Office Memorandum

TO: 
FROM: 
SUBJECT:

Director says make sanitized version extracts from NSA SAB study on combat for Canadians + RN

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-22-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526
Checked with Capt. Agnew re status of this and he said nothing has been done but they are going to do it. They have not finished the Robertson Rpt.

D.B. Young

Suspense 15 Feb.
Re Para 3 of your OM.
Recommend the extract be prepared by P/P as soon as practicable.
Let me know if this will be done so I can tell.

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**Remarks**

Canadian h.o. has been asked by his home office to try to get a copy of the report filed by Prof. Robertson's study report on Committee Early Warning. I told him I'd ask you.

2. We do not have any copies to spare & would have to run off another copy for Canada. If we do that, we should give one to Gesta also.

**From Name or Title**

Friedman

**Date**

17 Dec 53

**Telephone**

DD 1 FEB 50 95

Replaces DA AGO Form 965, 1 Apr 48, and AFHQ Form 12, 10 Nov 47, which may be used.
Feels he showed cowardice.
Summary of Questionable Items in "Robertson Report" in Regard to NSA's Possible Releasing of the Report To The Canadian's and British:

I. References on which NSA probably should not be quoted as an authority or source:

1. Operations of Intelligence Advisory Committee
2. Operations of Watch Committee
3. Operations of Indications Boards
4. %a figures showing relative amount of intelligence on certain subjects derived from COMINT
5. ELINT
6. SOSUS (Navy's sound surveillance system)
7. Estimates on the Soviet atomic stockpile, BW capability and delivery systems
8. The fact that SAC needs 3-6 days warning for an "immediate" counter-attack
II. Items in report which are potentially embarrassing to NSA:
   1. The fact that the group used a certain British JIC paper
   2. The fact that the group used the Kelly report and other closely held documents
   3. Certain details of the Russian problem
III. Page-referenced Comments:

Pg 3: The only one of these reports that has not been widely referred to by columnist in the same sense as used here is The WSEG (Weapons System Evaluation Group).

Pg 4: This reference to the Bull Report has also appeared in the press, but slanted to the more general "air defense" rather than to intelligence.

Pg 5: The pencilled objection to using the Bromwell Report as a source seems peculiar since one of the witnesses before the Bromwell Committee was Sir Edward Tuchs, KCMG, then Director, GCHQ (4 April 52).

Pg 6: It may not be within the scope of NSA's authority to release information on the Indications Boards, Watch Committee, IAC, and percentage figures indicating the relative amount of all intelligence derived from COMINT.

(see also remarks about Pg 2)
Pg 7: The intention of the Group in discussing
EINT, the use of Indications Boards, and the
Watch Committee was to advise the Director,
NSA, of certain situations. These matters
are beyond the purview of NSA.

Pg 8: Judging from the manner in which we were
required to handle the referenced British
file paper, it's conceivable that, as far as
the British are concerned, we had no business
having it. It might be well to omit any
such reference.

Pg 9: See remarks relative to Pg 687

Pg 13
Pg 15 { OK as is
Pg 16

Pg 19: Again, EINT is beyond NSA's scope,
and hence it is not within NSA's authority to
release such information.
Appendices

I. Pg.5: Considering the nature of the liaison between Canada and Britain and the U.S., I don't see any objection to mentioning the Watch Committee in this manner, even if it is tied to SRO; G-2.

II. Pg.1: Again, these are matters well beyond the scope of NSA.

III. Pg.142: Although the figures in the table (particularly those on SAC) were very closely held even among our own people when this report was prepared, some of them were released in the 16 Oct. '53 Colliers, the only one that may still be very sensitive is the 3-6 day statement on SAC.

Pg 4: The sound surveillance system (SOSUS) is a Navy project. I assume ONI is the releasing authority.

IV. Pg 142: See remarks relative to Pgs 657 (i.e. operation of Watch Committee beyond scope of NSA).

V. Pg 3: Another reference to the British JIC paper previously mentioned (re: Pg 8) as a source of possible embarrassment.

VI. Pg 1: Another percentage figure on relative amount of intelligence coming from COMINT.

VII. Pg 3: The indicated section should be omitted on the grounds that, even among the COMINT community (both US & UK) the distribution of this information is strictly
controlled.

VIII  Pg 1-6 : The releasing to anyone of information on ELINT seems beyond NSA’s scope. As of last summer, some of the listed ELINT operations were of a semi-secret nature, and although undoubtedly known by the British & Canadians, such information probably should not come from NSA.

IX  Pg 3 : OK as is

XI  Bibliography : Perhaps the entire bibliography should be omitted. Most of the publications listed have very limited distribution. Many were obtained semi-officially through personal contacts in DOD. Listing all of these could attract undue attention to some of the more closely held documents. Some of the more sensitive items are numbered 4, 5, 9, 12(?)
IV General

1. From a security point of view (with one or two possible exceptions) there is probably very little of an objectionable nature in this report as far as releasing it to the properly cleared Canadians and British is concerned.

2. From a domestic diplomatic point of view, NSA might do well by avoiding a position where they could possibly be quoted by the British or Canadians as an authority or source on certain areas mentioned in the report.

3. From the point of view of future dealings with the Canadians and British (at all levels), this report could be construed in a few areas as being a rather bare-faced and soul-searching confession of certain weaknesses that may or may not work to our advantage.