The following are Federal Laws and Armed Forces Security Agency Memoranda that will be pertinent to your assignment.
ESPIONAGE ACT


Section 31
UNLAWFULLY OBTAINING OR PERMITTING TO BE OBTAINED INFORMATION AFFECTING NATIONAL DEFENSE.

(a) Whoever, for the purpose of obtaining information respecting the national defense with intent or reason to believe that the information to be obtained is to be used to the injury of the United States or to the advantage of any foreign nation, goes upon, enters, flies over, or otherwise obtains information concerning any vessel, aircraft, work of defense, navy yard, naval station, submarine base, coaling station, fort, battery, torpedo station, dockyard, canal, railroad, arsenal, camp, factory, mine telegraph, telephone, wireless, or signal station; building, office, or other place connected with the national defense owned or constructed, or in the progress of construction by the United States or under the control of the United States, or any of its officers or agents, or within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, or any place in which any vessel, aircraft, arms, munitions, or other materials or instruments for use in time of war are being made, prepared, repaired, or stored, under any contract or agreement with the United States, or with any person on behalf of the United States, or otherwise on behalf of the United States, or any prohibited place within the meaning of section 36 of this title; or

(b) whoever for the purpose aforesaid and with like intent or reason to believe copies, takes, makes or obtains, or attempts, or induces or aids another to copy, take, make, or obtain, any sketch, instrument, appliance, document, writing, or note of anything connected with the national defense;

(c) whoever, for the purpose aforesaid receives or obtains or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain from any person, or from any source whatever, any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note, of anything connected with the national defense, knowing or having reason to believe, at the time he receives or obtains, or agrees or attempts or induces or aids another to receive or obtain it, that it has been or will be obtained, taken, made or disposed of by any person contrary to the provisions of this title; or

(d) whoever lawfully or unlawfully having possession of, access to, control over, or being intrusted with any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, instrument, appliance, or note relating to the national defense, willfully communicates
transmits or attempts to communicate or transmit the same to any person not entitled to receive it; or willfully retains the same and fails to deliver it on demand to the officer or employee of the United States entitled to receive it; or

(e) whoever, being intrusted with or having lawful possession or control of any document, writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note, or information relating to the national defense, through gross negligence permits the same to be removed from its proper place of custody or delivered to anyone in violation of his trust, or to be lost, stolen, abstracted, or destroyed, shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 10 years and may, in the discretion of the court, be fined not more than $10,000. As amended Mar. 28, 1940 1 c. 72, Sec. 1, 54 Stat. 79.

Section 32.
UNLawFULLy DISCLOSING INFORMATION AFFECTING NATIONAL DEFENSE.

(a) Whoever, with intent or reason to believe that is is to be used to the injury of the United States, or to the advantage of a foreign nation, communicates, delivers, or transmits, or attempts to, or aids or induces another to communicate, deliver, or transmit to any foreign government, or to any faction or party or military or naval force within a foreign country, whether recognized or unrecognized by the United States, or to any representative, officer, agent, employee, subject, or citizen thereof, either directly or indirectly, any document; writing, code book, signal book, sketch, photograph, photographic negative, blueprint, plan, map, model, note instrument, appliance or information relating to the national defense shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than 20 years: Provided, That whoever shall violate the provisions of subsection (a) of this section in time of war shall be punished by death or imprisonment for not more than 30 Years; and (b) whoever, in time of war, with intent that the same shall be communicated to the enemy, shall collect, record, publish, or communicate, or shall attempt to elicit any information with respect to the movement, numbers, description, condition, or disposition of any of the armed forces, ships, aircraft, or war materials of the United States, or with respect to the plans or conduct, or supposed plans or conduct of any naval or military operations, or with respect to any works or measures undertaken for or connected with, or intended for the fortification or defense of any place, or any other information relating to the public defense, which might be useful to the enemy, shall be punished by death or by imprisonment for not more than 30 years.

(June 15, 1917, c. 30, Title I, Sec. 2, 40 Stat. 218)
MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Secretary of State
The Secretary of War
The Secretary of the Navy
The Attorney General
The Joint Chiefs of Staff
The Director of the Budget
The Director of the Office of War Information

Appropriate departments of the Government and the Joint Chiefs of Staff are hereby directed to take such steps as are necessary to prevent release to the public, except with the special approval of the President in each case, of:

Information regarding the past or present status, technique or procedures, degree of success attained, or any specific results of any cryptanalytic unit acting under the authority of the U. S. Government or any Department thereof.

HARRY S. TRUMAN
AFSA MINIATURNNO. 72-50

15 February 1950

Subject. Handling of Code Word Material.

1. The following instructions are published for the guidance of all AFSA person nel for the handling of Code Word material.

a. Defini tio n: Code Word Material is a term applied to classified material which, in addition to its classification, bears a five letter code word designation.

b. Classification: The appropriate classification, TOP SECRET or SECRET, and its associated Code Word shall appear on every sheet of paper (top and bottom).

c. Transmission: Code Word material will either be transmitted by encryption on an authorized cryptosystem, or through TOP SECRET channels over officially approved officer courier routes, except where such routes involve air or land transport over territories of foreign nations.

d. Dissemination: Code Word material will be disseminated only to personnel who have been properly indoctrinated in the handling of special intelligence and only then on a "need-to-know" basis.

e. Addressing: All Code Word material will be wrapped in double envelopes and addressed as follows:

(1) Outer Envelope will be marked in the same manner as all other TOP SECRET correspondence (Register Number, "VIA OFFICER COURIER," etc.)

(2) Inner Envelope will be stamped TOP SECRET (Code Word will NEVER appear on either the inner or outer envelope), and in addition to the regular address, the following phrase will be appended, "TO BE OPENED ONLY BY PERSONALLY." The title or the name of the person known to be authorized to receive Code Word material will be inserted in the blank.
AFSA MEMORANDUM NO. 72-50

Subject: Handling of Code Word Material.

2. Strict compliance with the above directions is required of all AFSA personnel, as failure to observe these security precautions may result in serious compromise of this Agency's activities.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, AFSA.

/s/ M. J. COMFIELD
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Administration

DISTRIBUTION II

AUTHENTICATED:

F. T. JOHNSON
LT USN
3 April 1950

AFSA MEMORANDUM NO. 10-11

Subject: Personal Mail.

1. AFSA personnel are reminded that neither the Armed Forces Security Agency nor the Service Cryptologic Agencies will be used as a c/o address for receiving personal mail.

2. Personnel assigned to the Armed Forces Security Agency will not utilize official mail channels for the posting of personal mail; all such mail must be posted in mail boxes located outside the Station areas.

3. An exception to the requirements of paragraph 1 above is permitted in the case of individuals actually quartered at either the Naval Communication Station or Arlington Hall Station.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, AFSA:

/s/ M.J. Coffield
N. J. COFFIELD
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Administration

DISTRIBUTION I
AFSA-05/mr
A8-6

AFSA MEMORANDUM NO. 120-6

Subject: Security Regulations.

1. Effective this date, and until further notification, the provisions of the CSAW Security Manual will apply to all AFSA spaces, facilities, and personnel located at NCS; the provisions of ASA security regulations will apply to AFSA spaces, facilities, and personnel located at AHS.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, AFSA:

/s/ J. S. Harper
J. S. Harper
Captain, U. S. Navy
(Act'g) Chief of Administration

DISTRIBUTION II
Subject: Camera Restrictions at Arlington Hall Station and J. S. Navy Communication Station

References: (a) Post Regulations, Arlington Hall Station
(b) Organization and Regulations, J. S. Navy Communication Station

1. "Post regulations concerning the use and possession of cameras at Arlington Hall Station and U. S. Navy Communication Station are quoted as follows:

   a. Para. (f), page 22, Post Regulations, Arlington Hall Station reads:

   "Cameras. Cameras must be registered with the Provost Marshal. Unregistered cameras will not be permitted on the Post and are subject to seizure. bona fide members of the Civilian Camera Club are authorized to register their cameras and bring them on the Post for the purpose of study at the request of the Camera Club. Members of Club will check their cameras in Headquarters Building, Room 4-119, during the day. Under no circumstances will cameras be carried into an Operations Building. The use of cameras on the Post is strictly forbidden!"

   b. Page 7-3, Ite. 6/13, Organization and Regulations, J. S. Navy Communication Station reads:

   "The personal possession of cameras on the Station shall be prohibited without the written permission of the Commanding Officer. Official cameras, film and photographic equipment may be carried in and out of the Station if the bearer has a property pass bearing an authorized signature."

   2. The use of personal cameras at either post is strictly forbidden.

RESTRICTED
AFSA-521

AFSA MEMORANDUM NO. 120-16

Subject: Recognition of A.H.S. Badges at N.C.S.

Reference: NCS STATION ORDER NO. 14-49.

1. The reference is quoted in part for the information and guidance of all AFSA personnel:

2. Effective immediately permanent (photo) badges issued by Arlington Hall Station shall be recognized by sentries for admittance to inner and outer compounds of the Navy Communication Station as indicated below:

   (a) YELLOW (photo) badges:

   Authorized to enter outer and inner compounds through all regularly manned gates. No escort required.

   (b) GREEN (photo) badges:

   Authorized to enter outer and inner compounds through all regularly manned gates. No escort required.

   (c) CHERRY (Photo) badges:

   Authorized to enter the inner and outer compounds when in company (escort) of a wearer of YELLOW or GREEN Arlington Hall Station badges or by NCS Personnel wearing permanent badges. CHERRY badge personnel must be attended at all times while within NCS compounds. Escort slip not required."

FOR THE DIRECTOR, AFSA:

/s/ M.J. Coffield
M. J. COFFIELD
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Administration

DISTRIBUTION II
3. The contents of this memorandum will be brought to the attention of all AISA personnel, and strict compliance with the Post Regulations noted herein will be observed by all AISA personnel.

FOR TII: DIRECTOR, ATSA:

/S/ H. J. Coffield
M. J. COFFIELD
Colonel, USAF
Chief of Administration

RESTRICTED
AFSA MEMORANDUM NO. 120-18/1

Subject: Certification of Public Law 513 (Crypto Security Law)

1. AFSA Memoranda 120-18 and 120-19, 15 May and 13 June 1950 respectively, are hereby superseded.

2. All personnel, military and civilian, entering on duty with this Agency, will read Public Law 513 and complete the certification attached thereto. This will be accomplished during initial processing into the Agency by the Personnel Division. The signed certificates will be forwarded to the Security Control Division for file.

3. Public Law 513 will be reviewed quarterly by all personnel. Office and Staff Division Chiefs will notify the Chief, Security Control Division, in writing, by the 15th of the month following the end of each calendar quarter that this has been accomplished. Individual certifications are not required.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

Geo. E. Campbell
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION I

CONFIDENTIAL
AFSA MEMORANDUM NO. 120-25/1

SUBJECT: Security of Equipment used for Storage of Classified Material

1. AFSA Memorandum No. 120-25 (202-50) 29 November 1950 and Appendix I, 30 August 1951, are hereby superseded. The procedures and standards set forth herein shall govern the use of vaults, safes, and safe cabinets and the custody of safe combinations for all components of AFSA.

2. Each vault, safe, and safe cabinet having a combination lock has been assigned a Security Control Division File number for identification. When present equipment is moved or when new equipment is acquired, Physical Security Branch will be notified immediately so that records may be kept up to date.

3. Each combination will be changed.

   a. At least every six (6) months.

   b. Whenever a person knowing the combination is removed from assignment, a person who has had access to a combination is presumed to know it.

   c. Whenever the combination becomes known to anyone not authorized to know it. A person who has had access to a combination is presumed to know it.

4. Combinations will be furnished to Physical Security Branch in sealed envelopes, (Safe and File Combination Record - PRNC-NCSW 365) for use in emergencies. The Security Control Division File Number assigned to the equipment will be inserted on the top line of each envelope, and a list of the names and badge numbers of persons to whom the envelope may be issued will be written in the space provided.

5. The keys to key-locked and bar-locked cabinets will be stored in combination-locked safes or cabinets.

   a. Whenever the combination of a safe is needed, it may be obtained from the Physical Security Officer or the Security Guard Officer. The envelope containing the combination will be given only to the Director, Deputy Director, Chief of Staff, Staff Duty Officer or any person whose name appears on the envelope.
7. Responsible Chiefs and Heads of organizational units will ensure that the instructions listed below are understood and followed by all persons in their units who are responsible for locking and checking safes and cabinets.

   a. When a combination lock is being locked, the combination dial should be turned in one direction at least four (4) complete turns. It should not be turned one way and then the other, and IT SHOULD NOT BE SPUN RAPIDLY.

   b. Before a safe-cabinet is locked, all drawers must be completely closed. After the combination is turned, the locker should check by depressing the latch of each drawer and attempting vigorously to open the drawer.

   c. When a cabinet is being secured with a bar lock, the locker should insure that the bar is put through all fasteners and that the padlock is completely closed and locked.

   d. When a cabinet of any type is being secured, care should be taken to insure that loose papers, paper clips, etc., do not become wedged behind drawers or in the drawer tracks.

8. Each piece of equipment used to store classified matter will bear, posted at a conspicuous place, a list of the names, home addresses, and home telephone numbers of all persons authorized to open the equipment and use its contents.

9. A Security Record Certificate will be posted or each piece of equipment used for the storing of classified material and on each door to a room which has been declared a restricted or secured area. On this sheet will be recorded the date and time of each opening, locking, and checking of the equipment or door and the signature of the person who performs the function. When these sheets become completely filled, they will be signed by the chief or head of the organizational unit concerned and forwarded to Physical Security Branch for review.

10. Each piece of equipment used for the storage of classified material will, when open and in use, bear a red card with the print legend "Open." When it is closed and locked the card will be reversed to reveal the legend "Closed."

11. Each equipment used to store only unclassified material will bear a legend to that effect signed by the appropriate unit Chief or Head.

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RESTRICTED
FSC Memorandum No. 120-25/1

12. All forms, cards, and envelopes prescribed in this memorandum may be obtained from the Publications and "Provisional Branch of the Adjutant General's Office.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

[Signature]

GEO. E. CAMPBELL
Colonel, AGC
Adjutant General

DISTRIBUTION IV

RESTRICTED
AFSA-16

AFSA MEMORANDUM NO. 120-26(29-50)

29 December 1950

SUBJECT: Names of Organizations having Interests in Conflict with those of the United States

1. For the information of all persons in AFSA, there is attached hereto a consolidated list of organizations designated by the Attorney General as having interests in conflict with those of the United States of America.

2. Affiliation or association by any member of this Agency with any one of the organizations listed will entail serious risks on his part in connection with loyalty determination.

FOR THE DIRECTOR, AFSA:

/s/ E. S. L. Goodwin
E. S. L. GOODWIN
Captain, U. S. Navy
Executive for Coordination and Compliance

Attachment - 1

1. List of organizations designated by the Attorney General, dated 11-29-50

DISTRIBUTION III
Organizations Designated by the Attorney General as having Interests in Conflict with those of the United States
(Extracted from the FEDERAL REGISTER, 29 Nov. 1950, Vol. 15, No. 231)

Totalitarian:

Black Dragon Society
Central Japanese Association (Beikeku Chue Nipponjin Kai)
Central Japanese Association of Southern California
Dai Nippon Butoku Kai (Military Virtue Society of Japan or Military Art Society of Japan)
Heimiska Kai, also known as Nekubei Heiskei Giumsha Kai, Zaibel Nihonjin,
Heiyaku Giumsha Kai, and Zaibel Heimusha Kai (Japanese Residing in America
Military Conscription Association)
Hinode Kai (Imperial Japanese Reservists)
Hinomaru Kai (Rising Sun Flag Society—a group of Japanese War Veterans)
Hokubei Zaigo Shoke Dan (North American Reserve Officers Association)
Japanese Association of America
Japanese Overseas Central Society (Kaigai Dobo Chue Kai)
Japanese Overseas Convention, Tokyo, Japan, 1940
Japanese Protective Association (Recruiting Organization)
Jikyoku Ken Kai (Current Affairs Association)
Kibei Seinen Kai (Association of U. S. Citizens of Japanese Ancestry who have
returned to America after studying in Japan)
Kanka Teikoku Gunyudan (Imperial Military Friends Group or Southern California
War Veterans)
Nichibei Kogyo Kaisha (The Great Fujii Theatre)
Northwest Japanese Association
Peace Movement of Ethiopia
Sakura Kai Patriotic Society, or Cherry Association—composed of veterans of
Russo–Japanese War
Shinto Temples
Sokoku Kai (Fatherland Society)
Tsuiko Shu (Reserve Officers Association Los Angeles)

Assist:

American Nationalist Party
American National Labor Party
American National Socialist League
American National Socialist Party
American Patriots Inc.
 gunshot Organization der NSDAP, Overseas Branch of Nazi Party
Association of German Nationals (Reichsdeutsche Vereinigung)
central Organization of the German–American National Alliance (Deutscher–
Amerikanische Einheitsfront)
Citizens Protective League
Committe for Nationalist Action
ante Alighieri Society
Fascist: (Cont'd)

Federation of Italian War Veterans in the U. S. A., Inc. (Associazione Nazionale Combattenti Italiani, Federazione deli Stati Uniti d'America)
Friends of the New Germany (Freunde des Neuen Deutschlands)
German-American Bund (Amerika-deutscher Velksbund)
German-American Republican League
German-American Vocational League (Deutsche-Amerikanische Berufage-meinschaft)
Kyffhaeuser, also known as Kyffhaeuser League (Kyffhaeuser Bund), Kyffhaeuser Fellowship (Kyffhaeuser Kameradschaft)
Kyffhaeuser War Relief (Kyffhaeuser Kriegshilfswerk)
Lictor Society (Italian Black Shirts)
Mario Morgantini Circle
National Bule Star Mothers of America
Nationalist Action League

Communist:

Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Abraham Lincoln School, Chicago, Illinois
Action Committee to Free Spain Now
American Association for Reconstruction in Yugoslavia, Inc.
American Branch of the Federation of Greek Maritime Unions
American Committee for European Workers' Relief
American Committee for Protection of Foreign Born
American Committee for Spanish Freedom
American Committee for Yugoslav Relief, Inc.
American Council for a Democratic Greece, formerly known as the Greek American Council; Greek American Committee for National Unity
American Council on Soviet Relations
American Croatian Congress
American Jewish Labor Council
American League Against War and Fascism
American League for Peace and Democracy
American Peace Mobilization
American Polish Labor Council
American Rescue Ship Mission (a project of the United American Spanish Aid Committee)
American Russian Institute, New York
American Russian Institute, Philadelphia
American Russian Institute (of San Francisco)
American Russian Institute of Southern California, Los Angeles
American Slav Congress
American Youth for Democracy
American Progressive League of America
Boston School for Marxist Studies, Boston, Massachusetts
California Labor School, Inc., 216 Market Street, San Francisco, California
American Youth Congress
Citizens Committee to Free Earl Browder
Citizens Committee for Harry Bridges
Civil Rights Congress and its affiliated organizations, including: Civil Rights Congress for Texas, Veterans Against Discrimination of Civil Rights Congress of New York
Comité Coordinador Pro República Espanola
Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy
Commonwealth College, Mena, Arkansas
Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates, including: Citizens Committee of the Upper West Side (New York City), Committee to Aid the Fighting South, Daily Worker Press Club, Dennis Defense Committee, Labor Research Association, Inc., Southern Negro Youth Congress, United May Day Committee, United Negro and Allied Veterans of America, Yiddisher Kultur Farband.
Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates, including: Florida Press and Educational League, Peoples Educational and Press Association of Texas, Virginia League for Peoples Education.
Connecticut State Youth Conference
Congress of American Revolutionary Writers
Congress of American Women
Council on African Affairs
Council for Pan-American Democracy
Detroit Youth Assembly
Emergency Conference to Save Spanish Refugees (founding body of the North American Spanish Aid Committee)
Friends of the Soviet Union
George Washington Carver School, New York City
Hawaii Civil Liberties Committee
Hollywood Writers Mobilization for Defense
Hungarian-American Council for Democracy
Independent Socialist League
International Labor Defense
International Workers Order, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates, including: American-Russian Fraternal Society; Carpatho-Russian Peoples Society; Carvantes Fraternal Society; Croatian Benevolent Fraternity; Finnish-American Mutual Aid Society; Garibaldi American Fraternal Society; Hellenic-American Brotherhood; Hungarian Brotherhood; Jewish Peoples Fraternal Order; People's Radio Foundation, Inc.; Polonia Society of the IWO; Romanian-American Fraternal Society; Serbian-American Fraternal Society; Slovak Workers Society; Ukrainian-American Fraternal Union.
Jefferson School of Social Science, New York City
Jewish Peoples Committee
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee
Joseph Weydemeyer School of Social Science, St. Louis, Mo.
Labor Youth League
League of American Writers
Macedonia-American People's League
Michigan Civil Rights Federation
Communist: (Cont'd)

Michigan School of Social Science
National Committee for the Defense of Political Prisoners
National Committee to Win the Peace
National Conference on American Policy in China and the Far East (a Conference called by the Committee for a Democratic Far Eastern Policy)
National Council of Croatian Descent
National Council of American-Soviet Friendship
National Federation for Constitutional Liberties
National Negro Congress
Nature Friends of America (since 1935)
Negro Labor Victory Committee
New Committee for Publications
North American Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy
North American Spanish Aid Committee
Ohio School of Social Sciences
Oklahoma Committee to Defend Political Prisoners
Pacific Northwest Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Peoples Educational Association (incorporated under name Los Angeles Educational Association, Inc.) aka Peoples Educational Center, Peoples University, People's School
People's Institute of Applied Religion
Philadelphia School of Social Science and Art
Photo League (New York City)
Progressive German-Americans, aka Progressive German-Americans of Chicago
Proletarian Party of America
Revolutionary Workers League
Samuel Adams School, Boston, Massachusetts
Schappes Defense Committee
Schneiderman-Darcy Defense Committee
School of Jewish Studies, New York City
Seattle Labor School, Seattle, Washington
Serbian Vidovdan Council
Slovenian-American National Council
Socialist Workers Party, including American Committee for European Workers' Relief
Socialist Youth League
Tom Paine School of Social Science, Philadelphia, Pa.
Tom Paine School of Westchester, New York
Union of American Croatians
United American Spanish Aid Committee
United Committee of South Slavic Americans
United Harlem Tenants and Consumers Organization
Veterans of the Abraham Lincoln Brigade
Walt Whitman School of Social Science, Newark, New Jersey
Washington Bookshop Association
Washington Committee for Democratic Action
Washington Commonwealth Federation
Wisconsin Conference on Social Legislation
Workers Alliance
Workers Party, including Socialist Youth League
Young Communist League

Subversive:

Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates
Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates,
including: Florida Press and Educational League; Peoples Educational and
Press Association of Texas; Virginia League for Peoples Education
German-American Bund
Independent Socialist League
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Socialist Workers Party
Workers Party
Young Communist League

Organizations which have "adopted a policy of advocating or approving the
commission of acts of force and violence to deny others their rights under
the Constitution of the United States":
American Christian Nationalist Party
Associated Klans of America
Columbians
Knights of the White Camellia
Ku Klux Klan
Original Southern Klans, Incorporated
Protestant War Veterans of the United States, Inc.
Silver Shirt Legion of America

Organizations which "seek to alter the form of government of the United States
by unconstitutional means":
Communist Party, U. S. A., its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates
Communist Political Association, its subdivisions, subsidiaries and affiliates
including: Florida Press and Educational League; Peoples Educational and
Press Association of Texas; Virginia League for Peoples Education
Independent Socialist League
Industrial Workers of the World
Nationalist Party of Puerto Rico
Partido del Pueblo of Panama (operating in the Canal Zone)
Socialist Workers Party
Workers Party
Young Communist League
CONFIDENTIAL

7 February 1971

SPECIAL CIRCUS A-11

AFSA-11

AFSA STAFF N0. 120-27

SUBJECT: Unauthorized Disclosures of Classified Information

1. The President of the United States has expressed concern over the large number of recent unauthorized releases to the press and public of classified information.

2. Personnel of AFSA are being reminded quarterly, through the procedure prescribed in "Memorandum No. 120-18", of the law which protects classified cryptologic information. It is now called to their attention that much of the classified information available to them in SH is non-cryptologic in nature and that, as members of the military services and employees of the Government, they are obligated to protect all classified information, cryptologic or not.

3. Anyone serving in AFSA who intends to expose to publicity any writing or statement must check it carefully before he leaves his control to assure that it is free of classified information. If he is in doubt, he should, for his own protection, secure the writing or statement with the Director, AFSA, by the process prescribed (in "Memorandum No. 10-33") for cryptologic lectures and articles.

4. In addition, all are reminded that the unpremeditated statement, if made in the wrong place and to the wrong people, is capable of exposing classified information to publicity. For this reason, and because of their constant concern with large amounts of classified information, AFSA personnel must be particularly alert in their conversations. No amount of official censorship can protect against careless conversation; security in this respect depends entirely upon the loyalty, discretion, and alertness of each individual.

5. This "memorandum will be read quarterly by or to every person serving in AFSA. Chiefs of Offices and Staff Divisions will add a report of compliance with this provision to the report (to AFSA-15) called for by AFSA Memorandum No. 120-18.

/S/ Karl S. Stone

Director, Armed Forces Security Agency

DISTRIBUTION III

CONFIDENTIAL

THIS MATERIAL IS CONFIDENTIAL. It is directed that this material not pass out of the hands of personnel associated with the Armed Forces Security Agency, except by express permission of the Director, Armed Forces Security Agency.

Prepared by: AFSA Security Control Division
7 January 1952
Part I

INTRODUCTION TO SECURITY

The Agency by which you are employed is engaged in a very sensitive operation; the details of the operation and the final results thereof are highly classified. Even the smallest slip as to the failure or success of the work within the Agency may be of comfort to the enemy. The success or failure of this and similar activities has, therefore, always been diligently guarded, even at the expense of sacrificing lives to do so. The necessity that you constantly guard your conversation regarding the work of the Agency is obvious. To be brief, you do not discuss it anywhere except on the job.

Realizing human frailties and the natural tendency of most humans to talk about themselves, access to information concerned with Agency operation is based on a "need to know." This method of granting access to information to personnel tends to insure that each person is familiar only with the part of the process performed by his own immediate section. It is necessary that each employee realize that even though a friend is a fellow employee and known to be cleared, he is not entitled to the information that you hold unless he is working on the same job you are. You are never, under any circumstances, to discuss your work with anyone except your immediate supervisor and as required to accomplish your daily task; you will never answer questions about your work to anyone unless instructed to do so by your supervisor. No one is entitled to information by virtue of his rank or position alone.

To assist in maintaining the security of the operation and to serve as identification of various phases of it, code words are used. Code words are of the highest classification and each refers to a definite phase of the operation and, perhaps, of your work. Ordinarily, no one person has access to more than one code word. If some code word material to which you are not normally entitled comes into your possession, it is your duty to immediately return it to the proper authority so that it may be placed in the proper channels and to inform your supervisor of your knowledge.

Further indoctrination into your work and the operation of your section will be given you by your immediate supervisor as required. Do not be inquisitive or impatient; do not ask questions of persons outside your section; do not wander into areas where you do not belong. Undue curiosity or tendency to wander, either one or both, is sufficient grounds to terminate your employment by AFSA.

As you know, you have been or are being thoroughly investigated by one of the governmental investigating agencies. You will continue to be the subject of investigation from time to time to insure that your personal life and your personal character remain above reproach. This action is necessary
to maintain the security of the United States and to protect the lives of Americans everywhere. AFSA, must, therefore, be sure of the character, loyalty, and discretion of each individual connected with this Agency and on a continuing basis.

Any question you may have about any of the material which you receive during this indoctrination will be answered by us. Any proven violation of the oath which you will sign at the completion of the indoctrination is sufficient evidence in a court of law to make you liable for imprisonment, fine, or both, under the Espionage Act. It is essential that it will never be necessary to apply the provisions of this law to anyone within the Agency.
The Armed Forces Security Agency comprises a number of units, which are components of the National Military Establishment. It employs many military and civilian personnel. It is organized for the purpose of conducting certain types of research and analysis in the communications field. The nature of the work is CONFIDENTIAL. The details of the work, including specific aims and methods are of even higher classification and all come under the classification of Security Information as defined by Executive Order No. 10290, dt 24 Sept 51; the results of the work are given the highest protection afforded the classification of documents and information.

Even before your approval for full participation in AFSA, there are many items of information in connection with the nature and details of the work of AFSA which will come into your possession either directly and legitimately or by deduction and inference from collateral information which is furnished to you. Even in listening to me now you will obtain certain information which, added to other facts which will become known to you, may enable you to deduce much about the work in which AFSA is engaged. Such deductions must be given the same protection which is afforded classified documents. It is the information which is classified, regardless of whether obtained from a classified or a non-classified source. This is one of the reasons for prohibiting the circulation of this talk to persons outside of this organization. By the same reasoning the imparting of any of the information I am giving you to persons not in the organization is prohibited unless expressly authorized. This holds regardless of whether you are later disapproved for full association; approved and subsequently withdraw, or approved and remain active.

Personnel new to AFSA remain in a provisional status until such time as their security status has been evaluated. The need for such evaluation and the methods of obtaining the information on which it is based will be discussed later. Persons are placed in this provisional status only on the basis of three important assumptions: 1. That they are loyal citizens of the United States; 2. That they are particularly well qualified by education, experience, or mentality for some phase of this work; and 3. That they are capable of learning and practicing the requirements of security. Since many persons new to the organization have had little or no experience in military security, I am going to discuss some elementary facts. If you are already familiar with them, my discussion will refresh your memory.

AFSA work is involved almost exclusively with classified matter. By the nature of the beast, the organization thrives particularly on TOP SECRET
matter, "the security aspect of which is paramount," and the unauthorized disclosure of which would cause exceptionally grave damage to the nation. Such is the stuff that the AFSA organization is made of, the stuff it handles and creates.

Other classifications established by Regulations are as follows:

"Secret" Information and material (matter), the unauthorized disclosure of which would endanger national security, cause serious injury to the interests or prestige of the nation, or would be of great advantage to a foreign nation, shall be classified SECRET.

"Confidential" Information and material (matter), the unauthorized disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the interests or prestige of the nation, or would cause unwarranted injury to an individual, or be of advantage to a foreign nation shall be classified CONFIDENTIAL.

"Restricted" Information and material (matter) which required security protection other than that determined to be TOP SECRET, SECRET, or CONFIDENTIAL shall be classified as RESTRICTED.

You will note that some pages of material you will read later are marked CONFIDENTIAL. Every classified document is marked in a similar way. Merely stamping a document with a classification does not lead it its security, however, such measures are only guides which help to indicate the proper course to follow. The most important aspect of security is the method of handling various classifications of information. Handling may be divided into two aspects: (1) who shall receive what information, and (2) what mechanical safeguards shall be used for storing various classified documents.

Regulations state that confidential matter may be disclosed to those persons in the Navy, Army, Air Force, or other government services whose official duties require such action. This regulation is interpreted somewhat broadly in the services generally, but AFSA takes a very narrow view of it. Confidential information concerning AFSA, which is Security Information, is almost never disclosed to persons outside this organization, and then only for reasons which are telling and cogent, and in such manner as to indicate that this particular confidential information is in a class apart from other information so classified.

Because almost every phase of AFSA work involves highly classified Security Information and material responsible AFSA personnel must guard against allowing what is commonplace within their organization to be commonplace outside of it. TOP SECRET means what it says. Unauthorized disclosure of TOP SECRET information involves "exceptionally grave damage to the nation." What is commonplace in AFSA work is ordinarily a rarity elsewhere. Familiarity should breed only a greater appreciation and respect.
Conversely, the AFSA worker must guard against a tendency to dismiss information of classification lower than TOP SECRET as of no great consequence. The mere fact that material is classified at all indicates its importance to presumably competent authority. Unauthorized disclosure of restricted or confidential matter is subject to the same Espionage Act 50 U.S.C., 31 and 32, as amended, and Public Law 513 as is TOP SECRET matter. Beyond any such dire implications and the threat of punishment, however, the security sense essential to AFSA work must extend to every phase of the work and must be solid all the way down the line.

Maintenance of security is a professional skill, requiring initial study and effort, which after a while becomes automatic and unconscious. Great athletes do not time their movements except intuitively. Similarly, properly instructed and reasonably experience AFSA personnel seldom plan their security measures, they automatically exercise security discretion at all times. For such personnel, security is not something separate and apart, but a natural element, a part of the job. Security is a matter of reflex, not reflection. That, at least, is the ideal, and it is among the highest ideals of the Armed Forces Security Agency.

AFSA personnel are naturally subjected to questions from outsiders about their work. Usually such questions are asked only out of idle curiosity or interested friendship. The safest reaction is a casual vagueness calculated to give the impression that the activities of the organization are routine, commonplace, and non-mysterious.

Reserve personnel who are taking one of the courses and attending "drill" in their District may be asked by family and friends what they are doing and what outfit they are in. A safe answer to the question might be "I'm taking a course in Communications -- systems, methods, etc." Such an answer is direct enough so that further questioning is unnecessary. Also it sounds like routine work and probably will not provoke any further interest.

Above all, do not be coy. Do not hint at secrets, or make sly allusions to what you could tell if you would. Do not give answers in such a way as to arouse the curiosity of your questioner. Your job is to alleviate his itch, to diminish his curiosity, not to arouse it through suggestion.

AFSA personnel will be exposed to curious people other than those who ask questions, namely to people who just listen. Again, these will not necessarily be spies or saboteurs, but the curious and uninitiated, who, when they know too much, are doubly dangerous because they have not had the security indoctrination to make them realize how dangerous is their little knowledge.

As Americans, we are all prone to make speculative statements or even positive assertions concerning subjects about which we know little
or nothing. We feel free to discuss things which we know should be secret as long as we are not in on the secret. When it touches the field of AFSA work this may be a very dangerous thing.

It is advisable for AFSA personnel to refrain from discussing their work, even among themselves, when away from duty stations. There is, of course, no harm in such discussions when there is no possibility of their being overheard by outsiders, but the habit of talking shop away from the organization leads inevitably to carelessness in the matter of being overheard. Unless the habit of not talking is cultivated, even the most alert person will sooner or later forget, not alone that the walls have ears, but that other people have them too.

It is well to note, also, that precautions against outsiders overhearing what they shouldn't must be observed on station as well as off. Careless conversations should not make it possible for outsiders to overhear insiders through windows, through walls, or through telephones which happen to be in use nearby.

Personnel assigned to the AFSA organization must be approved. Ordinarily they will not receive such approval until specially investigated. This security measure is designed to eliminate bad security risks at the very outset. It is at best an elementary precautionary measure which eliminates fairly obvious risks. Greater risks remain, despite this initial selectivity. Note that such risks are created not by willful or conscious betrayal of classified matter, but by unthinking and unconscious acts of commission or omission. Security is, of course, concerned with barring those who might willfully betray their country by betraying the AFSA organization, but its far more difficult job is to prevent thoughtless exposure, careless disloyalty, or unconscious betrayal. An act of unconsidered carelessness may do greater harm than one of calculated malice.

It should be apparent, therefore, that there is a valid distinction between a disloyal person and one who is a bad security risk for other reasons. Generally speaking the distinction is analogous to the distinction between murder and manslaughter. The law distinguishes with regard to intent, but the result is identical. In either case the victim is dead. There are degrees of responsibility and of punishment. There are no degrees of being dead.

A bad security risk might be anyone who for any reason finds it difficult to keep a secret. Everyone knows people who are simply constitutionally unable to keep their mouths shut. They may, and often do, have hearts of gold. Security takes a very unsentimental view of such goodness.

Certain people have an inner compulsion to impress others with their importance, and revealing secrets seems to be a fashionable method of achieving such an impression. Anyone so psychologically uncertain of himself that he might adopt this mode is a bad security risk.
Certain people may talk in excess when they drink, and while the AFSA organization, fortunately, does not require testoscalers, its members must know either when to stop drinking or when to stop talking. A wagging tongue may be no more disloyal than a friendly puppy dog's tail, but it is infinitely more dangerous. Too great a fondness for luxury, for the spotlight, for vices, foibles, peccadillo, call them what you will, whatsoever the lack of moderation, may make a person a bad security risk.

The security investigation which is required for all AFSA personnel attempts to eliminate not only the potentially disloyal but the bad security risks as well. An unsatisfactory report on an individual, therefore, implies no suspicion of disloyalty or incipient treason. To call the investigation a "loyalty check" is to miss much of its significance. It is that, but the phrase "security check" gives a much better indication of its scope. It is recognized that to a greater extent the bright and able minds of our day are naturally concerned with political questions. Even the scientists, who were long considered—and who considered themselves—secure in their ivory towers, have entered the political arena. It would be foolish to expect first-class men with first-class minds to be uninterested in ideas of change and progress. It is recognized further that such men have been at times overly receptive to change and to proposals for social progress without examining very carefully the implications therein. Such over-receptiveness is, for example, characteristic of youth. It is not taken to indicate that a mature person is likely to betray his country or that he desire to undermine his government. On the other hand, continued association with certain persons or groups who advocate change and make certain proposals for social progress may be associated with persons or groups who are inimical to the government of the United States. Such an association cannot be condoned for any reason. Whoever lends himself to becoming a tool of such a person or group, no matter whether through ignorance of with the purest of motives, is, by nature, a possible tool of enemies of the United States. He is decidedly a poor security risk.

Many such considerations exist which are not immediately apparent to the uninstructed individual. Every effort is made to base security checks on these practical considerations. Investigations, even though they are conducted by other agencies, are evaluated by this organization, and the evaluations are not based on snobbery, intolerance, or political orthodoxy.

Inevitably, certain people are admitted to the AFSA organization who should have been kept out, and others are kept out who should have been welcomed. Security attempts to keep each of these groups to a minimum. If, in the name of security, able men are excluded from the AFSA organization for reasons which are not valid, operational efficiency suffers.

Security itself has been sensitive to the need for change. As the organization grew the requirements of operational efficiency demanded reliance on an ever widening circle of people. The "need to know" grew along with the organization. The result was a rigid system of compartmentation, though retained, was made more elastic. It was recognized
that the product of any one operating section depended greatly on a number of others, and allowance was made for such inter-dependence.

Thorough-going security for AFSA might seem best attained by an organization consisting of one man in solitary confinement. While such an environment might, on occasion, seem desirable or preferable to AFSA personnel, it is obviously undesirable from the standpoint of operational efficiency. The use of additional personnel, in steady contact with one another, is certainly not a relaxation of security.

Within the AFSA organization there can be no relaxation of security. There can and must be recognition of operational imperatives. The only imperative which is categorical and unmistakable for all AFSA personnel, however, is the primacy of security.

Every member of the AFSA organization whether officer, enlisted, or civilian is required to subscribe to an oath of secrecy. What I am saying is intended to show you the need for such an oath, and to give you such an understanding of security that you will not be guilty of unconscious violation of its principles.

One phase of AFSA work in which many people would be employed in time of war is cryptanalysis. This is a field which requires the services of trained personnel, and as you will know this training cannot be acquired overnight. Much time and effort are required even to locate individuals who are good prospects for such training. It is for this reason that AFSA encourages Reserve personnel to enroll in the cryptanalysis course given by correspondence and that almost all active duty and civil service personnel are given elementary cryptanalysis training and tests. This serves to locate a reservoir of potential trainees and partially trained people to draw on in case of emergency.

The mere knowledge that you may be taking such a course is of much greater value to foreign agents than you may suppose. It is very natural for one who is not fully aware of the complications of security to draw false conclusions from the obvious belief that the general public and the foreign agent must know that the United States engages in cryptanalysis activities. The belief in itself, is true; the informed public in this country as well as foreign agents do know that we try to "break codes." It does not follow from this fact that it is safe or proper to make the slightest reference to such pursuits except to those who need to know about it. Every reasonable effort must be made to conceal the scope and size and even the very existence of such an organization. Quite valid conclusions concerning its activities might be drawn from a mere analysis of its size and extent. We cannot hope for complete success in concealing the existence of such an activity, but we know full well that we cannot hope to realize any goal higher than that at which we aim. We aim for perfection in this regard with the sincere hope that we may at least achieve the degree of security essential to our continued effectiveness. The need for this perfection can best be emphasized by a consideration of how enemy
intelligence operates against our endeavors. From an understanding of what foreign intelligence wishes to learn about us, we can know how to defeat its purpose.

In the first place, military intelligence seeks to establish what is called an "order of battle" of our military forces. That is, so far as possible, military intelligence seeks to find out first how our military forces are organized and second, the names and backgrounds of the personalities who occupy the various posts. It is hard for one not in the military intelligence to believe the extent and detail to which this is done. European intelligence agents kept careful track of names, training, and squadron assignments of the pilots in their enemy air forces. Much of this data could be obtained by newspapers published in the enemy country and gathered through neutral sources. Further information as to the composition of squadrons and higher groups was obtained by interrogation of captured pilots. The information was valuable in several ways. First, in interrogating pilots recently shot down the interrogation officer could display the broadest knowledge of the most minute detail concerning the captured pilot's unit. Accordingly, the pilot was led to feel that there was no sense in trying to withhold information from such an all-knowing enemy. Second, when a new pilot was captured it was possible to identify his unit even if he refused to do so himself. From unit identification it was possible to determine the movement of the enemy's forces, their present employment (as to whether currently operational or in training) and to get information as to their current equipment.

From this you can see what the intelligence officer of a country who considers the U.S. as a potential enemy would want to know about our AFSA work. He wants to know who is receiving cryptographic and cryptanalytic training. In the event of mobilization, he will be especially interested in where those of us who have cryptanalytic training are assigned. He would be very pleased to know how many of us are engaged in training for this activity, because in discovering this fact he can estimate the intensity of our effort along such lines and can make his plans accordingly.

Today it is not possible to read the newspapers without knowing that it is common for foreign powers to subject members of our military forces to searching interrogation whenever they can arrest our men. Do you suppose those foreign powers would care to ask you what you know about our country's cryptographic work? Can you imagine the consequences to you? You think this picture impossible? Think it over if you do. Every one who hears this talk today knows many things foreign agents desire to know.

We all must recognize that the press of this country has carried statements to the general effect that during World War II we broke various Jap codes. How this must interest Intelligence Officers and also the Communication Security Officers of our prospective enemies. Let us consider the questions which such a statement could raise in the
minds of the military authorities of Lower Slobovia who regard the United States as a primary target country. First, what type of Jap codes does the United States so loosely claim to have broken? Second, what is the connection between the Jap code so claimed to have been broken, and the codes now used by Lower Slobovia? We must consider the fact that there is a somewhat limited number of cryptographic procedures available, and that other countries can and do use systems and techniques similar to those employed by the Japanese. To release information about our success against one, would advertise to the others that we have been able to develop the tools and techniques, the necessary "know how" to attack their systems successfully.

In addition, some of the methods we have developed are of much broader application than the individual problems which they were designed to solve. The continuous battle between the cryptanalysts and the cryptographers is often likened to that waged between gun and armor. The impetus toward the development of new armor is slight indeed as long as it remains invulnerable to any practical mode of attack and its users are reluctant to go to the effort and expense of making any radical change. Consequently, no matter how much publicity the breaking of codes may have enjoyed, AFSA continues to keep silent. It is clearly a case here that you cannot argue "why be so secretive about something that everybody knows?" or "after all—the cat is already out of the bag."

It's not so bad, really. After a while the individual develops, as a sixth sense, a sense of security. This sixth sense provides him with a reflex to questions just as touch does to fire, a reflex to outsiders as taste does to bitterness. It becomes instinctive and involuntary. The AFSA organization depends on the development of this sixth sense and relies on it for its very existence. Without it and without the security that it provides, AFSA cannot long exist. Cultivate it, mature it, and honor it.