WAR DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

3 March 1947

SUBJECT: Intelligence Functions and Responsibilities

TO: CINCPE
    CINCSAL
    CG USFET
    CG USFA
    CG NATO
    CG ADPAC
    CG CARIBBEAN DEFENSE COMMAND
    CG ARMY AIR FORCES
    CG ARMY GROUND FORCES
    CG ARMY Z. I. and MD.W.
    CG COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
    Chiefs of Administrative and Technical Services

1. Resulting from our experiences in two wars and from our painful surprise at Pearl Harbor, it has been acknowledged on the highest levels that Intelligence services of the Government must be rehabilitated and brought to high efficiency. Such acknowledgment has previously been voiced on the general principle that as our positive power to provide national security, i.e., military strength, is decreased, the efficiency of our Intelligence services must be correspondingly increased in order to insure sufficient advance warning of hostile intent and capabilities to allow mobilization of our national resources.

2. Preoccupation with problems of demobilization and reorganization has absorbed greatly the time and thought of the higher commanders and principal staff officers during recent months. It is desired now to draw the attention of these officers to the importance of placing Intelligence on the priority level which is required in national interests.

3. Progress in the improvement of the efficiency of the Intelligence services has been attained since the postwar reorganization of the War Department through the application of various recommendations of Boards of officers and investigating committees. There are, however, certain fundamental difficulties which tend to retard full recognition of the importance of Intelligence in our national defense structure. These are:
a. A lack of full understanding and appreciation on all levels, from the War Department to the lowest troop echelon, of the scope and vital importance of Intelligence to national security.

b. Assignment of inexperienced personnel to Intelligence duties; lack of stress of Intelligence training in all echelons; frequent turnover of trained personnel on intelligence duties, thus sacrificing benefits of experience and continuity; and inadequate incentive to attract and continue on Intelligence duty the highest type of military personnel.

c. Curtailment of Intelligence personnel available for collection, evaluation, and dissemination of Intelligence.

4. A long-term plan has recently been approved which, if applied progressively by commanders and staffs of all echelons, should result in the elevation of the Intelligence Service to the level of priority it demands in our scheme of national preparedness. This plan is:

a. Continuing review of the curricula and field inspection of instruction in all Army service schools by appropriate commanders and by the Director of Organization and Training and the Director of Intelligence in cooperation, to insure that the courses in Intelligence training emphasize the importance of Intelligence and are adequate and consistent with the mission of the schools.

b. Continuing review of programs and field inspection of training by appropriate commanders and by the Director of Organization and Training and the Director of Intelligence in cooperation, to insure that Intelligence training in the service is adequate and appropriate to the mission of the units concerned.

c. Initiation and monitoring by the Director of Intelligence, WDGS, of continuing review by the Joint Intelligence Committee (with Joint Chiefs of Staff approval) of instruction in the schools under control of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to insure that Intelligence is adequately stressed, and that the Intelligence courses are adequate and consistent with the mission of the schools.

d. Continuing emphasis by the Secretary of War and the Chief of Staff in testimony before the Congress and in conferences with military commanders of the vital importance of Intelligence in our national preparedness.
e. Establish the principle at the earliest practicable
date that a requirement for assignment to Intelligence positions
will be the prior completion of a service school Intelligence
course, or equivalent war experience, appropriate to the posi-
tion; the detailed plan to be originated by the Director of
Intelligence along the following general lines:

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Unit positions below division and numbered Air Force level:</th>
<th>Special Service Schools</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Positions including and above the division and numbered Air Force level, excepting the War Department General Staff and Military Attaches:</td>
<td>General Service School</td>
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<tr>
<td>Senior positions above division and numbered Air Force levels and including War Department and Military Attaches:</td>
<td>Strategic Intelligence School</td>
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f. Continued monitoring of assignment of officers to
Intelligence positions by appropriate commanders and by the
Director, Personnel and Administration, and the Director of
Intelligence to obtain greater stability of Intelligence or-
ganization and increased length of duty tour.

g. Continued review by the Director of Organization
and Training and the Director of Intelligence of tables of
organization and allotments to insure that Intelligence posi-
tions are accorded same prestige of rank as are operations,
war planning and supply positions.

h. Continuing review by appropriate commanders and
by the Director of Organization and Training and the Director
of Intelligence to avoid assignment to Intelligence officers
duties which prevent proper performance of their intel-
ligence functions.

i. Continued careful selection by appropriate com-
manders and by the Director, Personnel and Administration,
on advice of the Director of Intelligence, of officers to fill
top level intelligence positions including military attaches.

j. Continued decentralization of selected functions
by appropriate commanders and by the Director of Intelligence
within the Army structure where efficiency will not be
sacrificed.

k. Continued efforts by the Director of Intelligence through the National Intelligence Agency to pass functions not of primary interest to the War Department either laterally to other departments of the Government or to the Central Intelligence Group where efficiency will be gained.

1. Allocate personnel to Intelligence, recognizing the principle that as our positive power for security declines our reliance on Intelligence to determine the strength and direction of threats to our security increases.

5. It is requested that each addressee impress all appropriate elements within his sphere of responsibility with the importance of an efficient Intelligence service within the Army, and by appropriate instructions and continued field inspection require execution of the general plan cited herein.

BY DIRECTION OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF

/s/ M. I. Hodes
Brigadier General, GSC
Asst. Deputy Chief of Staff