1. There appears little doubt that the complete consolidation of CI activities would work and work successfully, if the entire problem were attacked, realistically, at a high governmental level.

Certain absolute prerequisites to success, however, are:

a. The designation of a strong, forceful, intelligent and experienced individual, to be in complete command, with rank and authority over each individual intelligence chief, at least as far as CI is concerned.

b. The delegation, to such commanders, of almost dictatorial powers, i.e.
Authority which could
not be questioned by
an individual service
or combination of
services.

2. Action on any plan such
as the above would involve
the publication of more
information on CI than
has ever before reached
the man-in-the-street.

However, it would seem
that public admission that
CI is a primary weapon
would be an extremely
serious price to pay for
An integrated/defensive organization which, when established, could take care of itself publicity-wise — Sop. in view of Q.4, 573.

3. Security restrictions, unintelligently applied, may be a large part of the reason for C.I.'s present plight. They have prevented "the C.I. Story" from reaching the high-level ears that it should have in proper detail. It seems time to acknowledge...
That such a thing exists. The high level personnel of other countries undoubtedly know it. Why shouldn't we tell our own—and thus gain the support we need to make it work.