We now have radar on U.S. borders, in Alaska and in Labrador, but Russian planes from bases shown at top of map could attack by sea routes or through central Canada (red-tinted area). Plans call for two more radar nets—Alaska-Greenland, Alaska-Labrador—with seaward flanks covered by airborne radar patrols.
RUSSIAN PLANES Are Raiding Canadian Skies

By WILLIAM A. ULMAN

They sneak in almost daily, our northern outposts report. And now that Russia has the H-bomb we're wide open to attack. What's being done about it? The author, seeking the answer, visited installations so secret he can't say he's seen them, flew thousands of miles—and saw the Red intruders himself. We are building a defense. Here's the story.

OUTSIDE, the arctic summer day was crisp and clear; the waters of Bering Strait shone dully in the distance. Inside the big alert hangar of the jet-fighter interceptor squadron the atmosphere was deceptively casual. There were 13 of us gathered in the hangar's hot room: six pilots, six flying radar officers and myself, a reporter seeking the most critical story of our time—the story of America's present line of defense against Malenkov's H-bomb.

We were sitting around playing poker, but we were dressed in dark-blue high-altitude pressure suits, ready for any emergency. And suddenly, as we sat there, it came: the blast of the scramble horn. A captain sitting across the table hurriedly scrubbed back his chair, beckoned to me and ran out the door.

One of our big radar stations on the west coast of Alaska had picked up the blip of an unidentified plane—almost certainly a Russian plane.

Almost every day, at least one unidentified aircraft violates our continental borders. "They come in at all times and places," a general in the Alaskan Air Command had told me, "and some have even penetrated deep into north central Canada." Teddy Roosevelt would have called this a shooting war.

To the pilots at our advance interceptor bases, it's not a shooting war yet. They call the Red planes "bogeys" and the area where they are sighted "unfriendly airspace.""They come in at all times and places," a general in the Alaskan Air Command had told me, "and some have even penetrated deep into north central Canada." Teddy Roosevelt would have called this a shooting war.

To the pilots at our advance interceptor bases, it's not a shooting war yet. They call the Red reconnaissance planes "spoofs"; their mission apparently is to fool our radar defenses and photograph our coasts, and when our jets go out to meet them, they run. But someday maybe the Red plane will be a real "bogey"—a Russian who doesn't run—and the pilots whose job it is to chase them off never know that this won't be the day.

They hope the day never comes. That first bogey, the one that comes in at just the wrong time, the plane whose pilot doesn't know he's been spotted, the one-planes making the interception were racing to complete their own preparations.

The ground crew silently and swiftly strapped us into the plane's ejection seats, connected the oxygen hoses and leaped away. We were already moving; a jet needs no warmup. The hydraulically powered canopy snapped down over us and locked. "Tower to Air Force Jet 994. Cleared for immediate take-off!" It was just 2 minutes, 40 seconds since the horn had first blown. My pilot cut in the afterburner, a jet plane device which instantly increases power thrust by 50 per cent. We sped off the field, banked sharply, then began to climb at top speed to 43,000 feet. By now the operators at the radar control center had taken over our three-plane flight, steering us by voice direction toward the blip on their scope.

Minutes later, we spotted the distant gleam of a Russian reconnaissance plane, speeding back toward its Siberian base. "There he goes," said the pilot. "Always the same story. Let's go home."

We went into a turning dive and headed back for the penny-ante game. The room smelled of fresh coffee and stale smoke as we walked in. The other pilots hardly looked up. The captain returned to his seat, picked up his cards and frowned. "Another of the same," he said. "No sweat." I could sense his frustration, but I couldn't share it. For me the flight had been both exciting and frightening. I kept thinking: What if that had been many planes instead of just one—planes which didn't turn tail, but kept coming, bound for the States? What did we have to stop at least one of those planes, loaded with a hydrogen bomb, from shattering one of our cities?

The answer, I knew by now, was—not enough.

For weeks, I had been on a journalistic survey of Collier's, trying to find the answer to these questions: Can we defend ourselves now against a massive sneak air raid intended to knock us out in a single blow? If not now, when? Just what are the details of our defenses against the new Soviet H-bomb?

In the course of my assignment, I flew thousands of miles in all kinds of jet aircraft from all the edges of our continent. I talked at length with the best military and scientific brains in this country and Canada. I visited the headquarters of our Air Defense Command at Colorado Springs and of the Air Research and Development Command at Baltimore. I have been inside installations where—despite my top-level clearance by the Pentagon—

MAP BY JO KOTULA
Brig. Gen. J. W. McCasley (left, with Maj. M. P. Algier) heads air defense of east central U.S., where one third nation’s wealth, one fourth its people could be destroyed by nine H-bombs

some of the equipment was concealed from my eyes. I have even been permitted to enter places I can never admit I’ve seen, and have spoken to men I must not identify.

Here’s what I found:

- We have a partial radar fence along the U.S.-Canadian border, but it’s too wide-spaced, too complex and too close to home—“a fence,” said one officer grimly, “with no wire strung between the posts.” Our border radar won’t warn us of attack soon enough; onrushing bombers would reach some of their targets almost as fast as the warning of their approach. At best, the inhabitants of our large Northern cities might have barely a searching at any proposals for joint defenses—. where our large Northern cities might have barely time to run for the cellar—and the cellar is no defense against the H-bomb.

Next year we may be better off. A more effective radar line is being pushed and test stations are being constructed in the Far North; if the first units work, we probably will have a warning net from Alaska to Greenland by the summer of 1954. It will give us from four to six hours’ warning of any air attack.

- Sometime later—I’m not permitted to say when—another second radar outposts may be strung across Canada in the more easily accessible territory between our present border fence and the new net being built in the arctic. It will confirm the first warning and indicate the actual direction of attack.

**Construction Depends on the Weather**

The construction of these two northern radar nets depends on the vagaries of arctic weather, the uncertainty of Congressional appropriations and the strategical concepts of our new Joint Chiefs of Staff. The nets, together with our airborne radar at sea, would be tremendous steps forward—perhaps enough to make the difference between the survival and the utter destruction of our country as a major power. The two early-warning lines would be far less expensive than has been widely reported elsewhere—less than a billion and a half dollars, compared with published estimates of between 20 and 150 billions. This whole concept of effective warning at low cost is made possible by two exciting new devices, never before publicly disclosed: a self-watching radarscope and a long-range radio transmitter capable of overcoming the especially difficult communications problems of the arctic.

Right now, our air-defense planners intend to build the two radar fences—weather, Congress and the Joint Chiefs permitting.

- The big gap in our defenses once the radar nets are operating will be fighter planes. We have interceptors in northeastern Canada and in Alaska; in between and on both flanks there are holes: the Russians could drive a whole fleet of aerial trucks through.

- Obviously, radar nets and fighter protection alike require the same friendly and vigorous cooperation from Canada that the United States has always received in the past. But Canada—although its dilemma today is much like that of a person handcuffed to a man who has been publicly threatened with assassination—has reason to look searchingly at any proposals for joint action put forward by the United States. Our past record has not been entirely consistent—and a Canadian officer I spoke to indicated why.

“Look here,” he said, “I believe we’d be glad to let you build a couple of bases in the north-central tundra—but would you man them and keep them manned even after a change in political administrations? Would you send in enough strength to keep the Russians from paratrooping in one day and tearing the bases to shreds—obviously we’re ignoring it as a possibility part of a surprise attack? Not by a long shot.

**Comment on the New Red Plane**

In an Air Force installation, I stood talking to a top scientist and a uniformed Air Force officer about the new Red plane. “The Russians could do this,” said the scientist. “They could put a big TU-4 into the air, then send up two of the new atomic bomb北vers. We could hook onto the TU-4’s wings, tilting their own wings to maintain the best possible flight characteristics, then cut their own fuel lines, and hitchhike almost all the way to the target on the TU-4’s power plant.”


“Ah,” said the scientist, “but the Russians would never launch the attack in bad weather in the first place. And if the three planes ran into squalls en route, they could simply unhook, make their way through the front separately, then reunite on the other side. A radar operator trying to track them would go crazy. What had looked like one big slow TU-4 would suddenly become one TU-4—and two very fast jet bombers, breaking away in different directions for their own targets.”

We stood silent a moment, then the scientist grinned. “I got the O.K. of the Heroes of the Soviet Union for that one,” he said. Then he explained: to test defense theories, he and his colleagues try to foresee the most outlandish schemes the Russians might come up with; for particularly nasty ideas, they “decorate” one another.

Virtually all the air-defense people I questioned about potential Soviet weapons discount the possible use of intercontinental missiles—long-range, atomic versions of the German V-2. Among other reasons, they doubt that materials exist to build such missiles, at least for another 10 to 12 years. They are working on countermeasures just to be safe, but they feel certain that by the time the H-bomb is delivered, it will be carried by aircraft known to us in fact or principle—planes we can destroy, provided we have warning and sufficient defense forces. If Russia were to

Collier’s for October 16, 1953
All of its equipment is delicate and complicated, and at any given moment some components are out of action for maintenance or repair; neighboring installations have to try to cover the gap.

There's a human problem, too—and it has been one of the biggest flaws in the system. Radar has to be watched, and watchers grow weary and confused—wearily in monotonous areas like the Far North, where one blip on a radarscope is considered heavy traffic, confused in busy areas like the northeastern United States, where there's often too much happening for a single brain to figure it out.

I saw it work both ways.

At the Alaskan fighter-interceptor outpost where I observed the Russian reconnaissance-plane chase, I spent some time in the radome, standing behind a thin young officer hunched over a radarscope. He was watching the progress of a blip already identified as the plane of a low-flying bush pilot. The officer kept passing a hand over his eyes. "Watching these damn' scopes gets your eyes after about 30 minutes," he told me. "You lose your acuity. He looked weary, and welcomed another officer's offer to spell him.

Science of Radar Control Operation

Now look in, as I did, on a typical aircraft control and warning radar station in the U.S. proper. It was a dimly lighted, busy place—an amphitheater of radarscopes, with the center of the stage occupied by a big, vertical, transparent Plexiglas map, or plotting board. Behind the board stood two airmen and a WAF wearing earphones. As information poured in on the various scopes in front—some set for 10 miles, others for as much as 150 miles—it was telephoned to the three pilots. They lettered the information on the board in reverse, so that it could be read from the other side by the scope watchers in the front of the theater.

The mood of the room was tense; the men at the radarscopes kept staring up at the big board, their foreheads wrinkled, their lips tight. "(This," said a stocky little scientist standing near me, "is man's new attitude—to look toward heaven, his eyes clouded with doubt and fear.) There was reason for the tension.

Suppose a blip appears in one position on a radarscope—and information then comes in from another station indicating another plane in the same area.

Are there actually two planes, or just one? The difference in the angle of vision of the two scanning stations, perhaps 50 miles apart, could give the misleading impression that there are two planes when actually there's only one, but the watcher has to be sure. And the only way to be sure is to do a fairly complicated calculation. Now multiply that situation by the 30 or more tracks on the big Plexiglas board, and imagine the possible confusion.

Scores of time-consuming, brain-wearying multiple calculations beset our large aircraft and warning radar stations every day. Mental exhaustion is a constant hazard. When it overtakes our watchers—

That is the moment when time—and the Soviet—could overtake us.

For more than three years, from late 1946 to mid-1950, almost nothing was done to improve our continental defenses. We lived in a kind of heedless complacency, convinced that a cut-rate defensive system would serve the purpose. Then came Korea—and the nation awoke to the chilling fact that it takes guns to stop aggression. Beyond our vulnerable border with Canada there were no guns, nor even warning devices to set off an alarm in case of attack.

Our military men, given a go-ahead at last, began to seek out a method of getting the most protection in the quickest time and at the smallest cost.

They came up with two alternatives.

First, we could strengthen and extend our border.
Radar far from home—that's the answer to Russia's 'Hell-bomb'

To understand the problem, the planners considered border radar to provide continuous tracking of any attacking bombers as they approached the continental United States; our fighter-interceptors and antiaircraft would then know the precise location and direction of enemy bombers, once the radar had picked them up. That would give a certain degree of protection, but not much warning in terms of time.

Or, second, we could set up a new radar-alarm system, constructed far enough from United States borders (and targets) to give us the earliest possible notice that an attack was on the way. That wouldn't offer the same opportunity to pinpoint the location of an enemy bomber as he headed south—but it would mean a quick, timely warning, which might be the best protection in the long run.

**Effectiveness of Radar Shown**

Then the planners thought: Why not have both? Why not build gradually outward from our borders in advancing perimeters, and also establish a warning fence in the Far North, the two radar projects ultimately meeting in mid-Canada?

With strengthened border radar, we could increase the effectiveness of our home defenses. With the second step—known to military men as a Distant Early Warning, or DEW, Line—we could insure ourselves against another Pearl Harbor debacle.

We could get our strategic bombers—our counterpunchers—into the air and safely dispersed, ready to launch an attack as quickly as possible. We could alert our civil-defense system, and give ourselves time to take cover and time to prepare for a fight—time to save the nation.

The amount of time? With one hour's warning, the Strategic Air Command could get no more than 10 per cent of its bombers off the ground and out of harm's way. Three hours would raise the figure to 30 per cent. But a six-hour advance notice would enable virtually all the SAC's planes to disperse and launch a retaliatory strike. What's more, given that much time our fighter planes could rally to attack the intruders; the existence of a Distant Early Warning Line could mean the destruction of as many as 90 per cent of attacking enemy bombers before they could reach their targets—compared with the 30 per cent figure cited in 1950 by General Hoyt S. Vandenberg, former Air Force Chief of Staff.

But before the six-hour DEW Line could be built, there were some problems to lick. Obviously, no defensive system could operate at top efficiency where so much depended on human eyes and human brains working under severe stress.

Also, a radar net in the Far North would cause a major communications headache. The best radio equipment then available was useless in the arctic for about four months out of every year because of polar magnetic storms; there had to be some way to get word from the northern DEW Line to the control centers in the United States. Finally, costs had to be held to a minimum.

The task of making the DEW Line a practical project was assigned to the Air Research and Development Command, a three-ring circus of military, scientific and industrial brains, directed by Major General Donald L. Putt from an old office building in downtown Baltimore.

In 1950, ARDC let contracts for various parts of its research operation to the Rand Corporation, Associated Universities, Inc., Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and various other colleges, laboratories and scientific centers around the country. Their mission: "To perfect an automatic system for the collection, reporting and display of electronically digested intelligence (so it can) be channeled instantly to appropriate control and command centers where the early knowledge could be used for effective defense and counter-attack purposes."

**"Automaticity" Latest Coined Word**

The scientists coined a word for the solution to most of these problems. "Automaticity," a top scientist told me, "was the obvious answer. Man can still make the final decisions, but he's just not bright enough to compete with a machine, not quick enough to reduce the mathematical problems of modern war to actions which have to be taken at supersonic speeds. And even if man could do the job," he added, "he lacks the stamina to keep it up."

By last year, the scientists had come through with two revolutionary devices whose develop-
Today's a foe could fly safely almost to our border

ment marked the technological "breakthrough" the military men had hoped for.

"First," an ARDC official in Baltimore told me, "we had to devise a completely new method of sure Arctic communication by radio. Cable was no good, because of shifting ice and other terrain and weather considerations—to say nothing of possible sabotage. Second, we needed a warning device on the radar stations to relieve men in Arctic stations of the brain-wearying job of staring endlessly at a blank scope." Security still envelopes both of the devices which solved these problems. But this much can be said:

The new radio transmitter sends messages well over 500 miles, and operates even more efficiently in the Arctic than radio normally does in temperate zones. Instead of being knocked out of commission one third of every year by magnetic storms, it will get through 99 percent of the time, year-round. It requires only 40 kilowatts of power, easily produced by Diesel generators. With the new transmitter, our combat commands within the United States will get radar intelligence from the Arctic within three minutes after it's picked up by our outposts.

The new self-alerting radar is, in one respect at least, even more important. In essence, it's a radar set with a bell which rings whenever the scope picks up a signal (that sounds simple, but it took months of patient research to hook the visual radar to the audible bell). Now the radar can tell, for example, that a bomber is sneaking through under the converging beams, or by ducking behind mountain ranges which are effective hiding places from radar. The unmanned radar sets will fill the gaps.

Duties of DEW Line

Precisely what will the DEW Line do? It will simply alert officials in the United States to the presence of enemy planes. It won't be able to pinpoint their position, it won't be able to supply much information about them—but it will provide this much vital information: a warning that the planes are coming, and some indication of their number. As one Bell Telephone Laboratories engineer is said to have put it: "You'll know the planes are there—one, two, many... or jeppers creepers!"

When finished, the Arctic DEW Line will consist of a string of manned stations, complete with arc-series gap fillers and an all-season communications system to the interior of the United States.

"But," said another holder of the Order of the Heroes of the Soviet Union, "what if the Arctic DEW Line is penetrated? At best, we can track an intruder 80 or 100 miles—the range of our radar—then lose him in the wilderness. Washington and Ottawa will know only that someone has crossed the Arctic headed south, probably with evil intent, else he'd have filed a flight plan and come in like anyone else instead of skulking through. Once he's well past our northern radar stations no one will have any idea where he is or where he's going until he's breathing down our necks.

And that's why we've suggested the construction of a second DEW Line, down around the 65th parallel, or about 500 miles south of the first one.

In Baltimore, a general also spoke to me about the radar fence the experts are already calling DEW Line II. "It would begin to give us something really good in early warning," he said earnestly. "We could plot the course of an intruder crossing two lines. That would prove definitely that he was dangerous—and, more important, it would give us his course, so we could prepare our combat defenses."

DEW Line II, lower down on the expanding face of the globe, would require more stations, running from Alaska across Hudson Bay to Labrador.

Besides the two DEW Lines, our early warning system undoubtedly will be extended over our exposed sea flanks, using radar-equipped Super Constellations—covering the Atlantic from Newfoundland to the Azores, the Pacific from Alaska to Hawaii. Without this flank protection, our whole air-defense system would be wide open to end runs, making the DEW Lines virtually useless.

Finally, U.S. military experts are hoping to improve radar defenses within the United States around the borders and around large cities and vital defense installations. These so-called radar islands are already in existence, but they suffer from the usual radar shortcoming: there are potentially dangerous gaps under their beams and behind mountains and other terrain features. Now scientists, working closely with the Air Force, have suggested plugging these holes with small unmanned gap fillers, perhaps six-or-ten to every large radar.

But increasing the number of radar installations creates new problems. Remember the aircraft control and warning radar station in the United States, and the strained faces of the watchers trying to keep track of dozens of radar reports at once? What will happen to these men if the number of radar reports is greatly increased—if, instead of having to make sense of multiple reports from only one big radarscope, they're forced to keep track of eight or ten more besides?

Once more science came through the
Where happy endings start

Can't our radar be attacked? Yes—

with a brilliant solution: an adaptation of the high-speed electronic computer, the ultimate in automation.

Not only will the new computer evaluate any number of radar reports—it also will take into consideration every other possible pertinent fact: ground observer reports, the weather, flight plans and so on. No longer will men and women have to scrawl radar tracks painstakingly (and backward) on transparent boards. No longer will the watchers knit their brows over the results.

Here's what will happen instead:

At any one of the Air Force's big combat centers, a team of officer specialists will sit in front of big individual radar consoles, each equipped with rows of buttons and switches so the watcher can call up precisely the information he wants. When a tracker thinks he has an actual intruder, he'll back the radar picture along to the identification officer's screen, while the electronic computer busily figures out the mystery plane's speed, position, heading and the like. The identification officer will call on the computer for civilian and military flight plans, ground observer reports, everything he needs to make a prompt identification; it has a "memory" for such matters and will supply them on request.

If the blip on the identification officer's radar screen remains a mystery, he swiftly passes the picture to the boss, the sector commander (probably a brigadier general), who sits with the weapons assigner. They study the blip —then do the job that no machine, however efficient, can do: exercise intelligent judgment.

The weapons assigner transfers the still-unidentified picture quickly to the interceptor officer, who is in touch with a nearby air base. He then orders a scramble.

As the single jet takes off to investigate, the interceptor officer tells the pilot where he'll find the intruder, reading off information supplied by the computer (in the not too distant future, the computer will be able to pass its information directly to the pilot; he will read the course, altitude and position of the stranger from dials in his cockpit).

Antiaircraft Is Made Ready

Meanwhile, the weapons assigner has flipped a second switch, and the blip appears before still another man, the antiaircraft liaison officer, who sits ready to bring into play all the antiaircraft guns and rockets in the area if the interceptor attacks and misses, or is shot down.

From the time an enemy plane is first sighted on the radarscopes to the moment it's brought under fire, only a few minutes have elapsed—and in the bustling combat centers, the officers on whom the nation's very existence may depend are still fresh and clear-eyed, ready for anything.

In a very real sense, the new electronic computer is the key to the whole early-warning setup—the device that ties everything else together and makes it work.

But one vital component is still missing. A warning of impending attack is very well—but it doesn't provide protection. That is the job of the antiaircraft, guided missiles and antiaircraft guns.

A Russian bomber which approached the United States through the Canadian border, or via the East or West Coasts, would not only go undetected until it was almost at our borders—it would go un attacked as well. Even if the two DEW Lines were already in operation, there wouldn't be a fighter plane for miles around—until the enemy was virtually within striking distance of United States territory.

We have fighter-interceptor bases in eastern Canada, mainly in Labrador, and in the west in Alaska. In between, there's a deep pocket, aimed straight at the heart of our nation. Why is it there?

Partly for the same reason we don't have a complete radar-warning system today—because of the years between World War II and Korea in which we did little or nothing to prepare our continental defenses.

Whether we will be able to meet the deficiency in our fighter defense depends largely on whether the planes are made available in time—and that, in turn, depends on budgetary and policy considerations.

Meanwhile, Air Force officials are making additional plans. One suggestion under consideration is that we develop heavy patrol fighters—or modify some of our new B-57s, patterned after the British Canberra fighter bomber—and set them patrolling in overlapping arcs across the border. They would have enough range to fly deep into Canada—about as far as DEW Line II—and enough speed to make them a real threat to the relatively slow-flying TU-4, which will probably be Russia's principal long-distance bomber for some time to come.

These multiengine jet fighters could harass enemy bombers all the way south, calling for help en route from short-range interceptors.

The experts are also counting on another development to help turn back
but that's all the alarm we'll need

enemy squadrons: air-to-air rockets, launched by radar-electronic fire-control systems which would provide a pattern almost impossible to evade. They may eventually be armed with atomic warheads, and they certainly will have proximity fuses which will cause them to explode at precisely the right moment. Security won't permit any further description of these missiles, but their possibilities are obvious.

Something must be done, and our officials are well aware of it. Warning is no good without protection. Their aim is to have the protection ready—in some form—by the time our DEW Lines go into operation.

What will it all cost? Manned radar, gap fillers, long-distance radios, self-reading radarscopes, complicated electronic gadgets—won't they be tremendously expensive?

Here are the figures, as nearly accurate as they can be right now—the first realistic estimates ever published of the expected hardware price of our planned radar-warning system (not including maintenance or operating costs):

For DEW Line I: $45,000,000.
For the longer DEW Line II: $75,000,000.
For extending our sea-approach warning line: $450,000,000.
For strengthening our border radar: $15,000,000.
For several hundred gap fillers: $60,000,000.
For 30 electronic computers: $180,000,000; for phone lines, office equipment, buildings, etc.: $500,000,000.
The total: $1,325,000,000.
In addition, some $518,000,000 already has been spent on the present radar-warning system. It must be emphasized that the grand total of $1,343,000,000 in money spent or to be spent buys the U.S. vitally needed warning and combat tracking ability, but no defensive weapons to do the fighting.

The one and one-third billion dollars still to be spent is a lot of money. But it's not 150 billion dollars, the figure that some people have reckoned as the cost of radar warning. And it's insignificant when matched against the total defense budget for 1953-'54 of $34,372,000,000.

Most important, the money, in the estimate of our top scientists and military planners, might pay for the survival of the nation at a moment when nothing else is available. Although these vitally needed funds are not yet in the budget, we can't afford not to spend the money.

Won't the whole early warning system be vulnerable to enemy attack? That's one of the points raised by critics of the plan, both within and outside the Air Force. One man told me, "The Soviet would probably try a three-phase attack: First, bomb out our radar intelligence; second, shatter our strategic bombing bases, both at home and abroad; third, use the H-bomb or atomic bombs on a dozen major cities, atomic plants and industries, then proceed to demolish what's left in leisurely and economical fashion."

"Where would the DEW Lines be then?"

One of the greatest brains in arctic radio communications, to whom I reported this criticism, replied sharply: "The day the Russians attack DEW, either by air or ground, that in itself will be actual war. The price for this advance warning is small compared with what that warning can save us."

"These DEW stations are not fortresses! You could call them electronic versions of the old cavalry vedettes, the advance guards whose one job was to warn the main body. Sure, they might be lost in the early skirmishes—which is another good reason for keeping the number of men in each station to an operational minimum. Every one of those men deserves the highest—" he stopped and angrily flipped away his cigarette. "Well, what more do you expect to buy in a world like this? We'll warn you—but we can't guarantee you security, too!"