Certain Aspects of "MAGIC" in the Cryptological Background of the Various Official Investigations into the Attack on Pearl Harbor

by William F. Freidman
Sir:

Reference is made to Contract No. DA-19-170-se-1739, File No. 694-NSA-56, 56-NSA/PR-270, which was entered into as of 1 August 1955 by and between the United States of America and the undersigned and which was modified only as to date of delivery of all the items called for under said contract. In accordance with the provisions of Article II (Delivery) of said contract, I am sending you herewith (a) approximately 150 catalog cards supplementary to those sent under Project 1, Article I, paragraph b(1) of said contract; and (b) the completed manuscript called for under Project 3 of the same Article, viz., a special report originally tentatively entitled The Cryptological Background of the Various Official Investigations into the Attack on Pearl Harbor. The said tentative title of the item called for under Project 3 is now not quite suitable and I have deemed it advisable to amend it by prefacing it with the words "Certain aspects of 'Magic'," making the complete title "Certain aspects of 'Magic' in the Cryptological Background of the Various Official Investigations into the Attack on Pearl Harbor."

I have adopted a rather informal style which may perhaps make the brochure more interesting. Several ideas therein cast a new light, I think, on certain aspects of the investigations and the questions raised by a category of historians who have much to say about the attack on Pearl Harbor and who are known as "revisionists." My brochure may therefore be useful in a study of the Pearl Harbor Disaster, especially for historians who take a more realistic view of what happened and why the U. S. forces in Hawaii were caught by surprise. It is perhaps unfortunate that I had to use a small amount of material which is still classified and therefore the brochure as a whole has had to be classified.

I realize only too well that the present brochure can certainly be improved by further work but the time limit—already twice extended—permits of no additional delay in the delivery of this item. Let it be considered, in the words of the previous Director of the National Security Agency, as "Model No. 1."

Sincerely,

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

2 Incls:

a/s
TO: Director
National Security Agency
Washington 25, D. C.
Attention: Contracting Officer, NSA

In accordance with Article II (Delivery) on Contract No. DA-49-007-SC-1739, File No. 69/4-NSA-55, 56-NSA/PR-<270, this invoice is submitted for payment

............... $4,000.00

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN

CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above bill is correct and just and that payment therefor has not been received.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN
CERTAIN ASPECTS OF "MAGIC" IN THE CRYPTOLOGICAL BACKGROUND
OF THE VARIOUS OFFICIAL INVESTIGATIONS
INTO THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR

by

William F. Friedman
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1. INTRODUCTION

More than 15 years have passed since the Japanese, with unparalleled good luck, good luck that now seems astounding, and with a degree of skill unanticipated by the United States, executed their surprise attack on Pearl Harbor during the morning hours of 7 December 1941. It was an attack that constituted a momentous disaster for the United States; it made our Navy's Pacific Fleet, for all practical purposes, hors de combat for many months. In the view of Mark S. Watson, in a volume written for the Army series on the history of the U. S. Army in World War II, Chief of Staff: Prevar Plans and Preparations (1950), the disaster was the result of a "fateful series of mischances" among which he listed those which he considered the most important. He did not list them all; to do so would make the disaster partake of the character of an enormous, and almost incredible Greek tragedy—so many big and little things went wrong to make the disaster possible and to prevent its being averted with little or no damage.

The Battle of Pearl Harbor is still being fought but the adversaries this time are all Americans; and though the battle is bloodless, because the weapons are now words, not bullets or bombs, it is quite acrimonious and intense, as internal or civil wars generally are. This time the battle is intended to capture, by a sort of literary "brainwashing," the minds of a large segment of the American people who more or less dimly feel that the truth, the whole truth, has not yet been told. Many Americans, I am sure, are still undecided in regard to who or what was
responsible for this most momentous and most humiliating naval disaster in our history.

Fifteen million words, more or less, have been written concerning, explaining, or attempting to assess and fix responsibilities for the Pearl Harbor disaster, and to show why the U. S. forces at Honolulu were caught napping in the early hours of what President Roosevelt referred to as that "day of infamy" when he appeared before Congress on 8 December 1941 to declare war on Japan. The Report and Hearings Before the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Attack (79th Congress, 2d Session, Government Printing Office, Washington, 1946), hereinafter referred to as PHR, alone contain 15,000 transcript pages; the overall final report of the Committee comprises some ten million words and fills 40 volumes of closely printed text. Thus far, in addition to this vast amount of material there must be at least five million words in the writings of private individuals. Some of them defend the Findings, Conclusions, and Recommendations of the Majority in the PHR; others defend the Findings and Conclusions of the Minority in the PHR; still others disagree and violently attack both what the Majority and the Minority said. Even representative Keefe, a Republican who signed the Majority Report found it necessary to add to that report some additional views of his own where he could not agree with those of the Majority. It is obvious that in this brochure it will be impossible to deal with all that has been written on the subject. Even to list by title the books, brochures, articles (not to mention the thousands of newspaper accounts, letters to editors, etc.) which have something to add to the
story would be a fairly large task. A bibliography covering the items on Pearl Harbor in my private collection will be found in the "Subject file" now in the NSA Library. But it is a strange, indeed, it is a remarkable fact that not a single new item of information having a direct bearing upon attempts to explain why the Pearl Harbor attack could have come or did come as a complete surprise to the U. S. has been turned up since 1946, when the Joint Congressional Committee completed its task. One may well assume, therefore, that since no new facts have come to light it must be something else that is keeping the Battle of Pearl Harbor going. The assumption is true: the facts developed in the various investigations of 1944, 1945, and 1946 are being scrutinized now through different sorts of spectacles and by different observers; this results in new "interpretations" of the old, well-known facts.

It is the purpose of this brochure to make a few observations and comments on the current Battle of Pearl Harbor. They are directed at the writings of certain historians who call themselves or are known as "revisionists," and who find much support in two recently published books, both by high-ranking officers of the U. S. Navy. These charges are very serious—indeed they are tantamount to imputing at least very questionable behavior by persons of such stature as the late President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the Army's Chief of Staff, General George C. Marshall, and the Navy's Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Harold R. Stark. The charges are really not new; their antecedents, or nuclei of them or carefully veiled hints at them, can be found in some of the early writings of the more rabid Roosevelt-baters, and even in some parts of the
reports made by various official U. S. investigating bodies appointed to look into the matter during the last phases of World War II or soon after that war had been won.

In another section of this report will be found an attempt to explain the genesis of the suspicions which aroused the Roosevelt haters and which kept them "needling" the President and his Administration for an explanation of how it was possible that the U. S. was taken so completely by surprise when the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor; to introduce the explanation at this point I think would be confusing. All that can logically be said right here is that the President, his Administration, and the Chiefs of the two military services simply could not afford to permit the true explanation to be broadcast while the war was still in progress.

A very impartial bibliographical survey of the principal items in the literature of the subject has been prepared by a historian of recognized standing, Dr. Louis Morton, Chief of the Pacific Section of the U. S. Army's Office of Military History. His survey, entitled "Pearl Harbor in Perspective," was published in the April 1955 issue of the United States Naval Institute Proceedings (Vol. 81, No. 4, Whole No. 626, pp. 461-468). A copy of Dr. Morton's survey forms Appendix I to this brochure.

A second recapitulation of the Pearl Harbor story and also a source of material which may interest the reader in what the present brochure aims to do is found in an article by Robert H. Ferrell, Assistant Professor of History at Indiana University, published also in 1955, in The Historian, under the title "Pearl Harbor and the Revisionists"
(Vol. XVII, No. 2, Spring 1955, pp. 215-233). Prof. Ferrell's article (given completely in Appendix 2 to this brochure) begins as follows:

It was perhaps inevitable that after the second World War, as after the war of 1914-18, there should appear in the United States a school of historians questioning the purposes of the war and the motives of the wartime statesmen. The cost of both world wars, in human lives and in physical resources, was very high; and it was only natural that some individuals should question such expenditure. Yet the new school of "revisionism" appearing after the second World War has undertaken a line of investigation which, if successful, will force the rewriting of an entire era in American history. The revisionists hope to prove that in 1941 President Franklin D. Roosevelt purposely exposed the Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, and goaded the Japanese into attacking it, thus bringing the United States into the war on the side of the Allies. As Professor Harry Elmer Barnes has put the case, in rather plain English, "The net result of revisionist scholarship applied to Pearl Harbor boils down essentially to this: In order to promote Roosevelt's political ambitions and his mendacious foreign policy some three thousand American boys were quite needlessly butchered. . . .

Professor Ferrell follows this extract from Professor Barnes with the following words (in a footnote):

"Of course, they were only a drop in the bucket compared to those who were ultimately slain in the war that resulted, which was as needless, in terms of vital American interests, as the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor." H. E. Barnes, ed., Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace (Caldwell, Idaho, 1953), Ch. 10, "Summary and Conclusions," p. 651.

Strong language, isn't it? Very strong, I think, coming from a well-known historian such as Barnes. What substance is there to the strident claims of those professional historians, some of them very well-known and able men, who are the spokesmen for the revisionists? What is it that they wish to prove from their study of the facts concerning the Pearl Harbor disaster? First, they wish to prove that there was no need at all, "in terms of vital American interests," for the U. S. to enter into World
War II as one of the belligerents. Some of them no doubt believe that we fought on the wrong side, with the wrong allies! With this phase of the subject I shall not concern myself in this brochure, since I make no pretence whatsoever of being a historian competent to deal with such an important subject. Next, some of the revisionists claim or believe that they have proof that the disaster at Pearl Harbor was no "accident," that it was brought about deliberately by President Roosevelt. They believe that what they call our "back-door" entry into the conflict was based upon an erroneous view, held by him and his Administration, as to what the U. S. role should be in world affairs; also, they want us to believe that our entry into World War II was for the personal political advantage of President Roosevelt and his followers in the Administration. They contend, in fact, that he goaded the Japanese into making the attack, that he enticed them into doing so by using the U. S. Pacific Fleet as a "lure;" that he knew from the so-called "MAGIC", the Japanese secret communications which Army and Navy cryptanalysts had solved, the exact time the attack would be made and the exact place where they were going to make it; that the President sensed that such an attack was the only thing which would unify American opinion and bring the people of the United States to a pitch of excitement and resentment sufficiently high to lead them to accept with equanimity U. S. entry into World War II on the side of the British and the French, thereby, as Roosevelt felt and as turned out to be the case, assuring the complete defeat of the Axis powers; that President Roosevelt should and could have avoided the disaster at Pearl Harbor but deliberately chose not to do so, for the
reasons cited above; and that he purposely withheld MAGIC intelligence
from Admiral Kimmel, Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, and
General Short, Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department, the two
highest-ranking commanders in Hawaii who should have been but were not
given this information and who, therefore, were permitted by him to be
deliberately misled as to the real situation, misled to the point, in
fact, that when the attack came they were entirely unprepared even to
meet it, let alone repulse it. In withholding this information, one of
the proponents of this theory, a retired admiral of the regular U. S.
Navy, Rear Admiral Robert A. Theobald, implies in his book, The Final
Secret of Pearl Harbor (New York: The Devin-Adair Co., 1954), that to
make it quite certain that the Japanese attack would be a complete sur-
prise, so far as General Short and Admiral Kimmel were concerned, the
President had to have and did have as reluctant partners in his conspiracy,
or what was tantamount thereto, General Marshall, the Chief of Staff of
the Army, and Admiral Stark, the Chief of Naval Operations, both regular
officers of highest integrity and repute. And although Admiral Kimmel
does not go quite so far as does Admiral Theobald as to make charges
tantamount to conspiracy, he does go quite a long distance along the same
route. There is a degree of confusion in regard to this point, however.
The following, for example, appears on the inside flap of the dust cover:

Admiral Kimmel sticks to his own end of the story. He tells
us about the material he was denied, the warning messages he didn't
get. He impugns no motives, he makes no deductions from unproved
hypotheses. "Is this a slap at Theobald?" But the book is
sufficient to nail down the inescapable point: the blame for the
loss of the Pacific Fleet battleships rests squarely on Washington
not on the men at Pearl.

But on the back of the dust jacket, repeated from the last chapter of his
book (p. 186), Admiral Kimmel says:

Again and again in my mind I have reviewed the events that pre­
ceded the Japanese attack, seeking to determine if I was unjustified
in drawing from the orders, directives and information that were
forwarded to me the conclusions that I did. The fact that I then
thought and now think my conclusions were sound when based upon
the information I received, has sustained me during the years that have
passed since the first Japanese bomb fell on Pearl Harbor,

When the information available in Washington prior to the attack
was finally disclosed to me long after, I was appalled. Nothing in
my experience of nearly forty-two years service in the Navy had pre­
pared me for the actions of the highest officials in our government
which denied this vital information to the Pearl Harbor commanders.

If those in authority wished to engage in power policies, the
least that they should have done was to advise their naval and mili­
tary commanders what they were endeavoring to accomplish. To
utilize the Pacific Fleet and the Army forces at Pearl Harbor as a
lure for a Japanese attack without advising the commander-in-chief
of the Fleet and the commander of the Army base at Hawaii is some­
thing I am wholly unable to comprehend.

While I am still able to do so, I feel that I must tell the
story so that those who follow may fully realize the imperative
necessity of furnishing the naval and military commanders at the
front with full and clear information. Only in this way can the
future security of our country be preserved.

Dr. Morton in commenting upon Admiral Kimmel's Story says (p. 461):

Admiral Kimmel's case rests upon the allegation that he was
deliberately denied information available in Washington. Had he
had this information, he says, he would have known the Japanese
intended to strike Pearl Harbor and could have adopted measures
to meet the attack and minimize the losses. These measures, which
he outlines, are of considerable interest, though one wonders to
what extent they are guided by hindsight.

Dr. Morton continues as follows: (p. 462)
To support his case, Admiral Kimmel draws on the evidence presented during the investigations of the Pearl Harbor attack. This evidence, he claims was not only obscured at the time but was evaluated to produce a desired result. Inconsistencies in the testimony were ignored, and important questions raised during the hearings left unanswered. He charges bias on the part of investigating officers and a deliberate effort to whitewash the administration and block an impartial search for the truth.

"The Congressional investigation," Kimmel declares, "was governed by the majority party, the Democrats. The huge volumes of testimony in that inquiry served to confuse the public mind as to the significance of the facts and to smother testimony damaging to the administration."

Responsibility for Pearl Harbor, Kimmel charges, rests squarely upon the shoulders of his superiors in Washington and ultimately on the Commander-in-Chief, President Roosevelt. "Until this day," he writes, "I have kept silence on the subject of Pearl Harbor... Now, however, I deem it my duty to speak out. What took place in Washington must be so clearly placed on the public record that no group of persons in administrative power will ever dare again to invite another Pearl Harbor and place the blame on the officers in the fleet and in the field."

The charges that Admiral Kimmel makes are not new and were being circulated even before the end of the war. The Japanese attack on December 7 had unified the country and ended temporarily the debate between the "Isolationists" and the "Interventionists" which had marked the prewar years. All classes and parties closed ranks for the duration of the struggle. But even during the war, there had been a recognition of the political implications involved in the question of responsibility for Pearl Harbor, and the administration had taken steps to preserve the record. Six investigations had been conducted even while the conflict raged, all but one of them by the Army and Navy. As a result, a large volume of testimony and documents that might otherwise have been lost was assembled. But the requirements of wartime security and a unified national effort made public debate impossible.

The war over, partisan differences reappeared, and critics of President Roosevelt began to challenge openly the views so widely held during the war years. The cooling of passions and disillusion with the postwar world raised further questions about American participation in the war. Historians and publicists, as they have done after every war, sought to reassess the causes of the war and to place Roosevelt's policy in the larger perspective of American history. Thus, in the years following the end of the conflict, a new interpretation of the events that had preceded the war and of the conduct of the war itself emerged.
The foregoing final paragraph of the extract from Dr. Morton's article brings us directly to the principal revisionist contention which will be examined in the present brochure. The contention, as noted above, was first stated in 1945 by John T. Flynn, one of the early and most vitriolic revilers of President Roosevelt, in a pamphlet entitled The Final Secret of Pearl Harbor, in which he revealed the fact that U. S. cryptanalysts had solved the Japanese diplomatic codes and ciphers before the Pearl Harbor attack. His contention was that the intelligence derived or derivable from the solved and translated messages, the so-called MAGIC, told exactly where and when the Japanese were going to strike; that this priceless information Roosevelt deliberately kept from Admiral Kimmel and General Short, with the result that the Japanese were able to make their attack with complete surprise; and that the loss of men and ships that resulted therefrom, however unfortunate it was for the U. S. and a few American families, unified the country. That, claims Flynn, was Roosevelt's aim. At any rate, as Dr. Morton indicates, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor ended the debate between the "isolationists" and the "interventionists."
2. THE REAL ESSENCE OF THE PROBLEM

Distilled down to its essence, therefore, the first question is: Did MAGIC really contain clear and unequivocal indications as to exactly where and when we would be hit by the Japanese in the war which Roosevelt knew, or was expecting, or at least felt was in the offing?

Much has been written on this basic question; hundreds of thousands—indeed, millions of words, in fact—have been published on the question in an attempt to answer it either affirmatively or negatively. If some Americans now scoff at the whole business and say that all that could be said on the point was said years ago—why not stop flogging a dead horse?—let them note that in as staid and unsensational a newspaper as The Wall Street Journal there appeared a long review of Admiral Kimmel's Story in the issue for 14 January 1955, accompanied by a lengthy editorial entitled "Pearl Harbor" in the same issue; let them note, too, another lengthy editorial entitled "Myth of the broken code" in the issue of the same newspaper for 21 January 1955; let them read also the baker's dozen "Letters to the Editor" in the issues for 21 January, 31 January, 4 February, and 6 February 1955, all commenting upon the two editorials and the book review mentioned above. The question therefore can by no means be said to be "dead and buried;" in fact, even to this day references to the "MAGIC" that was available and was not used at the time of Pearl Harbor keep popping up in the daily newspapers, in periodicals, and in books.

For instance, there are two "Letters to the Editor" in the Washington Post on Pearl Harbor as recently as 31 December 1956 and 4 January 1957. And
as I write this brochure word has just come that the Chicago Tribune is about to publish another (revisionist, no doubt) article on the subject.

Let me therefore repeat the question: Did MAGIC really contain clear and unequivocal indications as to exactly where and when we would be hit by the Japanese in the war which Washington knew, or was expecting, or at least felt was probably soon to come?

In this brochure I shall attempt to dispose of this basic question in a rather simple and, in my opinion, a definitive manner by attacking it in what may seem to be a round-about way. But just before getting right down to it I will place before the reader a short extract from a book published late in 1956 by a recently-deceased and a highly-respected (by certain Americans who knew him) Japanese whose words were such—he died in prison—as to indicate that he had no particular reason for hiding the truth. I refer here to the book written by Shigenori Togo, the man who was Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor and across whose desk there certainly must have passed the most important of the messages to and from the Foreign Office and Japanese ambassadors, ministers, and consuls abroad.¹

It is to be noted, and indeed emphasized, before going into this phase of the subject, that at the time of the attack the only cryptographic systems which the U. S. cryptanalytic agencies had solved and were able to read were not the Japanese military or naval systems; they were only the systems used by the Foreign Office. Whatever intelligence the U. S. authorities were able to obtain from MAGIC therefore must have been and —

was clearly derived from Japanese diplomatic communications. With this fact in mind let us take a look at an item of much interest in Togo's book (pp. 118-119 and 197):

It is not difficult to conceive the extent of the tyranny of the military power from the fact that on the eve of the Pacific War such a fundamental datum as the total tonnage of Japanese naval vessels—not to speak of the displacement of the gigantic battleships Yamato and Musashi, or the plan to attack Pearl Harbor—was vigilantly withheld from the knowledge of the civilian cabinet ministers. General Togo even told me in Sugamo Prison that it was only at the IMTFE that he had first learned that the Japanese task force which carried out the attack on Pearl Harbor had assembled at Hitokappu Bay on 10 November, and weighed anchor for Hawaii on the morning of the 26th! The high command did not divulge its secrets even to the full general who was Premier and Minister of War; it is easy to conceive how other ministers were treated.

The war decision was thus made, and various problems which would arise with the opening of the war were submitted to meetings of the Liaison Conference. One thing which—needless to say—was not discussed in the Liaison Conference was operational aspects of the impending hostilities. It was disclosed at the IMTFE that the naval task force under Admiral Nagumo had sailed from Hitokappu Bay on 26 November under orders to strike Pearl Harbor, and in its judgment the tribunal made the absurd finding that the scheduled attack was freely discussed at the meeting of the Liaison Conference on 30 November. We had, of course, no knowledge of the plan; it was the invariable practice of the high command not to divulge to civilian officials, such as us, any scrap of information bearing on these highly secret operations, and anyone familiar with the system will readily understand our total lack of knowledge of them. (This condition is sufficiently well illustrated by the fact, which I have mentioned elsewhere, that Tojo told me that it was only at the IMTFE trial itself that he first learned any operational details of the Pearl Harbor attack; a mass of additional evidence was adduced at the trial showing that the civilian members of the Cabinet had no prior knowledge even of the existence of the plan to attack Hawaii.)

It is a fair and logical deduction to conclude that if Togo was telling the truth, i.e., that the civilian members of the Japanese Cabinet, including Prime Minister Tojo and the Foreign Minister himself, had no...
prior knowledge of the plan, including of course the exact date on which the Pearl Harbor attack was to take place (as set by the Japanese high command) then the MAGIC messages themselves in the communications from and to the Foreign Office could not possibly have contained any definite information, let alone a clear-cut statement, on this very important point. And if the MAGIC messages did not contain this information or statement how could President Roosevelt or any members of his immediate official family, or the heads of U. S. Army and U. S. Navy intelligence staffs know from the MAGIC messages exactly where and when the attack was coming? But this question does arise: did Togo tell the truth in his book? If he did, how are we to explain certain of the MAGIC messages the records of PFR contain?

After re-reading the hundreds of MAGIC messages that were exchanged between the Foreign Ministry and its offices abroad in the year 1941 it seems fantastic, it strains our credulity, to believe that Togo did not know what was being planned. To mention only one set of messages, the "dead line" messages—after which "things are automatically going to happen"—how could Togo not know what was being planned? How are we to explain them, if he didn't know that the U. S. was going to be attacked? But let it be remembered that we are now re-reading the messages from the vantage point of hindsight. There is not a single message that can be said to contain categorical evidence proving that Minister Togo must have known that Pearl Harbor was to be the target. In 1946, and even now when we re-read those messages in Part 12 of the PFR, I realize that it is fantastic that somebody in U. S. Intelligence did not or could not see that the blow was being prepared against Pearl Harbor. But if we
believe Togo was an honorable man and was telling the truth, then we must conclude that he and his closest associates in the Foreign Office were no better at intelligence than our own intelligence authorities! They knew or only guessed that something was going to happen after 29 November 1941, but they didn't know exactly where or when! Or shall we assume that somebody in the Japanese Foreign Office, some subordinate of Togo, the Foreign Minister, was "in on the secret"—and it was he that took care of all the messages that pointed to Pearl Harbor? Could be! Could easily be! How many messages going out of any one of our own large executive departments and signed by the Secretary thereof are actually seen by the Secretary? But I do not wish to belabor the point. Let us merely say that it is quite possible that Togo saw none of the crucial messages or, what is more probable, that he saw them but, not being "in on the secrets" of the Japanese high command, did not draw the correct deductions—that the U. S. was to be attacked, without warning, at Pearl Harbor in the early hours of 7 December 1941, and that the object of the attack was to destroy the U. S. Pacific Fleet if possible. But let us also remember that reading the MAGIC messages in 1946 or in 1956 is analogous to reading the final chapter of a detective tale—before the preceding chapters, with their false and purposely misleading clues injected by the author to evoke the reader's interest. In reading such a detective story in the normal manner the final chapter often makes the reader feel inferior, even silly, that he could not see the truth, the real elements of the mystery right from the beginning. The Japanese were getting intelligence reports—call them if you will, "ordinary spy reports" from several U. S. military bases
besides Hawaii, such as the Philippines, Panama Canal, Seattle, and San Francisco. It is true that Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor seemed to be and actually was much greater than at any other base; but one could also say that this greater interest stemmed from a perhaps justifiable fear by the Japanese that the U. S. Pacific Fleet might sortie some dark night and strike the first blow at Japan. They, as well as the U. S., did not want to be taken by surprise! Perhaps an intelligence specialist with the proper kind of imagination might have hit upon the real reason for the greater Japanese interest in Pearl Harbor, but who can be certain of this? All that can safely be said in regard to the Togo statement is this: Both he and Prime Minister Tojo may have been told, or they may have guessed, that Japan was going to strike—but not exactly where and when. These two very important elements the Japanese high command kept to itself even after the task force left Japanese waters. And for those revisionists who think the U. S. note of 27 November 1941 was an ultimatum and that it was that note which triggered off the attack on Pearl, let them ruminate on the fact that the Japanese task force which attacked Pearl left Japanese waters the day before that note was sent off by Secretary of State Hull. His note may have constituted an ultimatum—but it did not bring on the attack. The attack was planned very carefully, months before that, and, to repeat, was already launched to the point of having departed from Japanese waters.

But there is another revisionist prop, and a very important one, I must emphasize, which I wish to undermine, for it should be greatly weakened when consideration is given to another argument which is so obvious
and simple that it has been a source of astonishment to me that the revisionists themselves have not thought of it. (Parenthetically I want to preface the argument by saying that any hesitancy I might have in stating it melts away when I find that several very able naval historians with whom I have discussed it expressed astonishment that it had not hitherto been mentioned. One of them said of it in a recent personal letter:

"In retrospect I realize that some of the ideas you mentioned about the events leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor (like Columbus' egg trick!) are startling in their simplicity and obviousness—which is probably why no one has heretofore recognized their importance." My contention, I think, warrants taking a new look at a certain phase of the Pearl Harbor mystery—if indeed there is any mystery about the factors entering into our being taken by surprise.
3. A NEW LOOK AT THE REVISIONISTS ALLEGATIONS OF CONSPIRACY TO KEEP KIMMEL AND SHORT IN THE DARK

The revisionists' argument, which I hesitate to repeat (since it has already been stated in this brochure; but its repetition may make what I have to say crystal clear) runs as follows: President Roosevelt desperately needed a good reason for justifying America's entry into World War II. He needed it in order to save the British from utter defeat by Germany; France was already down and out! Britain was next on Hitler's list—and then the United States. (The revisionists deny this most vehemently, but everything that Hitler had done thus far was strictly in accordance with the plans he outlined in Mein Kampf. In this connection, and as I write this, there has just come out a book which must be regarded as authoritative and which is called The German Weapons and Secret Weapons of World War II, by Rudolf Lusar. Lusar was head of the Technical Arms Department of the Wehrmacht. He discloses that Germany was also building the Heinkel 343, a bomber capable of reaching the United States and returning without refuelling. Several of the planes were ready at the end of the war. The book also says that it was originally planned to stage the first air raid on the United States in May 1945. So much for the revisionist contention that the benign Herr Hitler had no designs whatsoever on the United States; for it is very clear that he planned to bomb this country just as soon as he had finished off England.) The President wanted to get the U. S. into the conflict not only to save Britain but, ultimately, also to save the U. S. Timely action was needed. He had goaded Hitler by several unneutral acts in the Atlantic, as well as in establishing certain U. S.
logistical relations with Britain ("lend-lease," the transfer of 50 U. S. destroyers, etc.); but Hitler was too clever to be pushed to the point where Germany would have to declare war on America prematurely or where German action would justify an American declaration of war on Germany before Germany was ready for such action. Hitler realized, as well as President Roosevelt, that what American did held the answer to Germany's problem. President Roosevelt knew that the America people were not at all anxious to be drawn into the European war; but he felt that it was absolutely necessary that something be "engineered," so to speak, in order that the U. S. would, willy-nilly, be drawn into the conflict. This, the revisionists contend, as I have reiterated, Roosevelt felt was necessary to save England; it was incidentally also intended, they contend, to divert attention from the failure of the New Deal to bolster the badly sagging economy as a result of defective monetary policies and other internal difficulties. U. S. participation was also a Democratic objective, they say, for Roosevelt's reelection; and, of course, it was desirable to preserve the Rooseveltian prestige. The long-drawn out arguments with the Japanese might, in view of the Tri-partite pact of the German, Italian, and Japanese Axis, and despite Hitler's canny strategy of not succumbing to American provocation in the Atlantic, serve his purpose. Americans did not like the Japanese anyhow and were distrustful of these Orientals. Japanese ambitions in the Far East and distrust of the Japanese kept popping up everywhere in the American press and public opinion. But Roosevelt felt that there was one sine qua non to getting into a shooting war with the Japanese. In the words of Mr. Stimson, his
Secretary of War, unfortunate words one must now admit, it was all a matter of how the Japanese "could be maneuvered into the position of firing the first shot," otherwise the American people would be lukewarm about a war with them. MAGIC, that is, the secret intelligence which the solution of the Japanese diplomatic communications made available to the Roosevelt Administration in great abundance, provided a golden opportunity—so the revisionists, including Admiral Theobald, fervently believe. I have already and more than once stated in this brochure that the revisionists are convinced that MAGIC told the President exactly when and where their attack was going to be launched: in the early hours of the morning of 7 December 1941, at Pearl Harbor. By withholding from the U. S. commanders at Pearl Harbor this private knowledge which President Roosevelt gained from MAGIC—the horse's mouth, so to speak—enabled the President to accomplish his heart's desire. With this highly secret information he could maneuver the Japanese so that they would fire the first shot; he realized, they concede, that there would be some losses of men and ships, of course, as so callously stated in the extract from Professor Barnes which was quoted above, but these losses, they contend, he would regard as justified in the long run by saving England, France, and, later on, America from the Axis Powers—and it would incidentally save his own prestige and insure his reelection.

The important element in the foregoing argument, let it be noted, is that, to quote from Secretary Stimson's diary a bit, Japan was to be "maneuvered into a position of firing the first shot." The maneuver, according to the revisionists, included using the ships of the U. S.
Pacific Fleet as a lure; that is why, they argue, Roosevelt insisted on having that fleet based on Pearl Harbor instead of on the west coast of the U. S., as Admiral Richardson, Kimmel's predecessor, wished. But let be noted that Admiral Richardson's objections stemmed from purely logistical considerations, such as easier maintenance and repair; and morale of the sailors entered into the picture—Hawaii was a long way from "home" for the men and officers of the fleet. (Admiral Richardson had not the slightest idea that keeping the fleet at Pearl would deter the Japanese from doing what they wished to do in the Far East. In fact, he thought keeping the fleet on the West Coast would be more effective. Well, the President, the Commander-in-Chief, didn't agree with Admiral Richardson—and that's all there was to it. It turned out, unfortunately, that Admiral Richardson's view was more nearly correct than the President's—but does that mean that the President had ulterior motives in keeping the fleet at Pearl? I don't think so at all.)

And now for my counter argument on this score.

If we assume for the moment that the revisionists' argument is valid, why don't they go just one step further? If all that President Roosevelt thought necessary for his purposes, if all that he was seeking, was "to maneuver the Japanese into firing the first shot," and if MAGIC contained all that the revisionists claim it contained, would it not have been possible, by means of that very MAGIC to accomplish his purpose without such a terrible loss of American lives and, without loss of any of the ships that constituted the apple of the President's eye, the Navy's big battleships? If Roosevelt was so clever a politician and so machiavellian
in his strategy as to think up a way of maneuvering the Japanese into a position wherein they would be enticed or maneuvered into firing the first shot, should one doubt that he lacked the intelligence to have gone one step further in his thinking and saying something like the following to himself: "Eureka! I've got it. MAGIC will provide the golden opportunity I've sought for so many months. I've hit upon a perfectly marvelous idea and opportunity! An absolutely and amazingly wonderful opportunity! The Japanese have to come to Pearl Harbor to make their surprise attack, an attack clearly indicated by these MAGIC messages. They have to travel several thousand miles, in fact, to get to Hawaii from Japanese waters. If we caught them red-handed, so to speak, near Hawaii and preferably just before the attack, nobody could possibly claim they were on a simple, harmless reconnaissance mission—or on maneuvers. Why, with Japanese-American relations so tense, even if they were caught as many as 500 miles from Pearl Harbor every unbiased critic would say that they really fired first! So I'll bring Kimmel and Short fully into the picture—I'll tell them the story MAGIC is telling us. I'll secretly order them here right away (November 26th, for example) and I'll have Marshall and Stark come in. I'll show Kimmel and Short the crucial messages. Then I'll tell them something like this: Look, my boys, you see now, don't you, what your're in an excellent position to do to the Nips? You see, don't you that this inside and absolutely authentic information says that they are coming from Japan to attack Pearl Harbor by surprise at seven o'clock on the morning of 7 December; they're coming with a task force which will certainly be a pretty big one, you may be sure. It will comprise several
aircraft carriers; they'll have maybe as many as 350 aircraft, including
dive bombers, etc., of course. Now as Commander-in-Chief, I direct you
to do everything that will be necessary to meet them when or preferably
just before they arrive to launch their attack. I direct you to destroy
them; knock out the whole task force, carriers, planes, and all, just
before they reach Oahu if you can. I direct you, Kimmel, to get all your
battleships and, of course, your carriers out of their berthing positions
at Pearl Harbor some time during the night, so that there won't be any
ships there for them to bomb. And I want all your planes, including
those on your carriers, the Lexington and the Enterprise, up in the air
before seven o'clock; you'd better get off messages at once to Halsey,
Newton, and Brown to alert their task forces; if they're not at Pearl get
them back as soon as you can; maybe you'll want to get the Saratoga back
from the West Coast to join your other carriers if there's still time,
and that's OK with me. Short, I want all your anti-aircraft batteries on
shore to be fully manned and with live ammunition at hand, ready for use;
I know you don't have too much in the way of fighter and bomber planes but
I want you to wipe out as many of their aircraft as possible with what you
have. Forget that screwy message you sent about being prepared for
sabotage—in view of these messages that's an absurd notion. You can see
that the Japs are after our fleet and the protection of the fleet while
at Pearl is your job, you know. Be sure your radar is working properly—
24 hours a day. I want you, Kimmel, to get your carriers and battleships
out where they can destroy the Japanese carriers and escort ships while
their aircraft are being shot down just before they reach Pearl. This,
my lads, if done well will go down in history as the most thrilling and important battle of all time. Even much more important is the fact that if you knock off their task force and assuming we'll have minimal losses we'll come out far ahead in naval strength because right now our Pacific Fleet is no match for the Japanese Combined Fleet—they've got more ships, faster ships, and with longer-range guns than we have, I'm sorry to say. Now I don't want you to tell anybody I've alerted you because of what MAGIC is telling us. We're reading their most secret diplomatic codes and ciphers, which are all that count now anyhow right now, and it's very important that they don't get suspicious about the security of their Foreign Office communications. I want them to continue using those cryptographic systems because the information we're getting out of them now is priceless and will be even more so in the war which will without question ensue when you've destroyed their task force for Pearl. They won't get suspicious if you will act exactly as though your operations and maneuvers are a routine matter—training—but I want you to be on Alert No. 1. Don't forget that on 17 June 1940, when we thought the Japs and the Germans were about to gang up on us, we sent messages directing our commanders to put our forces at Pearl on a full alert, and you did so; that time, fortunately, nothing happened. We were probably jumping at conclusions then, but now it's different—now we've got this MAGIC. You'll have to go at this carefully, of course, so as not to alarm the Japs and lead them into calling the whole thing off, which they still can do, as we understand their plan. But the important thing is to keep from doing anything that will alarm them and make them call the whole thing off.
I want them to fire the first shot. I'm sure you can think up ways to work up to a condition of full alert so that they'll not get suspicious. That might precipitate an "incident" and give the Japs an excuse to say that we committed the first overt act. Besides we don't want to alarm the civil population, of course. Everybody knows that relations between Japan and ourselves are very tense right now, so that exercises and maneuvers of a defensive type will certainly be regarded as only logical and the natural thing to do. Now I suggest that you get back to your posts as fast as you can—you've got only a few days to prepare a real surprise for the surprise they think they're going to spring on us. Let's see how well you can knock 'em off. Give 'em hell! So long, and the best of luck to you. About 150 million Americans will probably never know how much they will owe you two for what I'm sure you'll be able to do, even with what little you have. I wish you had more—but you know what the trouble is. I don't have to tell you. It's enough merely to remind you that the Selective Service Act was extended in the House just a few months ago by a majority of just one vote."

On 3 December the President (in this imaginative account) sends a message to Kimmel and Short telling them that we've deciphered a long message from the Japanese Consul, Kita, in Honolulu to Tokyo. "Kita is the Jap whose been giving them the dope about ships in harbor; he's the one whose been sending Tokyo the detailed story of what ships are anchored where. But from this 3 December message it's clear that somehow Kita has figured out, or maybe somebody in Tokyo has figured out, that it would be a terrible denouement to come all the way from Japan to make their surprise
attack only to find that the 'birds had flown the coop.' So Kita has figured out a plan whereby he and his spies in and around Pearl can send last word to the Japanese Attack Force Commander that everything is OK, that the important elements of the U. S. Fleet are still in their berthing positions, and haven't suddenly departed just a few hours before the attack is scheduled to commence." (See Message from Kita to Tokyo, 3 December 1941, p. 267 of Part 12, PHR, a message which by the way was not processed until 11 December 1941 but which if there really was a conspiracy would certainly have been done before 7 December.) "Kita doesn't even have the slightest inkling, of course, that I'm telling you, Kimmel and Short, about the set-up he has prepared to make sure to get word to the Japanese task force that the birds haven't flown the coop. You arrange with Naval Intelligence, Army Intelligence and the FBI at Honolulu to grab Kita and Kita's spies on Saturday and hold them in cold storage until after the planned for attack has come off—and has, of course, failed, because it will fail, if you've done your part."

If any reader of this brochure thinks that the foregoing fanciful, imaginative, or conjectural account of what might have happened is too bizarre for serious consideration let me call his attention to what Admiral Kimmel says he could and would have done—if only he'd been "let in on" MAGIC, or at least had been told what was in those messages. Let me quote from his book (pp. 87-88):

No one had a more direct and immediate interest in the security of the fleet in Pearl Harbor than its commander-in-chief. No one had a greater right than I to know that Japan had carved up Pearl Harbor into sub-areas and was seeking and receiving reports as to the precise berthings in that harbor
of the ships of the fleet. I had been sent Mr. Grew's report earlier in the year with positive advice from the Navy Department that no credence was to be placed in the rumored Japanese plans for an attack on Pearl Harbor. I was told then, that no Japanese move against Pearl Harbor appeared "imminent or planned for in the foreseeable future." Certainly I was entitled to know when information in the Navy Department completely altered the information and advice previously given to me. Surely, I was entitled to know of the intercepted dispatches between Tokyo and Honolulu on and after September 24, 1941, which indicated that a Japanese move against Pearl Harbor was planned in Tokyo.

Knowledge of these intercepted Japanese dispatches would have radically changed the estimate of the situation made by me and my staff. It would have suggested a re-orientation of our planned operations at the outset of hostilities. The war plans of the Navy Department and of the Pacific Fleet, as well as our directives and information from Washington prior to the attack, indicated that the Pacific Fleet could be most effectively employed against Japan through diversionary raids on the Marshalls when the Japanese struck at the Malay Barrier. Knowledge of a probable Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor would have afforded an opportunity to ambush the Japanese striking force as it ventured to Hawaii. It would have suggested the wisdom of concentrating our resources to that end, rather than conserving them for the Marshall Islands expedition.

Admiral Kimmel cites instance after instance, message after message, which contained information which, he says, would have been of vital importance to him and would have prevented the disaster if only he had been given the information which he should have received as Commander-in-Chief of the U. S. Pacific Fleet. Maybe, maybe he's right in his contention. His proximity to the scene might have led him to make the imaginative jump that was necessary in order to reach the correct solution to the astounding story that MAGIC was unfolding.

Imagination bogs down when one considers what such a picture as I have conjured up might have been painted from what the Japanese messages were saying—or what the revisionists claim they clearly said.
It is true that in Hawaii there were fewer fighting aircraft, both Army and Navy, than were released from the Japanese carriers when the attack was launched. But the aircraft on the U.S. Navy carriers Lexington and Enterprise, had these carriers been positioned on the basis of the information the revisionists claim President Roosevelt had, would have made up for the lack of aircraft on Hawaii at the time of the attack.

In Admiral Kimmel's story the Admiral makes a few comments on the question of whether his account represents action that he might have taken. But let it be remembered that what he says is based on hindsight; and the Admiral freely admits this point. He contends that had he had the benefit of the intelligence which was in the MAGIC messages and which he never received the story would have been very different (pp. 109-111):

The question will arise in your minds, as it has in mine: Would the receipt of this information have made a difference in the events of December 7? No man can now state as a fact that he would have taken a certain course of action years ago had he known facts which were then unknown to him. All he can give is his present conviction, divorcing himself from hindsight as far as humanly possible, and re-creating the atmosphere of the past and the factors which then influenced him. I give you my views, formed in this manner.

Had I learned these vital facts and the "ships in harbor" messages on November 28th, it is my present conviction that I would have rejected the Navy Department's suggestion to send carriers to Wake and Midway. I would have ordered the third carrier, the "Saratoga," back from the West Coast. I would have gone to sea with the fleet and endeavored to keep it in an intercepting position at sea. This would have permitted the disposal of the striking power of the fleet to meet an attack in the Hawaiian area. The requirements of keeping the fleet fueled, however, would have made necessary the presence in Pearl Harbor from time to time of detachments of various units of the main body of the fleet.

On December 4, ample time remained for the Navy Department to forward to me the information which I have outlined,
and in addition the following significant facts, which the Navy Department learned between November 27 and that date:

1) Japan had informed Hitler that war with the Anglo-Saxon powers would break out sooner than anyone dreamed.

2) Japan had broadcast her winds code signal using the words "east wind rain," meaning war or a rupture of diplomatic relations with the United States.

Assuming that for the first time on December 5 I had all the important information then available in the Navy Department, it is my present conviction that I would have gone to sea with the fleet, including the carrier "Lexington" and arranged a rendezvous at sea with Halsey's carrier force, and been in a good position to intercept the Japanese attack.

At some time prior to December 6, 1941, the commanders of Hawaii could have been informed of the promise of armed support as detailed by the War Department in London to Air Marshal Brooke Popham in Singapore. This vital information was denied to them.

On December 6, fifteen hours before the attack, ample time still remained for the Navy Department to give me all the significant facts which I have outlined and which were not available to me in Hawaii. In addition, the Navy Department could then have advised me that thirteen parts of the Japanese reply to the American proposals had been received, that the tone and temper of this message indicated a break in diplomatic relations or war with the United States, and that the Japanese reply was to be formally presented to this government at a special hour soon to be fixed. Had I received this information on the afternoon of December 5, it is my present conviction that I would have ordered all fleet units in Pearl Harbor to sea, arranged a rendezvous with Halsey's task force returning from Wake, and been ready to intercept the Japanese force by the time fixed for the outbreak of war.

Even on the morning of December 7, four or five hours before the attack, had the Navy Department for the first time seen fit to send me all this significant information, and the additional fact that 1:00 P.M., Washington time, had been fixed for the delivery of the Japanese ultimatum to the United States, my light forces could have moved out of Pearl Harbor, all ships in the harbor would have been at general quarters, and all resources of the fleet in instant readiness to repel an attack.

For some years I, too, have wondered to what extent Kimmel's statements as to what we could or might have done, had he had or had he been given the information in MAGIC, are guided by hindsight. But having
read his book carefully I feel that it is quite possible that he is warranted in making his statements. The defense of Pearl Harbor was not his responsibility, of course—it was General Short's. But between Kimmel and Short, both capable officers, their closeness to the situation and the greater amount of time they had to think about their duties and responsibilities with respect to safeguarding the Pacific Fleet might have led them to a safe conclusion: that they had better take all precautions to avoid a sudden attack on Pearl Harbor.

One further comment: if, as a result of the inside information the revisionists say we got from MAGIC, all the submarines, destroyers, carriers and battleships in a large task force of the U. S. Pacific Fleet, or even the whole of the fleet had been lying in wait for the Japanese task force sent to make the attack on Pearl Harbor there would have been strength enough, I think, to wipe out the whole Japanese task force. It is true that the Japanese task force included only two battleships, but it had six carriers, two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser, eleven destroyers and a number of submarines, about five, some of which carried midget submarines. (Capt. Harley Cope, USN in "Climb Mount Hiitaka," U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 72, No. 12, December 1946.) I say this on the assumption that Admiral Kimmel would have timed his counter-move so that the Japanese task force would not have had the protection of the aircraft of its carriers, because if Kimmel and Short had operated on the basis of information the revisionists claim was clearly in MAGIC the Japanese 361 planes would already have departed on their mission. This I regard as a point of considerable importance. There is reason to
believe that had only a task force of the U. S. Pacific Fleet gone out to engage the Japanese task force in battle on the high seas, the U. S. task force would probably have fared very badly because of the fact that the Japanese not only did have six carriers to our two but also their battleships were faster and had longer range guns. Also, if even the whole U. S. Pacific Fleet had gone out, on the basis of MAGIC—as MAGIC is conceived by the "revisionists"—to meet the Japanese task force which was to attack Pearl Harbor, and had the two navies met on the high seas, with the Japanese carriers still sailing with their entire complement of airplanes, the U. S. Pacific Fleet would probably have suffered a terrible, humiliating and ignominious defeat, because the Japanese task force because of what I have already said—they had six carriers to our two, their first-line battleships were speedier and had longer-range guns than any of our own battleships had. Not only would there have been a great loss of American lives, but also none of our battleships or carriers could have been raised and repaired. As it was, and quite fortuitously, there were no carriers at Pearl on 7 December; and with one exception the battleships damaged or sunk at Pearl Harbor were soon back in commission, thanks to an obvious strategic error made by the Japanese high command—they could have but they failed to destroy the dry docks, machine shops, and the repair facilities at Pearl! Why the Japanese overlooked this rather obvious point is not too clear; it shows them to be not too good as naval strategists. Only one Japanese naval officer has thus far tried to explain this strategic error. They, or at least Admiral Yamamoto had the imagination to realize that with the U. S. Fleet in being in the Pacific
their plans for conquest could not be carried to completion very easily; therefore it was necessary to destroy the U. S. Fleet. Dr. Louis Morton in his article "The Japanese decision for war" (U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Vol. 80, No. 12, December 1954, p. 1329) says:

Against the almost unanimous opposition of the naval planners, Admiral Yamamoto remained adamant. Unless the American Fleet could be destroyed at one blow at the start of the war, he insisted, the Japanese would probably fail in their effort to seize the Netherlands Indies and Malaya. And even if they were successful, he predicted that they would be unable to hold any of their gains for long. . . . A determined effort by the Pacific Fleet might well result in disaster. . . . The Japanese believed it necessary to destroy or neutralize the American Fleet at Pearl Harbor and to deprive the United States of its base in the Philippines.* America's line of communications across the Pacific was to be cut by the seizure of Wake and Guam.

But that was as far as imagination of Japanese Navy strategists carried them: the only thing they thought necessary was to destroy the U. S. Pacific Fleet. On the other hand, although the U. S. war plans elaborated in the first half of 1941 (in May of that year) took into account the possibility that the Japanese might, (as they had three times before and successfully) begin a war on an enemy without a preceding declaration of war, that is, by a surprise attack, and although this possibility was placed first on the list of contingencies, with Pearl Harbor as the focal point of the attack, and although the war plans even envisioned that such an attack could come from aircraft flown from carriers, it is an almost inexplicable fact that all this was simply forgotten by the end of the same year. The U. S. high command in Washington certainly forgot this

* Some American naval historians and strategists disagree with Dr. Morton on this point; they insist that the Japanese Navy needed a spectacular victory—the Army was getting too much publicity, and that is why Yamamoto insisted on the Pearl Harbor attack. It was not necessary for their plans to take all that could be taken in Southeast Asia.
contingency; and the two principal commanders in Hawaii, by December 1941, also apparently forgot it—or did they lack the imagination that the January to May 1941 war planners used in thinking up the things that the Japanese might do? In Washington they were thinking only of deterrents to Japanese expansion in the Far East. They imagined that as long as the U. S. Pacific Fleet remained intact in the Pacific it would serve as a deterrent to Japanese moves toward conquest in Southeast Asia. The Japanese attack Pearl Harbor, our greatest overseas bastion? How absurd! Washington, by December 1941, just simply could not imagine that the Japanese would be foolhardy enough to attack Pearl Harbor and try to destroy the ships of Pacific Fleet in their berthing positions in that harbor. Except here and there among the junior officers of the Navy the possibility of a surprise air attack on the Fleet was kept in mind. "A group of the younger officers (on the West Virginia) . . . anticipating an air attack on the Fleet, had discussed among themselves what to do in case it came, and knew exactly how to act." (Morison, S. E. The rising sun in the Pacific, Vol. III of History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Little Brown and Co., Boston, 1953, p. 103). Their foresight, says Prof. Morison, saved the West Virginia. To repeat, it is true that this contingency about which I have already said a good deal, was explicitly stated in war plans—but apparently nobody seriously believed that it could be done, or that the Japanese would be so foolish as to try it. Indeed, Prof. Morison says of the attack on Pearl Harbor: (P. 132)
Thus, the surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, far from being a "strategic necessity," as the Japanese claimed even after the war, was a strategic imbecility. One can search military history in vain for an operation more fatal to the aggressor. On the tactical level, the Pearl Harbor attack was wrongly concentrated on ships rather than permanent installations and oil tanks. On the strategic level it was idiotic. On the high political level it was disastrous.
4. WAS MAGIC WITHHELD FROM KIMMEL AND SHORT AND, IF SO, WHY?

We come not to another very important question which has been raised in revisionist circles: Why did not the commanders at Pearl Harbor get MAGIC; why did they not have the machines and facilities for deciphering the Japanese highest level diplomatic communications, the so-called "Purple" crypto-system? Prof. Ferrell says: "The British and General MacArthur received the Purple decoding machines from Washington; why not the commanders at Pearl Harbor? (p. 225) This is a good question, and not as foolish as it might be made to appear by the usual answer that the authorities in Washington couldn't prevent the Pearl Harbor attack, even with the code, so what would Kimmel and his Army opposite at Hawaii, Lieutenant General Walter C. Short have done with it."

Let us agree that the question raised is not a foolish one but let us consider it in two parts. First, as to why the British got the Purple system. In the autumn of 1940 U.S. military and naval authorities on the highest level agreed that there should and could be some exchange of intelligence between the U.S. and the U.K. Included in the material to be exchanged was communication intelligence. It was ascertained that the U.K. communication intelligence experts had not succeeded in solving the highest-level Japanese diplomatic cryptosystem and the machine which was involved in enciphering and deciphering the messages in that system.

Moreover, parenthetically, had the German experts,/ Cryptanalysts of the U.S. Army's Signal Intelligence Service, however, had accomplished this task and were reading the Japanese messages in that cryptosystem, which
they had named, for brevity as well as for disguise, the "Purple" system, its predecessor, also a machine system, having been named the "Red" system. On the other hand, it had been ascertained that the U. K. cryptanalysts, although they had been unsuccessful with the "Purple" system, had been quite successful with certain German and Italian diplomatic cryptosystems the study of which had only recently been undertaken by U. S. cryptanalysts. It therefore seemed that both the U. S. and U. K. could profit by some sort of exchange. A team of four cryptanalysts, two from the Army and two from the Navy, was sent to London in January of 1941 to discuss the technical aspects of an exchange of material. The U. S. team took with it a recently-completed "Purple" machine and the data necessary to use it in deciphering the Japanese messages. It is very important to understand that the British had not only extensive facilities for intercepting and forwarding Japanese diplomatic traffic to London but they also had a corps of very competent cryptanalysts and Japanese translators—without whom possession of the "Purple" machine would have been of little or no value. The British also were able to read and translate other systems carrying Japanese diplomatic traffic—and they did so not only in London but also at Singapore and Hong Kong, and possibly in one or two other strategic spots under the British Crown.

In the exchange of the "Purple" machine and informational details concerning the Purple system for specific technical data on certain German and Italian cryptosystems (principally diplomatic) both the U. S. and the U. K. gained advantages of inestimable value. On this point there never has been any doubt on either side. Moreover, this exchange paved the way
to a later complete U. S.-U. K. collaboration in cryptanalytic operations after the U. S. entry into World War II as one of the belligerents. The value of this collaboration can hardly be overestimated but this brochure will not deal with this aspect.

As long as we are dealing with the question about the U. S. delivery to the British of a "Purple" machine and the cryptosystem which used it, we may well go into a related question concerning which little has been said in the torrent of words about the Pearl Harbor disaster. The British acquired the "Purple" in January 1941, and were able from the very first to use it—no strings were attached to this usage, except that the secret would be treated with the care that it deserved in order to keep from enemy knowledge the fact that we had solved it. (There have always been very detailed and strict regulations governing the handling of communications intelligence and in time the U. S. and U. K. regulations became identical). The reason for mentioning that there were no strings attached to the U. S. gift to the British is to forestall a revisionist allegation that President Roosevelt must have permitted the gift to be made only on condition that no information coming from "Purple" would be used by the British in a manner that would interfere with his conspiracy to withhold from the two commanders at Pearl Harbor whatever intelligence they might obtain which would prevent the Japanese taking them by surprise. Such an allegation would, of course, be absurd on its face—but then the revisionists do not always argue in a logical manner. Exactly why the British would, even if they could have agreed, to keep "Purple" intelligence from Short and Kimmel is hard to understand. In the first place, although there
was no direct communication between these commanders and the British, certainly, there was communication between British and American intelligence authorities in the Far East. In the second place, let it be noted that the British had been able to read and were reading Japanese diplomatic systems other than Purple; in fact, many of the messages which the revisionists claim most definitely indicated that a surprise air attack was to be made at Pearl Harbor were in cryptosystems other than Purple. For example, the so-called "bombing plot" message was not in "Purple" at all but in a system held by consulates, a system designated by us as J-19; and several other messages related to the bombing plot message were in the same system.

What has all the foregoing to do with the British? Simply this: is it conceivable that the British, too, would have participated in a conspiracy of silence so as to let the Japanese destroy the U. S. Pacific Fleet, the fleet that was their principal protection against Japanese aggression in the Far East? Hardly. Is it not clear that the various messages in Purple and in the other Japanese systems conveyed to the British no definite statement as to an impending attack on the American bastion in the Hawaiian area? The British, let us remember, were then supposed to have the finest and most carefully trained intelligence experts in the world. Is it likely that the detailed story of an impending attack, if revealed by MAGIC, would have been completely overlooked by their experts? Is it conceivable that they would, if they saw the outlines of the story, have kept it to themselves? That they would have kept it from their U. S. friends? That they would have seen to it that no word of it
Leaked to Short and Kimmel? The British were counting upon the U. S. to protect British interests in the Far East.

In the foregoing paragraphs it was stated that certain Japanese messages were long-delayed in their processing into plain English by the Army and Navy cryptanalytic units. These delays were caused by several things: (1) there were so many messages to be forwarded from U. S. intercept stations that U. S. radio facilities were then not equal to the task of carrying them all; many had to be sent by air mail pouch or even by ordinary U. S. Mail pouch; (2) there were so many messages and so few persons capable of processing them in Washington—let us not forget that a few dozens of persons in Washington were trying to keep up with what hundreds, perhaps thousands, of Japanese were doing in Japanese message centers in Japanese embassies, legations, and consulates all over the world; (3) there were many times when it was impossible to solve a new key until a sufficient amount of traffic had accumulated; (4) there were many cases when decrypting a message was stymied by errors in transmission or interception; (5) there were only a handful of persons in both the Army and the Navy cryptanalytic units who could translate Japanese—and no pool in the U. S. from which trained and trustworthy Japanese translators could be selected, as is the case in other foreign languages such as French, German, Spanish, etc.; and until the Japanese was converted into English, the messages containing useful intelligence about Japan might just as well be filed in the waste basket.

While we dwell upon the foregoing elements in the story it might be a good place to point out that a conspiracy to withhold information in
order that an attack might be carried out could hardly afford to risk
certain contingencies. For instance, it would be essential, would it not,
that a high degree of priority in processing be accorded all Japanese
Government messages going to or coming from Honolulu, so that the alleged
conspirators themselves might not be caught napping? But it is a fact
that several very important messages having a direct bearing on the situa-
tion were not processed until several days after the attack. The very
fact that the processing of all messages to and from Honolulu was not
given the highest or even a high priority itself constitutes an argument
against the alleged conspiracy being objective—and not completely sub-
jective.

Let us now take up the question about the withholding of MAGIC from
Admiral Kimmel and General Short—as viewed by the highest level author-
ies in Washington. First of all it is easy to admit the fact that the
critical MAGIC messages of the early autumn of 1941 and up to the day of
the attack were withheld from them; there can be no question whatever
about this fact. But the important point is why? The revisionists say
that it was necessitated by the Roosevelt-Marshall-Stark conspiracy to
bring about the attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. A dispassionate
view, however, must take into consideration quite different and more
logical factors. First, as the Purple messages continued to be read in
Washington the strategic value of our solution of that cryptosystem
became increasingly apparent. This is a good place to insert what General
Marshall had to say on the subject of the value of MAGIC, which he describ-
ed in detail in a highly secret letter he wrote to Governor Dewey, a
Republican, who had learned about MAGIC (nobody knows how or from whom). Marshall had learned that Dewey was proposing to use this highly explosive information in the 1944 Republican Presidential campaign against a fourth term for Roosevelt. The war was not over! Here it is, in extenso:

Extracted from CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATION PEARL HARBOR ATTACK, Part 3, pp. 1132-1133.

[29877] [Copy]

For Mr. Dewey's eyes only. 27 September 1944.

My dear Governor: Colonel Clarke, my messenger to you of yester-day, September 26th, has reported the result of his delivery of my letter dated September 25th. As I understand him you (a) were unwill- ing to commit yourself to any agreement regarding "not communicating its contents to any other person" in view of the fact that you felt you already knew certain of the things probably referred to in the letter, as suggested to you by seeing the word "cryptograph," and (b) you could not feel that such a letter as this to a presidential candidate could have been addressed to you by an officer in my position without the knowledge of the President.

As to (a) above I am quite willing to have you read what comes hereafter with the understanding that you are bound not to communic ate to any other person any portions on which you do not now have or later receive factual knowledge from some other source than myself. As to (b) above you have my word that neither the Secretary of War nor the President has any intimation whatsoever that such a letter has been addressed to you or that the preparation or sending of such a communication was being considered. I assure you that the only persons who saw or know of the existence of either this letter or my letter to you dated September 25th are Admiral King, seven key officers responsible for security of military communications, and my secretary who typed these letters. I am trying my best to make plain to you that this letter is being addressed to you solely on my initiative, Admiral King having been consulted only after the letter was drafted, and I am persisting in the matter because the military hazards involved are so serious that I feel some action is necessary to protect the interests of our armed forces.

I should have much preferred to talk to you in person but I could not devise a method that would not be subject to press and radio reactions as to why the Chief of Staff of the Army would be seeking an interview with you at this particular moment. Therefore I have turned to the method of this letter, with which Admiral King
concurs, to be delivered by hand to you by Colonel Clarke, who, incidentally, has charge of the most secret documents of the War and Navy Departments.

In brief, the military dilemma is this:

The most vital evidence in the Pearl Harbor matter consists of our intercepts of the Japanese diplomatic communications. Over a period of years our cryptograph people analyzed the character of the machine the Japanese were using for encoding their diplomatic messages. Based on this a corresponding machine was built by us which deciphers their messages. Therefore, we possessed a wealth of information regarding their moves in the Pacific, which in turn was furnished the State Department—rather than as is popularly supposed, the State [2975] Department providing us with the information—but which unfortunately made no reference whatever to intentions toward Hawaii until the last message before December 7th, which did not reach our hands until the following day, December 8th.

Now the point to the present dilemma is that we have gone ahead with this business of deciphering their codes until we possess other codes, German as well as Japanese, but our main basis of information regarding Hitler's intentions in Europe is obtained from Baron Oshima's messages from Berlin reporting his interviews with Hitler and other officials to the Japanese Government. These are still in the codes involved in the Pearl Harbor events.

To explain further the critical nature of this set-up which would be wiped out almost in an instant if the least suspicion were aroused regarding it, the battle of the Coral Sea was based on deciphered messages and therefore our few ships were in the right place at the right time. Further, we were able to concentrate our limited forces to meet their naval advance on Midway when otherwise we almost certainly would have been some 3,000 miles out of place. We had full information of the strength of their forces in that advance and also of the smaller force directed against the Aleutians which finally landed troops on Attu and Kiska.

Operations in the Pacific are largely guided by the information we obtain of Japanese deployments. We know their strength in various garrisons, the rations and other stores continuing available to them, and what is of vast importance we check their fleet movements and the movements of their convoys. The heavy losses reported from time to time which they sustain by reason of our submarine action, largely result from the fact that we know the sailing dates and routes of their convoys and can notify our submarines to lie in wait at the proper points.
The current raids by Admiral Halsey's carrier forces on Japanese shipping in Manila Bay and elsewhere were largely based in timing on the known movements of Japanese convoys, two of which were caught, as anticipated, in his destructive attacks.

You will understand from the foregoing the utterly tragic consequences if the present political debates regarding Pearl Harbor disclose to the enemy, German or Japanese, any suspicion of the vital sources of information we possess.

The Roberts' report on Pearl Harbor had to have withdrawn from it all reference to this highly secret matter, therefore in portions it necessarily appeared incomplete. The same reason which dictated that course is even more important today because our sources have been greatly elaborated.

As another example of the delicacy of the situation, some of Donovan's people (the OSS) without telling us, instituted a secret search of the Japanese Embassy offices in Portugal. As a result the entire military attaché Japanese code all over the world was changed, and though this occurred over a year ago, we have not yet been able to break the new code and have thus lost this invaluable source of information, particularly regarding the European situation.

A further most serious embarrassment is the fact that the British government is involved concerning its most secret sources of information, regarding which only the Prime Minister, the Chiefs of Staff and a very limited number of other officials have knowledge.

A recent speech in Congress by Representative Harnes would clearly suggest to the Japanese that we have been reading their codes, though Mr. Harnes and the American public would probably not draw any such conclusion.

The conduct of General Eisenhower's campaign and of all operations in the Pacific are closely related in conception and timing to the information we secretly obtain through these intercepted codes. They contribute greatly to the victory and tremendously to the saving in American lives, both in the conduct of current operations and in looking towards the early termination of the war.

I am presenting this matter to you in the hope that you will see your way clear to avoid the tragic results with which we are now threatened in the present political campaign.

Please return this letter by bearer. I will hold it in my most secret file subject to your reference should you so desire.

Faithfully yours,

(Sgd) G. C. MARSHALL.
It seems to me that the foregoing letter goes a long way toward answering the question as to why MAGIC was withheld from Kimmel and Short. Stated briefly, the authorities in Washington were fearful that if MAGIC continued to be sent them the secret that we were able to read all their diplomatic cryptocommunications, including "Purple", their most secure system, would soon find its way to the Japanese. The whole of the island of Oahu had thousands of Japanese nationals, among whom it was natural to assume there were—there must have been—plenty of spies. The Army and Navy authorities in Washington felt that it was becoming too dangerous to the continued secrecy of the fact that we had solved and were reading messages in Purple to send any more of the messages to Kimmel and Short. Of course they could have been sent some gists—as had been done in the first half of 1941—but General Sherman Miles, the then Assistant Chief of Staff for Military Intelligence, stated before the Joint Congressional Committee that sending even gists would have been dangerous, by overloading the radio circuits; and he went on to say that while the Navy cryptosystems could have been used, because they were more secure than the Army's, even that would not remove the danger altogether. I will interject at this point the statement that General Miles was not too well-informed on these practical matters, because the Navy had adopted and was using an Army cryptosystem and a machine invented by Army personnel. Both the Army and the Navy's cryptosystems could and would have stood up under the strain of sending all the important MAGIC messages to Kimmel and Short and in extenso.
But, insist the revisionists, the Navy furnished a MAGIC machine and information on how to use it to the Commander of the 16th Naval District—the Philippines. Why not to Kimmel and Short? There were very good reasons for this; but at this point we shall merely ask: did possession of MAGIC prevent General MacArthur from being taken by surprise and losing all his planes at one fell swoop more than 12 hours after the General knew of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor? General MacArthur blames his chief of the Army Air Corps forces in the Philippines, General Brereton, for being caught napping; and Brereton blames MacArthur. Possession of the Purple machine alone obviously was not sufficient—the interpretation, appreciation, and evaluation of MAGIC is just as important. It might be useful to quote what General Willoughby, MacArthur's G-2, said on this latter point in an affidavit dated 8 May 1945 (PFR, Part 35, p. 87) in protecting the Navy's monopoly of MAGIC:

In 1941 the Navy obtained and maintained a highly efficient crypto-analytical service, specializing in Japanese material; though the Army had notably participated in the development of this subject, the Navy appears to have obtained a lead; consequently, it can be said that the Navy enjoyed an almost monopolistic privilege. In an otherwise meritorious desire for security (though every modern nation knows that crypto-analysis is going on), the Navy has shrouded the whole enterprise in mystery, excluding other services, and rigidly centralizing the whole enterprise. At this date, for example, this same system is still in vogue: as far as SWPA is concerned, the crypto-analysis is made in Melbourne, forwarded via 7th Fleet D.N.I.; the Melbourne station is under direct orders of Washington, is not bound by any local responsibilities, forwards what they select, and when it suits them. The possibility of erroneous or incomplete selection is as evident now as it was in 1941. The only excuse the Navy has is that its field is primarily naval intercepts, but there is a lot of Army traffic or other incidental traffic. This collateral traffic is not always understood or correctly interpreted by the Navy, in my opinion.
The solution to this vexing and dangerous problem is a completely joint, inter-locking intercept and crypto-analytical service, on the highest level, with the freest interchange of messages and interpretation.

The sequence of messages referred to, had they been known to a competent intelligence officer, with Battle Order and tactical background, beginning with November 14th, would have led instantly to the inescapable conclusion that Pearl Harbor naval installations were a target for attack, with November 25th or November 29th as the deadlines, suggesting irresistibly that elapsed time was involved, for some sort of naval seaborne sortie.

C. A. Willoughby,
C. A. Willoughby,
Major General, G. S. C. ,
Assist. Chief of Staff, G-2,
General Headquarters, SWPA.

The fact is that skilled cryptanalytic help and skilled Japanese translators were not in sufficient supply to permit either the Army or the Navy to maintain many such people anywhere outside the U. S.—they were badly needed in Washington. And besides, nobody thought or even imagined that they were so badly needed at Pearl Harbor as at Manila—the Japanese would never be so foolhardy as to attack Pearl! The U. S. Navy authorities believed that the Philippines might be cut off—but not Hawaii. Manila needed MAGIC much more than Pearl! That explains why there was a Purple machine in Manila, more than anything else. The Navy communications personnel at Pearl were assigned the mission of trying desperately to solve the important Japanese naval cryptosystems and to get what information could be gleaned from traffic analysis of Japanese communications; the Army had no signal intelligence or cryptanalytic personnel at all in Hawaii after 1939—the very small unit it did have in Honolulu was brought back to Washington after but one year’s operations there—because the few trained persons of that unit were thought
to be much more useful in Washington. Hawaii seemed to be the last place
the Japanese would try to attack! Why keep the few trained cryptanalytic
personnel there when they could be so much more useful in Washington?
What the Army had, therefore, was simply an intercept unit directed to
listen in on certain assigned Japanese circuits and to forward the
traffic to Washington for study.

In this decision to bring back to Washington that small Army crypt-
analytic unit (two or three persons at most!) I am quite sure that the
Chief Signal Officer consulted no higher authority—and, I am sure too,
the Commanding General of the Hawaiian Department at that time, General
Short's predecessor, was glad to get rid of the unit—its maintenance
caused him difficult logistical problems. The secrecy of its operations
certainly was a source of irritation to him and his staff—they never
got to see the results. The trained Signal Corps officer the Signal
Intelligence Service in Washington sent to Hawaii in 1940 performed no
signal intelligence functions; by direction of the local commander he
was soon given "more necessary" duties, such as devising and supervising
the laying of communication cables in and around Honolulu. And with
this decision I can take no exception—the Commanding General on the
spot knew best what he needed. I know for a fact that when the Signal
Corps sent a very small unit to Corregidor it was only with the greatest
difficulty that the Commanding General there was finally persuaded to
let the unit do what it was sent out to do—but only for a short time.
The members of any Signal Intelligence unit (Signal Corps personnel) were
badly needed for ordinary Signal Corps functions. Washington could do
very little about this—the local commander decided. In all that I have said above, however, the most important point by far was, so far as concerned both the Philippines and Hawaii, that an attack by the Japanese was too fantastic to warrant much thought, so preparations for a possible attack were somewhat neglected.
5. THE "WINDS CODE MESSAGES"

Many thousands of words have been expended in discussing and writing the story of the so-called "Winds Code Messages," and, in particular, whether there were any authentic "Winds Code Execute" messages.

There were two "Winds Code" set-ups, which were intended, for reasons peculiar to the Oriental mentality, to give a certain kind of warning but just exactly what kind of a warning is unclear because both of these "set-ups" were, to say the least, impractical, indeed quite foolish, because they were so susceptible of being confused with ordinary weather and news broadcasts. And, indeed, this is exactly what did happen with regard to the one of most interest to the U. S. A weather broadcast—now termed the false "Winds Code Execute" message was intercepted—and for a few hours at any rate was taken to be the real thing. But it wasn't "the real McCoy"—it resembled what the Execute message might have been but when carefully scrutinized it just didn't meet all the conditions specified in the code instructions. The alarm it set off subsided as soon as the discrepancies with what a real Execute should be were recognized.

I think that one thing was established conclusively after exhaustive investigation by several of the Pearl Harbor boards, including that of the Joint Congressional Committee: the Japanese never did send out an authentic "Winds Code Execute" message which clearly indicated that Japan was going to attack the U. S. If indeed the Foreign Ministry intended to transmit such a message it was forgotten at the last moment; and even if
It had not forgotten, the most the message could have conveyed was that there was going to be a break in relations between Japan and the country signified by the particular "Winds Code Execute" message. The other thing which seems to be certain is that having forgotten to send out the "Execute" meaning a break between Japan and the U.S., somebody seems to have remembered to send out after the attack on Pearl Harbor a "Winds Code Execute" signifying that Japan was breaking relations with Britain but not with the U.S.S.R. Even this one the Japanese who were interrogated after the surrender of Japan denied having transmitted but all the evidence I have examined indicates that they were not telling the truth. One might say, if they didn't tell the truth about that one we should not put any credence in their denial that a "Winds Code Execute" was sent out on 3 December, the one indicating a break in relations (or war) with the U.S. Certain of the Japanese interrogated on the point denied ever setting up the "Winds Code" in the first place. This point is examined in great detail in Appendix E to PER, pp. 467-486 and there is consummate skill in this examination. The PER arrived at the following conclusion, which I think represents the last word that can be said on this subject (p. 486):

CONCLUSION: From consideration of all evidence relating to the winds code, it is concluded that no genuine message, in execution of the code and applying to the United States, was received in the War or Navy Department prior to December 7, 1941. It appears, however, that messages were received which were initially thought possibly to be in execution of the code but were determined not to be execute messages. In view of the preponderate weight of evidence to the contrary, it is believed that Captain Safford is honestly mistaken when he insists that an execute message was received prior to December 7, 1941. Considering the period of time that has elapsed, this mistaken impression is understandable.
Granting for purposes of discussion that a genuine execute message applying to the winds code was intercepted before December 7, it is concluded that such fact would have added nothing to what was already known concerning the critical character of our relations with the Empire of Japan.

This conclusion reached in 1946 remains unshaken to this day—nothing has turned up to make a change in it desirable, so far as concerns any "Winds Code Execute" message that might have been transmitted on 3 December, as Captain Safford contended. One could only wish that the conclusion had stated categorically that there was such a message in regard to a break in relations between Japan and the British (and also the Dutch East Indies) because the evidence is clear that such a signal was sent—but then, by that time, 8 December, the attack on Pearl Harbor was finished.

The "revisionists," however, still believe in Captain Safford—the sole person who stuck to his statement that there was a 3 December warning, and that all copies of that message were deliberately destroyed. The interesting thing about this whole tempest-in-a-teapot is that even if there had been an authentic U. S.—Japan execute message it would have not told us nothing whatever that was already known on 3 December. Moreover, and this I think is very important, the attack on Pearl was prepared for with so much secrecy I would doubt very much that the Japanese would take any chance whatever in sending out a message which might "tip their hand". It just doesn't fit in the picture at all!

It is interesting to note that Admiral Kimmel, while he mentions the "Winds Code" affair and cites (p. 100) what the Naval Court of Inquiry said about it—later proved to be wrong—does not press the
matter to seriously. I think the Admiral is very dubious that a real Execute was ever sent out on 3 December as claimed by Captain Safford, although he does say (p. 101): "The findings of the Naval Court of Inquiry on this subject are confirmed by the evidence presented to the joint congressional investigating committee." The Admiral does not state specifically what the "findings" were but the reader is left to conclude that the committee found that there was an Execute transmitted on 3 December and that it was intercepted by us—but the information was not transmitted to him or to other commanders afloat.

Senators Ferguson and Brewster in their Minority Report say (p. 526): "Even if the wind execute message they saw was a false one they believed it true at the time and should have acted accordingly." A good point, and I think, one that should be emphasized; it is too bad it wasn't followed up regardless of any other considerations.
6. THE QUESTION OF SABOTAGE

What led General Short to prepare for sabotage rather than for military action by the Japanese?

In my opinion the reason for General Short's very brief answer to the war warning message sent him after the 26 November 1941 American rejoinder to Japanese proposals for arriving at a modus vivendi was not, as many people believe, utter nonsense. Short said merely that he was prepared for sabotage. The fact is that everybody in Washington and, apparently, also in Honolulu had but two things in mind as to possible or probable Japanese action. First, the Japanese march was certainly to be to the southward (to Malaya, Thailand, Indo-China, Borneo, or the Dutch East Indies; indeed all their actions seemed to point in those directions) and Short was not able to do anything at all about that. Then, secondly, there was incessant talk in America, including in the radio broadcasts and in the writings of columnists, sabotage was what we had to guard against. The generally-held view was that the Japanese were tricky, that attempts to thwart their march would be countered by the various mechanisms of sabotage. This I remember very vividly. And I feel sure that when General Gerow received General Short's message stating that all steps to prevent sabotage had been taken and that he was in liaison with the Navy, General Gerow probably thought "Fine business—Short's on the job." So must have the others in Washington who saw it—General Marshall included. By hindsight Short's message seems entirely unresponsive to the message sent him. But the matter of
sabotage was in the air. That's what we had to look out for. Confirmation of this attitude can be seen in various messages. Even the Navy's strong message beginning "This dispatch is to be considered a war warning" ends with "Continental Districts Guam Samoa directed to take appropriate measures against sabotage." Everybody had forgotten all about the war plan of May 1941 which envisaged as the first and most dangerous contingency a surprise air attack on the Fleet at Pearl Harbor. Parenthetically I may add that those whose memories of World War I included the two great acts of sabotage by German agents in this country (the Black Tom explosion and the Kingsland Fire) before the U. S. became a belligerent in that war will perhaps agree with me that Japanese sabotage was the thing Americans thought was most to be feared in regard to American territory. Let us not forget that this fear quickly expressed itself very clearly and heartlessly in what was done to thousands of Japanese-American citizens (including Nisei) in California the moment we declared war on Japan. Why did they move them out of the port cities? What were the authorities afraid of? Sabotage! For this reason I, for one, find it difficult to criticize General Gerov in his handling of General Short's message in response to the 26 November message from Washington.

But what about the views held by U. S. intelligence authorities on this question of sabotage? Were they the same as those of the average American citizen, "the man-in-the-street"? I think they were—and just as the views of "the man-in-the-street" of those days were wrong, so it seems were the views of our intelligence authorities. Why? Because we never have paid too much attention to intelligence. After several
thousands of years of experience, why do military and naval authorities seem to pay less attention to intelligence than to logistics, for instance? Why does intelligence have to play the role of step-child in the conduct of warfare? What is there about intelligence that makes it less desirable as a career than artillery, for example? The reasons are clear when one looks into the matter.

Admiral Theobald lays great emphasis on Tokyo to Honolulu message number 83 of 24 September 1941 (the so-called "Bombing Plot Message") and says (p. 46):

After studying Tokyo dispatch #83, no military intelligence organization could fail to reach that deduction [that it was to prepare the detailed plan for a surprise attack on the major units of the Fleet moored there].

Here I think is the kernel of the nut—the secret of why the U. S. was taken by surprise. I have underlined the phrase "no military intelligence organization" in the foregoing extract because I think that our military and naval intelligence organizations had serious defects at that time—and I think they still have. (Theobald does not mean just military, U. S. Army Intelligence, but also U. S. Navy Intelligence.) I think that serious defects in our military and naval intelligence made it possible for the Japanese to take us by surprise at Pearl Harbor.

A strong statement? Yes, but I think it is warranted. I will with some diffidence go into this question because I do not know too much about the situation as of 1957. I did know what it was like in 1940-41 and in 1950, four years after the PHR was released. It is clear that the intelligence situation in the U. S. was defective in 1940-41 and in 1950, when the Korean "police action" broke out without warning. Where
were our intelligence services then? What were they doing or thinking about? By 1950 we had CIA. What help was CIA?

Four years after the PIR was released, Major General Sherman Miles, Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence of the War Department General Staff, from April 1940 to February 1942, in what some people may regard as an apologia, has many things to say in an endeavor to explain what appear to have been derejections of himself and his staff. It was an attempt to absolve G-2 from its responsibility for the debacle of 7 December 1941. For the most part he does as good a job of this, perhaps, as could be done to exculpate G-2 from its failures, omissions, and lack of the kind of imagination which might have foreseen and forestalled the disaster caused by the Japanese surprise attack. A salient paragraph among many which could be quoted is the following (p. 71):

The plain fact is that the war warnings sent out by the highest military authorities nine days and more before Pearl Harbor were far more authoritative and more definitive of what the Hawaiian commanders might expect, and what was expected of them, than any information or interpretations from "magic" that Military or Naval Intelligence could possibly have sent. Complete reliance was placed on the effect those warnings should have had—and did have everywhere except in Hawaii. But Tokyo apparently believed that the incredible might happen and Hawaii be surprised: Washington did not.

General Miles takes it for granted that the warnings sent out by Washington properly alerted all our overseas commands except the one in Hawaii. One wonders about the basis for the General's assumption in this regard. Indeed, in one case, already mentioned, even 12 hours after General MacArthur in the Philippines knew that the Japanese had made the

surprise attack at Pearl Harbor his command was nevertheless taken completely by surprise, when the Japanese destroyed all his planes on the ground, just as they did in Hawaii. General Miles, notwithstanding his statement that (p. 70):

"The Hawaiian commands later complained that this "magic" information was not transmitted to them—this in spite of their failure to react to the authoritative warning orders sent them when the situation was commonly known to be far more critical. By comparison, it may be noted that General MacArthur, who had access to "magic," could not later identify the more important "magic" messages; he apparently took no action on them, but alerted his command for war on Washington's warning orders. Thus assumes that General MacArthur "alerted his command for war on Washington's warning orders." What does "alerting" mean, anyhow, if a commander loses all his planes by what I think was inattention?

General Miles admits (pp. 70-71) that "there were two "MAGIC" messages ... which have subsequently been held to have been signposts, had we so read them, to Pearl Harbor." The General devotes many words to these two cases and concludes that the signposts pointed to a half-hearted proposal, admittedly discussed in Washington, that the British and U. S. occupy the Netherland Indies before the Japanese did so—and he thus tried to explain away the famous clue contained in a Tokyo message to Berlin telling General Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador to Germany, to tell the Germans: "Say very secretly to them that there is extreme danger that war may suddenly break out between the Anglo-Saxon nations and Japan through some clash of arms, and add that the time of the breaking out of this war may come quicker than anyone dreams." The explanation of Miles (or, better perhaps, the lack of imagination) on the part
of U. S. intelligence agencies appears to me (even by hindsight, of course) to be pretty thin.

Here are two more paragraphs from General Miles' article, both of which I think are of considerable significance:

The last twenty-four hours in Washington before the bombs fell have come in for much scrutiny. Why did the President, with most of the Japanese final answer before him, conclude that it meant war and then, after a fitful attempt to reach Admiral Stark by telephone, quietly go to bed? Why was he in seclusion the following morning? Why was no action taken on the Japanese reply by the Secretaries of State, War, and Navy when they met on that Sunday morning? Why did they not consult the President, or he send for them? Where was everybody, including my humble self? Why, in short, didn't someone stage a last-minute rescue, in good Western style?

The picture undoubtedly is one of men still working under the psychology of peace. They were, to quote Secretary Stimson again, "under a terrific pressure in the face of a global war which they felt was probably imminent. Yet they were surrounded, outside of their offices and almost throughout the country, by a spirit of isolationism and disbelief in danger which now seems incredible." They were men who thought they had done their possible to prepare for impending war, and who had no idea that there was an innocent maiden in need of rescue.

I will add another extract that may be helpful in seeing things in what I regard as their proper light. This extract comes from Secretary Stimson's statement with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, repeated as a footnote (p. 239) to the PHR:

As expressed by Mr. Stimson: "A keener and more imaginative appreciation on the part of some of the officers in the War and Navy Departments of the significance of some of the information might have led to a suspicion of an attack specifically on Pearl Harbor. I do not think that certain officers in the War Department functioned in these respects with sufficient skill. At all times it must be borne in mind, however, that it is easy to criticize individuals in the light of hindsight, and very difficult to recreate fairly the entire situation and information with which the officers were required to deal at the time of the event." See statement of the Secretary of War with respect to the report of the Army Pearl Harbor Board, committee exhibit No. 157.
My own explanation of the failures and derelictions of U. S. intelligence can be stated in few words: I do not think there were no imaginative officers in G-2 or in Naval Intelligence; but more important there was nobody in either the Army or the Navy intelligence staffs in Washington whose most important, if not sole duty, was to study the whole story which the MAGIC messages were unfolding and which played so important a part in our failure to deduce that the Japanese were planning a surprise attack on the U. S. Fleet at Pearl; there was nobody whose responsibility it was to try to put the pieces of the jigsaw puzzle together. Certainly there was nobody in the Army's Signal Intelligence Service who was assigned to or available for this purpose—even if the responsibility for this sort of work had been fixed on that organization, which it wasn't. This was likewise true of the equivalent Navy organization. This important phase of intelligence was a responsibility which in both services was jealously held by the Intelligence staffs. And the distribution of the MAGIC messages was so rigidly controlled that there was nobody in either of these Intelligence staffs whose duty it was to study the messages from a long-range point of view. The persons, officers and civilians, in intelligence, as well as in the White House, had the messages only for so short a time that each message represented only a single frame, so to speak, in a long motion picture film—a film which should have been shown and should have been intently studied as a continuous series of pictures, because they were telling a story. But the film was simply not there to be studied and this was a very serious weakness, I think, in the intelligence organizations of the two Services. It may have been that they
simply did not have the people to devote to such work.

Of course, there are those critics who point to the message which Navy Captain McCollum testified that he thought should be sent to Admiral Kimmel, and to the one which the Army's Colonel Sadler testified that he thought should be sent to General Short. They, it seemed, sensed that MAGIC was telling a story and was pointing toward a surprise attack, the most likely target being Pearl Harbor. But both efforts came up against stone walls—their superior officers claimed enough had been sent to put Kimmel and Short on full alert: To send more would only confuse them, or worse than that, irritate them. But the latter were obviously wrong—or so it seems to us now—again by the aid of hindsight. Admirals Theobald and Kimmel have made the most of this failure on the part of those above Captain McCollum and Colonel Sadler to realize how inadequate the warnings that had been sent to Short and Kimmel really were.

The Joint Congressional Committee (Majority Report) clearly felt that what Kimmel and Short were sent by way of information left much to be desired. One thing seems certain, as I have already said: the intelligence arrangements in both Services were inadequate. The Committee reached certain conclusions and made but five major recommendations, the second of which is as follows:

That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent; that upon effecting a unified intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received.
The assignment of an officer having an aptitude for such work should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions. Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded the important role which it deserves.

What has been done about this recommendation by the Services? Very little; in fact, I think it can be said that nothing has been done. Of course, we have the Central Intelligence Agency; but is that establishment really responsive to the Joint Committee's recommendation? I hardly think so. The three services no doubt can cite good reasons why they have not made a professional career in intelligence possible or attractive to its officer personnel; no doubt they can cite at length factors and difficulties that would have to be overcome. All I can say is that judging by what the Army has done the attitude toward intelligence seems not to have changed very much, as is indicated by the following editorial which appeared in the Washington Post on 5 December 1955 and which states the case in succinct terms:
Snub to Intelligence

The recent reorganization in the Army General Staff leaves the Military Intelligence Service in an ambiguous and rather humiliating position. Although directors of the other major staff divisions have been designated as Deputy Chiefs of Staff with the rank of lieutenant general, the Chief of Intelligence remains a major general with the subordinate title of Assistant Chief of Staff.

The extraordinary thing about all this is that not long ago the special task force which investigated the intelligence problem for the Hoover Commission strongly recommended that in the case of those units associated with the three armed services their chiefs “be evaluated in the organizational structure to level of Deputy Chiefs of Staff in the Army and Air Force, and Deputy Chief of Naval Operations in the Navy.” This was a rather prolix way of saying that they ought to have a little more prestige and influence, along with a little more gold braid, than they now enjoy. Why, in the case of all three services, was this recommendation ignored by the Department of Defense?

The chief function of military intelligence is to collate and interpret the information provided by the attaches abroad and by other agencies, such as the CIA, the FBI and its own counterespionage service. Correct interpretation requires more than the accumulation of relevant facts; it also requires a considerable knowledge of the psychology of the potential enemy, and this in turn requires an extensive study of his language, history, culture, customs and philosophic tradition, since these afford the keys to such an understanding. But all this, together with the secrecy in which their activities are necessarily cloaked, seems to have made intelligence officers somewhat suspect to a certain sort of politician. Even professional military men are often inclined to discount the value of the critical function exercised by intelligence officers in the discussion of pet military projects or plans.

The question raised by the reorganization is whether we can realistically expect to increase the quality of military intelligence by deemphasizing its significance. It is hard to see how a career in intelligence can be made to appeal to capable officers when the importance of intelligence is so obviously downgraded in comparison with other staff functions.
High-level Army authorities obviously don't think that Intelligence is as important as Personnel, Supply, and similar services. How long will it take before it becomes quite clear to them that Intelligence can be of the greatest help in fighting a war? For too many years intelligence in the Army and in the Navy has been a "deadend" for officers who showed an interest in it, or an aptitude for it. Is this to continue indefinitely? Do the Armed Forces think that the Central Intelligence Agency will or can do the job? Of course, CIA representatives can be assigned to the headquarters of military commands—but will that fill the need? I doubt it, I doubt it very much.

The introductory statement of the "Supervisory, Administrative, and Organizational Deficiencies in our Military and Naval Establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor Investigation" (p. 253) the PHR begins as follows:

The Committee has been intrigued throughout the Pearl Harbor proceedings by one enigmatical and paramount question: Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history, with the almost certain knowledge that war was at hand, with plans that contemplated the precise type of attack that was executed by Japan on the morning of December 7—Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur? The answer to this question and the causative considerations regarded as having any reasonably proximate bearing on the disaster have been set forth in the body of this report. Fundamentally, these considerations reflect supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies which existed in our Military and Naval establishments in the days before Pearl Harbor. In the course of the Committee's investigation still other deficiencies, not regarded as having a direct bearing on the disaster, have presented themselves. Otherwise stated, all of these deficiencies reduce themselves to principles which are set forth, not for their novelty or profundity but for the reason that, by their very self-evident simplicity, it is difficult to believe they are ignored.
It is recognized that many of the deficiencies revealed by our investigation may very probably have already been corrected as a result of the experiences of the war. We desire, however, to submit these principles, which are grounded in the evidence adduced by the Committee, for the consideration of our Army and Navy establishments in the earnest hope that something constructive may be accomplished that will aid our national defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December 7, 1941. We do this after careful and long consideration of the evidence developed through one of the most important investigations in the history of the Congress.

What have the Services done to ameliorate the deficiencies mentioned? In my opinion, very little. Maybe it would be correct to say "nothing."

As a colleague said to me recently "Nothing will be done—until war breaks out. Then, of course, intelligence is no longer treated a step-child."

Is that what we want? The chances are that there won't be time to use intelligence after a war breaks out: maybe the U. S. will be down and out by that time.
7. CONCLUSIONS

After reading some but not all the millions of words alluded to at
the beginning of this brochure to what conclusions have I arrived? I will
be brief.

First, I must confess, I think that Kimmel and Short were not as cul-
pable as I first thought they were back in 1941-1942, despite all the
"warnings" sent them. The Washington authorities were culpable, too—
maybe a lot more culpable than were these two officers. Both the Majority
and the Minority Reports make good sense. The Report of the Majority
contained some very pertinent recommendations—but nobody seems to be doing
very much about implementing the second and perhaps the most of these
recommendations; nor has much, if anything, been done about following up
on the Conclusions of the Minority, Senators Ferguson and Brevster. In
1946 I thought the latter two senators were "hitting below the belt" but
today, in 1957, I think they hit closer to the truth than the Majority.
I think Mr. Keefe's "additional views" on the Majority Report make good
sense—Kimmel and Short, he said, were not the sole culprits. I think
that the Intelligence Services came off rather easily—too easily in the
fixing of responsibility and pointing out derelictions. I think the
intelligence staffs might have used more imagination but this was not
because they were staffed with obtuse officers or persons of low-grade
intelligence. As a matter of cold fact, I think, they were badly under-
staffed, because in both the Army and the Navy "intelligence" didn't
count—for much at any rate, then. This raises the question: does it
count for much more today in the Armed Services? I think that Kimmel and Short should have been sent more information—even if they were sent only "gists" of MAGIC—to let them evaluate for themselves the significance of what the Japanese were saying. General Miles says that the warning messages sent them were of far more importance than anything they could have got from "Magic". I don't agree. They might have had more time to ruminant; they might even have guessed—as Admiral Kimmel hints—what the Japanese were planning; our commands might therefore have been much more prepared than they were to meet the attack. This, one must admit, could have been done even without their having a Purple machine or a cryptanalytic staff to solve and translate messages in that or in the other Japanese diplomatic systems.

I think that Admiral Stark was wrong in waiting for General Marshall to be found before sending off a message to Kimmel and Short—and to the other overseas commanders—as soon as the last part of the 14-part Tokyo to Washington message became available—especially when he knew from "Magic" that Kurusu and Nomura were told exactly to the minute when to present the whole message to Secretary Hull. (That we knew the contents of the last part of that message /deliver this whole message exactly at 1:00 p.m." before the Japanese Embassy code clerks had them is a credit to the efficiency of Army and Navy cryptanalytic staffs.)

I think that Colonel Edward French, Chief of the Signal Corps Message Center, used very poor judgment when he sent Marshall's message via commercial radio. He could have used Navy radio or FBI radio—but I am sure he thought it was infra dig to ask a "sister" government radio
service (especially the Navy) to do (at a critical moment) something that Army radio couldn't do. Or maybe Colonel French didn't realize the gravity of the situation, or was not told so in impressive enough language.

The Ferguson-Brewster Minority Report does not point the finger at all the high ranking officials who should share the responsibility but it does say (p. 573) "Both in Washington and in Hawaii there were numerous and serious failures of men in the lower civil and military echelons to perform their duties and discharge their responsibilities. These are too numerous to be treated in detail and individually named." I would have liked them to have named the Directors of Intelligence in the Army and in the Navy, specifically, because I think poor intelligence work played such a large part in the debacle.

And, of course, although it is clear that MAGIC was withheld from Kimmel and Short after the summer of 1941, I do not think (and of this I am quite sure) that it was deliberately withheld for the specific purpose of bringing on the attack at Pearl! Except for the most rabid of the revisionists this is too fantastic a thesis; but there is a stronger argument against such a thesis: it is not supported by the facts.
8. EPISODE

What was it that so aroused the anti-Rooseveltians, leading them to suspect that it was "skullduggery" and gross negligence in Washington that was responsible for the Pearl Harbor disaster?

Why did the President, his closest associates in the White House, and the officers in the top-level positions in the Army and in the Navy, generate so much suspicion in the minds of the Republicans? Why such reluctance to have an investigation to explain why the U. S. forces were caught by surprise at Pearl Harbor? This is a point which I do not think is explained in the literature and which ought to be. Why did the President and his administration allow so much suspicion to grow up in the minds of the Republicans by the questions which the latter raised after 7 December 1941 and which they continued to raise throughout the war? Could this have been avoided? It is my opinion that it was this refusal to explain, this subjecting to continued "needling" of the President and the Democrats by the Republicans throughout the war that aroused the gravest suspicions that there was indeed gross negligence in the White House and at the highest executive levels, and maybe greater derelictions to be hidden. The adamant resistance the President and the Democratic Administration had to maintain against Republican pressure for Congressional hearings on this point and the reasons therefor were quite obvious: we now know that such hearings would have "let the cat out of the bag"—that the U. S. was reading all the Japanese crypto-communications between the Foreign Office and its embassies, legations, and consulates abroad. The Japanese would have changed their Purple system without delay. It
is inconceivable, the Administration believed, that the secret could have been kept even if all the hearings were in Executive Sessions. They felt and were warranted in feeling that Hearings on the subject would be disastrous during the war: too much vital information on the subject would have leaked out. It is true that the Japanese had been alerted during the war by the Germans; they were told, in fact—and nobody knows to this day just how the Germans found out—that we were reading Japanese diplomatic messages. All this appears in the PHR and makes interesting reading. But it is astonishing that even after they were told the Japanese simply refused to believe the story and continued to use the Purple system. (Neither, for that matter, did the Germans put much credence in the suspicions, forwarded by Marshal Rommel from Africa, that the British must be reading his messages; Rommel felt that this and only this could account for his continuing defeats in North Africa after 1943! Have these two episodes any lessons for us? Yes, indeed! Cryptographers become enamored of their inventions and their minds become polarized in a sort of conviction [conviction] that the systems they have concocted are invincible. It happened to us, too! I can remember the mental shock I had when indubitable evidence was placed before me showing that the Germans were reading the enciphered code system we were using for communications between U. S. Army Observer with the British Expeditionary Forces in North Africa in 1942-3 and Washington! That is why I believe that some body—experts, of course—outside the one that thinks up and produces our own crypto-systems but within NSA should be called in frequently to take a good look at those systems to make sure that some crack in the strong cryptosecurity
edifice the NSA cryptographers think they have erected doesn't exist and that such a crack can not be widened.

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