IS THIS OUR LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE?

By JOSEPH and STEWART AL SOP

These are the grim facts the free world faces: A Russian “devastation” stockpile of atom bombs, a Red Air Force larger than ours, and 6,000,000 Russians under arms by 1955. Is there anything we can do to avert this menace? Yes, say these experts—provided we act now.

In the training courses of the intelligence services, the first lesson is to distinguish between “capabilities” and “intentions.” As words of art, capabilities are what the other fellow can do to you, and intentions are what he means to do to you. Mistakes about either are easy and frequently costly. It is idiotic to get into a fight with a perfectly good friend, just because he is flexing his biceps. It is even worse to be knocked out cold by an enemy, just because you have paid more attention to the smile on his face than to the knuckle-duster in his pocket.

Democracies incorrigibly incline toward the latter error. Stanley Baldwin and Neville Chamberlain all but destroyed Britain by our breakneck postwar demobilization. And we invited the Korean aggression by the Truman-Louis Johnson disarmament policy of 1949-50.

It is well to remember these incidents of the past, now that America is again engaged in a fateful calculation of capabilities and intentions. On the one hand, the Kremlin’s new rivalries at home and new peacefulness abroad fill the headlines, and are raising high hopes for an end of the cold war. On the other hand, the Soviet Union’s growing military power is causing the darkest apprehensions among the few who trouble to follow the true trend of the world power balance.

Which are to guide our policy, the apprehensions or the hopes?

The present report solely concerns Soviet capabilities, and it will have only this to say about Soviet intentions: If we are again deceived, the penalty will not be paid in such distant countries as China and Korea. One way or another, the penalty will be paid here in the United States.

This is predictable, in turn, because the American strategic situation is now being transformed in a way that very few Americans even dimly understand. We are in the midst of an unnoticed revolution, all too closely resembling the change that overtook Britain when the Germans passed the British in military-industrial strength and the invention of modern aircraft opened the British Isles to attack across the Channel.

It took more than eight decades, from the accession of Bismarck to the outbreak of war in 1899, for Britain to let slip her ancient position as the invulnerable arbiter of Europe. In our case, the challenge is perhaps more difficult to meet, since the change has gone very far indeed in the eight short years since 1945. The causes are:

The invention of absolute weapons;

The emergence of the Soviet empire as a military-industrial giant power;

And the development of weapons systems which can reach from continent to continent, reducing our protecting ocean moats almost to the status of the Strait of Dover.

Thus far, these revolutionary developments have never really been taken into account in American policy making. For instance, we have built heavily on our atomic monopoly. Yet, as will be shown, the breaking of that monopoly by the Soviet Union was not even allowed for in the whopping defense budgets of the last two Truman years.

When asked to explain this curious neglect, such leading postwar policy makers as Charles E. Bohlen and George F. Kennan used to reply that coping with the change in the American situation was too heavy and too painful a task. Something might still turn up, they used to say, to alter the whole trend.

When asked just what might turn up, they would then answer in effect that Stalin’s toes might turn up.

Stalin waited a long while to die. We can no longer hope that it will be eight years, or ten years, or fifteen years before the final phase, when this country will come within direct and easy range of Soviet power. We must now expect this to happen in two or three or at the most four years, unless positive counteraction is taken. Such is the real problem. It is made all the worse by the general unawareness that the problem exists. For those, then, who do not absolutely trust the Kremlin’s peacefulness, it may be well to have a look at this problem’s main aspects.

The invention of absolute weapons is the most obvious symbol of the strategic revolution of our time. Only eight years ago, when President Roosevelt died, the American atomic bomb had not been tested. Four years ago, when President Truman launched his disarmament policy, our atomic monopoly was still unbroken—it lasted until the explosion of the first “people’s democratic” atomic bomb in September, 1949. When President Eisenhower was inaugurated, American official estimates credited the Kremlin with about 200 atomic bombs. In only two more years the Kremlin is expected to have about 400 atomic bombs. And after that will come the era of the “people’s democratic” hydrogen bomb.

The problem of how many enemy bombs would “devastate” America has recently been studied by a high-level Government-research group, Project East River. “Devastation” was precisely defined as the extent of atomic destruction that would force an American surrender. Possible combinations of bomb damage were carefully analyzed, for their effects on industrial plant, industrial working force, transport, communications, electric power, and so forth.

In this coolly scientific manner, an exact estimate was made of a potentially decisive enemy stockpile. It can now be stated on indisputable authority that Project East River’s decisive stockpile contained approximately 400 bombs, or the same stockpile that the Kremlin will control by the end of the year 1955.

On the import of this development, there is testimony from a witness who may not be lightly disregarded. No other Western leader has studied the world power balance more closely than Winston Churchill. None has placed a higher value on the chief assets on our side of that balance—American industrial productivity, America’s still enormous atomic lead and American strategic airpower. Yet in July, 1950, Churchill (Continued on Page 61)
Caught...
with our stamps down!

It was one of those frizzling fry-
eggs-on-the-sidewalks Fridays. At ten
d'ock the Old Man phoned and said
that he wouldn't be in. "You take
over, Henry," he says. Ha!

The afternoon was just one foul-up after
another. A batch of invoices had to be done
over, wrong discounts. A Big Customer wires
from Boston about his Urgent order—which
turned up in the Baltimore freight depot.
The bank has a fussy, dealer's check bounced.
The office air conditioning went floopy. Floopy!
And at 4:40 p.m., DST, there is wild wail
from Mrs. Ducky, the Old Man's secretary.
Our stamp box is bare. Daffy, the new girl,
had forgotten to buy stamps.

Some crisis! Everybody is scheduled to
get away early on the weekend.

So who hoofles through the sun baked
streets? And stands in line with all the parcel
makers in the stifling postoffice? And tries to
keep the stamp sheets from gumming on the
way back? And sticks stamps on every last
blasted envelope? Don't answer!

Monday bright and early, I phone the
Pinney-Bowes place, and tell them, "You
send up one of those baby postage meters,
and I'll see that it stays here."

And the Old Man didn't even argue.

There's no argument about it! With the
DM, the smallest office can have metered
mail—and get rid of old fashioned stamps.

WITH the DM, you print postage as you
need it, for any kind of mail, directly on the
envelope (or on special tape for parcel post).
With the meter stamp, you can print your
own small advertisement, if you like. There's
a moisture seal for sealing envelopes.

The postoffice sets the meter for such
postage as you want to buy. Postage in a
meter is safe from loss, damage, theft—and
automatically accounted for, shown on visible
registers. Metered mail, already postmarked,
can get away faster in the postoffice.

Anybody can learn to use a postage meter. It's
a great time saver—and postage saver.

There's a postage meter, electric or hand
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Ask the nearest Pitney-Bowes office to show you. Or
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The Saturday Evening Post

IS THIS OUR LAST CHANCE FOR PEACE?

(Continued from Page 17)

solemnly told the House of Commons:
"There could be no more certain way of
bringing about the destruction of
civilization than that we should drift on
helplessly until the Soviets are fully
equipped with atomic bombs." You may not accept Churchill's
somber conclusion, as these reporters live in misery, at any rate by American
criteria. This happy security is
Self-contained. This happy security tricities to produce aluminum and there
is more aluminum to build airframes. If Russian machinists have no cars
and tramp to work in bas shoes, then
there is more shoe leather for the armed
forces and there is more manufacturing
capacity for military vehicles and there
are more petroleum products to fuel the
war machine.

In other words, the misery of the
Soviet people provides the surplus and
the strength of the Soviet state. The
surplus is vast, for it is the product of
the largest empire in history, which now
has great industrial as well as agri-
cultural productivity. And since power,
and not a better life for the people, is
the state's sole aim, this vast surplus of
atom bombs.

You may not accept Churchill's
must be the innumerable signs of
cruel paradox, the very features of the
Soviet system which we take as signs of
poverty and weakness. But there is
also been muffled by official
weakness.

The jeweler had to pay. "It is
obvious," the court said, "that in
fixing the amount a customer is to
pay on a credit sale a merchant
cannot arbitrarily name any amount
that he chooses as a 'finance charge'
or 'carrying charge' and thereby
exclude it from the tax base. This
would open unlimited opportuni-
ties for evasion of the tax."

Based upon a 1953 decision of
the United States Court of Appeals.
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

June 27, 1953

(The continued from Page 61)

The state is always invested and re-invested to increase the state’s crude military might.

It is often asked, “How does anyone know the Soviets are producing so many atomic bombs, artillery, or tanks, or any planes whatsoever?” The answer is partly secret, although much can be learned by careful analysis of published data. Any rate the test of events has shown that the estimates are reliable. Or rather this text has shown that Western intelligence estimates of Soviet military-industrial accomplishments always tend to err on the side of optimism, because of the desire to realize that the people’s misery is the state’s strength.

For example, in the year 1952 was officially supposed to be the earliest date for the explosion of the people’s democratic atomic bomb. The Joint Chiefs of Staff used to ridicule this date that was given in their own planning papers. As late as September, 1949, so would these experts tell us, Dr. Voronev, the new Soviet leader actually had in print a “more realistic” prediction that the Soviets would not be able to build their first bomb until 1964. Doctor Bush had to revise his book in proof, and the Joint Chiefs had to revise the estimate. Roughly, when the Soviet atomic explosion occurred that September of 1949.

As late as 1952, our own difficulties with jet engines led to a confident official assumption that Soviet jet-engine output must be very low in quantity and very poor in quality. Then a MIG-15 engine was captured in Korea. It was found to incorporate British technology; the Kremlin is now expected to be expanded no less than 2.5 times by the mid-1930’s. Double-tracked and otherwise greatly improved, the Trans-Siberian Railway has been fully opened, and other lines are now being laid. The result of this industriousness was the famous Soviet T-34, far and away the best medium tank of the last war, which we did not really equal until 1950.

The postwar steel figures show how much the war was fought off for the Kremlin. In 1945, Soviet steel production was hardly more than 12,000,000 tons a year. In 1950, war damage had been repaired; expansion had begun, and the Soviet steel base was about 20,000,000 tons. This year Russian steel capacity has reached 39,000,000 tons, while the Soviet empire as a whole now has a base of no less than 49,000,000 tons. In two more years the Soviet imperial steel base is expected to be close to 60,000,000 tons, or more than the combined steel capacities of Western Europe and the British Isles.

Many people—Aneurin Bevan and Treasury Secretary George Humphrey, to name just two—are comfortably convinced that America’s 117,500,000 tons of steel capacity still gives the West a safe superiority. But here, again, the mirage of the people enters in. What you use steel for can matter much more than how much steel you have.

Even in 1945, with the West Russian steel plants still in ruins, Soviet war production was authentically credited with turning out 120,000 pieces of artillery of all calibers, 110,000 mortars, 450,000 machine guns, 30,000 tanks and howitzers, a score of other weapons. It is another American illusion that the

Russians fought the last war with American arms; Lend-Lease mainly aided the Kremlin not with arms, but with support equipment and raw materials. Since the war, the production of arms, the strengthening of the armed forces, the steady buildup of a powerful military supporting structure have been the largest objects of the Kremlin’s policy.

As we ourselves saw in the war period, a high level of military spending need not halt and may even stimulate an upward surge of national income and productivity. As the steel figures indicate, Soviet national income has risen rapidly and continuously throughout the postwar years. The best British and American authorities put the rate of rise at between 9 and 10 per cent per annum, compounded. The main result has been a continuously increasing Soviet military effort.

The people, the consumers, have of course been thrown some, in the form of more and cheaper food, goods and services. When the starting point is almost absolute misery—as those who have been in internment camps will recognize—small improvements give a vital sense of increasing well-being. And while the secret police still enjoy their privileges and wield their machine guns, the people’s misery is not likely to make trouble—it will only go on providing surplus for the Kremlin.

Then, too, the historic weak spots in the Russian economy may have been buttressed by lavish investments, in every thing from aluminum production—to be expanded too less than 2.5 times by 1955—to Soviet technical and scientific education—already producing an annual crop of physicists, chemists, engineers and other militarily valuable specialists considerably larger than our crop in America. In particular, the Trans-Siberian Railway has been fully double-tracked and otherwise greatly improved. Two more trans-Asian lines are well along toward their completion date in 1955. Important new truck production has been built up, in step with the mechanization of the Red Army. And there will be fuel for these new trucks and for the Red Air Force, since Soviet petroleum output has now been brought up to 60,000,000 tons per year by restoring the Baku wells and opening new oil fields beyond the Urals.

Those who still rely on poor transport or deficient petroleum to hamstring the Kremlin are like the British and American experts who said Hitler could not wage war for only eight months because of the German oil shortage.

And while these problems have been so energetically tackled, the lion’s share of Soviet national income has always been and is still being invested for the same purposes covered in our own Pentagon and Atomic Energy Commission budgets. In the years 1949-50, at least 30 per cent of Soviet national income was absorbed by the military effort, direct and indirect. Since 1950, this share has been a full 40 per cent. By contrast, American postwar defense and atomic spending has dropped as low as 6 per cent of national income, and is now running at about 16 per cent.

What do these figures mean in reality? You cannot get at the truth by studying the Soviet budget, since the Kremlin rig all prices in favor of the armed services. But go back to the steel base and you can work it out for your self. In effect, American defense spending now amounts to 16 per cent of a national income proportional to 117,500,000 tons of steel. Soviet military spending currently amounts to 40 per cent of an empire-wide income proportional to 49,000,000 tons of steel. Six teen per cent of 117.5 is less than 40 per cent of 49. If we merely wished to equal the Soviet investment of manpower and materials, we should have to increase our defense appropriations to around $60,000,000,000 this year.

But here the rule of the people’s misery plays its last trick on us. An enormous share of every American defense dollar goes to pay and maintain our uniformed personnel. We use more than 60,000 men to form and support a division in the field. The Soviet divisional slice is hardly more than 24,000 men. The Kremlin not only invests more materials and manpower than we do, the Kremlin has no men up.

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Oh, I don’t mind. After all, she helps me make the beds.”

THE SATURDAY EVENING POST
twice the return of finished military power. If we wished to equal the Soviet fighting force in being, we should have to increase our defense budget to something like $120,000,000,000 this year.

Such are the techniques, then, which enabled the Kremlin to maintain a position at the beginning of this year that we could hardly put into the field in wartime—175 Red Army divisions, more than 60 divisions in the Soviet territories, 2,500,000 men in the Chinese communist armies, a Red Air Force of 20,000 planes, a Children's Defense Force that may have passed 2000 planes, a Red Navy that is larger than the British Navy, and so on. Such are the methods by which the Kremlin is now driving toward its ominous goal for 1955, unaltered since Stalin's death, of a Red Air Force at least half again larger than our own, and a staggering total of 6,000,000 men under arms in Russia alone.

In truth, the grim trick of building the strength of the system is the misery of the people. As is hardly known behind the Soviet radar fence is nowhere near the size of the miseries of many areas in the Russian mainland, are already rated as obsolete, with no early replacements in sight. Indeed we should hardly be able to let when and with a night and all- weather recon radar is often built-in radar tracking equipment.

This gives sharp interest to an incipient American monopoly. A Navy patrol plane was intercepted in thick cloud cover over the Black Sea and tracked, still through solid soup, all the way across Turkey to Cyprus. The conclusion was obvious, that this could have been done only by an all-weather fighter, which is cutting edge intelligence compromise—an agreement that the Soviets do not now have an all-weather fighter, but will have one soon.

One day you accept this Alice-in-Wonderland logic, the trend is still plain. The American Strategic Air Command, our main deterrent of Soviet aggression, is already smaller in its deterrent value. Unless strong steps are taken to meet the buildup of the Soviet air power, we must face the provemrement of American long-range striking power, the deterrent may be altogether ineffective.

Even more significantly, the Soviet strategic air arm began regular reconnaissance of our own air borders some time last summer. Regular recon missions have been flown from the Kamchatkan and Soviet Arctic bases, over Alaska, Northern Canada, and Greenland—because of our big Thule base there. None of these missions has been intercepted. Almost certainly our radar is spotted. Indeed we should hardly know that Malenkov's strategic bomb-assuming our American radar fence is nowhere near the critical approach, being much too long, and the all-weather reconnaisance plane has no holes to shoot. As for our defending fighter force, it theoretically con- sists of nine-two, 3000 finished military power, the deterrent may be altogether ineffective.

The first interception of an American reconnaissance aircraft on the Soviet side of the Iron Curtain occurred some time last summer. A Navy patrol plane was intercepted in thick cloud cover over the Black Sea and tracked, still through solid soup, all the way across Turkey to Cyprus. The conclusion was obvious, that this could have been done only by an all-weather fighter with built-in radar tracking equipment.

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are even useless radial-engined fighters left over from the last war. Current all-weather-fighter production is shockingly low.

Meanwhile, as may be inferred from the Soviet air reconnaissance of this continent, Malenkov's strategic air arm has been gaining strength. At present it is still built around 1000 TU-4's, the improved copy of a captured B-29 which is comparable to our B-50. Like most of our own strategic aircraft, the TU-4 lacks intercontinental two-way range. The Soviets also lack the chain of advance bases on allied soil which substantially improve our capability.

Yet Gen. Hoyt S. Vandenberg himself has repeatedly warned us that the TU-4's may well be used for one-way sacrifice missions. Or the TU-4's may be saved, and far cheaper yet far deadlier planes may be sacrificed, if Malenkov exploits the curious aerodynamic possibilities of the TU-4's carrying small jet bombers under their wings, in a certain "technological break-throughs."

Lincoln's other findings, which are the very opposite of hopeful, may be briefly summarized as follows:

First, the existing and presently planned American air-defense system is hopelessly weak. If it achieves 10 per cent of interception of an attacking force, it will be doing wonders.

Second, the Soviets will have both the atomic bomb and the long-range air power to deliver a massive intercontinental attack within about two years.

Third, therefore, this country will be nakedly exposed to air-atomic "devastation" by the Kremlin within two years, unless immediate countermeasures are taken.

We may hope the Lincoln time schedule is pessimistic. Certain respectable authorities argue that the time of total danger will not come for three or four years. But this is the only honest qualification. It is frivolous to dismiss the Lincoln findings with the phrase, "The offense is the best defense," especially when our own offensive power is weakening. It is downright shocking to mock Project Lincoln for advocating an "air Maginot Line," especially when our own military plans concede to the Kremlin the inestimable privilege of striking the first blow, which may itself prove decisive. These current Pentagon cliches are mere frightened evasions of the hard and central fact, that only the greatest and most urgent American efforts can now prevent this country from coming within easy, direct range of Soviet air-atomic power. If and when that day comes, the grand strategic revolution of our time will be tragically complete.

Nor can we be certain that day will not come, even if we now lay out five or six billion dollars a year for new and better air defenses. There is still the next phase to think about—the phase of long-range guided missiles. The atmospheric missile, ram-jet-powered and flying in the hyper-supersonic speeds, will be all but impossible to intercept. There is no known way to intercept the ballistic missile—the two-stage rocket like a huge, doubled-up V-2, flying at near planetary speeds outside the earth's atmosphere, which is thought to be the end of this particular road of weapons development.

An American industrialist with direct responsibility has recently given the considered opinion that this country can have a ballistic missile within five years, by a special effort on the pattern of the Manhattan District Project. In practice, he added, "God knows when it will be," since these huge and terrible birds are immensely costly, and our long-range-missile projects are now lumped in with twenty-four other projects for missiles of short and medium range, with a total annual appropriation of only $1,000,000,000.

Meanwhile, the Soviets are believed to have been making an all-out effort to develop an intercontinental missile ever since the end of the last war. Some experts therefore forecast a Soviet ballistic missile by 1957 or 1958. Others think this forecast is unduly pessimistic. Yet the Joint Chiefs of Staff held a long and anxious emergency meeting, not long ago, for the curious reason that a meteor fell in the Southwest Pacific. The place of fall was a significant distance from the supposed Soviet center of guided-missile development. A missile of this range could hit any American target from launching sites on Soviet soil. The meteor had been mistaken for a missile. Evidently, the meteor was so large that it could be seen from many miles away. The Başkanlık has not revealed the identity of the object which fell into the ocean.

The meaning of all these depressing Sat-Sat observations is this:

Both the air-atomic oriented front and the land-atomic oriented post have been allowed to gather momentum for an unimpeded advance towards total war without the American planning for arms to stop it. It is the general feeling that the American public, caught in the confusion of war, is quite uncritical in accepting the statement from the Joint Chiefs of Staff that "the American public is not likely to have accurate information on the various emergency plans of the Government, because we are not going to broadcast all information that is obtained."
THE SATURDAY EVENING POST

June 27, 1931

The Role I Liked Best...

By MAUREEN O'SULLIVAN

I'll never forget my first day of rehearsal for the role of Henrietta in The Barretts of Wimpole Street. I bounced onto the set with all my youth showing, but without having memorized a single one of my lines. If a little knowledge is a dangerous thing, I was dynamite that day.

To make my embarrassment complete, the two stars of the picture, Norma Shearer and Charles Laughton, were letter-perfect. I went to the dressing room, while the new dictator spoke them when he had not the fateful incapacity of resistance to aggression. We should endeavor to come to a settlement with them before they become possessed of this devastating power...

And in another speech made a little earlier in the same remarkable House of Commons speech about the US-Soviet relations, he said: "What do we need in order to win? First, arms; second, arms; third, arms and arms again!" Stalin's question and answer was more truly permanent for many years to come.

To these add the splendid vision of a true world settlement, that President Eisenhower so movingly offered in his first full-dress speech on foreign policy. Then you have the full commentary on the third alternative—the fearfully risky, painful and dangerous but perhaps fruitful, perhaps necessary effort to get a settlement—if need be, to force through a settlement—while there is still time to do so. This is the moment, while the new Soviet regime is still rendered malleable by internal rivalry, and while we are still able to negotiate without the fateful incapacity that Churchill warned against. If this opportunity slips by, there may not be another.

THE END

Meal-making's fun in your Oster Kitchen. That's because you have three smart, speedy and... oh, so simple ways to end kitchen drudgery.

The Joint Chiefs do not think the pessimists are absolutely touched in the head. It is already very late to try to cope with the remorseless strategic revolution in the midst of which we live. But it is not too late, if all the incredible resources of American ingenuity and American productivity are mobilized for peace. We still have freedom of choice. In order to choose wisely, we must first face the facts set forth above, which have not been faced. And when we have properly faced these facts, we must then seek honest answers to some hard questions.

Staple of all, that the Kremlin "will never willingly make war on the United States," as so many people believe. The Kremlin's inventiveness really may not be directly aggressive. But what will be the situation if the Kremlin merely has the capability of "devastating this country by air-atomic attack?"

Was not British policy paralyzed by the far milder spectacle of Hitler's Luftwaffe, until a cornered and enfeebled Britain had to fight a war of desperation? What will it be to American policy, when it is known that America can be destroyed by an order from the Kremlin? Shall we then respond to the challenge, if there is another aggression like Korea? Or if we do not respond to the challenge, what of the resulting crumbling of the Western alliance, the inevitable game of devil take the hindmost throughout the whole free world? How shall we feel as super-Munich is succeeded by super-Munich, while we rapt at our own impotence and wonder when our turn will come? Will it be a consolation then, that the Kremlin has not "made war on the United States"?

So far, the hard questions answer themselves. But suppose we make the enormous effort that is needed to achieve a truly mutual "peace of mutual terror" in Sir Winston Churchill's phrase. What will be the situation then?

Will it be tolerable, for example, when the two giant powers both possess intercontinental guided missiles with atomic or hydrogen warheads? When both halves of the world exist in a state of permanent, twenty-four-hour alert? When in both Washington and Moscow hands are always hovering above a push button that may destroy civilization, and a mistake about a meteor may cause the button to be pushed? Can a free society adjust itself to such conditions?

These questions may seem to answer themselves, like the others. But reflect for a moment on the alternatives to the "peace of mutual terror." One alternative is the still-faint possibility, that grows fainter with each further tilt of the world power balance, that somehow, sometime, sometime or other will halt the revolution of our time. But this alternative out-Micawbers Mr. Micawber. Another alternative is surrender. Needless to say, this alternative is not to be considered. The third alternative is that which was hinted at by Churchill in the same remarkable House of Commons speech about the Soviet atomic bomb that has been quoted already. He then said:

"In three or four years, if the Soviet will have a sufficient supply of these bombs to cause a major catastrophe at any time they so decide. I think it very much better that we should make a resolute effort to come to a settlement with them by peaceful means, but on the basis of strength and not of weakness, on the basis of success and not of negotiation at any cost. They are a call to take risks, perhaps very great risks, to make negotiation succeed. Then against the arguments of the progressive groups which resent the words of Stalin which are still the leitmotiv of Soviet policy, although the dead dictator spoke them when he was a mere youth, arguing communist tactics in the abortive Russian revolution of 1905, Said Stalin: "What do we need in order to win? First, arms; second, arms; third, arms and arms again!" Stalin's question and answer was more truly permanent for many years to come.

To these add the splendid vision of a true world settlement, that President Eisenhower so movingly offered in his first full-dress speech on foreign policy. Then you have the full commentary on the third alternative—the fearfully risky, painful and dangerous but perhaps fruitful, perhaps necessary effort to get a settlement—if need be, to force through a settlement—while there is still time to do so. This is the moment, while the new Soviet regime is still rendered malleable by internal rivalry, and while we are still able to negotiate without the fateful incapacity that Churchill warned against. If this opportunity slips by, there may not be another.