

FORM DS-10 2-10-47	DEPARTMENT OF STATE	DATE <i>2 July</i>
REFERENCE SLIP		
TO: <i>NSA - Mr. Friedman</i>		
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REMARKS:		
<p><i>Herewith a copy of my notes on the Conference for Armistice & Volyzsides.</i></p> <p><i>I have not included copies of the enclosures, since</i></p>		
FROM	<i>(over)</i>	

Declassified and approved for
release by NSA on
05-15-2014 pursuant to E.O.
13526

they were verbatim
extract from the
Conference Report.

You may destroy
this when you are
finished with it.

— R. F. Packard

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ~~SECURITY INFORMATION~~~~C. NOE~~

15 June 1953

MEMORANDUM

To: R - Mr. Armstrong

Through: R/SPS - Mr. Polyzoides

From: R/SPS - R. F. Packard

Subject: BRISA Conference on the Communications Security of NATO Countries

The final session of the Conference was held on Friday afternoon, 12 June, at which time a corrected final draft of the Conference Report was agreed. The final Report will be published and circulated within a few days.

1. The Conclusions and Recommendations will be contained in the Report as paragraphs 25-34. A copy of them is attached herewith as Enclosure 1.

2. The proposed action to be taken as a result of this Conference is described in paragraphs 18 through 24 of the Report. A copy of these paragraphs is attached hereto as Enclosure 2.


The following explanations may be of interest as regards the Conclusions:

1. COMINT is described as a "potential source" of highly valuable intelligence to the USSR (Para 25), and the damage to the security to the US and UK created by the availability of this COMINT to the USSR is described as "potential damage" (Para 27).

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
~~G. NOE~~

be exploited effectively by the USSR except in those cases where the USSR participates directly in, or can affect directly, the negotiations or arrangements which the traffic concerns. However, both parties agreed that, so long as the communications of NATO countries are vulnerable, they represent a valuable potential source of COMINT for the USSR and, therefore, real potential damage to the security of the US and UK.



EO-3.3(h)(2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

4. In considering means to correct violations of "COSMIC" and "NATO" communications security regulations it was felt that such violations could not be dealt with effectively save by



dealt with indirectly (Para 30a).

5. In selecting the existing communications security machinery of the NATO Standing Group as the instrumentality for improving the national communications of NATO countries (Para 30a) the Conference was aware that the Standing Group actually exercises authority only in the military sphere, but felt that its machinery was an available and accustomed means which could accomplish the improvement program best and that the participating countries would likely agree to its use for this purpose.

The following explanations may be of interest as regards the proposed course of action:

1. The consensus of the Conference was that the initial approach to the French Government (Para 18) should be at the diplomatic level. However, other means are available such as the existing contacts of the Tripartite Security Survey Working

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 Group. The Conference felt that the details of the approach could be worked out best by USCIB and LSIB, rather than attempting to reach sensible detailed conclusions on this matter within the limited time available to the Conference itself.

EO 3.3(h) (2)
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

2. The principles which are to govern the initial discussions with the French and the subsequent dealings with other NATO countries (Paras 18b and 22) are based on intelligence and general security considerations. In addition to being enumerated in paragraph 10 of the Report they are summarized in Paragraph 29 of its Conclusions.

3. SECAN and EUSEC (Para 19d) are the specific subordinations of the NATO Standing Group in the communications security field which the Conference selected as the instrumentalities for dealing with all the NATO countries except France. [redacted]

[redacted]
 to the US Government. [redacted] the task of handling this evaluation for European NATO countries having been delegated to the [redacted] Government.

4. The Combined Working Group which is proposed (Para 24) would be a small, informal body equating in the COMSEC field to the Tripartite Security Working Groups in the general security field. It would be concerned only with this program for improving the communications security of NATO countries.

The principal differences between the Conclusions of this Conference and the Conclusions of the Conference on French COMSEC in 1951 are as follows:

1. It is concluded now that a program for improvement should be undertaken with all NATO countries -- not just France -- and that this program should concern armed forces, as well as diplomatic, communications. (The 1951 Conclusions limited the program to French diplomatic communications.)

2. It is concluded now that the internal security of France is still inadequate, and that the internal security of other NATO countries cannot be assessed accurately for want of adequate information. The internal security of other NATO countries cannot be assumed to be better than that of France. Since it is also concluded now that the USSR could not compensate adequately through other sources of intelligence for the potential value of COMINT from the communications of NATO countries, the inadequacy of internal security should not be a deterrent to undertaking a COMSEC program as soon as possible, so long as there is no direct

[redacted]

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cryptanalytic techniques. (In 1951 it was concluded that no steps should be taken pending an adequate improvement in the internal security of France.)

3. The recent Conference did not attempt to reach exact conclusions as to the value to either the USSR or the [redacted]

[redacted] It has been concluded, however, that this vulnerability represents a real potential danger to the security of the US and UK. (In 1951 it was concluded that [redacted])

4. It is now concluded that BRUSA COMINT success and cryptanalytic techniques should not, and need not, be revealed. (In 1951 it was concluded that [redacted])

[redacted] It is concluded now that a successful program can be undertaken now through COMSEC channels by appealing to the know-how and concern of France and certain of the other NATO countries. (In 1951 it was concluded that a violent shock on the diplomatic level would be prerequisite to any success with the French.)

5. The present plan does not propose the provision of US equipment to NATO countries or the insertion of US or UK technical assistance within the cryptographic agencies of the NATO countries. (Both of these steps were considered prerequisite in 1951.)

It is recommended that the views of Lee Parke be obtained prior to approving this Report in USCIB. Lee Parke may desire to participate in drawing up the minimum communication security standards which are to be used by SECAN as a basis for dealing with the NATO countries.

The corrected final draft Report of the Conference is forwarded herewith. It is requested that it be returned for file.

Encls

As stated above

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