Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting

SUBJECT: Report by AF SAC to the JCS on the Division of Responsibility for Cryptologic Operations.

1. Divergencies having arisen between AFSA and the three Services as to the significance of portions of JCS 2010 and JCS 2010/6, dealing with the establishment and organization of the Armed Forces Security Agency, I endeavored to reconcile the differences, with the aid and advice of AF SAC, the result being to bring only the Navy over to AFSA's point of view, but not the Air Force nor the Army. Thus AF SAC is formed to submit a split report on the situation, for resolution by the JCS. The report sets forth divergencies in interpretation of the two referenced documents. The enclosure to the report sets forth changes that are recommended by AFSA and the Navy, on one hand, and by the Air Force and the Army, on the other hand. The purpose of the recommended changes is to clarify these documents so as to make their basic intent more obvious.

2. a. The basic intent in the formation of AFSA was to establish a single Armed Forces cryptologic center which, by consolidation of facilities and personnel under a single head, would not only be conducive to maximum efficiency and economy in COMINT activities of the armed Forces, but would also avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility, thus conforming to one of the principal recommendations of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor. Evidence that this was the intent is found in the fact that the complete COMINT processing plants, facilities, and personnel of the Army at Arlington Hall Station and of the Navy at the Naval Communications Station were turned over to AFSA for unified operation under my direction.

b. The foregoing unification was the result of the adoption by the Secretary of Defense of the proposal made by the Army in the Report of the Committee on the Creation of a Unified Armed Forces Security Agency. The principal arguments advanced by the Army were summarized in the fundamental conclusion reached by the Army as set forth in Par. II of its proposal, as follows:

"The Department of Army members held that the most efficient direction and maximum exploitation require that the responsibility for all communications intelligence tasks other than the performance of intercept and decentralized field processing be fixed within a single organization."

3. Adoption of the ArSA-NAVY recommendations will consolidate and unify under one organization, viz., AFSA all COMINT processing, except intercept and decentralized, mobile, field processing. Adoption of the AIR FORCE-NAVY recommendations will permit each of the Services to establish large COMINT processing centers not only within the U.S. but also in theaters of operations.

4. If the currently-held views of the Air Force and the Army are found by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to be of sufficient merit to warrant the adoption of the changes in JCS 2010 and JCS 2010/6 recommended by those two Services, the consequences are clear: the situation will inevitably terminate in the U. S. having four competing cryptologic organizations none of which will be completely effective. That is the very situation which it was intended to avoid by creating AFSA, and which, as demonstrated by a parallel one in the former German Government, will be an important factor in determining whether in a future war the U. S. will be victorious or go down in defeat. Rather than accept such a risk it would appear better to dissolve AFSA and return to the original situation in which there were three Service cryptologic organizations, with some mechanism for their coordination. The original Navy proposal, as contained in the Report referred to in Par. 2b above and which advocated the retention of the then current arrangement with a stronger coordinating mechanism, would be a far better solution of the problem.

5. RECOMMENDATION:

Approval of AFSA-NAVY views as outlined in AF SAC Report JCS 2010/7.