REF ID: A517797

28 May 1953

SECURITY INFORMATION

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

delav.

| COMPRESS ON FORTITON LATER | COMMENTS ON |  | POSITION | PAPER |
|----------------------------|-------------|--|----------|-------|
|----------------------------|-------------|--|----------|-------|

SECURITY INFORMATION

- 1. The subject paper is noteworthy not so much for its convincing nature, as for its evidence of a completely crystalized and rigid position. 2. The portions dealing with mechanism can be ignored at this time, since they are secondary to the main question which is whether or not this step should be taken. 3. It appears from the paper as a whole that the U.K. is convinced: A. That the insecurity of is of more value to Russia than the resultant U.S. B. That Russia could obtain the information matter by no other means. That this requires that we unequivocally sacrifice all "(probably forever)" without further
- 4. Point 3A above is elaborated upon at length in Appendix A, in a survey somewhat similar to that prepared by the AdHoc Committee of USCIB. The surveys are different in that theirs is based primarily or products and ours on products, and in the lack of any specific span of study whereas the U.S. study covered a six month period. time in the Examination or cited examples reveals that their selection is considerably less rigid in terms of what is damaging. I think it probable that examination of the complete texts would reveal many instances of messages which sound serious in the extract but are rather trivial in the whole. Some are highly questionable even from the extract, as for example:

Annexure 2 item 4c 4d 4é 4f 5c (30 Jan 531) Annexure 4 item 4c Annexure 6 item 4c Annexure 7 item 3b

Nevertheless there is no doubt that a quantitatively small but nevertheless real leakage of intelligence is taking place. With respect to

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-12-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

HS EVES ONLY

EO 3.3(h)(2) **REF ID: A517797** PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

U.S EYES ONLY

# TOP SECRET CANOE

SECURITY INFORMATION

### SECURITY INFORMATION

| goes so far as to state that the amount is  |
|---|
| small. In this and in the appraisal of potential, the are   |
| essentially agreed. The divergences are in estimates of degree.   |
| 3350000101111, 188, 201, 188, 201, 201, 201, 201, 201, 201, 201, 201  |
| 5. Point 3B is the fundamental questionmark in the  |
| This statement made without qualification or further comment in any form  |
| represents an assumption rather than a fact. This assumption runs counter   |
| to the known:   |
|   |
| a. Communist infiltration of and other nations.   |
| b. Elaborate public press and radio reporting of all  |
| nations - particularly the U.S.   |
| c. Recent oral report by  |
| 6. Point 3B is essential to the U.K. position, since unless it is   |
| very nearly true, the course of action which the insists upon would   |
| mean that Point 3C would be a burnt offering to an unresponsive deity.  |
| In addition if 3C is untrue to the extent that our attempts to inform   |
| the in their turn, we would hand the USSR a picture   |
| of our own cryptographic (and by inference, cryptanalytic) abilities.   |
| 7. The fundamental problem is not answered by the paper.  It remains a cold fact that someone withthe requisite authority must make a command decision in which only part of the factors are known, a few can be guessed at and the remainder are hidden in the future: |
| be guessed at and the remainder are hidden in the lutter.   |
| (Known to us  |
| a. { Known   are to us   Infer - They are also   against the USSR   |
|   |
| $\int$ Known - The quantitative leakage is not dramatic as of now   |
| b. Infer - It could grow worse - particularly in war  |
| (Infer - It could grow worse - particularly in war  |
|   |
| Known - Western open sources leave relatively little work for   |
| USSR intelligence as of now   |
| C. Trees We wish not out one and dutolli name by  |
| Infer - We might not cut off much intelligence by   |
| ciphers   |
| Crosses MOCD contains as all times is many still supposed and suite   |
| (Known - USSR espionage of all types is very widespread and quite   |
| d. \ effective have disclosed   |
| Infer - We might not accomplish much and might/well a fair amount of  |
| THIST - WE WIRELD INDO SECONDITION WHEN STIME STATE OF LAST OF LAST   |
| ( Known - is of value to us if not of   |
| e. dominant importance  |
| A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A A   |
| Infer - Who can judge its value to USSR?  |
|   |

# TOP SECRET SANCE

U.S. EYES ONLY

REF ID: A517797

U.S. EYES ONLY

FOP SECRET

CANDE

TOP SECRE

SECURITY INFORMATION

| <b>OHERX</b>    | ? - Will one or more go communist?   |
|-----------------|--|
| ų,              | ? - Will at least the elements of existing cryptography remain if they were forced into  |
| n.              | ? - Will we then want to read them?  |
| H <sub>vt</sub> | ? - Will we one day get intelligence vital to us in our position as leader of the Western block? Will we perhaps get warning of defection? |
|                 | one sense the die is cast. All we can do is control the speed atual loss. When modern devises were given by the and                        |
| we set          | in motion an inevitable This process will be   |
| relatively      | slow. We can accelerate this or let nature take its course.  |
| The decision    | on must weigh the possible gain against the accelerated loss.  |
| 8.              |  |
| `               | this moment, let us improve the COMSEC only of those of our partners of whose constancy we feel more or less certain                       |
|                 | and whose COMSEC needs improvement. For example:   |
|                 |  |
| ٠.              |  |
|                 |  |
|                 | L. E. SHINN  |
| •               |  |
|                 |  |
|                 | EO 3.3(h)(2)   |
|                 | PL 86-36/50 USC 3605   |

TOP SECRET CANGE

| REF ID: A517797                               |          |
|---|----------|
| If we are going to do anythe at this mornant, | Lug more |
| 9. Que final thought: Let us improve the C    | OMSEC    |
| only of those constan                         | en we    |
| fall more or less cortain and whose constant  | SEC      |
| heads improvement. For example;               |          |
|   |          |

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

L. E. SHINN

REF ID: A517797

### TOP SECRET CANOE

This document is to be read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in accordance with comnunication intelligence security regulations and authorized to receive the information reported herein.

CONTENTS ON POSITION PAPER TOP 1 ECHETT
SECURITY INFORMATION

| 1.                                    | The subject paper   | is noteworthy not    | so much for its con             | vincing    |                 |
|---------------------------------------|---------------------|----------------------|---------------------------------|------------|-----------------|
| nature,                               | as for its evidence | e of a completely    | crystalized and rigid           | d T        |                 |
| position                              | 1.                  |                      |                                 | <u> </u>   |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      |                                 |            |                 |
| 2.                                    | The portions deal   | ing with mechanism   | can be ignored at t             | his time.  |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      | n which is whether o            |            |                 |
|                                       | p should be taken.  |                      | Standard and a standard and are | 7          |                 |
| <del></del>                           |                     | •                    |                                 |            |                 |
| 3.                                    | It appears from t   | he paper as a whol   | e that the U.K. is co           | onvinced:  | a significant   |
|                                       |                     |                      |                                 |            | •               |
| 4                                     | A. That the inse    | curity of            | is of                           | more EO:   | 3.3(h)(2)       |
|                                       | ·                   | han the resultant    | is to the                       |            | 86-36/50 USC 36 |
|                                       | v.s.                | L                    |                                 | 1///       |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | B. That Russia c    | ould obtain the in   | formation for by 1              | no /·/     |                 |
|                                       | other means.        |                      | · ·                             |            |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | C. That this req    | uires that we unea   | uivocally sacrifice e           | all /      |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      | orever)" without furt           |            |                 |
|                                       | delay.              |                      |                                 | / · · /    |                 |
| ***                                   |                     | '                    |                                 | ·          | -               |
| 4.                                    | Point 3A above is   | elaborated upon a    | t length in Appendix            | A, in      |                 |
| a survey                              | somewhat similar    | to that prepared by  | y the AdHoc Committee           | of USCIB.  |                 |
| The surv                              | eys are different   | in that theirs is    | based primarily on              |            | - F             |
| products                              |                     |                      | lack of any specific            |            |                 |
| time in                               | the study whe       | reas the U.S. stud   | y covered a six month           | n period.  |                 |
| Exam: nat                             | ion of cited examp  | les reveals that the | heir selection is con           | ısiderably |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      | think it probable the           |            |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      | instances of message            |            |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      | trivial in the whole.           | Some       |                 |
| are high                              | ly questionable ev  | en from the extract  | t, as for example:              |            |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | Annexure 2 it       |                      |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       |                     | 4d                   |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | :                   | 4e                   |                                 |            |                 |
| • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • |                     | 4f                   |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       |                     | 5b                   |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       |                     | 5c (30 Jan 531)      |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | •                   | 6b                   |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | •                   | 6 <b>d</b>           | •                               |            | i i             |
|                                       | Annexure 4 ite      |                      |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | Annexure 6 ite      |                      |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       | Annexure 7 ite      | em 3b                |                                 |            |                 |
|                                       |                     |                      |                                 |            |                 |

Nevertheless there is no doubt that a quantitatively small but nevertheless real leakage of intelligence is taking place. With respect to

REF ID:A517797

TOP SECRET CANOE

This document is to be read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in accordance with com-

TOP GEORIA

| N. A. B. W. M. A. F.   | 14 m   |  |  |  |   |   |
|--|--|--|--|--|---|---|
|  | **************************************   | The state of the s | *****  |  |   |   |
|  | Catharan Carlotte Car |  | as to state  |  | amound is   |   |
|  |  | e appraisal of   |  |  | are   |   |
| sentially  | agreed. The  | divergences ar   | e in estimat   | es of degre  | ee.   |   |
|  |  | ***************************************  |  |  |   |   |
|  |  | fundamental qu   |  |  |   |   |
|  |  | ut qualificati   |  |  |   |   |
|  |  | rather than a  | fact. This   | assumption   | runs counte   | r |
| the known  |  |  | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  |  | •   |   |
|  | Communication design   | filtration of  | and o  | ebas I.  | nations.  |   |
| =•   | COMMUNTAC III  | TITCLE STIDE OF  | and o  | ouet   | IR CTOUR.   |   |
| (\\\\\ <b>h</b> . '  | Eleborete mil  | blic press and   | redic renor  | ting of all  |   |   |
| // // <b>5.</b>  |  | rticularly the   |  | orne or ar.  |   |   |
| \\\\ c.  |  |  | 3,50   | •  |   |   |
| 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4  |  | ntial to the   |  | since unle   | ess it is   |   |
|  |  | rse of action  | hich the   | insists  | upon would  |   |
| en that Po   | Int 30 would t   | be a burnt offe  | ring to an   | unresponsiv  | re deity.   |   |
|  |  | ue to the exten  |  |  |   |   |
| 3e \ \   |  | n their turn,  |  |  |   |   |
| cour own e   | ryptographic (   | (and by inferen  | ce, cryptana   | lytic) abil  | lities.   |   |
|  |  |  |  | · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·  | ·   |   |
| 7. The   | fundemental r  | problem is not   |  | 49. 21   |   |   |
|  |  |  |  |  | pap   |   |
| t remains a  | cold fact the  | at someone with  | the requisi  | te authorit  | y must make   |   |
| t remains a command de   | cold fact the  | at someone with<br>ch only part of   | the requisit   | te authorii<br>s are know  | y must make   |   |
| t remains a command de   | cold fact the  | at someone with  | the requisit   | te authorii<br>s are know  | y must make   |   |
| t remains a command de guessed a   | cold fact the  | at someone with<br>ch only part of<br>ainder are hide  | the requisition the factor   | te authorii<br>s are know<br>uture:  | y must make   |   |
| t remains a command degrees as Know  | cold fact the  | at someone with<br>ch only part of<br>ainder are hide  | the requisit   | te authorii<br>s are know  | y must make   |   |
| t remains a command degrees at   | cold fact the  | at someone with<br>ch only part of<br>ainder are hide  | the requisite the factors are  | te authorites are known ature: to us   | y must make   |   |
| t remains a command degrees at   | cold fact the  | at someone with<br>ch only part of<br>ainder are hide  | the requisition the factor   | te authorites are known ature: to us   | y must make   |   |
| t remains a command de guessed a Known a. Infe   | cold fact the rision in which and the remains and the remains are are  | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide   | the requisite the factor len in the factor len i | te authorites are known uture: to us to us usse  | y must make<br>n, a few can   |   |
| remains a command des guessed at Known & Known | cold fact the cision in which and the remains of the cold fact that the remains of the cold fact that the co | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also titative leakage   | the requisite the factor are against the a | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR   | y must make<br>n, a few can   |   |
| remains a command des guessed at Known & Known | cold fact the cision in which and the remains of the cold fact that the remains of the cold fact that the co | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide   | the requisite the factor are against the a | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR   | y must make<br>n, a few can   |   |
| t remains a command despendent of the command despendent of the command despendent of the command of the comman | cold fact the cision in which and the remains of the could be coul | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also also are grow worse - p   | the requisite the factor are against the articularly   | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR amatic as c                                   | y must make<br>n, a few can   |   |
| t remains a command december of the command december of the command december of the command of t | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with ch only part of ainder are hide also titative leakag grow worse - p open sources le  | the requisite the factors are against the articularly ave relative   | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR amatic as c                                   | y must make<br>n, a few can   |   |
| t remains a command dece guessed at Known a. Infe  | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also also are grow worse - p   | the requisite the factors are against the articularly ave relative   | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR amatic as c                                   | y must make<br>n, a few can   |   |
| t remains a command degree guessed at Known a. Infe  | cold fact the cision in which the and the remains of the country o | at someone with ch only part of ainder are hide also titative leakag grow worse - p open sources leadingence as of   | the requisite the factors are against the against the against the against the articularly ave relative now   | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR amatic as of in war ely little                | of now  |   |
| t remains a command dece guessed at Known a. Infe  | cold fact the cision in which the and the remains of the country o | at someone with ch only part of ainder are hide also titative leakag grow worse - p open sources le  | the requisite the factors are against the against the against the against the articularly ave relative now   | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR amatic as of in war ely little                | of now  |   |
| t remains a command degree guessed at Known a. Infe  | cold fact the cision in which the and the remains of the country o | at someone with ch only part of ainder are hide also titative leakag grow worse - p open sources leadingence as of   | the requisite the factors are against the against the against the against the articularly ave relative now   | te authoris s are known uture: to us ne USSR amatic as of in war ely little                | of now  |   |
| t remains a command dee e guessed as Known a. Infe   | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also also also also also also also   | the requisite the factor the factor the factor the factor are against the against the factor articularly ave relative now the intelligent  | te authoris s are known uture:  to us  ne USSR  amatic as of in war ely little ence by sec | y must make<br>a, a few can<br>of now<br>work for<br>uring                        |   |
| t remains a command degree guessed at Known a. Infe  | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage aligence as of not cut off multiple contact of all topological topologica | the requisite the factor the factor the factor the factor are against the against the factor articularly ave relative now the intelligent  | te authoris s are known uture:  to us  ne USSR  amatic as of in war ely little ence by sec | y must make<br>a, a few can<br>of now<br>work for<br>uring                        |   |
| t remains a command dee e guessed as Known a. Infe   | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage aligence as of not cut off multiple contact of all topological topologica | the requisite the factor the factor the factor are against the against the articularly ave relative now  | te authoris s are known uture:  to us ne USSR amatic as of in war ely little ence by sec   | y must make  I, a few can  of now  work for  uring  d and quite                   |   |
| t remains a command degree guessed as Known a. Infe  | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage of all the conage of all  | the requisite the factors are against the against the against the articularly ave relative now the intelligence of the second se | te authoris s are known uture:  to us  ne USSR amatic as of in war ely little ence by sec  | of now  work for  uring  d and quite  |   |
| t remains a command degree guessed as Known a. Infe  | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage aligence as of not cut off multiple contact of all topological topologica | the requisite the factors are against the against the against the articularly ave relative now the intelligence of the second se | te authoris s are known uture:  to us  ne USSR amatic as of in war ely little ence by sec  | of now  work for  uring  d and quite  |   |
| t remains a command descended as Known as Infe   | cold fact the cision in which the remains of the re | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage of all the conage of all  | against the against the factor of the factor | te authoris s are known ture:  to us  to us  usse usse use use use use use use use us      | y must make  a, a few can  of now  work for  uring  d and quite  osed fair amount |   |
| t remains a command descended as a Known as Infe   | cold fact the cision in which the remains of and the remains of the cold of th | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage of all the complishment accomplishment acco | against the against the factor of the factor | te authoris s are known uture:  to us  ne USSR amatic as of in war ely little ence by sec  | y must make  a, a few can  of now  work for  uring  d and quite  osed fair amount |   |
| t remains a command descended as Known a. Infe   | cold fact the cision in which the remains of and the remains of the cold of th | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage of all the conage of all  | against the against the factor of the factor | te authoris s are known ture:  to us  to us  usse usse use use use use use use use us      | y must make  a, a few can  of now  work for  uring  d and quite  osed fair amount |   |
| t remains a command dee guessed as Known a. Infe   | cold fact the cision in which the cision in which the remains of the cision of the cis | at someone with the chooly part of ainder are hide also also titative leakage grow worse - popen sources leakage of all the complishment accomplishment acco | against the against the against the against the against the articularly ave relative now the intelligence of the articular against the aga | te authoris s are known ture:  to us  to us  usse usse use use use use use use use us      | y must make  a, a few can  of now  work for  uring  d and quite  osed fair amount |   |

## TOP SECRET CANOE

This document is to be read only by those personnel officially indoctrinated in accordance with communication intelligence security regulations and authorized to receive the information reported herein.

TOP SECRET

| QUERY   | ? - Will one or more go communist?   |
|---|--|
|   |  |
| <b>n</b><br>1944 -                                | - Will at least the elements of existing cryptography remain if they were forced into  |
| n<br>N  | ? - Will we then want to read them?  |
| Alberta (n. 1965)<br>Alberta<br>Alberta (n. 1965) | ? - Will we one day get intelligence vital to us in our position as leader of the Western block? Will we perhaps get warning of defection?                             |
| of the event<br>we set                            | one sense the die is cast. All we can do is control the speed wal loss. When modern devices were given by the and in motion an inevitable loss of This process will be |
|   | low. We can accelerate this or let nature take its course. must weigh the possible gain against the accelerated loss.  |
| 8.  | One final thought: If we are going to do anything more at this moment, let us improve the CONSEC only of those of our of whose constancy we feel more or less combain  |
|   | and those COMSEC needs improvement. For exemple:   |

L. U. SHIMM

EO 3.3(h)(2) PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

Form 781-C105C TOP SECRET CANOE