THE COLMAR COMPROMISE

ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C.
TO: Director
Armed Forces Security Agency
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D.C.
ATTN: AFSA-14

SUBJECT: Historical Study.

Attached study prepared in the Historical Section, G2, Army Security Agency and entitled The Colmar Compromise is forwarded for reference and file.

FOR THE CHIEF, ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

1 Incl.
Cy #3 of The Colmar Compromise.
TO: Director
Armed Forces Security Agency
The Pentagon
Washington 25, D. C.
ATTN: AFSA-1
This Document contains the Following TOP SECRET Pages.

Text material - 47 pages
Chronological Summary - 2 pages
Tab 2 - 7 pages
Tab 3 - 5 pages
ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

THE COLMAR COMPROMISE

Prepared under the Direction of the
Chief, ARMY SECURITY AGENCY
April 1952
CAS-22
HISTORICAL NOTE

This historical study, dealing with the Colmar Compromise in France in 1944, outlines the emergency measures which must be taken when the compromise of major systems occurs, and indicates the enormous amount of work involved in replacing these systems. Further, it reveals the large numbers of personnel involved in such a compromise from enlisted men to theater commanders, and emphasizes the grave situations in which all concerned find themselves. Hence, it provides important orientation for personnel in communication security duties. The incident itself was insignificant because there was no actual compromise.

The study was written to be Chapter XVI in the manuscript history of Converter M-13b-C (ASAW-1, or SIGABA), a technical survey. Because of dissimilarity and special interest, the compromise study is given separate distribution.

15 April 1952

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TOP SECRET

SECURITY INFORMATION

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1. Photographs - 1 through 9
   Siemens Chest-76, contents and condition of contents

2. Court Martial Orders 282, 1944, and the testimonials of the officers and men involved in the compromise

3. Charges and additional testimonials

4. Department of the army, office of the Secretary of Army Lt., dated 16 Sept 1948, to Mr. George J. Neuman from Mr. Henry J. Sonnen
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THE COILWAR COMPROMISE

A. General

In spite of the carefully worked out measures concerning the physical security of the W-134-C (CTAAB), and the high degree of cryptographic security established for it, a very serious compromise of some and Combined Cryptographic System and materials occurred at a Division Headquarters in Europe late in World War II.

Headquarters, Communications Zone, FTO, (Paris, France), dispatched an Urgent-Secret message on Tuesday, 6 February 1945 at 2110Z, to all strategic commands in Europe, informing them of the possibility of the compromise. The War Department received an info copy of this message, No. 31-95103, and by 61109, 7 February, Arlington Hall officials had read the following communication:

Suspend use immediately of editions 18 and 19 of systems 2201, 2222 and 2242, editions 10 and 11 of CCP 0125 and 0126 and edition 2 of system 512.

Grave possibility of compromise all mentioned exists, all Commanders to be informed of possibility of enciphered traffic via radio in above systems being read by enemy. Reserve systems now being distributed.

Use only secure landline, courier, or reserve systems where available until security restored. Note 12, 13, 14, 15 and 17 not affected as well as CCP 0121, 0122 and 0131 by above. Inform all subordinate units concerned.

1. Info copy to SWIC - Code letters for Arlington Hall Station
The following day (5-15) two messages from Rome, Italy, were received on the 7th were received at the War Department.

No. TW 96041, 1802 ZULU.

Use of the 0122/015 suspended immediately due to suspected compromise. Cease all coaling from subordinate holders under your jurisdiction and inform your headquarters earliest possible to put edition 1-16 into effect.

No. TW 96742, 1900 ZULU.

Bring into effect immediately OCM 0131-14 for intra-service use only as temporary measure. Distribution now being made to Army for issue to divisions. Ground force divisions will continue use as soon as document available. Ground force divisions will hold OCM 0131 until normal system and security restored.

A fourth message, No. TW 96041	extsuperscript{2} had been received at the War Department and subsequently by MAC on 5 February, which still have no definite information nor details concerning the compromise. It was not until 10 February at 2300, when the officer in charge of the War Department Code Center called Colonel Clinton B. Allsopp, chief, Security Division, MAC, to tell him that an extremely important message, No. 96921	extsuperscript{3} concerning the compromise had just been received, did MAC officials become conscious of the fact that the SIFAR itself and several baskets, SICVI and SICIA US were lost. The message read as follows:

"Reported truck belonging to two eighth infantry division containing following documents stolen in Colmar France: SICIA US.

2. Alleging message No. PX 96041, 8 Feb 45, from VQ, Comzone 1945, this message signed "enough", read as follows: Now suspected compromised SIC 00-3 emergency distribution in progress in an effort to make 12 February date for edition possible. Notify all holders concerned.

3. Alleging secret message No. PX 96921, 10 Feb 45, 1900, from VQ, Comzone, European theater of operations, US, Paris, France."
The following day (5 Feb 45) two messages from Romme, Rom, sent on the 7th were received at Arlington Hall.

No. V 1/960/1, 19627 VERS.

Use of P-0120 9-15 suspended immediately due suspected compromise. Doct. air from subordinate holders under your jurisdiction and inform this headquarters earliest possible to put edition 9-15 into effect.

No. V 1/96749, 19097 VERS.

Bring into effect immediately COMP 0131-11 for intra-service U. S. Army only as temporary measure. Distribution now being made in Army Ground Forces for issue to divisions. Ground Force divisions will commence use as soon as document available. Ground Force divisions will hold COMP 0131 until normal system and security restored.

A fourth message, No. V 960/12 had been received at the War Department and subsequently by AHS on 3 February, which still gave no definite information nor details concern the compromise. It was not until 10 February at 2200, when the officer in charge of the War Department Code Center called Colonel Clinton B. Alleopp, Chief, Security Division, AHS, to tell him that an extremely important message, No. 96921 concerning the compromise had just been received, did AHS officials become conscious of the fact that the STRANA itself and rotor basket, CIC IV and SIGA 10IC were lost. The message read as follows:

"Warning truck belonging to two other infantry division containing following documents stolen in Colmar, France: STRANA.

2. Outgoing message No. V 960/11, 8 Feb 45, from U. S. Army, 19657, took message printed "For the rear," read as follows: "Note suggested compromised COMP 0131 emmery distribution in progress in an effort to make 12 February date for edition 1 possible. Notify all holders concerned."


No. V 960/12, 19103 VERS.

Upon receipt of message No. V 960/12, 10 Feb 45, 19871, from U. S. Army, European Theater of Operations, USA, Aris, France.