Mr. H. J. Herczog  
Chief NSA-063

Upon my return from overseas duty, I found the excerpt from your address on 27 April 1954 which I requested. I want to thank you indeed for such very fine addition to my file of material of this type. I appreciate not only its valuable content but also its very nice form.

[Signature]

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 11-19-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526
TO: Mr. Friedman, Special Assistant                                    DATE: 3 August 1954

FROM: H. J. Herczog, Chief, NSA-063

SUBJECT: Attached is the excerpt from my address which you requested. I sincerely apologize for the delay and only hope that this will still be of some use to you. If you would like any additional information on this or any other part of the address, I shall be very happy to make it available in, I promise, a shorter time.

Incl: a/s

H. J. Herczog
Chief,
Field Operations Direction Group

APPENDED DOCUMENTS CONTAIN CODE WORD MATERIAL
AN EXAMPLE OF COMINT CAPABILITY IN THE FIELD

AN EXCERPT FROM THE ADDRESS
"FIELD OPERATIONS"

Given by Chief, Field Operations Direction Group
- 27 April 1954 -
We have seen something now of what we have in the field, what they are doing, and why they are there. The next question to answer is, "how well are they doing their jobs?" This one is hard to answer very precisely. Existing capabilities in the field vary fairly widely at times, and it is not easy to make a definite estimate. I think we can say, however, that the general level around the world is good, and that it is improving at a most encouraging rate every day.

A better way of treating this subject of field capability would be to discuss what can happen when a unit is capable. There have been a number of instances in recent months wherein many of our field units have made truly outstanding contributions; however, of more interest to you, perhaps, might be this story about the recent conflict in Korea.

We had COMINT units in Japan and Korea during the war, as you know, and in my opinion these units were, pound for pound, the best in the world. One of these units was an Air Force detachment, then known as Detachment 151 of the 15th Radio Squadron Mobile. The mission of this unit was to provide close COMINT support to the 5th Air Force in Korea, and it did this by intercepting and processing the
English. I mention these details simply to show that this exploitation effort was not just some sort of low-level operation unique to the field, but was in fact a traditional, COMINT production effort.

At the end of certain messages passed on these nets indicated the movement of area, a fact which was most unusual. 5th Air Force was alerted, and Detachment 151 began to watch those links very closely. Several weeks later, at about matter of minutes and was made immediately available to the 5th Air Force. All that was known so far was that here was a sizeable and unusual flight which may have been scheduled to The last placename, could not be located on any map. ...

Meanwhile, this same message was available to the 6920th Security Group in Japan which, together with NSA, was providing technical support to Detachment 151. The significance of the message was recognized by Group, and the principal officers and non-coms concerned were called in for a conference. The problem was this vital, last placename, On the assumption that this last location might in fact be in a Lt. Green of the Group staff, a multi-linguist, translated the expression for
to be a "way" point and not the final destination. This additional information was flashed back to Korea, the 5th Air Force Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and the Commanding General were notified.

By this time several other messages were noted involving unusual flights of various piston and jet aircraft scheduled for the same area and times concerned.
The situation looked a little more clear: it was quite possible that this flight was intended to [ ] If true, this constituted the [ ] in the Korean conflict. It was judged that complete failure of this [ ] would certainly have the effect of discouraging any future action of this type by the enemy. 5th AF decided to take countermeasures against the flight.
The problem now was to work out an interception plan. First, a
Major Nixon, a pretty sharp intelligencer in Korea, got from collateral
sources the air-speed of a [ ] with normal [ ] load. Using this infor-
mation, plus the [ ] sources and the [ ] route given in the original message,
Nixon calculated how long it would take these bombers to reach the target
from time of take-off. It was then necessary to plan the approach of our
interceptors. The problem here was to avoid, as much as possible, the
enemy air-defense system which was known to be extremely effective. It
covered virtually all of [ ] except for
one small corridor which ran from [ ] to a point which was
just about in the center of the peninsula, as indicated on the map. Most
of our knowledge of this system also came from the COMINT produced by De-
tachment 151 from the other enemy air communications mentioned earlier.
We knew a great deal about this air-defense system; we knew where their
visual and radar stations were, how their air-defense system was alerted,
how their ground-controller operated when vectoring their planes against
our aircraft, and so on.
It was decided that the interception would be by two flights: one would approach the area from the northeast, flying behind the air-defense curtain along the 38th Parallel to the coast, and turning at sea to make its run through the unprotected corridor to the target. The other flight would approach from the sea, southwest of the target area. In this way, our interceptors would almost completely avoid the enemy's air-defense system. (The flight from the northeast, by the way, was led by Major, later Lt. Col. Davis, an ace of the Korean-war who later lost his life in combat).
The plan was now complete. Only the enemy takeoff time was needed. Then, two messages were intercepted, one of which gave the takeoff time for the bombers, and the other of which gave the takeoff time of several fighter planes from one of the way points. Here, then, came the bombers and their escorts. The previously calculated flight times were applied to these actual takeoff times, and the UN fighters were scrambled at what was hoped to be the appropriate time to intercept enemy \_. I say "hoped to be" because everything had to be correct:

The translation of the original message had to be correct.....

Lt. Green's rendition of the Korean expression for \_ had to be correct.....

Major Nixon's calculations, which were based on the route given in the original message, had to be correct.....

Our knowledge of the enemy air-defense system, which was based largely on COMINT, had to be correct.....

The messages giving the actual enemy takeoff times had to be correct.....

In short, COMINT had to be correct!

As our fighters gained altitude and broke out over the target area, they came upon a flight of \_ aircraft and various piston and jet fighter escorts. The situation was almost exactly as expected. Our fighters made two passes, one in each direction, and returned to Seoul. Enemy losses: \_. UN losses: none. Further, this \_ bombing mission was effectively disrupted, and it is interesting to note that the \_ against us for the remainder of the war...
This is an example of what you can do with a capable COMINT unit, properly supported, and located in the right place at the right time.