MEMORANDUM FOR MEMBERS OF AFSAC:

Subject: Justification of Basic Principles of AFSAC 25/68 (Enclosure "C").

Reference: (a) AFSAC 25/68.
(b) AFSAC 25/63.

1. The general justification for the subject principles is set forth in Enclosure "B" of reference (a), under "DISCUSSION". As pointed out there, the basic premises upon which these principles are predicated are that:

(a) AFSAC is operated by and for the Services.

(b) AFSAC's mission in the COMINT field is very broad and includes the production of combat intelligence.

(c) If AFSAC is to accomplish its mission properly, it must be as strong as possible and capable of dealing directly with problems at any level of complexity.

(d) For maximum efficiency and economy, unnecessary duplication of effort must be avoided.

(e) The best way to achieve (a) and (d) above is to consolidate the COMINT effort to the maximum practicable degree.

(f) Certain necessary activities are obviously not susceptible of physical consolidation (e.g., interception and point-of-intercept processing).

(g) Those activities which can be efficiently and economically consolidated are logically the responsibility of AFSAC.

(h) Those activities which cannot be consolidated can be undertaken by the Services with the least chance of unnecessary duplication.
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1. The sole purpose of intercept control is to provide material for processing; hence intercept control authority must be commensurate with processing responsibility.

2. In addition to gaining general acceptance of these premises, the objective of reference (a) is to define more explicitly the respective responsibilities of AFSA and the Services. Paragraph 3 d. (c) of JCS 2010 requires a determination by the JCS of activities that are not the sole responsibility of AFSA. These have been generally defined in paragraph 5 a. of Enclosure "B" to JCS 2010/6. Paragraph 3 d. (7) of JCS 2010 requires correlativey that the JCS determine which activities are the sole responsibility of AFSA and which are, therefore, denied to the Services. Reference (b) is an initial statement of the COMINT activities in this latter category.

3. Specifically, the reasons behind the various principles, as set forth in reference (b), are as follows:

(a) Paragraph 63

This is a statement of the fundamental principle that must underlie the development of a strong AFSA. Only by its acceptance can we insure the existence of a strong, efficient, and economical AFSA. The objection to insertion of the word "effective" after the word "maximum" is that it leaves the principle open to various interpretations, which will make it difficult to apply.

(b) Paragraph 64

Unless AFSA's role in regard to combat intelligence is plainly stated, paragraph 5 a. of JCS 2010/6 (Enclosure "B") may be construed to mean that the Services are entirely responsible for the COMINT activities necessary for direct support of their combat operations.
(a) Paragraph 65

This is intended to prevent duplication of effort by prohibiting any Service processing activities within the continental U.S. which AFSA can properly perform. The second sentence of the AFSA version in effect defines "center". "Major" in the Air Force version requires definition.

(b) Paragraph 66

This is intended to provide for eventually placing under AFSA control such theatre processing activities as those of ASA Europe and ASA Pacific (which was recommended by General Clarke as Chief of ASA). It is a step toward increasing the strength and effectiveness of AFSA, and is fully justifiable as a joint service to a joint command. Here again the Air Force must define "major" before its version is understandable. AFSA is prepared to present, for Army consideration, a plan which delineates proper command and control relationships.

(c) Paragraph 67

This is intended to clarify and delimit further, in consonance with the basic premises in paragraph 1 above, the responsibilities of the Services as set forth in paragraph 5 a. of JCS 2010/6 (Enclosure "B"). In the Air Force version, omission of the word "commander" at the end of subparagraph a. is not serious but the AFSA version stresses the local or area character of these Service activities, as opposed to the broader field in which we believe AFSA's responsibility lies. Introduction of the "command element" by the Air Force in subparagraph b. is completely unacceptable to AFSA because it leaves the principle open to various interpretations.

(f) Paragraph 68

This further clarifies the responsibilities of the Services by stipulating what they may do within the continental U.S. Service activities authorized in this area are:
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1. Necessary interception.
2. Necessary point-of-intercept processing.
3. Training required for 1. and 2. above.
4. Administration and control of authorized Service activities.

This paragraph supports and strengthens the restrictions imposed by paragraph 65.

In the next to the last line, the word "there" should be deleted, and the word "Service" should be inserted after the word "authorized," for clarification.

The expression "continental U.S. has been substituted for Zone of the Interior because it is more definitive.

(g) Paragraph 69

Agreed to by all ad hoc members.

(h) Paragraph 70

Omission agreed to by all ad hoc members.

(i) Paragraph 71

This is a most important principle which means, in effect, that AFSA's inability to perform any of the tasks within its assigned mission shall not constitute the right for any Service to undertake such tasks without the specific approval of AFSA in each case. The AFSA version states this principle in the positive sense.

(j) Paragraph 72

This principle has three objectives:

1. To break down the illogical division in JCS 2010 between fixed and mobile facilities.
2. To insure that AFSA has adequate control of the intercept facilities it requires, and
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3. To insure the greatest and most economical over-all coverage with the limited facilities normally available in peacetime.

The Army view is merely a rephrasing of the provisions of JCS 2010 and will not accomplish the above objectives.

The Air Force view may achieve objectives 1 and 2 above, but will not accomplish 3.

(k) Paragraph 73

This is a safeguard for the Services. Actually, the Air Force version, which omits subparagraph b. (1), affords AFSA greater freedom of action, but the Army and Navy prefer the other view, which is acceptable to AFSA.

(1) Paragraph 74

Agreed to by all ad hoc members.

(m) Paragraph 75

Agreed to by all ad hoc members. (This is a safeguard for the Services and provides an orderly and authoritative means of settling differences in the interest of all concerned.)

(n) Paragraph 76

This principle is merely to insure that control machinery is properly streamlined for optimum effectiveness.

The Army view would perpetuate present arrangements and make standardization of control procedures difficult to achieve.

Operational control can be defined as it has been under current operating arrangements between AFSA and ASA. Additional safeguards for the Services are provided under paragraph 73.

(o) Paragraph 77

Agreed to by all ad hoc members.
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(p) Paragraph 78

Omission agreed to by all ad hoc members.

(q) Paragraph 79

Agreed to by all ad hoc members. (This is another safeguard for the Services which also specifies procedures for the settlement of differences in the interest of all concerned).

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