As a Technical expert -- not a policy maker -- in the intelligence field in one of the Defense Agencies for over thirty years, I am led to make the following observations on the debacle in which we find ourselves as regards the Korean situation:

1 a. On 7 December 1941 the United States Armed Forces suffered a major disaster by a Japanese sneak attack at Pearl Harbor. The several investigations conducted during and after the war showed that the intelligence authorities had been provided with perfectly authentic information which, if it had been properly employed, would at least have prevented our being completely taken by surprise. But they did not use the information properly, and we were overtaken by a severe disaster the consequences of which went far beyond those suffered at Pearl Harbor.

5. The disaster's experience of Pearl Harbor and the investigations referred to above should have had some salutary effect on the intelligence authorities, so that, presumably, we should at least be in a better position now, as regards intelligence, than we were before Pearl Harbor. Are we? The debacle in which we find ourselves as regards the Korean situation shows that the intelligence authorities were not provided with authentic information, or if they were, it was not used properly. In any case, from an intelligence point of view, the U.S. is in a worse position now than it was before Pearl Harbor. The question arises: how and why should this be the case?

2 a. On 20 July 1946 the Joint Committee on the Investigation of the Pearl Harbor Committee submitted its final report (Senate Document No. 244). The following recommendation has been extracted from its set of five principal recommendations (p.253):

(Handwritten notes and corrections on the original document.)
That there be a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent; that upon affecting a unified intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received ... Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded the important role which it deserves." [My emphasis]

b. The following is the introductory statement to the series of 25 recommendations concerning "supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments revealed by the Pearl Harbor investigation" (p.253):

"The Committee has been intrigued throughout the Pearl Harbor proceedings by one enigmatical and paramount question: Why, with some of the finest intelligence available in our history ... -- Why was it possible for a Pearl Harbor to occur? [Committee's emphasis] ... Fundamentally, these considerations reflect supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies which existed in our Military and Naval establishments in the days before Pearl Harbor ... . We desire, however, to submit these principles for the consideration of our Army and Navy establishments in the earnest hope that something constructive may be accomplished that will aid our national
defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December 7, 1941

The following are two of the set of 25 recommendations referred to in Par. b above:

1. Operational and intelligence work requires centralization of authority and clear-cut allocation of responsibility." (p.254)

3. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials. ... Nevertheless, there is substantial basis, from a review of the Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence". (p.257)

Exactly four years have passed since the Joint Committee submitted its report. In calling attention to the supervisory, administrative, and organizational deficiencies in our military and naval establishments, the Committee noted in its introductory statement that "It is recognized that many of the deficiencies revealed by our investigation may very probably have already been corrected as a result of the experiences of the war." Have they all been corrected? By no means -- not even the most important ones. Has the Joint Committee's "earnest hope that something constructive may be accomplished that will aid our national defense and preclude a repetition of the disaster of December 7, 1941" been realized. The Korean debacle speaks for itself. Nothing constructive in the field of intelligence was accomplished.
Consider the following:

b. Do we now have "a complete integration of Army and Navy intelligence agencies in order to avoid the pitfalls of divided responsibility", as recommended by the Joint Committee? Far from it. We now have three such agencies in the Department of Defense instead of two, as was the case before Pearl Harbor: the Air Force, established as a separate Service after Pearl Harbor, also had to have its own intelligence organization. The situation is far worse than before Pearl Harbor in respect to this question of integration of intelligence agencies. Whereas before Pearl Harbor there were for all practical purposes, only two such agencies in the Government as a whole, in the U.S. there are now at least fifteen operating agencies and/or coordinating bodies having something or other to do with intelligence:

1) Director of Intelligence, U. S. Army
2) Director of Intelligence, U. S. Navy
3) Director of Intelligence, U. S. Air Force
4) Director of Joint Intelligence Committee (JCS)
5) Intelligence Advisory Committee (Interdepartmental)
6) Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA)
7) Armed Forces Security Agency Council (AFSAC)
8) Army Security Agency (ASA)
9) Navy Security Agency (OP-202)
10) Air Force Security Service (AFSS)
11) Central Intelligence Agency
12) Office of the Special Assistant to the Secretary of State for Research and Intelligence.
13) Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission
14) Federal Bureau of Investigation
15) United States Communications Intelligence Board.
Each of these agencies is constantly and conscientiously striving to maintain its own prestige and prerogatives; not only that, but all those engaged in intelligence operations compete with one another for funds, and the funds are quite limited for intelligence. (But there is plenty of money to erect a continental radar fence to give warning, about 30 - 60 minutes, of an air attack on the U.S.)

c. Have the Defense agencies followed the recommendation "that upon affecting a unified intelligence, officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work"? Far from it. (It would almost seem, in fact, that possession of these traits actually disqualifies an officer for such assignment.) Have the men selected been "maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating material received"? Let these facts speak for themselves: Since Pearl Harbor the Army, for instance, has had seven Directors of Intelligence; not a single one of them had a day's working knowledge or actual experience in the field of intelligence before his assignment to the position. In the past five years there have been two Directors of Naval Intelligence; and the Air Force, since its establishment as a separate Service only three years ago, already has its second Director of Intelligence, the first one lasting in office less than one year. The CIA, created in 1946, has its third Director already, and talk about a fourth became current months ago. And who is said to be the selected successor to the present incumbent -- a man well experienced in Intelligence? Not at all. And he is an old and sick man, to boot. In former days there
might have been some excuse for selecting as Directors of Intelligence officers from some arms such as Infantry, Cavalry, etc., but since Intelligence has come to be so complex technically and so vital strategically, it would seem that experience in the field should be a sine qua non for the selection of a director of intelligence. Would one expect the Signal Corps of the Army, or the Navy Communication Service, or Air Force Communications to be operated satisfactorily if the men selected to be the heads of those organizations knew nothing about communications before their selection?

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d. Is there any mechanism today whereby the data produced by technical operations in the whole field of intelligence are correctly evaluated, properly disseminated, and quickly acted upon by a centralized authority? CIA? The Korean debacle speaks for itself in this regard. Two years after the Pearl Harbor investigation had been completed and none of the Committee's recommendations had been adopted, a plan was submitted for the establishment of at least a central evaluation and dissemination organism for communications intelligence produced within the Armed Services. The plan was discussed at length, but nothing happened — it was "Ad hoc-ed" to death, by the agencies concerned. Had it been adopted, it might at least have given some warning as to Korea. It, at least, would have been the only agency that could have done so.

e. In the various fields of intelligence is there any body which has the final authority and is competent technically to establish valid priorities in the collection and processing of Intelligence? Obviously, the answer is in the negative, for there was a plethora of sources for such intelligence which, if it had been produced and correctly evaluated would, in all probability, have indicated quite clearly what was brewing in Korea. An action on such a large scale as is now obvious could hardly have been launched without
long and extensive preparation.

4. When will it become evident to the Commander-in-Chief that we need a thorough housecleaning in the whole field of U.S. Intelligence and perhaps a Czar in that field to over-ride inter-service and inter-agency rivalries, bickerings, and competition for funds, prerogatives and prestige? Or is it too late already?
5a. One of the most important segments in the whole field of intelligence is that occupied by communications intelligence. There is reason to believe that a complete consolidation of facilities and integration of operations in that portion of the intelligence field could work, and work successfully, if the entire problem were handled, realistically, at the highest governmental level. The following are absolute prerequisites to such success:

(1) The designation of an energetic, forceful, and intelligent man who has had actual experience in the fields of intelligence and who would be given full command of all communications intelligence activities.

(2) His rank and authority over the individual Service intelligence chiefs should be clear and unquestionable. The delegation, to such a commander, of almost dictatorial powers over all communication intelligence activities should be subject only to the authority of the President.

(3) He should be maintained in office continuously, subject only to the successful performance of his mission.

(4) He should be given full responsibility for the collection of raw material, its processing into readable form, and the evaluation, and dissemination of the final product.

b. Action on such a proposal as the foregoing would necessarily involve the disclosure of more information than has ever before been made public. However, it would seem that public admission of the fact that communications intelligence can be and often is a primary potential weapon would be a small price to pay for having an effective organization which, when established, could take care of itself as regards publicity, especially in view of the existence of Public Law 513.
c. Security restrictions played a large part in the failure to use communications intelligence properly in the case of Pearl Harbor disaster. The same restrictions may be in part to blame for the present plight of communications intelligence activities. They have largely prevented the story of the part played by these activities in our winning World War II from reaching the highest level persons who, in the final analysis, control them. It seems time to acknowledge that such activities are being conducted. The high level personnel of other countries undoubtedly know that fact. Why not tell our own people -- and thus gain the public support we need for these activities?