USCIB: 13.1/7

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18 May 1955

TOP SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject:

Personnel Security Standards.

Reference:

CIB # 000119 of 5 May 1955 (distributed to Board and

Executive Committee Members only).

1. Vote sheet results on the reference were as follows:

STATE:

"It is felt that the general problem of personnel security which is raised here is too complicated to merit immediate approval of recommendations (a), (b) and (c) without critical examination of the entire problem and of the efficacy of these specific steps in relation to it. Such an examination should be based on mutual consideration by all member agencies, rather than on the more limited examination in recommendation (d).

"It is suggested that this problem be referred initially to the Security Committee for examination and recommendation as to the usefulness and character of an exhaustive survey."

DEFENSE:

"It is suggested that:

- 1. Before any changes are made in present USCIB personnel security policies, the Director, NSA be requested to report to USCIB on the following:
 - a. His estimate of the total damage to the U. S. COMINT effort of the Petersen case.
 - b. His comments on present COMINT personnel security policies and practices, particularly as to their adequacy to protect U. S. COMINT techniques and successes.
 - c. Any recommendations he may desire to make for improving these security policies and practices.
- 2. That USCIB, after examining the NSA report, then decide whether or not to review the entire USCIB personnel security policy or make changes in that policy."

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Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 02-20-2014, pursuant to E.O. 13526

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AIR FORCE:

"It is agreed that a review of present COMINT clearance procedures and policies may be in order. The proposal to interrogate six additional investigative references is not considered practicable, however. Nor is it believed desirable to utilize polygraph methods for the screening of military individuals. Inasmuch as it is proposed to study USCIB Directive No. 5 with a view to possible revision and since this will be of concern to the USAF, participation by the Air Force in this study is desired. It is recommended that action relative to CIB #000119 be assigned to USCIB SECCOM."

NAVY:

"Recommend that ad hoc committee make study and submit report for consideration before any other specific steps are taken."

CIA:

"This Agency will be glad to designate a representative to sit on the ad hoc committee mentioned in par. 7(d)."

NSA:

"Desire paper be considered at next regular meeting."

FBI:

"Request receive further consideration in committee."

ARMY:

"Para 7 (b), line 3 - Add 'an NAC and' after the word least."

2. In view of the comment by the Defense and NSA Members and after further consultation with their representatives it appears that discussion at USCIB would be desirable before undertaking Committee study of the problems raised by the reference.

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3. Accordingly, the reference together with the above comments thereon will be scheduled for discussion at the June meeting of USCIB.

Captain, U. S. Navy

Executive Secretary, USCIB