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USCIB: 5/419

14 January 1953

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE MEMBERS OF USCIB:

Subject: Procedure for Arranging Visits to Foreign COMINT Installations.

1. At the 81st USCIB Meeting the Director, NSA, was authorized to prepare, for Board approval, a procedure governing visits by U.S. COMINT personnel to foreign COMINT installations. This procedure is contained in the enclosure.
2. Members are requested to submit their concurrence or comments by vote sheet. Replies should be forwarded to the Secretary not later than 21 January 1953.

[Handwritten Signature]

H. D. JONES
Acting Executive Secretary, USCIB

Enclosure - 1
NSA Serial # 00022
dtd 12 Jan 53.

USCIB: 5/419

Serial: 00022

12 JAN 1953

~~TOP SECRET - SECURITY INFORMATION~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ACTING EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, USCIB

SUBJECT: Procedure for Arranging Visits to Foreign COMINT Installations

1. Pursuant to USCIB decision at the 81st Meeting, 28 November 1952, the inclosure has been prepared to provide guidance for those member organizations desiring to send representatives to foreign COMINT installations.

2. Please submit these proposed arrangements to USCIB members with a request for their concurrence or comment.

FOR THE DIRECTOR:

/s/ Alfred R. Marcy
ALFRED R. MARCY
Colonel, US Army
Chief of Staff

Incl:

Procedure for Arranging Visits
by U.S. Personnel to Foreign
COMINT Installations.

Enclosure with USCIB 5/419 dated 14 January 1953.

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PROCEDURE FOR ARRANGING VISITS
BY U.S. PERSONNEL TO FOREIGN COMINT
INSTALLATIONS

1. Periodic visits to foreign COMINT installations (principally GCHQ and CS) by authorized U.S. representatives can accomplish much to further collaboration and maximize the total capabilities of the national efforts concerned. The achievement of such objectives can be realized most successfully, however, only when the agency to be visited has been adequately forewarned in order that all necessary preparations may have been completed.

2. Preparation for visits involves as a minimum the timely receipt of information regarding the time of arrival of the visitor and the specific subjects to be discussed. In this manner, the host agency will have an opportunity to insure that its best qualified personnel will be fully briefed and available for discussion on the date of the visit. In the past, the Director, GCHQ, has been extremely conscientious to insure that visiting U.S. personnel will have adequate reception and accommodations. However, even the best intentions to make adequate preparations cannot be realized unless the agency to be visited is afforded sufficient advance notice of the details of the proposed visit.

3. The Senior U.S. Liaison Officer at London (SUSLO), in making arrangements for visits to GCHQ, has noted that prior notice has at times been so lacking in details or belated as to impair the effectiveness of the mission concerned. These cases create an operational hindrance and constitute a breach of international courtesy as well. It is obvious that such situations can only work to the mutual disadvantage of both parties.

4. In order that liaison visits may be given the best possible chance of success in the future, it is desirable that the following procedure be applicable to all prospective visitors to foreign cooperating centers:

a. In establishing requirements for such visits, parent agencies should insure that the purpose of the proposed visit can not be fulfilled by a visit to U.S. agencies in Washington or elsewhere.

b. Proposals for visits should be in the hands of the Director, NSA, at least 21 days prior to the date of the visit. When the need for a visit arises unexpectedly, the Director is to be notified as soon as possible.

5. Personnel who have made no previous visit to a foreign cooperating center will be additionally required to report to the Chief, Foreign Contact Group, Building 19, Naval Security Station, Washington, D.C., for briefing on the subject of U.S.-U.K. or U.S.-Canadian COMINT relations.

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6. A request for personnel to visit foreign COMINT installations will include the following information for forwarding to the appropriate Senior Liaison Officer:

- a. Name and rank of individual concerned.
- b. Position of individual (job assignment).
- c. Date or dates of visit to foreign COMINT headquarters or activities.
- d. Specific (not general) purpose of visit, giving as much detail as is required for the Senior Liaison Officer to prepare a program for the visit.
- e. Status of COMINT clearance and indoctrination of individual.
- f. Administrative data:
 - (1) ETA
 - (2) Method of travel
 - (3) Place of arrival
 - (4) Arriving from
 - (5) Hotel accommodations desired.