UNITED STATES COMMUNICATIONS INTELLIGENCE BOARD

DIRECTIVE # 5

(Approved by USCIB on 14 January 1949
with concurrence of the Secretary of
Defense on 11 February 1949)

(Revised as of 25 Oct. 1950)
1. The elements of the procedure for clearing a person for COMINT are, consecutively:

(a) Determination of the "need to know".

(b) Investigation, and evaluation in terms of USGIB clearance standards.

(c) Approval for indoctrination.

(d) Indoctrination (and "debriefing").

2. Determination of the "need to know".

(a) The "need to know" exists only where COMINT is essential to a person for the performance of his official duties. The number of persons cleared for COMINT will be held to an absolute minimum.

(b) The responsibility for determining the "need to know" of persons within a USGIB member organization rests with that organization. The responsibility for determining the "need to know" of other personnel of the Department of Defense rests with the Secretary of Defense. The responsibility for determining the "need to know" of civilians under contract and employees and representatives of commercial firms and civilian research institutions which are to engage in research, or the design, development, or manufacture of equipment, pertinent to COMINT production rests with the USGIB member organization directing the project, which shall act in full coordination with any other member organizations concerned with the project. The "need to know" of all other persons will be determined by USGIB.

3. USGIB investigation and clearance standards.

(a) USGIB standards for clearance of a person for COMINT are as follows:

(1) The person shall be of excellent character and discretion, and of unquestioned loyalty to the United States. There shall be no exception to this requirement.
(NOTE: On 15 September 1950, by USCIB decision, the provisions of this subparagraph were relaxed to grant a waiver in the case of Nationals of countries providing Armed Forces in Korea in support of the United Nations in order that they might be used solely as translators of intercepted North Korean plain text traffic. (Refer to USCIB: A/38))

(2) The person should be a native-born U.S. citizen. The members of his immediate family should be U.S. citizens.

(3) No member of the person’s immediate family and no person to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation should be of dubious loyalty to the United States.

(4) No member of the person’s immediate family and no person to whom he may reasonably be supposed to be bound by ties of affection, kinship, or obligation should be a resident of a foreign country having basic or critical national interests opposed to those of the U.S.

(5) Exceptions to any of the foregoing requirements except the first may be made only in a case of compelling need after every reasonable assurance has been obtained that, in the circumstances, the security risk involved is negligible.

(b) To permit evaluation on the basis of the foregoing requirements, each person to be cleared for COMINT shall, prior to clearance, be required to furnish, under oath, a Personal History Statement (containing information essentially similar to that called for in the sample form attached hereto as Annex 1) and shall be subjected to a thorough investigation which shall include the following:

(1) Check of the date and place of birth of the individual.

(2) Check of the national files of the FBI and of such other investigative agencies as may be pertinent to the investigation.

(3) Local agency checks in areas where the individual has resided to consist as a minimum in every case of a check of the files of the

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appropriate field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, local police, local credit agencies (in the case of individuals over twenty-two years of age), the headquarters of the appropriate major subordinate command of the Department of Defense (if necessary), and such other agencies as may be pertinent.

(4) Check of records of the person's military service, if any.

(5) Verification of entries concerning education and affiliations in the Personal History Statement.

(6) Interviews with at least three character references, and at least mail checks with all employers listed in the Personal History Statement.

(7) Interviews with at least three additional character references found through the preceding steps in the investigation.

(c) Officers of the Department of Defense and of the Foreign Service of the United States with more than 10 years' continuous active commissioned service need not be subjected to the complete formal investigation as outlined above in paragraph 3(b). Before the indoctrination of such an officer, however, all pertinent records readily available in the Washington area will be scrutinized with a view to determining whether any questionable traits have been noted during his entire period of commissioned service.

(d) In each case the responsibility for initiating and conducting the required investigation and for making the evaluation based on the foregoing standards for clearance rests with the authority which has determined the "need to know". However, where the Secretary of Defense or USCIB has determined the "need to know", this responsibility will be delegated by the Secretary of Defense or by USCIB in the specific instance to a member organization.
(e) In emergency, or when there is other compelling need
to clear a person for COMINT prior to completion of the
full prescribed investigation, and the responsible
authority has determined upon such advance clearance
(paragraph 4(c), hereinafter), such investigative
checks as are immediately possible shall be made at
once, and the full investigation and final evaluation
shall be completed at the earliest practicable moment.

4. Approval for indoctrination.

(a) The responsibility for approving the indoctrination of
a person for COMINT rests with the authority which has
determined his "need to know". Where determination of
the "need to know" has involved coordination with other
departments, similar coordination shall precede the
decision to approve indoctrination.

(b) In a case where the responsibility for approving indoc-
trination rests with the Secretary of Defense or with
USCIB, the organization which has been charged with
making the required investigation and evaluation
(paragraph 3(d), above) shall furnish to the approving
authority the following:

(1) A certification that the person under consideration
meets all USCIB clearance standards (or a state-
ment to the contrary, with particulars).

(2) A statement of all derogatory and questionable
information obtained through the investigation (or
a statement that no such information has been
found).

(3) Any other reports of the investigation and documents
pertinent thereto which the Secretary of Defense or
USCIB may require in the specific instance.

Where the Secretary of Defense is the approving authority,
he will inform USCIB of his decision in each case.

(e) In emergency, or when there is other compelling need,
in the national interest, to indoctrinate a person for
COMINT prior to completion of the full prescribed
investigation, the authority which has determined the
"need to know" may approve such prior indoctrination.
5. **Indoctrination and debriefing.**

(a) **Indoctrination.** Each person who is to be cleared for COMINT shall be thoroughly and carefully instructed in the doctrine and principles of COMINT protection, and in the regulations which govern the dissemination and safeguarding of COMINT, and shall be required to subscribe to an oath of secrecy. The oath to be administered upon the indoctrination of a person to receive COMINT final products shall be essentially similar to that of the sample form attached as Annex 2.

(b) "Debriefing". When a person's "need to know" has ceased to exist he shall be debarred from further knowledge and required to subscribe to a final oath of secrecy. The oath to be administered upon the "debriefing" of a former recipient of COMINT final products shall be essentially similar to that of the sample form attached as Annex 3.

(c) The responsibility for indoctrinating and "debriefing" a person and for administering the oaths of secrecy rests with the authority which has determined his "need to know". Where the Secretary of Defense or USCIB has determined the "need to know", this responsibility may be delegated by the Secretary of Defense or by USCIB in the specific instance to a member organization.

(d) Each USCIB member organization shall maintain current records of personnel indoctrinated by it for COMINT, pursuant to its own determination of "need to know", and shall keep USCIB informed of the total numbers of such personnel. The USCIB Secretariat will maintain a similar list of persons cleared for COMINT pursuant to determination of the "need to know" by the Secretary of Defense or by USCIB.

6. **Applicability of these standards and procedure to personnel.**

Applicability of these standards and procedure to personnel of the COMINT operating agencies and other persons associated with these agencies in the technical phases of COMINT production and research. The standards and procedure herein prescribed apply fully to the personnel of the COMINT operating agencies and other persons associated with these agencies in the technical phases of COMINT production and research except as follows:

(a) The existence of the "need to know" of persons in these categories is inherent in the circumstances of their employment or intended employment. However, each person in these categories will have access to only such information as he needs for the proper performance of
Persons in these categories may be cleared for COMINT in numbers amply adequate for the needs of the operating agencies, but only the absolute minimum number should have access to the final COMINT products of the operations of those agencies.

(b) It is desirable that all persons of these categories be investigated and evaluated according to the standards of paragraph 3. However, such of these as need not and positively will not have knowledge of or access to operations (or pertinent information) beyond the stages of raw-traffic intercept, collection, transmission, and preparation; D/F bearing measurement, plotting and utilization; emission identification; the design, development, and production of intercept, D/F, and emission identification equipment; and the more elementary phases of traffic analysis may be investigated and evaluated according to lower standards at the discretion of the member organizations concerned.

(c) The secrecy oaths for COMINT recipients (exemplified in Annexes 2 and 3) need not be used for personnel in these categories where they are inappropriate. Instead, the forms for their oaths of secrecy shall be as prescribed by the COMINT operating agencies and as appropriate to the duties which they are to perform.

7. Continuing investigative checks and security surveillance.

Persons cleared for COMINT and retaining that status permanently or over a long period of time shall be subjected to such continuing investigative checks and security surveillance as are within the capacities of the investigative services of the U.S.