"Comments by Deputy Officer in Charge, JICPOA"

The following remarks are extracts from the Narrative of the Combat Intelligence Center, Joint Intelligence Center, Pacific Ocean Areas, prepared by Captain W. J. Holmes, U.S. Navy (Ret.), Deputy Officer in Charge of JICPOA, dated 8 November 1945. This narrative was forwarded to the Chief of Naval operations by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet, with this comment: "Captain Holmes had an unequalled opportunity to observe and take part in the development throughout the war of Intelligence for high command. He played an able part in this development and his recorded observations and opinions are therefore of unusual value."

No. 1

"The factors that vitally affected the Battle of Midway were many and complex, but it is undoubtedly true that without radio intelligence it would have been impossible to have achieved the concentration of force and the tactical surprise that made the victory possible."

"The fate of the nation quite literally depended upon about a dozen men who had devoted their lives and their careers, in peace and in war, to radio intelligence."

"In the defensive stages of the war, radio intelligence was not only the most important source of intelligence in the Central Pacific, it was practically the only source. There were very few captured documents or prisoners of war. There were no photographs of enemy held positions. In the Central Pacific, excluding the Solomons and New Britain, spy and coast watchers' reports never supplied any important intelligence."

"During the whole war the enemy's traffic was consistently read in detail and in great volume. After the Battle of the Coral Seas, most of his major moves were disclosed through this source alone. Whenever the main code was not being read, a feeling of frustration and exasperation permeated the radio intelligence organization and spurred them on..."
to each new success. Even during these periods the darkness was not complete. Much information was learned from traffic analysis short of decryption. Minor ciphers were usually being read. Frequently the information gained from the minor ciphers rivaled in importance that gained from the main naval code. Rather consistent success in breaking the weather code resulted in more and more reliance on an excellent Japanese weather observation system.

"Just how many submarine contacts were made through radio intelligence will probably never be known. Particularly in the beginning of the war, every effort was made to destroy all traceable connection between submarine operation and radio intelligence. However, it is known that the number of successful contacts rose and fell with the success of radio intelligence in decrypting enemy messages. On several occasions every submarine on patrol in the Central Pacific area was busy on information supplied by radio intelligence. From the intelligence viewpoint, the results were most gratifying. This was one form of intelligence that showed immediate tangible results. Sometimes it was only a matter of hours between decryption of a message and a submarine report of a successful attack. The news of these successes was immediately relayed to radio intelligence personnel who were responsible for the results. Thus everyone in the business felt they had a personal contact with the submarines on patrol and felt personal responsibility for the quality of the information furnished them. The effect of this on morale is difficult to overestimate.

"Radio intelligence had been, and continued to be, phenomenally successful in its field.

"For the duration of the war, Combat [i.e., C.I.C.], was engaged in the production and processing of intelligence of high classification for higher command echelons only. The most timely, and the most important part of this intelligence, was produced by radio intelligence."
"Part E - Statement of the Honorable C. E. Hancock

The following statement was made by Congressman Hancock of New York on the floor of the House of Representatives in support of S. 805 and is extracted from the Congressional Record, 25 October 1945, Vol. 91, No. 187; p. 10210:

"...I believe that our cryptographers in the war with Japan did as much to bring that war to a successful and early conclusion as any other group of men. Their work saved thousands of precious lives. They are entitled to glory and national gratitude which they will never receive. We broke down the Japanese code almost at the beginning of the war, and we knew it at the finish of the war. Because of that knowledge we were able to intercept and destroy practically every supply ship and convoy that tried to reach the Philippines or any Pacific island. We knew, for example, that shortly after MacArthur landed on Leyte a large convoy with 40,000 Japanese troops was dispatched to reinforce the Japanese forces there. They were met by our fleet and by our airplanes at sea and were totally destroyed: Our forces knew that a certain high-ranking Japanese admiral was headed for a certain spot at a certain time. When he arrived there our planes were on hand to receive him."

"Part F - Statement of Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee

The following statement with regard to "Magic," the cover name for Communication Intelligence, appears on page 232 of the Report of the Pearl Harbor Investigating Committee of the 79th Congress:

"...All witnesses familiar with Magic material throughout the war have testified that it contributed enormously to the defeat of the enemy, greatly shortened the war, and saved many thousands of lives."

"Part G - Statement of the Honorable Chan Gurney

The following statement was made by Senator Gurney of South Dakota on the floor of the Senate in opposition to proposed reductions in the Naval appropriation for 1948 and is extracted from the Congressional Record, 14 February 1947, Vol. 91, No. 30, p. 1081:
"...Not only will curtailment of programs be required in the areas just mentioned, but research and development of vital concern to all of us will be necessarily retarded; intelligence activities, so important when other factors of national security are shrinking, must be curtailed. Naval communications, including communication intelligence which played a vital role in the recent conflict, will suffer."
Part I - Statement of Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN

Vice Admiral Lockwood sent the following letter to the Chief of Naval Communications, enclosing a statement as to the value of Communication Intelligence against the Japanese in World War II:

NAVY DEPARTMENT
Office of the Chief of Naval Operations
Washington 25, D. C.

17 June 1947

From: Vice Admiral C. A. Lockwood, USN
To: Chief of Naval Communications.

Subject: Communication Intelligence against the Japanese in World War II.

Enclosure: (A) Statement as to value of subject activity.

1. I am enclosing herewith a statement as to the value of communication intelligence against the Japanese in World War II.

2. I feel that this is a very modest outline and that there are undoubtedly a very great number of incidents and examples which time and memory have obliterated. However, I hope that there will be no thought of curtailing the operations of this activity, or of eliminating research and training in peacetime of a facility which must of necessity be immediately available on the approach or war.

C. A. LOCKWOOD

CONTRIBUTION OF COMMUNICATION INTELLIGENCE TO THE SUCCESS OF SUBMARINE OPERATIONS AGAINST THE JAPANESE IN WORLD WAR II.

The contribution to the defeat of Japan in World War II by United States submarines is a matter of record. More than two-thirds of the entire Japanese merchant marine and numerous warships, including some of every category, were sunk. These sinkings resulted, by mid-1944, in isolation of Japan from her overseas sources of raw materials and petroleum, with far reaching effects on the capability of her war industry to produce and her armed forces to operate. Her outlying bases were weakened by lack of reinforcements and supplies and fell victim to our air, surface and amphibious assaults; heavy bombers moved in to the captured bases and decimated and demoralized the Japanese to the point where they were forced to accept unconditional
These effects of submarine operations have been substantiated, both from Japanese and Allied official records, and for the most part have been made public in detail, but nothing has been told about the manner in which such outstanding results were achieved by such a relatively small submarine organization.

As Commander of the Submarine Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet, from February, 1943, through the end of hostilities, I can vouch for the very important part which Communication Intelligence played in the success of the submarine campaign. Through intercept, cryptanalysis and translation of Japanese messages, Communication Intelligence supplied the Submarine Force with a continuous flow of information on Japanese naval and merchant shipping, convoy routing and composition, damage sustained from submarine attacks, anti-submarine measures employed or to be employed, effectiveness of our torpedoes, and a wealth of other pertinent intelligence.

The Submarine Force Operations Officer was designated the Combat Intelligence Officer. He was given access to all of the Communication Intelligence files and through him information was furnished to the Force Commander and thence to the individual submarines concerned. A private telephone was installed between SubPac operations office and the combat intelligence center of JICPOA so that information on convoy routing could be supplied with a minimum of delay. Special internal codes, carried only by submarines, were used for relaying this type of information, so that our own surface ships, though they might be able to decipher the submarine messages, were unable to determine the type of information being supplied. When ComSubPac moved his operational headquarters to Guam a special cryptographic channel was authorized by OpNav to supply this information direct from JICPOA at Pearl Harbor.

The information furnished made possible the assignment of submarines not only to the most profitable patrol areas but also to specific locations at particular times where contacts were made with convoys of known composition and importance, and frequently with enemy course and speed known exactly. Combatant units of the Japanese Fleet were similarly located on many occasions. During periods, which fortunately were brief, when enemy code changes temporarily cut off the supply of Communication Intelligence, and of consequent sinkings almost exactly paralleled the curve of volume of Communication Intelligence available. There were many periods when every available submarine on patrol in the Pacific Ocean Area was busy on information supplied by Communication Intelligence. The vast reaches of the Pacific Ocean could not otherwise have been covered so thoroughly unless a far greater number of submarines had been available. In early 1945 it was learned from a Japanese prisoner-of-war that it was common saying in Singapore that you could walk from that port to Japan on American periscopes. This feeling among the Japanese was undoubtedly created, not by the great number of submarines on patrol, but rather by the fact, thanks to Communication Intelligence, the submarines were always at the same place as Japanese ships.
Regulations required that messages containing Communication Intelligence be destroyed, and as a consequence, no record of the many successes due to this intelligence can ever be compiled. However, some of the more notable achievements come immediately to mind:

Severe damage to carrier HITAKA (or HIYO) by TRIGGER in June, 1943, which put her out of commission for almost a year.
Sinking of aircraft transport MOGAMIGAWA by POGY in August, 1943.
Sinking of escort carrier CHUYO by SAILFISH in December, 1943.
Sinking of submarine I-42 by TUNNY in March, 1944.
Decimation of large Saipan-bound convoy by PINTADO and SHARK II just prior to our landings on that island.
Sinking of submarine I-29 by SAWFISH in July, 1944.
Sinking of submarine I-41 by SEA DEVIL in September, 1944.
Sinking of escort carrier JINKO by SPADEFISH in November, 1944.
Sinking of carrier UNRYU by REDFISH in December, 1944.
Severe damage to carrier HAYATAKA (or JUNYO) by REDFISH and/or SEA DEVIL in December, 1944, which put her out of commission for remainder of war.
Sinking of submarines RO-115, RO-112 and RO-113 by BATFISH within four days in February, 1945.
Sinking of submarine RO-56 off Wake Island by SEA OWL in April, 1945.
Sinking of light cruiser ISUZU by CHARR in April, 1945.
Contact and trailing of YAMATO task force by THREADFIN and HACKLEBACK in April, 1945, which resulted in sinkings the following day by carrier air forces of the battleship YAMATO, the cruiser YAHAGI, and destroyers HAMAKAZE, ISOKAZE, ASASHINO and KASUMI.

The above are but a few of the many successes against the Japanese Navy that can be directly attributed to Communication Intelligence. The sinkings of Japanese merchant ships resulting from Communication Intelligence ran into hundreds of ships and probably amounted to fifty percent of the total of all merchantmen sunk by submarines.

In addition to the direct results there were equally as important indirect results which must be credited to the same source of information. For example: From an analysis of Communication Intelligence extending over a period of many months it was determined that our magnetic torpedo exploders were not functioning properly, and steps were taken to correct the defects. Then again, information concerning enemy minefields was so complete that defensive minefields laid down by the enemy served our purpose rather than his. Not only were our submarines able to avoid the areas of danger, but Japanese ships, being required to avoid them as well, were forced into relatively narrow traffic lanes, making it easier for the submarines to locate and attack them. It is impossible to estimate the number of our submarines which were saved and the number of Japanese ships which were lost because of the accurate information about enemy minefields supplied by Communication Intelligence. Also, information concerning names of ships sunk, nature of cargo and number of troops lost was of inestimable value in assessing damage sustained by the enemy and gauging his capabilities.
Without Communication Intelligence submarine operations would unquestionably have been far more difficult and costly because of the vast areas which had to be covered and the attainment of the ultimate objectives would have been greatly delayed.

/s/ C. A. LOCKWOOD
In August 1947 the Communication Intelligence organization assisted the State Department delegation at the Inter-American Conference at Petropolis, Brazil in the handling of special intelligence. After the conference, Mr. Norman Armour, Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs, sent the following letter to Op-20-2:

**DEPARTMENT OF STATE**
**WASHINGTON**

15 SEP 1947

Dear Captain Wenger:

It gives me great pleasure to be able to express to you the State Department's appreciation of the very valuable service which your Division rendered apropos of the recent Inter-American Conference at Petropolis, Brazil.

I understand that we owe to you and your staff not only a large share of the benefit of the coverage provided, but also the efficient technical means which were used for this purpose, and the naval personnel who functioned so smoothly at Rio in behalf of the Secretary, myself and Mr. Eddy.

It is highly gratifying to realize that such interdepartmental cooperation is an established fact, and that it can be called upon from time to time in the interest of the national welfare.

Sincerely,

Norman Armour

Captain J. N. Wenger,
Room 17-105,
Naval Communications Annex,
3801 Nebraska Avenue, N.W.,
Washington 25, D. C.
...The Department has found this material valuable at all times, and vital in a number of highly important situations. It would appear that information of this kind, and its analysis, will be even more vital in the future than in the past, both during the period of actual hostilities, and after hostilities may be concluded. This material is of great value in determining the facts on which policy must be formulated or action taken."

Part M - Statement of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur

General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers in Japan, has made the following statement regarding the value of Communication Intelligence:

"...The information from this source saved us many thousands of lives and shortened the war by no less than two years."

TOP-SECRET

Part N - Letter of Appreciation from the Department of State

In the letter which follows the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence extends his appreciation to the Communication Intelligence organization for the valuable intelligence made available to the Department of State during the year 1947:

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE
WASHINGTON

January 8, 1948

Dear Admiral Stone:

It is with pleasure that I write to you, as we enter the new year, to express the appreciation of the Department and of my office for the unique source of intelligence which is made available to us through you and the personnel of your division. I refer, of course, to communication intelligence and the very real benefit which it brings to bear upon the complex problems of our country's foreign relations and of the Department's efforts to maintain and consolidate a state of peace favorable to the national welfare.

The Department now relies upon the technical facilities and the skills of the Communication Supplementary Activities, Washington, and the corresponding unit in the Army, for its basic communication intelligence material,
and I should be grateful if you would inform Captain Wenger and Captain Harper of our appreciation for this indispensable service. It is certainly an outstanding example of interdepartmental collaboration to mutual advantage and in the spirit of team-work which is now, more than ever, the expressed goal of our Government.

The relationships which exist on the working level between our people and yours are still another source of gratification to me, and I should like to extend our thanks to them through you.

Sincerely yours,

W. Park Armstrong, Jr.
Acting

Rear Admiral E. E. Stone,
Director of Naval Communications,
Department of the Navy,
Washington 25, D. C.