REF ID:A60275

USCIB: 29.20/17

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5 July 1955

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### MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: COMINT Activities Involving Third Parties to UKUSA.

Reference: USCIB 29.20/16 dated 16 June 1955.

The enclosed comments and proposed reply to LSIB, prepared by the OSD member in coordination with Department of State and NSA representatives pursuant to paragraph 2 of the reference, are forwarded with a view to consideration at the 117th meeting of USCIB.

ONES

Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure .a/s

USCIB: 29.20/17

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EO 3.3(h)(2) PD 86-36/50 USC 3605 **1 July 1955** 

"MEMORANDUM FOR THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: COMINT Activities Involving Third Parties to UKUSA

REFERENCE: USCIB: 29.20/16

The enclosed draft reply to LSIB on this subject has been prepared by the Department of Defense member, in coordination with representatives of the Department of State and the National Security Agency, in response to the request in paragraph 2 of the reference. It is submitted for the consideration of USCIB.

With respect to the last sentence in sub-paragraph 3(b) of the LSIB message (enclosure with reference), although differing U.S. and U.K. solutions could place the British in a somewhat more favorable position with respect to future

it was felt that this possibility was not sufficiently great to warrant a change in the U.S. position or any comment by USCIB. Nevertheless, the point is raised for such consideration as the members of USCIB deem necessary.

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B. VERSKINE G.

General, USMC (Ret) Defense Member, USCIB

Enclosure with USCIB 29.20/17 dtd 5 July 1955.

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# TREFSLORA60275

#### MEMORANDUM FOR SUKLO

I would be grateful if you would pass the following message from USCIB to your Board in response to the message contained in your MOP 4649 of 13 June 1955:

Your agreement to defer action on this matter pending further consideration of respective courses of action is appreciated as is your recognition of U. S. inability to subject all U. S. COMINT units in Germany to international control and inspection. We would prefer to guard against future complexities and embarrassments by agreeing upon a single course of action.

USCIE views on your paragraphs 3a through d follow:

a. Reference your subparas a and b, USCIB does not think that the considerations noted overbalance the undesirable aspects of placing U. S. units under SACEUR. German agreement to the continued stationing of forces present in Germany at the time of its entry into NATO weakens considerably any effect on German political integrity. Describing these units to the Germans now would seem gratuitously to raise doubt on matters covered by that agreement without really bettering future cooperation. In any event this aspect could be taken care of without placing these units under SACEUR.

b. Reference your subpara c, USCIB is informed that paragraph 4 of the Resolution to Implement Section IV of the final Act of London Conference concerning the Powers of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe was not intended to cause a review of previous practices and that the

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reference to forces which NATO "has recognized as suitable to remain under national command" would be interpreted as meaning that forces not previously listed in NATO'S Annual Review of Forces can properly continue in that status. Therefore USCIB believes that COMINT units may be covered in the initial report by some such reporting phrase as "certain special administrative, line of communications and special purpose installations under national command and now in place in SACEUR's areas are not reported herein."

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USCIB has also noted that this situation was anticipated in Paragraph 12 of Annexure P1 to Appendix P wherein it is provided that: "Each nation with forces serving under SACEUR may individually arrange with the authorities concerned to operate in the theatre national COMINT units not provided specifically or exclusively for direct support of the forces under SACEUR. These units will not operate as part of the SACEUR Y structure and will not be subject to the arrangements for inter-allied cooperation."

c. Reference subpara d., all of the above would prevent any assertion that the units are being operated covertly against the provisions of the NATO agreement.

. We propose to act in accordance with the understanding stated in 2b above and to cover these units only under the general phrase described in that subparagraph.

USCIB would be grateful if ISIB could reconsider its position with a view to adopting the U.S. procedure. However, if this is not possible, USCIB would hope that ISIB could agree that the separate

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solutions discussed in this exchange are mutually satisfactory. If this is the case, it appears unnecessary to have the previously suggested discussions on this subject.