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USCIB: 9.3/27

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18 February 1955


~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIBEC:

Subject: USCIB Master Requirements List.

Reference: USCIB 9.3/26 of 18 February 1955.

1. The enclosure herewith is Tab C to the reference and should be attached thereto.
2. Attention is invited to the NOTE TO RECIPIENTS and the FORWARD to the list contained in the enclosure.

  
 RUFUS L. TAYLOR  
 Captain, U. S. Navy  
 Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure  
a/s

~~HANDLE VIA COMINT CHANNELS ONLY~~

USCIB: 9.3/27

NOTE TO RECIPIENTS:

1. You will note that various marginal comments have been made in ink in this proposed draft list of requirements. These comments are necessitated by the fact that, in some cases, coordinated overall review by competent and responsible officers within CIA has not yet been completed.

2. It is felt that USCIBEC's consideration and further coordination of the draft list may be facilitated by the marginal comments which the CIA itself feels necessary to include.

DRAFT

OCI 0819/55

FOREWORD

1. DCID 4/4, Priority National Intelligence Objectives, approved 14 December 1954, have been established pursuant to NSCID No. 4, paragraph 2, "as a guide for the coordination of intelligence collection and production in response to requirements relating to the formulation and execution of national security policy."
2. In implementation of this directive, CIA has prepared a draft list of requirements (attached) as an initial step in the formulation of coordinated national intelligence requirements. These requirements are intended (a) to identify the critical elements of intelligence that must be produced by intelligence research to meet the priority objectives, and (b) to provide a basis for the coordinated allocation of overall collection responsibilities and resources, and the development of detailed information requirements by each agency for specific source material.
3. The National Intelligence Objectives in DCID 4/4 are listed in three levels of priority, and each objective within a given category bears the same priority as the other objectives in that priority category. Requirements will bear the same priority as the objectives to which they relate.
4. In accordance with DCID 4/4, the Priority National Intelligence Objectives will be reviewed for revision at least semi-annually by the Board of National Estimates. Immediately after such review, it is proposed that the requirements will be reviewed and appropriate revisions incorporated.

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OCI-0819/55

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I a

Soviet over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Soviet intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Soviet or Satellite armed forces.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.




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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - I a




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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I b

Chinese Communist over-all politico-military strategy, intentions, and plans, particularly Chinese Communist intentions and plans to initiate hostilities using Chinese Communist armed forces.


REQUIREMENTS

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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - I b



~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I c


Soviet development, production, disposition, and employment of weapons and other components of weapons systems requisite for nuclear attack on the United States and/or key US overseas installations or for defense of the Soviet Bloc against air attack. Particular reference is made to the development, production, and employment of: (1) nuclear weapons; (2) delivery systems, including aircraft, guided missiles, and related base facilities; and (3) the components of the Soviet air defense systems.

REQUIREMENTS

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

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NIO - I c




EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - I d

Soviet capabilities, plans, and intentions for the clandestine delivery of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons.

REQUIREMENTS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II a


The Soviet estimate of US and allied capabilities and intentions, of US and allied economic and political stability, and of the strength, cohesion, and probable development of the NATO Bloc.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

*question  
Herald?*



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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - II et



~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II b

Major Soviet international political objectives and courses of action, including economic policies and actions, with particular reference to courses designed to weaken and disrupt the NATO alliance or to foment antagonism between Western and Asian powers.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - II b



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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II c


Soviet political strengths and weaknesses; the actual locus of political power in the USSR; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; Soviet-Satellite relations, with particular reference to the character and degree of Soviet control; the strengths and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the Soviet and Satellite populations.

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605


NIO - II c





EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - II c




~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II d

The character of the Soviet (including Satellite) economy, with particular reference to its ability to support a major war; the motivation, character, and magnitude of current economic development programs, their implementation, and their effect upon the economic, political and military strength of the Soviet Bloc.

REQUIREMENTS

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
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II e

Soviet and Satellite scientific and technical strengths and weaknesses affecting Soviet economic and military capabilities.

REQUIREMENTS

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


NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II f

The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Soviet and Satellite armed forces, including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, their logistical support, and military production and stockpiling.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.




~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II g

The Chinese Communist estimate of US capabilities and intentions with respect to the Chinese Communist regime and to the situation in the Far East.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II h

Major Chinese Communist international political objectives and courses of action, with particular reference to courses designed to foment antagonism between Western Asian powers and to extend the area of Communist influence and control in Asia.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.



EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

~~SECRET~~EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II 1

The internal political strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist regime; actual or potential personal or policy conflicts within the ruling group; the strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist apparatus of police control; the extent of actual disaffection and of potential resistance in the population of mainland China.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

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~~SECRET~~EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II J

Sino-Soviet relations, with particular reference to the degree of Soviet influence or control, the extent of Chinese Communist freedom of action, and actual or potential strains on the relationship.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - II j



*add item re  
USSR - Chinese  
rivalry re North  
Korea + Japan ?*

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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II k

The strengths and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist economy; plans for its development, and progress therein; scientific and technological strengths and weaknesses affecting economic and military capabilities; the capabilities and vulnerabilities of Chinese Communist internal communications and communications with the USSR.


EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

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NIO - II k



NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II 1

The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Chinese Communist armed forces, including their strategic and tactical doctrine, their political reliability, and their logistical support.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.



~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II m

The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the North Korean regime, and the relative degree of Soviet and Chinese Communist influence or control in North Korea.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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
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EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - II m



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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II n

The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the North Korean armed forces, including their political reliability and their logistical support.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II o

The political and economic strengths and weaknesses of the Viet Minh regime, the nature of its political relationships with the USSR and with Communist China, and its political and military objectives.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.





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NIO - II o



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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II p

The strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of the Viet Minh armed forces, including the nature and amount of military aid received from Communist China and the USSR.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.



~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II g

The political, economic, and military strengths and weaknesses of non-Communist regime in Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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
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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II r

The reactions of the governments and peoples of South and Southeast Asia to developments in Indochina and to the general threat of further Communist aggrandizement in the region; Communist political and subversive capabilities in those countries.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.



NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II s

The stability and orientation of [ ]; the effect thereon of economic difficulties, events in Southeast Asia, the increasing power of nuclear weapons, and progress in [ ] rearmament.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II t

The reactions of governments and peoples in Western Europe, particularly in the [redacted] to the increasing power of nuclear weapons and to increasing Soviet nuclear warfare capabilities; the effect of such reactions on the coherence and effectiveness of the NATO alliance.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 36

REQUIREMENTS

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
NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II u



EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC

REQUIREMENTS

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


NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II v



REQUIREMENTS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - II W

The strength, composition, interrelationships, capabilities (political, subversive, and clandestine), and vulnerabilities of major Communist parties outside the Soviet Bloc and of international Communist front organizations, particularly the political and paramilitary capabilities and vulnerabilities of the Communist parties in [redacted] trends in global and local Communist party tactics.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Strength and composition as indicated by: (a) discipline, ideological maturity and class composition of membership; (b) identity, policy orientation and calibre of leadership; (c) organizational efficiency, communications channels, methods of financing and structure; (d) size and ratio of hard-core membership to sympathizers.
2. Policies and objectives as indicated by: (a) programs, internal publications and propaganda; (b) readmissions and purges of "deviationists," and changes in leadership; (c) emphasis accorded to various types of activity; (d) significant additions or deletions in Soviet/Communist propaganda output.
3. Interrelationships between major Communist parties and policy direction of these parties and of international Communist groups as indicated by: (a) major Soviet or Cominform ideological pronouncements relating to national, regional or international Communism; (b) contacts with and indications of instructions from high level Orbit or non-Orbit party personalities; (c) indications of the extent and timing of Orbit financial support; (d) similarities or divergencies in tactics, propaganda and objectives of major Communist parties and international front organizations; (e) financial support rendered to Communist parties by front organizations.
4. Capabilities as indicated by: (a) appropriateness of policies and tactics and general receptiveness thereto; (b) degree of infiltration and strength in labor movement, professional associations, government institutions, armed forces; (c) size and

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
NIO - II w

training of organized sabotage and paramilitary units;  
 (d) size and financial health of national and local press  
 and clandestine publication facilities.

5. Vulnerabilities as indicated by: (a) degree and effectiveness of anti-Communist control measures; (b) effectiveness of Western counterpropaganda, policies and aid; (c) potential or actual internal doctrinal conflicts or personal rivalries; (d) internal organizational weaknesses, such as inadequate communications channels between center and provinces, inadequate covert organization; (e) public awareness of control from Moscow; (f) increasing strength of anti-Communist unions.

The following list of "major Communist parties" has been compiled on the basis of: (a) the strategic importance of the country to the USSR; (b) the party's size and capabilities, and (c) the party's position within the international Communist movement:

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
 PL 86-36/50 USC 3605



Iran

Burma

Indonesia

*Add countries?*

The following international organizations, and those national organizations operating under their auspices, are considered major:

The World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) (Including Trade Departments or Trade Union Internationals)

The International Union of Students (IUS)

The World Federation of Democratic Youth (WFDY)

The Women's International Democratic Federation (WIDF)

The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW)

The International Association of Democratic Lawyers (IADL)

The World Federation of Teachers' Unions (FISE)

The International Organization of Journalists (IOJ)

The International Broadcasting Organization (OIR)

The International Federation of Resistance Fighters (FIR)

The World Peace Council (WPC)

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III a

The policy of the [ ] government, with particular reference to its position in the global balance of power, its relations with Communist China and the USSR, and its attitude toward developments in Southeast Asia.

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Official and popular reactions to: (a) Asian policies and activities of the United Nations, Western powers, USSR, and Communist and non-Communist Asian countries; (b) official visits and meetings with high level Communist personalities; (c) expansion of Communist control in South and Southeast Asia; (d) SEATO and Communist efforts to develop an organization of Asian nations.
2. Plans and activities of [ ] governments: (a) gain Asian or Western Europe support for a Third Force (non-Communist, non-Western Bloc); (b) expansion of trade with Communist countries; (c) expand its own military capabilities; (d) acceptance of economic, military or technical aid from Communist countries; (e) improve internal economic conditions to preclude necessity of seeking aid from Western or Communist Blocs; (f) development of internal political and economic programs to build popular support of the government; (g) strengthen effectiveness of border troops; (h) degree to which liberal-conservative factionalism within the ruling [ ] affects the governments capabilities for preparing and implementing above activities.
3. Indications of official recognition of dangers of Communism [ ] (a) tightening of controls over Communist Party; (b) tightening of controls over activities of official representatives of Communist countries.

*western initiative re  
economic aid?*

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III b

The stability of the Government of Iran, with particular reference to Tudeh strength and capabilities.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III c

Arab  relations, with particular reference to the possibility of an outbreak of open warfare.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III d

The stability and policy of the Egyptian government, with particular reference to developments, relating to Middle East defense plans, the Suez base, and the Sudan.

REQUIREMENTS

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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III e

Nationalist unrest in [ ] and  
Communist connections therewith.

REQUIREMENTS

**NOTE:** Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Strength and activities of nationalist groups:  
(a) reactions to [ ] programs and policies; (b) degree of control maintained by leaders; (c) participation in governments; (d) coordination of plans and activities of various groups; (e) evidence of Communist connections or control; (f) intentions toward future cooperation and collaboration with [ ] (g) identification of leaders; (h) attitude toward local French population; (i) support by foreign nations, particularly Egypt.

*Danger to  
U.S. bases?*

2. Strength and activities of Communist, terrorist and other subversive organizations: (a) composition and leadership; (b) source of finances and arms; (c) plans and coordination of activities; (d) relationship with and degree of control by nationalist or foreign elements.

EO 3.3(h)(2)

PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

3. Strength of [ ] control: (a) strength and loyalty of armed forces and police; (b) degree of responsibility afforded local individuals or groups; (c) effectiveness of [ ] economic and political reforms; (d) effectiveness of control over popular morale and over nationalist groups and leaders; (e) control over foreign propaganda.

~~SECRET~~

NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III f

The stability and policy of the Governments of [redacted], the general trend of popular opinion in those countries, and the trend in parliamentary politics.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Composition, strength, plans and activities of political parties and factions and pressure groups with particular reference to: (a) degree of popular support; (b) strength and following of individual leaders; (c) efforts to combat effectiveness of government measures; (d) ability to influence government measures; (e) placing of members in strategic government and military positions; (g) attitudes on government foreign policies (particularly on East-West trade, NATO, SEATO), economic issues, and European defense; (h) general attitude toward Communist Party; (i) attitude in the East-West struggle and to [redacted] sovereignty.

*meaning?*

*Communist*

2. Policies and strength of government: (a) ability to control internal opposition; (b) popular support; (c) control of armed forces including police; (d) effectiveness of economic controls and reforms; (e) foreign policies, particularly on East-West trade, NATO, SEATO; (f) ability to develop support of minority parties; (g) effective control of Communists and Communist propaganda; (h) ability to increase national prestige and influence; (i) increased relationships with Communist countries; (j) control of labor organizations.



NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III g

Scientific and technological developments in [ ]  
[ ]

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Planning and control of scientific and technical research and development in [ ] (a) organization, locations, functions, and key personalities of controlling or supervising agencies; (b) allocation of funds and materials; (c) foreign affiliations or influence in each principal field of science; (d) availability or shortage of scientific manpower and facilities in each field of basic science; (e) objectives, achievements and potential of higher education in each principal field of science.

2. Research and development activities (including tests, successes, failures), installations and facilities, and key personalities related to: (a) nuclear BW and CW weapons; (b) guided missiles and rockets; (c) aircraft armored vehicles; artillery, combat weapons, naval vessels; (d) transportation equipment; (e) electronic equipment; (f) optical photogrammetric and aerial photographic equipment; (g) meteorological, hydrographic instruments and methods; (h) industrial, agricultural and mineralogical machinery and methods.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III h

The stability and orientation of the Yugoslav Government, its strategic intentions in the event of war, and the strength, composition, disposition, capabilities, and weaknesses of its armed forces.

EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.




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EO 3.3(h)(2)  
PL 86-36/50 USC 3605

NIO - III h



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~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III 1

The development of militant nationalism in Latin America and Communist exploitation of this trend.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Reactions and activities of government, political parties, and organizations with reference to: (a) U.S. economic policies which conflict with national interests; (b) policies and practices of foreign owned firms located in country; (c) real or potential foreign exploitation of natural resources; (d) efforts to increase political and economic independence of U. S. through domestic developments, increasing ties with other foreign nations, and policy on control of offshore waters.
2. Exploitation of nationalistic issues by Communist front organizations by: (a) use of radio, newspapers and other propaganda media; (b) attempts to form popular front movements.
3. Effectiveness of Communist exploitation of nationalism as indicated by degree of influence on government and party policies and on organized business and labor groups.

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NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III j

Economic conditions and trends in backward countries, particularly as they affect vulnerabilities to Communist propaganda on the one hand and attitudes toward the United States and the West on the other.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Attitudes, capabilities and activities of government in regard to: (a) economic developments, modernization and mechanization; (b) increasing business and commercial relations and securing aid from US or Western nations; Communist nations; (c) developing undeveloped areas; (d) control and development of natural resources; (e) effectual control of labor; (f) control or counteractions to Communist or Western propaganda; (g) detrimental effect of natural phenomena. *rephrase add U.S.*

2. Popular reaction to: (a) government policy on economic issues; (b) aid from Western or Communist nations; (c) Communist efforts to create and exploit economic difficulties; (d) modernization of methods and machinery; (e) exploitation of natural resources by foreign nations.

*Trends in economic thinking among influential elements - Communists, Socialistic or Capitalistic? in return initiatives in economic aid?*

~~SECRET~~NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OBJECTIVE - III k

Non-Soviet nuclear energy research and development; the production of fissionable materials and the use of such materials for weapons or other purposes.

REQUIREMENTS

NOTE: Order of listing of the requirements is a matter of convenience in presentation and has no significance with respect to the relative priority of the individual requirements for each objective within a priority category.

1. Research, developments, production, in any non-Soviet country related to nuclear energy: (a) locations, sizes and capabilities of installations and facilities; (b) type of fissionable materials produced, amounts and distribution; (c) type of foreign aid received and identification of country supplying same; (d) degree of government control.

*add U.N. activities*

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