Extract from ER 8C 1, Mediterranean (Western, Jigant Report, for February 1945.

(iv) Line Interception

17. During Brigadier VERNHAM's visit, numerous discussions took place. The necessity to make a serious attempt to exploit line interception was agreed, and DD(Y) promised to provide some ceiling for the formation of a unit.

18. There are several reasons for this necessity:

(a) During periods of static or semi static warfare, the use by the enemy of wireless falls to a low or non existent level. They use lines. It is hoped to fill in these gaps in the continuity of wireless interception by the results of line interception, and so facilitate the tasks of the wireless intercept sections, when renewed operations force the enemy again to use wireless.

(b) Recent GERMAN Signal Security measures, and the adoption of a new code name system have reduced the quantity and quality of tactical wireless interception. It is hoped the results of line interception will amplify and provide tactical Intelligence to the formations concerned.

37. It seems necessary to assume:

(a) that the vastly increased use of wireless during the war will continue after the war. Our intercept resources will therefore need to be larger than previously.

38. If our Military Missions and Diplomats are to be kept as well informed as those of other countries, during the difficult postwar period, interception in the MED area must continue after the close of hostilities.
On these assumptions, and to cover present necessities, the following steps have been taken:

(a) 2 Wireless Coy based at SARAFAND is now a Col's Command and is equal in size to a Special Wireless Group. This is a considerable increase on the No 2 WT Coy of pre-war commanded by a Major.

39. It is suggested that the MEDITERRANEAN set up for postwar should envisage stations at:

with collecting detachments located at:


41. The relationship between Army Sigint units and RSS units requires settlement. The necessity for close liaison has been realised and steps have been taken in the theatre to maintain this closely as described in paras 29 to 35 above.

42. From the point of view of the future, it seems necessary to maintain a trained nucleus of Army operators, engaged on active

43. A fusion between the present Army and RSS organisations at any rate in the MEDITERRANEAN Area after the close of hostilities would seem to be the most economical in personnel and most efficient method of securing the greatest amount of cover.