This study is an attempt to assess the current confluence of governmental intelligence and the documentation which has served as a basis for governmental agencies to engage in cryptologic activities.

This study is an attempt to bring together intelligence and documentation which have served as a basis for governmental agencies to engage in cryptology. There will be an attempt to make conclusions about whether the legality of cryptologic operations have ever been questioned and what conclusions are made.

This study is an attempt to bring together intelligence and documentation which have served as a basis for governmental agencies to engage in cryptologic activities. The study is limited to the National Security Agency and the predecessor agencies in the Army and Navy, although some of the predecessor agencies are responsible for the preceding U.S. Army cryptologic centers. Information concerning other governmental agencies is not germane to this study and the preceding U.S. naval cryptologic units have been omitted due to the lack of information about their activities.

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There will be no attempt to try and prove
the legality or illegality of any cryptologic activity. This task
fell within the purview of the various legal councils and
the courts. Furthermore, there
would seem to be a distinction between legality and
authority; which only the court that an individual
would recognize since we are also U.S. government's
cryptologic profession operates and has always operated
within an established chain of
command. It would seem to be reasonable to accept
the view that there is a
distinct possibility that a set which
cannot be determined
legally and authority, become two separate
issues. Usurpation within the framework can create
an authority. It is quite conceivable that someone
higher in the chain of command may authorize
some activities to a subordinate. The subordinate
then has an authority or authorized for the same
operations. And as far as the subordinate is concerned
this is considered legal. Whether or not this authority
is legitimate or maintaining the laws of the country
is another matter which can only be decided by
some other legal process. Therefore, the

One other command must be voiced before ending the
survey for the purpose of this study...
been divided into two broad categories, cryptography and cryptanalysis. Cryptography includes the production and protection of United States secure communications, and cryptanalysis will mean the obtaining and analysis of communications for the purpose of producing intelligence. If we attempt to trace just where to begin in a study of this kind, according to our definitions one could almost as equally trace all the way to the American Revolution and find both activities involving both cryptography and cryptanalysis. Here and elsewhere, we have spoken of the personal correspondence and secret military correspondence of such prominent figures as General George Washington, Thomas Jefferson, James Madison, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, John Jay, James Madison, John Adams, Robert Livingston, Edmund Randolph, Robert Morris, and others. There also seems to be some indications that both cryptography and cryptanalysis may have been conducted at an essentially more organized level, the first indicative instance being the events connected with the Boston Tea Party. There were a number of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and made notable contributions to his solutions of captured British messages towards the end of the war. There is however one indication that Jewell was acting under any specific grant of authority. The specific situation was such that an emergency existed, and Jewell was asked to break the codes and produce valuable intelligence. Furthermore, if there was no specific permission given, the situation was pressing.
In an article entitled "Sound among the Revolutions," the Michigan Alumni Quarterly Review (1936) author Howard H. Backham wrote: "It may not be too far-fetched to decipher many of the British code messages interpreted by the Americans."
There were a number of violations from both the committee of correspondence and the recipient. Each of the reports and communications were on the mission to frame all of Drescher's reports, eventually found their way to the committee who perceived the underlying fraud. Despite their actions, the reports to the Committee were addressed to individual members and finally even went unsigned. They all found their way to the agency who perceived the underlying fraud into their perception.