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12 January 1954

MEMORANDUM FOR CHIEF OF STAFF


SUBJECT: General McClure's Remarks on the Report of the Special Study Group (RS \$54-60/5)

- 1. In my opinion the comments of General McClure, Deputy A.C. of S., G-2, are of such a nature that they should be referred to PROD for comment.
- 2. a. In the first place it should be noted that the Special Study Group of NSASAB nowhere in its Report set forth the potentialities of COMINT in such a way as to constitute a guarantee that it will or could provide four to twelve weeks' warning. What the Report actually says on this point is contained in the second and third paragraphs of the Summary, page 2:

"COMINT is now providing substantial information on Soviet capability to initiate and sustain an attack against the United States. In addition, it is probable that COMINT, particularly through Special Intelligence, could give warning of Soviet intention to mount such an attack. The reliability of this strategic warning would increase with the approach of the attack, with first indications appearing 4 to 12 weeks prior to the attack.

"This potentiality can be fully realized only with an increase in the current level of effort. However, significant improvement can be affected by more intensive exploitation of the present COMINT program."

- b. This wording certainly mentions only potentialities and guarantees nothing.
- 3. a. Referring to par. 2 of General McClure's comments, the Study Group's use of the term "Soviet," taken in the narrowest sense, could be misleading, particularly in the condensed Summary on page 2.
- <u>b.</u> General McClure concurs with the Study Group in regard to the importance of the contribution which the solution of the high-level cryptosystems could make to the problem of advance warning. Whether G-2 can be of any help to us in digging up information which apparently CIA has thus far been unable to obtain, I do not know. It is possible that Army's CIC could help us.
- c. With reference to the remarks contained in par. 5 of General McClure's comments, these seem to put G-2 on the defensive, and appear to be based only on the statements on personnel made in the Summary. The Study Group's contentions in the body of the report and in the Appendix, refer especially to research, development and analytic NSA civilian





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Special Study Group

personnel. As far as the military are concerned, the point of making COMINT a rewarding and satisfying career seems to have been missed.

4. I urge that these papers be sent to PROD for comment, and to R/D for information.

WILLIAM F. FRIEDMAN Special Assistant