**Memo Routing Slip**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME OR TITLE</th>
<th>INITIALS</th>
<th>CIRCULATE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AFSA - 00</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Organization and Location**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Coordination</th>
<th>File</th>
<th>Information</th>
<th>Necessary Action</th>
<th>Note and Return</th>
<th>See Me</th>
<th>Signature</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Remarks**

More voices crying in the wilderness.

Approved for Release by NSA on 10-28-2013 pursuant to E.O. 13526

FROM NAME OR TITLE

AFSA - 0013

DATE 4 Aug 50

ORGANIZATION AND LOCATION

NME FORM NO 1 OCT 48 95 Replaces DA AGO Form 805, 1 Apr 48, which may be used.
Are We Prepared?
Intelligence Service
Is Our First Weak Spot

This is the first of a series of articles on the state of the country's defenses. Today's article deals with the American intelligence services. Subsequent articles will be devoted to the Nation's top-level policy and planning; continental defenses; atom attack and civil defense; the armed services; the potential defense of Western Europe; national mobilization and resources; the condition of the country's land, sea and air transport; the propaganda war; and, finally, an evaluation of America's national security.

By Ogden R. Reid and Robert S. Bird

BEHIND America's costly and belated effort to rebuild its crumbled national defense, in the wake of the Korean outbreak, lies a history of failure in one of the most essential arms of the Nation's military establishment—the intelligence services.

A country's intelligence machinery ideally ought to furnish the information on which national policy and military planning can build toward sound objectives. If the United States lacks reliable intelligence, it will flounder in the dark, dissipating its enormous power.

Korea brought home the weakness and misuse of American intelligence and demonstrated the immediate need for improving these services.

EVEN before Korea our past intelligence score shows five major failures:

Continued on Page 4, Column 5
Are We Prepared?

Intelligence Service Is Weak Spot

By Ogden R. Reid and Robert S. Bird

Continued From First Page

1. The fall of Czechoslovakia — We do not need to change in government, nor the down- fall of a free Czechoslovakia.

2. The fall of the Chinese Na- tionalist—All our intelligence sources have been checked by the censors of the Communists over there. It is not true.

3. The fall of a large number of high- ranking officials about the Moscow trial. There is no evidence of this.

4. Palestine—The military abili- ties of the Palestine and the falling overrated of the intelligence services by the CIA and the Defense Department. There is no evidence of this.

5. Thailand—A foreign rdio station in Thailand. The State Department has an initial putting together of all raw information are available on the matter. It is not true.

6. The Chinese—A report on the Chinese that the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

7. The United States—A report on the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

8. The British—A report on the British, French, and German intelligence services, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community. It is not true.

9. The United States—A report on the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

10. The British—A report on the British, French, and German intelligence services, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community. It is not true.

11. The United States—A report on the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

12. The British—A report on the British, French, and German intelligence services, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community. It is not true.

13. The United States—A report on the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

14. The British—A report on the British, French, and German intelligence services, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community. It is not true.

15. The United States—A report on the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

16. The British—A report on the British, French, and German intelligence services, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community. It is not true.

17. The United States—A report on the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

18. The British—A report on the British, French, and German intelligence services, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community. It is not true.

19. The United States—A report on the United States, Russia, and Great Britain are the muddies in intelligence evaluation and coordination, the interpretations placed on the evaluated materials, and the lack of dissemination of raw and finished intelligence to interested customers.

20. The British—A report on the British, French, and German intelligence services, the National Security Council, and the Intelligence Community. It is not true.

In this country, Intelligence is weak.

It is no use to say "We are the greatest power in the world" when we have no information. The problem is not to change the government nor the down-fall of a free Czechoslovakia. It is to find out what is going on in the world. We need to make sure that we have a good intelligence service that can give us the information we need to make decisions. This is especially true in the current situation, where there is much uncertainty and potential for conflict.