changed, and communication methods modified, thereby nullifying much constructive work which may have been accomplished only after months or years of effort on the part of those engaged in communication intelligence activities.

Respectfully,

/s/ F. FRANK KNOX

No. 18A

WAR DEPARTMENT

CONFIDENTIAL

Washington

December 11, 1942

The Honorable,

The Secretary of the Navy.
Dear Mr. Secretary:

You are advised with reference to your communication of November 30, 1942, that the War Department concurs in the recommendation that the "Code of Maritime Practices for the American Press" be revised so as to include the Navy Department's proposed paragraph covering "Enemy Communications."

In accordance with your suggestion, a letter, copy of which is attached, has been directed to Mr. Byron Price, Director of Censorship, requesting that the second paragraph of your letter be inserted in the "Code of Maritime Practices."

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War

Incl:
Cy. ltr. to Dir. of Censorship

No. 18B

CONFIDENTIAL

December 11, 1942

Mr. Byron Price,
Director of Censorship,
Apex Building,
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Price:

There has recently been brought to the attention of the War Department by the Navy Department that
information has been published which disclosed results obtained from communication intelligence activities. Experience has shown that when the enemy learns of benefits gained from communication intelligence, codes and ciphers are changed and communication methods modified thereby nullifying much constructive work which may have been accomplished only after months or years of effort on the part of those engaged in communication intelligence activities.

It is therefore requested that the "Code of Wartime Practices for the American Press" be revised so as to include the following paragraph; and that notice of this change be given proper distribution:

**ENEMY COMMUNICATIONS**

To the end that the enemy may not have information concerning any success we may attain in deciphering his encoded or enciphered communications, no mention should be made of available or captured enemy codes or enemy ciphers, or about the intelligence gained from intercepting and studying enemy radio messages.

Your kind cooperation in this matter is appreciated.

Sincerely yours,

/s/ HENRY L. STIMSON
Secretary of War

This document contains information affecting the national defense of the U. S. within the meaning of the Espionage Act, U.S.C. 50; 31 and 32. Its transmission or the revelation of its contents in any manner to an unauthorized person is prohibited by law.
The following is an important statement of policy from the Director of Naval Communications concerning the disclosure of information about clandestine stations in Latin America:

No. 19

Op-20-G/jac
Serial 0372020

December 17, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR COLONEL THOMASON, U.S.M.C.

Subject: Information disclosed in clandestine communications transmitted from Chile which may have resulted in sinkings.

1. Enclosed is a list of certain ships which were mentioned in clandestine messages transmitted from Chile on the circuits indicated. These ships were sunk on the dates shown, possibly as a result of these messages.

2. It is understood that this information is desired for use in connection with restrictions to be placed upon Axis communications from Argentina. In this regard, it should be pointed out that although certain exposures have already been made concerning these clandestine operations, nevertheless the cryptographic systems employed are still used on at least two other circuits, and it would be inimical to our future cryptanalytical operations should further disclosures result. The closing of clandestine stations in South America and the prosecution of the agents involved have
resulted in unfortunate publicity. The latest occurred in the November 16 issue of "Time," wherein the following statement appeared concerning communications of a certain clandestine station in South America:

"Its complicated coded and transposed messages were intercepted and turned over to the U. S. experts, who broke the code. From then on, officials in Washington followed carefully the work of Nazi spies in Argentina, Chile, Peru, Columbia, Mexico, and even in the U.S."

3. In connection with this matter, the following excerpts from a report on discussions held on April 2, 1942, in a conference at the State Department under the chairmanship of Mr. A. A. Berle, Assistant Secretary of State, it is believed, are pertinent:

"The desirability of consulting proper responsible authority in the U. S. Government prior to initiating any action with regard to closure of clandestine radio stations, or apprehension of individuals engaged in clandestine communications, was emphasized in order that the necessity for taking such action may be weighed against the disadvantage of disclosing information obtained from intercepted and decrypted messages sent by such stations or individuals. After thorough discussion of this matter it was the general opinion of the conference that, unless the type of information transmitted by such radio stations or individuals was of a nature that constituted direct jeopardy to allied shipping or military operations, it would be more desirable to permit the clandestine operations to continue. It was agreed that in any event wherein the
sole basis of action against individuals engaged in clandestine communications was information obtained from cryptanalytical attack on intercepted messages, serious consideration must be given to the fact that disclosure of success would generally result in discontinuing the codes and ciphers in use, thus stopping the source of information and usually resulting in a new cryptographic system more difficult to solve.

"It was decided in the conference that any questions of closing clandestine radio stations or apprehending individuals connected therewith should be referred to the Chief of Staff of the Army and to the Chief of Naval Operations before any positive action was initiated."

4. In view of the foregoing, it is requested that every possible precaution be taken in the use of the attached information to prevent its falling into unauthorized hands.

/s/ CARL F. HOLDEN
Op-20.
## SHIPS MENTIONED IN INTERCEPTS LATER SUNK

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name of Ship</th>
<th>Mentioned</th>
<th>Sunk</th>
<th>Circuit</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Bayou</td>
<td>2/19/42</td>
<td>2/27/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Santa Rita</td>
<td>3/1/42</td>
<td>7/9/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Berganger</td>
<td>3/31/42</td>
<td>6/2/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Alchiba</td>
<td>4/2/42</td>
<td>7/8/42</td>
<td>YLL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. U.S. Mercury(men)</td>
<td>5/1/42</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mercury Sun</td>
<td></td>
<td>5/18/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. Mikoyan</td>
<td>5/6/42</td>
<td>10/3/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Maldanger</td>
<td>5/6/42</td>
<td>6/27/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8. Ogontz</td>
<td>5/8/42</td>
<td>5/19/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9. Rio Blanco</td>
<td>5/11/42</td>
<td>4/1/42*</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10. Edward Luckenback</td>
<td>6/11/42</td>
<td>7/2/42</td>
<td>PYL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Date should be checked.

ENCLOSURE TO VCNO SECRET SERIAL 0372020
A government agency was responsible for one violation of security, and caused the following letter to be written by the Army:

No. 20

SPSIS 311.5-General

MEMORANDUM For: Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, War Department

Subject: Suppression of cryptographic information

1. Attention is invited to SSB translation #64001, which contains what purports to be "a summary of an American memorandum entitled 'American Information on Nazi Spying in Argentina', published by the Consulting Committee for Policies of Emergency Continental Defense".

2. This translation indicates that information concerning "secret radio stations....invisible links....methods used to compile information from the countries of this continent and contents of telegrams exchanged with Germany, which have been completely deciphered" was published in certain newspapers. That the message of reference states the case fairly accurately is shown by the accompanying article which appeared in the New York Times of January 23, 1943. Presumably this whole story has had a very wide circulation already.

3. The efforts of the War and Navy Departments have for some time been directed toward the suppression of information of this very character. The Joint U.S. Communications Board is even now engaging in
drafting a detailed paper dealing with the "Security and Suppression of Cryptographic Information", the intent of which is to coordinate all U.S. efforts toward this end.

4. If the information divulged as indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2 above is authentic and if it was furnished by any Department or Agency of the U.S. Government, the inconsistency in U.S. policy becomes obvious, since on the one hand the armed services are striving to prevent such occurrences and on the other hand certain U.S. agencies are facilitating their occurrences, thus nullifying the efforts of the armed services which are responsible for the security of information of the nature of that dealt with in this memorandum.

5. Incidents of this nature have come to notice several times in the recent past and steps toward their repetition were presumably initiated. It is suggested that steps should be taken once for all to insure that similar incidents will be positively prevented in the future.

For the Chief Signal Officer:

W. Preston Corderman
Colonel, Signal Corps

Incl.
Clipping

FEBRUARY 6, 1943

Clandestine stations in Latin America had been a problem to American cryptanalysts not only because of their subversive activities, but also because revelation of American success in deciphering their codes would have meant the drying up of very valuable sources of information. Finally, suitable action was agreed upon as follows:
Subject: Agreement between FBI, MID, and ONI for the operation of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in Latin America, and the action to be taken upon the information derived therefrom.

1. The agreement of December 1, 1942, subject, "Agreement between FBI and MID for the operation of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in Latin America, and the action to be taken upon the information derived therefrom," is hereby cancelled. The undersigned, in order to reduce to writing the basic principles regarding the operation of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in Latin American countries, agree upon the assignment of responsibility as described in paragraphs 2 and 3 below.

2. MID will be responsible for:
   (a) The establishment of a network to locate clandestine radio stations in various Latin American countries including the West Indies by lending direction-finding and communication equipment to the several countries concerned, by furnishing technical assistance and by coordinating the stations involved.
   (b) Disseminating the information obtained to representatives of FBI, ONI and the appropriate agency of the local country.

3. FBI will be responsible for:
   (a) Taking the action considered most advisable, after concurrence by representatives of MID and ONI, either by
eliminating, operating or leaving unmolested the clandestine stations that have been located.

(b) Keeping representatives of MID and ONI supplied with all information that establishes or tends to establish the existence and/or location of any clandestine station, and which has been received by FBI through other means than those described in paragraph 2(a).

(c) The transmission of such material by an operated clandestine station as is requested by MID or ONI.

Major General George V. Strong,
Assistant Chief of Staff,
G-2, War Department.

Rear Admiral H. C. Train,
Director of Naval Intelligence.

Hon. J. Edgar Hoover,
Director,
Federal Bureau of Investigation.

MARCH 25, 1943

In March, 1943, another important bulletin was issued by the Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet in regards to use of communication intelligence. It summarized the best thoughts of American and British cryptanalytical organizations as follows:
No. 22

UNITED STATES FLEET
HEADQUARTERS OF THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
NAVY DEPARTMENT, WASHINGTON, D. C.

FF/ A6-2
Serial: 00551

March 25, 1943.

SECRET

From: Commander in Chief, United States Fleet,
and Chief of Naval Operations.
To: Commander in Chief, United States
Atlantic Fleet.
Commander in Chief, United States
Pacific Fleet.
Commander, Seventh Fleet.
All Commanders of Sea Frontiers.
All District Commandants.
Chiefs of All Air Technical, Primary
and Intermediate Training.

Subject: Control of dissemination and use of
communication intelligence.

Reference: (a) Cominch Secret serial 0325520 of
June 20, 1942.

1. Reference (a) is hereby superseded and
shall be destroyed by burning.

2. The extreme importance of communication
intelligence as a reliable source of enemy inform-
ation has been repeatedly demonstrated. From no
other form of intelligence can the enemy's inten-
tions be so positively determined.

3. In view of these facts, it is imper-
ative that every possible precaution be taken with
regard to controlling the dissemination and use of
communication intelligence in order to avoid drying
up its sources. Any disclosures in the past with regard to the source of communication intelligence have invariably resulted in an immediate change in the enemy's communications and the consequent loss of weeks or months of painstaking effort on the part of our communication intelligence personnel. It is recognized, of course, that communication intelligence is of no value unless proper operational use can be made of it. However, momentary tactical advantage is seldom worth the risk of compromising the source, for such compromise will stop the flow of information and thereby vitally affect operations on all fronts and in all areas.

4. In order to further the maintenance of high security in regard to communication intelligence, the following regulations for the dissemination and use of this intelligence are hereby prescribed:

A. General.

(a) Particular care must be taken in every command to insure that communication intelligence is provided with special security safeguards and is seen and handled by the absolute minimum number of selected persons necessary for its handling and use.

(b) In exposed locations where enemy action is possible, particular precautions shall be taken to destroy all evidence of communication intelligence sources, including authorized files of communication intelligence messages, in order that there may be no possibility of its falling into enemy hands.

B. Cryptanalytical, or "Special," Intelligence.

(c) The utmost secrecy shall be used in dealing with cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, i.e., information resulting from the reading of enemy encrypted dispatches.

(d) Cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence shall be passed on to subordinate commanders only in the form of operational directives whenever practicable.
(e) When such intelligence must be given out to lower commanders as information, it shall be passed without any reference to its secret source and shall contain, somewhere near the beginning of the message, the word "ULTRA", or the word "SUPER".

(f) Only cryptographic systems of the highest security, i.e., Type X, ECM, HCM, CCM, or one-time cipher, and of the narrowest distribution which includes the originator and addressees, shall be used for transmitting cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, or any direct reference thereto.

(g) However, in exceptional instances where it is absolutely necessary to pass cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence to non-holders of these cryptographic systems, only the barest essentials required for necessary action by the addressee(s) shall be given, and the information shall be transmitted in the cryptographic system of the highest available security.

(h) In disseminating cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence to lower echelons, care shall be taken to avoid, when possible, quoting exact dates, times, positions, or actual names or enemy units in a manner whereby the disseminated information, if intercepted by the enemy, can be tied to the original source.

(i) Every effort shall be made to avoid indicating any connection between the source of intelligence and the outcome of operations. When action is based on cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence, local commanders should insure that the action cannot be traced to this source of intelligence alone.

(j) All copies of translations and paraphrases of cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence shall be stamped "ULTRA" or "SUPER" in addition to the usual secrecy classification.

(k) No reference to cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence shall be made in war diaries, reports, proceedings, etc., however limited the circulation, without specific authority of the Chief of Naval Operations.
C. Traffic Intelligence or "Y" Inferences.

(1) Traffic intelligence or "Y" inferences, i.e., information derived from enemy communications by methods short of cryptanalysis, shall be stamped "ULTRA" or "SUPER" and treated on the same level as cryptanalytical, or "Special," intelligence when it is of obvious importance. Other intelligence of this nature, including that derived from enemy plain language, shall be treated as secret.

/s/ E. J. KING

This ends the list of documents which contain details of the agreements discussed in Chapter V.