

~~TOP SECRET - U.S. EYES ONLY~~

FINAL

SUBJECT NUMBER

USCIB: 29.17/27 Item 3 of the Agenda for the 28th Meeting of USCIBEC, held on 22 April 1955.

Subject: COMINT Relations with [redacted]

OGA

The CHAIRMAN (Captain Taylor), stating that this item had been placed on the agenda by his office, said that the reply received from LSIB (enclosure with USCIB 29.17/23) contained certain comments which he believed deserving of discussion. He referred to paragraph 2 of this paper and the parenthetical expression it contains in which LSIB states for the first time that the supply of the requested equipments to the [redacted] deal.

He then asked Lt. Colonel Harrold if he had any points to raise.

LT. COLONEL HARROLD replied that he did, and said that he first wanted to inform the members that the Air Force has been approached by the [redacted]. With reference to the LSIB request as stated by SUSLO, London, that future equipment negotiations be handled by GCHQ and NSA he said that in view of the ELINT-COMINT confusion he would prefer to have matters handled between LSIB and USCIB for the time being.

The CHAIRMAN invited attention to the word "initially" in paragraph 4 of the proposal and, suggesting it may be significant from the British point of view, asked for opinions on phraseology which would permit initial negotiations between GCHQ and NSA, provided they are ultimately approved by USCIB-LSIB.

LT. COLONEL HARROLD said that he interpreted "initially" to mean that NSA and GCHQ would negotiate on technical matters and, when agreement is reached, present their recommendations to the two Boards.

MR. GODEL agreed with this interpretation, and expressed his opinion that General Canine would be the logical person to distinguish between ELINT and COMINT requests when they are first received.

The CHAIRMAN agreed, stating that it will be important for General Canine to determine, at an early stage, the effect of a [redacted]

He continued by saying that if ELINT equipments are considered an essential bargaining point for COMINT, as the British have stated, the Director, NSA will have to indicate the degree of COMINT need in order that this can be weighed as to relative importance against the ELINT need, as determined by ELINT authorities. He said that the Director NSA's recommendations in such a case would be considered by the Board.

CAPTAIN HOLTWICK assured the members that NSA would consult with other interested members before negotiating with the U.K. on future requests for ELINT equipments.

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There was further discussion on paragraph 4 after which it was agreed to leave the paragraph unchanged with the understanding that the minutes would reflect the members' views concerning it.

The CHAIRMAN asked if all members understood that by this decision, if approved by USCIB, the Director, NSA is authorized to initiate action to obtain, from previously indicated sources, the requested items of ELINT equipment for shipment to [ ] through U.K. channels.

The members agreed.

[ ] then distributed to the members copies of a telegram, referred to earlier by the Chairman, [ ]

[ ], in which he and the Air Force Representative described an approach which had been made to them by the British. The message read as follows:

"1. J. E. POULDEN WAS ADVISED MEETING REQUESTED IN 29 MARCH LETTER OF DIRECTOR GCHQ COULD NOT BE HELD AT THIS TIME BUT HE REQUESTED A LIAISON VISIT TO PRESENT LATEST BRITISH VIEWS. MR. A. BACON FROM NID WHO IS THE BRITISH LIAISON WITH THE [ ] ON COMINT AND ELINT MATTERS AND J. E. POULDEN OUTLINED BRITISH VIEW OF THE [ ] POSITION AS FOLLOWS:

(1) [ ] CONSIDER ELINT AND COMINT AS ONE AND THEREFORE STRONGLY DESIRE THAT ALL NEGOTIATIONS IN BOTH FIELDS BE HANDLED THROUGH ONE CHANNEL, NAMELY, THE BRITISH NAVAL CHANNEL WHICH HAS BEEN IN OPERATION SEVEN YEARS AND HAS BEEN PROVEN TO THE [ ] SATISFACTION TO BE SECURE.

(2) THE QUESTION OF SECURITY IS PARAMOUNT AND [ ] WHO IS PRESENTLY IN LONDON, HAS REITERATED TO MR. BACON IN THE STRONGEST TERMS THAT THIS IS A VERY CLOSELY GUARDED SECRET AND THERE WAS GREAT POLITICAL DANGER OF A SOCIALIST OR COMMUNIST MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT GETTING WORD OF THIS EXCHANGE OF INFORMATION THROUGH A BREACH OF SECURITY WITH THE RESULT THAT HE AND OTHERS INVOLVED WOULD BE CASHIERED AND IMPRISONED.

(3) [ ] FURTHER ADVISED THAT ANY FUTURE APPROACHES TO THE MINISTRY OF DEFENSE SUCH AS THE RECENT ONE BY A U.S. AIR ATTACHE IN [ ] INCREASES THE CHANCES OF A SECURITY BREACH AND MAY PUT HIM IN THE POSITION OF HAVING TO STOP THE FLOW OF BOTH COMINT AND ELINT TO BOTH U.S. AND U.K.

(4) HE FAILS TO UNDERSTAND WHY APPROACHES ARE BEING MADE BY U.S. AUTHORITIES WHEN THEY ARE ALREADY RECEIVING BOTH TYPES OF INFORMATION AND HE REFUSES TO DISCUSS THE MATTER WITH EITHER U.S. AUTHORITIES OR HIS OWN MINISTRY OF DEFENSE.

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(5) HE FEELS INSULTED THAT HE SHOULD BE ASKED TO FURNISH COPIES OF HIS RAW DATA SUCH AS OPERATORS' LOGS. AS BACKGROUND INFORMATION, J. E. POULDEN STATED THE FOLLOWING: THE BRITISH RECOGNIZE THAT THE [ ] HAVE A HIGH DEGREE OF COMPETENCE IN THE ELINT FIELD AND KNOW THEY USE HIGH GRADE ENGINEER OPERATORS. THEY ALSO RECOGNIZE FROM THEIR PREVIOUS CONTACTS THE HIGH DEGREE OF PRIDE THE [ ] HAVE IN THEIR OWN COMPETENCE AND THEREFORE NEVER PRESS THEM FOR RAW DATA AND ACCEPT THEIR EVALUATED RESULTS. THE BRITISH RECEIVE ELINT RESULTS IN THE FORM OF PERSONAL LETTERS EXCHANGED THREE TIMES A WEEK AT TECHNICAL STAFF LEVEL DELIVERED [ ]

[ ] ELECTRONIC MEANS OF COMMUNICATION ARE NOW BEING ESTABLISHED AND WILL BE OPERATING IN THE NEAR FUTURE ALLOWING DAY-TO-DAY EXCHANGE IF REQUIRED.

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"2. THE BRITISH ARE VERY CONCERNED ABOUT THE PRESENT SITUATION SINCE U.S. APPROACHES ARE STRAINING BRITISH [ ] RELATIONS AND THEY FEEL THAT ANY FURTHER TENSION CAUSED BY CONTINUED DIRECT CONTACTS BY ANY U.S. AGENCY MAY VERY LIKELY DISRUPT THE FLOW OF BOTH COMINT AND ELINT. BOTH J. E. POULDEN AND MR. BACON EMPHASIZED THAT [ ] IS THE CONTROLLER OF ALL ELINT MATTERS WITH AUTHORITY TO DISCONTINUE PASSAGE OF INFORMATION TO BRITISH AND U.S. THEY CONSIDER A SOLUTION OF THIS PROBLEM A MOST URGENT MATTER AND J. E. POULDEN HAS OFFERED TO VISIT WASHINGTON IMMEDIATELY TO CLARIFY ANY POINTS IN QUESTION IF DESIRED.

"3. IT WAS STATED BY J. E. POULDEN THAT AT ONE TIME GENERAL CANINE HAD OFFERED THE GOOD SERVICES OF HIS OFFICE IN AN ATTEMPT TO STOP FURTHER DIRECT U.S. APPROACHES TO THE [ ]

"4. THE IMPRESSION GAINED BY STEVENSON AND MARTIN AT THIS INFORMAL MEETING IS THAT THE BRITISH ARE VERY SINCERE AND ANXIOUS TO COOPERATE WITH THE U.S. AND THEY HAVE NO ULTERIOR MOTIVE IN THIS MATTER, BUT RATHER THAT THEY GENUINELY FEEL THERE IS A REAL DANGER OF THE LOSS OF A VALUABLE SOURCE OF INFORMATION TO BOTH U.S. AND U.K.

"5. THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPARED JOINTLY BY STEVENSON AND MARTIN. PLEASE SEE THAT GENERAL LEWIS GETS COPIES WITHOUT DELAY. (A COPY OF THIS HAS, IN FACT, BEEN PASSED TO GENERAL LEWIS.)"

The CHAIRMAN informed the members that a reply has been sent to the CIA representative.

[ ] in effect, acknowledged receipt of the U.K. views and said that they would be carefully considered; stated that his Washington headquarters could only reiterate the position stated earlier; and requested that Mr. Poulden be so informed and advised that a visit by him to the U.S. at this time would not assist in the resolution of the problem.

The CHAIRMAN expressed his opinion that the information presented [ ] should be injected into Board channels as quickly as possible, and, since LSIB has made no comment in paragraph 3 of their memo, he asked whether it would be advisable for him to ask SUSLO, London to find out whether the U.K. views [ ] represent the views of LSIB. He said that he considered it curious that LSIB, in their paragraph 3, make no mention of the effect of unilateral ELINT dealings on the COMINT negotiations, yet they have stated specifically that the ELINT equipment requested is essential to their success. In addition, he said, LSIB has not insisted upon cessation of separate dealings on ELINT but only noted that their [ ] contacts have indicated this.

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[redacted] considered it wise to get confirmation of the LSIB views.

MR. PACKARD, recalling the London Conference of July '54, said that the existing situation was predicted by Bacon, who was overruled when an agreement on COMINT alone was reached.

MR. GODEL proposed that the LSIB letter be taken at its face value.

The CHAIRMAN asked if it were being suggested that the information [redacted] be ignored in replying to LSIB with the understanding that we would continue with our unilateral negotiations.

MR. PACKARD said that if the [redacted] want the U.S. to desist from unilateral arrangements, LSIB should be put in the position of having to raise the issue by requesting that we change the terms of reference of the Conference.

The CHAIRMAN pointed out that we have a serious question of whether the COMINT approach to [redacted] is going to be jeopardized by a unilateral ELINT approach by the U.S. Recalling many statements by the Director, NSA on the subject he cautioned that the [redacted] potential as a [redacted] must be kept in mind.

[redacted] if anyone could foresee harm in asking LSIB for confirmation of their views.

MR. POLYZOIDES suggested that this not be done and that we continue to play the game our way. Pointing out that our own house is not yet in order on the COMINT-ELINT problem, he objected to forcing the issue before we are prepared to see it through. He recommended that the Committee's action be limited to approval of the U.K. letter received from SUSLO.

CAPTAIN HOLTWICK said that it would be interesting to know whether the equipment we are agreeing to furnish [redacted] through the U.K. is being wasted.

MR. POLYZOIDES, noting the LSIB assurance that the equipment is necessary for successful COMINT negotiations, said that if our "attorney" turns out not to be trustworthy and we do not get COMINT results, our complaint can be made to LSIB.

[redacted] Mr. Godel expressed the consensus of the group by saying that if the [redacted] are as concerned about unilateral approaches as the British say, the British will undoubtedly inform us through official rather than informal channels.

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LT. COLONEL HARROLD announced that he will soon go to Germany where he will talk with the Air Attaché from [redacted] during which discussions he hopes to obtain a clearer picture of the situation in [redacted]

[redacted]

MR. GODEL suggested [redacted] Air Force determine what their particular interests in the problem are. He then expressed his understanding that the Committee will be grateful for an expression of views by the ELINT authorities as to the impact on their business.

MR. POLYZOIDES then proposed that the members note the message [redacted] USAF Members investigate the ramifications of the message and forward their views on it at the earliest practicable date.

It was so agreed.

[redacted] on Colonel Harrold's trip would be presented at a meeting of the Committee. In addition, he said that he would welcome advice from the members, - particularly from NSA on the importance of [redacted] COMINT.

The CHAIRMAN referred again to the LSIB letter, noting that all points had been discussed and that the only remaining action concerned notification to LSIB.

CAPTAIN HOLTWICK recommended that an affirmative reply be sent to LSIB.

All members agreed.

CAPTAIN HOLTWICK, pointing out that the Board has a liaison representative in London (SUSLO), asked if it might not be proper for him to attend any future meetings [redacted]

MR. GODEL suggested that SUSLO's attendance be only on an invitational basis, [redacted] Air Force representatives there expected that COMINT of interest to him might be discussed.

MR. BUFFHAM stated that Colonel Pulling is accredited to LSIB and that it is customary for him to authorize all U.S.-U.K. COMINT and ELINT contacts.

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MR. POLYZOIDES suggested the decision be left to those on the scene.

After brief discussion the CHAIRMAN said that it was his understanding that the original arrangement permitted the members to have a unilateral contact on ELINT and that SUSLO would have no substantive cognizance over our dealings with ELINT. This, he said, in no way affected SUSLO's control over U.S. nationals visiting GCHQ whether for ELINT or COMINT purposes.

The CHAIRMAN informed the members that he would forward the Committee recommendation to USCIB on a "no objection" basis and, upon approval, inform LSIB of USCIB's views.

CAPTAIN HOLTWICK agreed to keep the Board informed on the nature and status of any approaches which come to NSA's attention.

DECISION. (22 April 1955) USCIBEC agreed that the LSIB statement on [redacted], as contained in the enclosure with USCIB 29.17/23, should be accepted in light of the foregoing discussion and on the assumption that future equipment requirements for [redacted] for COMINT purposes will be subject to ultimate USCIB approval in any case. USCIBEC agreed to recommend, therefore, that USCIB:

- a. Approve the proposals contained in the enclosure with USCIB 29.17/23, and
- b. Direct the Executive Secretary to see that LSIB is informed of such approval.
- c. Reexamine [redacted] Air Force report on the ramifications. Such report to be forwarded as soon as practicable for consideration at a future meeting of the Committee.

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