Introduction to Cryptology - IV

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Confidential

Cryptology in the Civil War.

A detailed account of the...

Original

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[Signature]

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This lecture, the fourth in the series, deals with the crypto-
systems used by both sides in the Civil War, the War of the Rebellion.
the War Between the States - choose your own designation for that
vicious, bloody, and very costly strife, when brother was pitted against
brother. Civil strife is unhappily always very bitter and leaves scars
which heal only extremely slowly with the passage of many years.

A detailed account of the codes and ciphers of the Civil War in
the United States of America can hardly be told without beginning
with a bit of biography about the man who became the first signal officer
in history and the first Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army,
Albert J. Myer, the man in whose memory that lovely little U.S. Army
post adjacent to Arlington Cemetery was named. Myer was born on 20 Sep-
tember 1827, and after an apprenticeship in the then quite new science of
electric telegraphy, he entered Hobart College, Geneva, New York, from which he was graduated in 1847.

From early youth he had exhibited a predilection for artistic and scien-
tific studies, and upon leaving Hobart he entered Buffalo Medical College,
receiving the M.D. degree four years later. His graduation thesis, "A
Sign Language for Deaf Mutes," contained the germ of the idea he was
to develop several years later, when, in 1851, he was commissioned a
1st Lieutenant in the Regular Army, made an Assistant Surgeon, and ordered
to New Mexico for duty. Myer's idea involved the development of an
efficient system of military "aerial telegraphy", which was what sys-
us
tem was then called. He had plenty of time at this
developing and far-away outpost to think about the. I emphasize the word "system"
because, strange to say, although instances of the use of lights and other
visual signals can be found throughout the history of warfare, and their
use between ships at sea had been practiced by mariners
for centuries, yet down to the middle of the 19th Century surprisingly
little progress had been made in developing methods and instruments for
the systematic exchange of military information and instructions in the
system of electric
means by means of signals of any kind. Morse's practical telegraphy,
developed in the years 1832-35, served to focus attention within the military systems and methods upon the matter of inter-communication by means of both visual and electrical signals, and in the years immediately preceding the Civil War, the U.S. Army took steps to introduce and to develop a system of visual signaling for general use in the field. It was Assistant Surgeon Myer who furnished the initiative in this matter.

In 1856, two years after he was commissioned assistant surgeon, and had devoted much of his leisure time to the study of visual signaling and its development, Myer drafted a memorandum on a new system of visual signaling, and obtained a patent on it. Two years later, a board appointed by the War Department to study Myer's system reported favorably. After some demonstrations by Myer, and the successful results, the War Department fostered a bill in Congress, which gave its approval to his idea. But what is more to the point, Congress appropriated an initial amount of $2,000 to enable the Army and the War Department to develop the system. The money, as stated in the Act, was to be used "for the manufacture of purchase of apparatus and equipment for field signaling." The Act also contained another important provision: it authorized the appointment, on the Army staff, of one Signal Officer with the rank, pay, and allowances of a major of cavalry. On 2 July 1860, "Assistant Surgeon Albert J. Myer (was appointed) to be Signal Officer, with the rank of Major, 27 June 1860, to fill an original vacancy." Two weeks later Major Myer was ordered to report to the Commanding General of the Department of New Mexico for signaling duty. The War Department also directed that two officers be detailed as his assistants. During a several months' campaign against hostile Navajos, an extensive test of Myer's new system, using both flags and torches, was conducted with much success. In October 1860, a Lieut. J.E.B. Stuart, later to become famous as a Confederate cavalry leader, tendered his services to aid in signal instruction; and it is interesting to note that one of the officers who served as an assistant to Myer in demonstrating his system before the board, which made a study of Myer's system, before it was adopted by the Army, was a Lieut. E.P. Alexander, Corps of Engineers. We shall hear more about him presently, but at the moment I will say that on the outbreak of War, Alexander organized the Confederate Signal Corps, which was established by the Act of the Congress. To organize a Signal Corps," the Act was approved on 19 April 1862 — nearly a year earlier than the Signal Corps of the Federal Army was likewise established as a separate corps.
Less than a year after Major Myer was appointed as the first and, at that time, the only Signal Officer of the U.S. Army, after a 36-hour bombardment, surrendered. The bloody four-year war between the North and the South began. The date was 14 April 1861. Myer’s system of aerial telegraphy was soon to undergo its real baptism under fire, rather than by fire. But with the outbreak of war, another new system of military signal communication, signaling by the electric telegraph, began to undergo its first thorough test in combat operations. This in itself is very important in the history of cryptography. But far more significant in that history is the fact I mentioned at the close of the last lecture, viz., that for the first time in the conduct of organized warfare, rapid and secret military communications on a large scale became practicable, because cryptography and electric telegraphy were now to be joined in a relationship that lasting wedlock. For when the war began, the electric telegraph had been in use for less than a quarter of a century. Although the first use of electric telegraphy in military operations was in the Crimean War in Europe (1854-56), its employment was restricted to communications exchanged among headquarters of the Allies, and some observers were very doubtful about its utility even for this limited usage. It may also be noted that in the annals of that war there is no record of the employment of electric telegraphy together with means for protecting the messages against their interception and solution by the enemy.

On the Union side in the Civil War, military signal operations began with Major Myer’s arrival in Washington on 3 June 1861. His basic equipment consisted of kits containing a white flag with a red square in the center for use against a dark background; a red flag with a white square for use against a light background; and torches for night use. It is interesting to note that these are the elements which make up the familiar insignia of our Army Signal Corps. The most pressing need which faced Major Myer was to get officers and men detailed to him wherever signals might be required, and to train them in what was called the "vigwag system," the training included learning something about codes and ciphers, and gaining experience in their usages.

But there was still no such separate entity as a Signal Corps of the Army. Officers and enlisted men were merely detailed for service with Major Myer for signaling duty. It was not until two years after the war started that the Signal Corps was officially established and organized as a separate branch of the Army, by appropriate Congressional action. In the meantime, another signaling organization was coming into being - an organization which was an outgrowth of the

![Figure 1](image-url)
government's taking over control of the commercial telegraph companies in the United States on 25 February 1862. There were then only three in number: the American, Western Union, and Southwestern. The telegraph lines generally followed the railroads. The then Secretary of War, Simon Cameron, sought the aid of Thomas A. Scott, of the Pennsylvania Railroad, who brought some of his men to Washington for railroad and telegraphic duties with the Federal Government. From a nucleus of four young telegraph operators grew a rather large military telegraph organization which was not given formal status until on 28 October 1861 President Lincoln gave Secretary Cameron authority to set up the U.S. Military Telegraph Department under a man named Anson Stager, who, as general superintendent of the Western Union was called to Washington, commissioned a captain (later a colonel) in the Quartermaster Corps, and made superintendent of the Military Telegraph Department. Only about a dozen of the members of the Department became commissioned officers, and they were made officers so that they could receive and disburse funds and property. All the rest were civilians. The U.S. Military Telegraph "Corps", as it soon came to be designated, without warrant, was technically under Quartermaster Meigs, but for all practical purposes it was under the immediate and direct control of the Secretary of War, a situation admittedly acceptable to Meigs. There were now two organizations for signaling in the Army, and it was hardly to be expected that no difficulties would ensue from the duality. In fact, the difficulties began very soon, as can be noted in the following extract from a lecture before the Washington Civil War Round Table, early in 1954, by Dr. George R. Thompson, Chief of the Historical Division of the Office of the Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army:

The first need for military signals arose at the important Federal fortress in the lower Chesapeake Bay at Fort Monroe. Early in June, Myer arrived there, obtained a detail of officers and men and began schooling them. Soon his pupils were waving messages from a small boat, directing the fire of Union batteries located on an islet in Hampton Roads against Confederate fortifications near Norfolk. Very soon, too, Myer began encountering trouble with commercial wire telegraphers in the area. General Ben Butler, commanding the Federal Department in southeast Virginia, ordered that wire telegraph facilities and their civilian workers be placed under the signal officer. The civilians, proud and jealous of their skills in electrical magic, objected in no uncertain terms and shortly an order arrived from the Secretary of War himself who countermanded Butler's instructions. The Army's signal officer was to keep hands off the civilian telegraph even when it served the Army.

Note that at the time of this episode the Signal Officer had no facilities for electric telegraph signaling — he was given control of such facilities in southeast Virginia by the commanding general of the Department, General Butler, and he kept them for only a few hours.
I have purposely selected this extract from Dr. Thompson's presentation because in it we can clearly hear the first rumblings that lengthy and acrimonious feud between two signaling organizations whose uncoordinated operations and rivalry greatly reduced the efficiency of all signaling operations of the Federal Army. As already indicated, one of these organizations was the U.S. Military Telegraph "Corps", hereafter abbreviated as USMTC, a civilian organization which operated the existing commercial telegraph systems for the War Department, under the direct supervision of the Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton. The other organization was, of course, the infant Signal Corps of the United States Army, which was not yet even established as a separate branch, whereas the USMTC had been established in October 1861, as noted above.

Indeed, the Signal Corps had to wait until March 1863, two years after the outbreak of war, before being established officially. You-with-realized that the Confederate Signal Corps had been established a full year earlier, in April 1862. Until then, as I've said before, for signaling duty on both sides, there were only officers who were individually and specifically detailed for such duty from other branches of the respective Armies of the North and the South. Trouble between the USMTC and the Signal Corps of the Union Army began when the Signal Corps became interested in signaling by electric telegraphy and began to acquire facilities thereafter.

As early as in June 1861, Chief Signal Officer Myer had initiated action toward acquiring or obtaining electrical telegraph facilities for use in the field but with one exception nothing happened. The exception was in the case of the military department in southeast Virginia, commanded by General Benjamin Butler, who was mentioned a few moments ago in the extract based on an episode that clearly foreshadowed the future road for the Signal Corps in regard to electrical signaling: The road was to be closed and barred. In August 1862, Col. Myer tried again and in November of the same year he recommended in his annual report that $30,000 be appropriated to establish an electrical signaling branch in the Signal Corps. The proposal failed to meet the approval of the Secretary of War. The telegraph train, which had been ordered by Myer many months before, was delivered in January 1862 and put in an experimental fashion, under considerable difficulties, the most disheartening of which was the active opposition of persons in Washington, particularly the Secretary of War. So, for practically the whole of the first two years of the war, signal officers on the Northern side had neither electrical telegraph facilities nor Morse operators - they had to rely entirely on the wig-wag system.
However, by the middle of 1863 there were thirty "flying-telegraph" trains in use in the Federal Army. Here's a picture of such a train. The normal length of field telegraph lines was five to eight miles, though in some cases the instruments had worked at distances as great as twenty miles. But even before the Signal Corps began to acquire these facilities, there had been agitation to have them, as well as their Signal Corps operating personnel, all turned over to the USMTC, which had grown into a tightly-knit organization of over 1,000 men in Washington, and had become very influential, especially by virtue of its support from Secretary of War Stanton. As a consequence, the Telegraph Corps had its way. In the fall of 1863, it took over all the electric telegraph facilities and telegraph operators of the Signal Corps. Colonel Myer sadly wrote: "With the loss of its electric lines the Signal Corps was crippled".

So now there were two competing signal organizations on the Northern side: The U.S. Army's Signal Corps, which was composed entirely of military personnel with no electric telegraph facilities (but was equipped with means for visual signaling), and the USMTC, which was not a part of the Army, being staffed almost entirely with civilians, and which had electric telegraph facilities and skilled Morse operators (but no means or responsibilities for visual signaling or "serial telegraphy" which, of course, was old stuff) "Electric telegraphy" was now the thing. The USMTC had no desire to share electric telegraphy with the Signal Corps, a determination in which the Corps must ably assisted by Secretary of War Stanton, for reasons that fall outside the scope of the present lecture.

However, from a technical point of view it is worth going into this rivalry just a bit, if only to note that the personnel of both organizations, the military and the civilian, were not merely signalmen and telegraph operators: they served also as cryptographers and were therefore entrusted with the necessary cipher books and keys. Because of this, they naturally became privy to the important secrets conveyed in cryptographic communications and they therefore enjoyed status as VIP's. This was particularly true of members of the USMTC, because they and only they, were authorized to be custodians and users of the cipher. Not even the commanders of the units they served had access to the ciphers. For instance, on the one and only occasion when General Grant forced his cipher operator, a civilian named Beckwith, to turn over the current cipher to a colonel on Grant's staff, Beckwith was immediately discharged by the Secretary of War and Grant was reprimanded. A few days later, Grant apologized and Beckwith was restored to his position. But Grant never again demanded the cipher held by his telegraph operator.
The Grant-Beckwith affair alone is sufficient to indicate the lengths to which Secretary of War Stanton went to retain control over the USMTC, including its cipher operators, and its cipher\footnote{See text.}. In fact, so strong a position did he take that on 10 November 1863, following a disagreement over who should operate and control all the military telegraph lines, Myer, by then full Colonel, and bearing the_ranking title "Chief Signal Officer of the United States Army", a title he had enjoyed for only two months, was peremptorily relieved from that position and put on the shelf. Not long afterward, and for a similar reason, Myer's successor, Lieut. Col. Nicodemus, was likewise summarily relieved as Chief Signal Officer by Secretary Stanton; indeed, he was not only removed from that position— he was dismissed from the Service without even the formality of trial by court martial. Stanton gave "phony" reasons for dismissing Col Nicodemus, but I am glad to say that the latter was restored his commission in March 1865 by direction of the President; also by direction of the President, Colonel Myer was restored to his position as Chief Signal Officer of the U.S. Army on 25 January 1867.

As far as we have been able to ascertain, he resumed his \footnote{See text.} commission in July 1864; Colonel Nicodemus lasted about six months after he supervised Myer, and Colonel Benjamin F. Fisher became Chief Signal Officer on 26 December 1864, but his appointment was never confirmed by the Senate. (Photo-\footnote{See text.}ysters 334, 335). In August 1865 Colonel Myer requested that he be restored to the position of Chief Signal Officer of the Army. Accompanying his application were letters of recommendation from several high-ranking officers of the Army and the Navy, and Myer's application was forwarded to Lieutenant General Grant, who returned the application to the President, saying, "Unless there are reasons of which I know nothing, I deem A. J. Myer entitled to the position of Chief Signal Officer of the Army— and recommend it accordingly." In a letter dated 30 July 1866 to Secretary of War Stanton, General Grant recommended: "the appointment of Albert J. Myer to the place of Chief of the Signal Corps as provided for by Act of Congress. Colonel Myer is the inventor of the system used both in the Army and Navy, which would seem to give him a claim to the position of Chief, which he once held and which the Senate has refused to confirm any other person in." Apparently this last letter produced results, for Colonel Myer was appointed Chief Signal Officer on 25 February 1867, to date from 22 February 1867.

Let's examine this in the light of the story. When Col. Myer was relieved from duty as Chief Signal Officer in November 1863, he was ordered to
Cairo, Illinois, to await orders for a new assignment. Very soon thereafter he was
either designated (or he may have himself decided) to prepare a field manual on
signaling and there soon appeared, with a prefatory note dated January 1864, a
pamphlet of 148 pages, a copy of which is now in the Rare Book Room of the
Library of Congress. The title page reads as follows:

"A Manual of Signals: for the use of signal officers in the field.
By Col. Albert J. Myer, Signal Officer of the Army, Washington,
D.C., 1864."

Even in this first edition, printed on an Army press, Myer devoted nine pages
to a reprint of an article from Harper's Weekly entitled "Curiosities of Cipher",
and in the second edition, 1866, he expanded the section on cryptography to
sixty pages. More editions followed and I think we may well say that Myer's
Manual in its several editions was the pioneer American text on military signaling.
But I'm sorry to say that as regards cryptology it was rather a poor thing. Poe
had done better twenty years before that in his essay entitled "A few words
on secret writing".

Because of its historic nature, you may like to see what Myer's original
"wig-wag code" was like. It was called "a two-element code" because it employed only two digits, 1 and 2, in permutations of 1, 2, 3
and 4 groups. For example, A was represented by the permutation 22; B, by 2122;
C, by 121, etc. In flag signaling, a "1" was indicated by a motion to the left,
a "2" by a motion to the right. Later these motions were reversed, for reasons
which must have been good but are now not obvious. Here is Myer's two-element
code which continued to be used until 1912:

**GENERAL SERVICE CODE**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>B</th>
<th>C</th>
<th>D</th>
<th>E</th>
<th>F</th>
<th>G</th>
<th>H</th>
<th>I</th>
<th>J</th>
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<td>22</td>
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<th>M</th>
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<th>O</th>
<th>P</th>
<th>Q</th>
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<th>S</th>
<th>T</th>
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<th>V</th>
<th>W</th>
<th>X</th>
<th>Y</th>
<th>Z</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: No. 3 (end of word) was made by a forward downward motion, called "front".
There were about a dozen more signals, for numbers, for frequently used
short sentences, etc.

We must turn our attention now to the situation as regards the organization
for signaling in the Confederate States Army. As indicated a few minutes ago, the
first great engagement in the war that of the First Bull Run battle, the
Confederate Signal Corps was formally established nearly two years earlier than...
that young lieutenant, E. P. Alexander, who had assisted Myer in demonstrating the wig-wag system before a board appointed by the War Department to study Myer's system. Alexander, a Captain in grey, used Myer's system during the battle, which ended in disaster for the Union forces; and it proved effective. Alexander's contribution in signaling was an important factor in the Confederate victory. Dr. Thompson, whom I have quoted before, says of this battle:

Thus the fortunes of war in this battle saw Myer's system of signals succeed, ironically, on the side hostile to Myer. Because of general unpreparedness and also some disinterest and ignorance, the North had neither wig-wag signals nor balloon observation.

During the first battle of Bull Run the only communication system which succeeded in transmitting the Union Army was the infant USMTC. But the Confederate system under Alexander, off to a good start at Bull Run, throughout the war and operated with both visual electric telegraphy, and the Confederates thought highly enough of their signal service to establish it on an official basis, less than a year after that battle. The Signal Corps of the Confederate Army was established, by an Act of the Confederate States Congress on 19 April 1862, as a separate corps, to be attached either to the Adjutant and Inspector General's Department or to the Engineer Department. The Confederate States Secretary of War on 29 May 1862 attached the Signal Corps to the former organization. Thus, although the Confederate Signal Corps never became a distinct and independent branch of the Army as did the Union Signal Corps, it received much earlier recognition from the Confederate Government than did the Signal Corps of the Federal Government. Again quoting Dr. Thompson:

The Confederate Signal Corps was thus established nearly a year earlier than its Federal counterpart. It was nearly as large, numbering some 1,500, most of the number, however, serving on detail. The Confederate Signal Corps used Myer's system of flags and torches. The men were trained in wire telegraphy, too, and impressed wire facilities as needed. But there was nothing in Richmond or in the field comparable to the extensive and tightly controlled civilian military telegraph organization which Secretary Stanton ruled with an iron hand from Washington.

We come now to a consideration of the codes and ciphers used by both sides in the war, and in doing so we must take into consideration the fact that on the Union side, there were, as I have indicated, two separate organizations for signal communications: the Signal Corps and the USMTC. After warfare between them had been settled by ruthless action by Secretary of War Stanton, the Signal Corps had responsibility only for signaling by visual or serial telegraphy, the USMTC had responsibility for signaling by electric telegraphy. We should therefore not be
too astonished to find that the cryptosystems used by the two competing organisations were different. On the other hand, on the Confederate side, as just noted, there was only one organisation for signal communications, the Signal Corps of the Confederate States Army, which used both visual and electric telegraphy, the latter facilities being taken over and employed when available. There were reasons for this marked difference between the way in which the Union and the Confederate organised and administered their signal operations. One reason, which strange to say, had to do with the difference between the crypto-communication arrangements in the Union and in the Confederate Armies.

We will discuss the cryptosystems used by the Federal Signal Corps first and then that of the Confederate Signal Corps. Since both corps used visual signals as their primary means, we find them employing Myer's visual-signaling code as shown above. At first both sides sent unenciphered messages; but soon after learning that their signals were being intercepted and read by the other side, each side decided to do something to protect its messages. Initially both decided on the same artifice, viz, changing the visual-signaling equivalents for the letters of the alphabet, so that, for instance, "22" was not always "A", etc. This sort of changing-about of values soon became impractical, since it prevented memorising the wig-wag meanings for letters once and for all. The difficulty in the Union Army's Signal Corps was solved by the introduction into usage of a cipher disk invented by Myer himself. A full description of the disk in its various embodiments will be found in Myer's Manual, but here's a picture of three forms of it. You can see how readily the visual wig-wag equivalents for letters of the alphabet can be changed according to some pre-arranged indicator for setting the concentric sections of Fig. 3. The two left-sided disks of Myer's Plate XXVI show that two disks into juxtaposition in Fig. 4, the letter A is represented by 122, B by 22, etc. By moving the two circles to a different juxtaposition a new set of equivalents will be established. Of course, if the setting is kept fixed for a whole message the encipherment is strictly monoalphabetic; but Myer recommends changing the setting in the middle of the message or, more specifically, at the end of each word, thus producing a sort of polyalphabetic cipher which would delay solution a bit. An alternative way, Myer states, would be to use what he called a "countersign word", but which we call a keyword, each letter of which
would determine the setting of the disk for a single word or for two consecutive words, etc. Myer apparently did not realize that retaining or showing externally, that is, in the cipher text, the lengths of the words of the plain text is very seriously impairing the security of the cipher. Later we shall discuss the security afforded by the Myer disk in actual practice.

In the Confederate Signal Corps, the system used for encipherment of visual signals was apparently the same as that used for enciphering telegraphic messages, and we shall soon see what it was. Although Myer's cipher disk was captured a number of times, it was apparently disdained by the Confederates, who preferred to use a wholly different type of device, as will be described presently, for both visual and electric telegraphy.

So much for the cryptosystems used in connection with visual signals by the Signal Corps of both the North and the South, systems which we may designate as "tactical ciphers." We come now to the systems used by the two Military Telegraph Corps (one in the North, one in the South), which had responsibility for what we may call "strategic ciphers", because the latter were usually exchanged between field commanders, the latter, the seat of Government, in the field, or among high commanders in the field. In the case of these communications the cryptosystems employed by each side were quite different.

On the Northern side, the Military-Telegraph Corps used a system based upon what we now call transposition but in contemporary accounts they were called "route ciphers" and that name stuck. The designation isn't too bad, because the processes of encipherment and decipherment, though perhaps not with the individual letters of the message but with entire words, involved following a diagram in which the message is written in prescribed paths or routes. I know no simpler or more succinct description of the rough cipher than that given by one of the USMT operators, J. E. O'Brien, in an article in Century Magazine, XXXVIII, September 1889, entitled "Telegraphing in Battle":

The principle of the cipher consisted in writing a message with an equal number of words in each line, then copying the words up and down the columns by various routes, throwing in an extra word at the end of each column, and substituting other words for important names and verbs.

A more detailed description in modern technical terms would be as follows:

A system in which encipherment the words of the plain-text message are inscribed within a matrix of a specified number of rows and columns, inscribing the words within the matrix from left to right, in successive lines and rows downward as in ordinary writing, and taking the words out of the matrix, that is, transcribing them, according to a prearranged route, to form the cipher message. These route ciphers were supposed to have been the
The specific routes to be followed were set forth in numbered booklets designated as "War Department Cipher" folders by five numbers. In referring to them hereafter I shall use the term "cipher books," or sometimes, more simply, the term "ciphers," although the cryptosystem involves both cipher and code processes. It is true that the basic principle of the system, that of transposition, makes it partake of the nature nature of a cipher system as defined in our modern terminology; but the use of "arbitrarily," of arbitrary means to represent the names of persons, geographical points, important towns and verbs, etc., makes the system partake also of the nature of a code system as defined in our modern terminology.

There were in all about a dozen cipher books used by the USMTC throughout the war. For the most part they were employed consecutively, but sometimes two different ones were employed concurrently. They contained not only the specific routes to be used but also indicators for the routes and for the sizes of the matrices; and, of course, there were lists of code words with their meanings.
invention of Anson Stager, whom I have mentioned before in connection with the establishment of the USMTC, and who is said to have first devised such ciphers for General McClellan’s use in West Virginia, in the summer of 1861, before McClellan came to Washington to assume command of the Army of the Potomac.

and many others

Anson Stager thought that he was the original inventor of the system, but this belief was quite in error. Word-transposition methods were in use hundreds of years before his time. For instance, in 1665, in an unsuccessful attempt to invade Scotland in a conspiracy to set the Duke of Monmouth on the throne, Archibald Campbell, 9th Earl of Argyll, suffered an unfortunate "accident". He was taken prisoner and beheaded by order of James the Second. The communications of the poor Earl were not secure, and when they fell into government hands they were soon deciphered. The method Argyll used was that of word transposition, and if you are interested in reading a contemporary account of how it was solved, look on pages 56-59 of that little book I mentioned before as being one of the very first books in English dealing with the subject of cryptography, that by James Falconer, entitled Cryptography Unlocked: Or the Art of Secret Information Disclosed Without a Key, published in London in 1665. There you will find the progenitor of the route ciphers employed by the USMTC in the War of the Rebellion, 1861-1865, 23 years after Argyll's abortive rebellion.

The cipher systems employed by the USMTC for messages of the Federal Army in the years 1861-65 are fully described in a book entitled The Military Telegraph during the Civil War, by Colonel William R. Plum, published in Chicago in 1882. I think Plum's description of them is of considerable interest and I recommend his book to those of you who may wish to learn more about these systems.

If I show you one example of an actual message and explain its encipherment and decipherment I will have covered practically the entire gamut of the route ciphers used by the USMTC, so basically very simple and uniform were they. And yet, believe it or not, legend has it that the Southern Signalmen were unable to solve any of the messages transmitted by the USMTC. This long-held legend I find hard to believe. In all the descriptions I have encountered in the literature not one of them, save the one quoted above from O'Brien, tries to make these ciphers as simple as they really were; somehow, it seems to me, a subconscious realization on the part of Northern writers, usually ex-USMTC operators, of the system's simplicity prevented a presentation which would clearly show how utterly devoid it was of the degree of sophistication one would be warranted in expecting in the secret communications of a great modern army in the decade 1860-1870, three hundred years after the birth of modern cryptography in the papal states of Italy.
Let us take the plain text of a message which Plum (page 58) uses in an example of the procedure in encipherment. The cipher book involved is No. 4 and I happen to have a copy of it so can easily check Plum's work. Here's the message to be enciphered:

Washington, D.C.
July 15, 1863

For Simon Cameron

I would give much to be relieved of the impression that Meade, Couch, Smith and all, since the battle of Gettysburg, have striven only to get the enemy over the river without another fight. Please tell me if you know who was the one corps commander who was for fighting, in the council of war on Sunday night.

(Signed) A. Lincoln

Simon Cameron was Lincoln's Secretary of War until Jan. 1862, when he was replaced by Edwin M. Stanton. If this message cited by Plum is authentic, and there is no reason to doubt this, then Cameron was still in friendly contact with Lincoln, possibly as a special observer.

Plum shows the word-for-word encipherment, in a matrix of seven columns and eleven rows. He fails to tell us why a matrix of those dimensions was selected; presumably the selection was made at random, which was certainly permissible.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1/</th>
<th>2/</th>
<th>3/</th>
<th>4/</th>
<th>5/</th>
<th>6/</th>
<th>7/</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(heavy) (null)</td>
<td>Stewart</td>
<td>Brown</td>
<td>Norris</td>
<td>Knox</td>
<td>Madison</td>
<td>(null)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Incubus</td>
<td>Washington, D.C.</td>
<td>July 15th</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>for</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>sigh</td>
<td>Simon</td>
<td>man</td>
<td>Camper</td>
<td>Fles</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>wood</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>give</td>
<td>give</td>
<td>much</td>
<td>Toby</td>
<td>to be</td>
<td>trammeled</td>
<td>that</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>much</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>relieved</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>serenaded</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>of the impression</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>that</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bunyan</td>
<td>Meade</td>
<td>bear, (commas)</td>
<td>ex</td>
<td>Couch, (commas)</td>
<td>cat</td>
<td>children</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Burgoon</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Smith</td>
<td>and</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(commas)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>all</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bat, (commas)</td>
<td>since</td>
<td>the</td>
<td>the</td>
<td>knit</td>
<td>of</td>
<td>Gettys</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>battle</td>
<td>ties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>large</td>
<td>ass, (commas)</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>have</td>
<td>striven</td>
<td>only</td>
<td>to</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>only</td>
<td>get</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>burg</td>
<td>the</td>
<td>enemy</td>
<td>the</td>
<td>river</td>
<td>without</td>
<td>another</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>village</td>
<td>hilltop</td>
<td>without</td>
<td>another</td>
<td>optic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>over</td>
<td>turnip</td>
<td>another</td>
<td>fight</td>
<td>bound</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Please,</td>
<td>tell</td>
<td>me</td>
<td>if</td>
<td>you</td>
<td>no</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>know</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>was</td>
<td>the</td>
<td>Harry</td>
<td>one</td>
<td>Madrid</td>
<td>locust</td>
<td>commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>corps</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>commander</td>
<td>who</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>was</td>
<td>was</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>for</td>
<td>opposing</td>
<td>fighting</td>
<td>bitch</td>
<td>guail</td>
<td>counsel</td>
<td>of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>(comma)</td>
<td>in the council</td>
<td></td>
<td>of</td>
<td>war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>on</td>
<td>Tyler</td>
<td>Rustle</td>
<td>upright,</td>
<td>Adrian</td>
<td>bless</td>
<td>(null)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>night</td>
<td>signature</td>
<td>A. Lincoln</td>
<td>(null)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nulls | monkey | (null) | (null) | (null) | (null) | (null) | (null) |

Notes:
- Ruled paper was provided to aid in accuracy. In the diagram, the upper line of rules is the cipher, the lower line is the plain text.
Note the "null" (non-significant, or "blind" word) at the bottoms of each column, these being added to confuse a would-be decipherer. At least that was the theory, but how effective this subterfuge was can be surmised, when once it became known that this was the usual practice. Note also the two nulls (blind and dummy) at the end of the last line to complete the line of the matrix.

The cipher message is then copied down following the route prescribed by the indicator "BLONDE", as can be seen on page 7 of Cipher Book No. 4. The indicator could have also been "LINIMENT".

If you examine the diagram at the top of the page I will explain how to explain the diagram at the top of the page. I will simply show you the "Directions for Use" which appear on the reverse side of the title page of "War Department Cipher No. 4", because I'm afraid you wouldn't believe me if I merely quoted from those directions. Here is a picture of the title page and I follow it with a photograph of what's on its reverse side of the same page:

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Do you imagine that the chap who was responsible for getting this cipher book approved ever thought about what he was doing when he caused those "Directions for Use" to be printed? If it doesn't seem possible, all he would have had to ask himself was, "Why put this piece of information in the book itself? Suppose the book falls into enemy hands; Can't he read, too, and at once learn about the intended deception? Why go to all the trouble of including "phoney" routes in the book? If the book doesn't fall into enemy hands, what good are the "phoney" routes anyway? Why not just indicate the routes in a straightforward manner, as had been done before? Thus: "Up the 6th column (since "G" is the first number at the left of the diagram), down the 3rd, up the 5th, down the 7th, up the 1st, down the 4th and down the 2nd.

This matter is so incredibly facetious that it is hard to understand how sensible men - and they were sensible - could be so misgoverned in their judgment or thinking "Directions for Use" when they stand for all the world to see and to judge.

Now for the transposition step. The indicator "BLONDE" signifies a matrix of seven columns and eleven rows, with the route set forth above, viz., up the 6th column, down the 3rd, etc., so that the cipher text with a "phoney" address and signature becomes as follows:

TO A. HARPER CALDWELL,

Washington, D.C.

Cipher Operator, Army of the Potomac:

Blonde of no one optic to get and impression I Madison square Brown never Toby as the have turnip ma Harry bitch rustle silk Adrian counsel locust you another only of children serenade fisa Knox County for wood that aw ties get hound who was war him suicide on for was please village large Banyan give sigh incubus heavy Norris on trussed cat knit striven without if Madrid stall upright martyr Stewart man much bear since ass skeleton tell the oppressing Tyler monkey.

(Signed) D. HOMER BATES

It was the usual practice to use for address and signature the names of the USNCG and Operations concerned -
Note that the text begins with the indicator "BLONDE". In decipherment the steps are simply reversed. The indicator tells what size matrix to outline; the words beginning "bless of who no optic . . ." are inscribed within the matrix: up the 6th column; then, omitting the "check word" or "null" (which in this case is the word "square") down the 3rd column, etc. The final result should correspond to what is shown in Fig. 40. There then follows the step of interpreting orthographic deviations, such as interpreting "sigh", "man", "camer", and "on" as Simon Cameron; the word "wood" for "would", etc., which then reproduces the original plain text.

Save for one exception, to-be-discussed-in-a-moment-or-two, all the route ciphers used by the USMC conformed to this basic pattern. The things that changed from one cipher book to the next were the indicators for the dimensions of the matrices and for the routes; and the "arbitraries" or code equivalents for the various items comprising the "vocabulary", the number of them increasing from one edition to the next, just as might be expected. The sole exception to this basic pattern.

The sole exception to this basic pattern of the transposition routes employed by the USMC is to be seen in Cipher Book No. 9 and on only one page of the book.

I will show you that page:

![Page 12, Cipher Book No. 9](image)

What we have here is a deviation from the straightforward route transposition, up the . . . down the . . . etc. By introducing one diagonal path in the route (the 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, 10th words in a message of five columns, and the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th words in a message of six columns) the simple up and down route no longer holds true. The words on the diagonal interrupt the normal up and down paths and introduce complexities in the method. In fact, the complexities seemed to be a bit too much for the USMC cipher operators because, as far as available records show, these complicated routes were never used.
I now wish to make a number of general and a few specific comments on Plum's description of the cryptosystems used by the U.S.M.T.C. as

have learned

First, we note that although Anson Stager, later Colonel Stager,

has been credited with inventing the type of cipher under consideration in this study, he was anticipated in the invention of about 200 years.

Also, he is given the lion's share of the credit for devising those ciphers although he did have a number of collaborators. Plum names four of them, presumably because he thought them worthy of being singled out for particular attention. Plum and others tell us that copies of messages handled by the U.S.M.T.C. (sometimes were) intercepted by the enemy but that none were solved. He cites no authority for this last statement, merely saying that such intercepts were published in the newspapers of the Confederacy with requests for help in their solution. But it may be noted that none of the Confederate accounts of war activities cite instances of the solution of intercepted U.S.M.T.C. messages, although there are plenty of citations of instances of interception and solution of enciphered
visual transmissions of Federal Army's Signal Corps. Douglass Freeman's

Leo A. Lieutenaunts mentions an undetermined solution.

In referring hereinafter to the cryptographic books used by the
U.S.M.T.C., I shall use the term "cipher books," or sometimes simply
"ciphers," although the cryptosystems involves both code and cipher processes.

Its underlying transposition feature makes it partake of the nature of a cipher
system according to modern terminology; but the heavy use of "arbitraries,"
that is, of arbitrary words to represent the names of persons, places,
rivers, etc.; important nouns and verbs, etc., makes the system partake
of the nature of code.

Plum states that 12 different cipher books were employed by the
Telegraph Corps, but I measure there were only eleven. The first one
was not numbered, and this is good evidence that a long war was not
expected that there were no preparations for a long war, and that hasty
improvisation were the outcome. This first cipher book had
16 printed pages. But for some reason, now impossible to fathom, the
sequence of numbered books thereafter was as follows: Nos. 6 and 7, which
were much like the first (unnumbered) one; then came Nos. 12, 9, 10--in
that strange order; then came Nos. 1 and 2; finally came Nos. 3, 4, and 5.

(Apparently there was no No. 8, or No. 11.) It would be

VICTIOUS

for the purpose

that the irregularity in numbering the successive books was of communication-

but there are other things about the books and the system, that a

security. There must have been some reason, but what they were is now

unknown. Plum states that No. 4, the last one used in the war, was placed

into effect on 23 March 1865, and that it and all other ciphers were

discarded on 20 June 1865. However, as noted, there was a No. 5, which

Plum says was given a limited distribution. I have a copy of it, but

whether it was actually put into use I do not know. Like No. 4, it had

40 pages; about 20 copies were sent to certain members of the Military

Telegraph- Corps, scattered among 12 states; and, of course, Washington must have

had at least one copy.

We may assume with a fair amount of certainty that the first (the

unnumbered) cipher book used by the USMT/ was merely an elaboration

of the one Stager produced for the communications of the governors of Ohio,

Indiana and Illinois, and of which a copy is given by only one of the

writers who have told us about these ciphers. Namely, David H. Bateag
Bates, in his series of articles entitled "Lincoln in the Telegraph Office"

*The Century Magazine, Vol. LXXIV, Nos. 1-5, May-Sept, 1907* shows a facsimile thereof (p. 292, June 1907 issue), and I have had as good a reproduction made of it as is possible from the rather poor photographic facsimile. The foregoing cipher is the prototype upon which all subsequent cipher books were based, the first of the War Department series being the one shown by Plummer, Appendix 1 to this lecture.

When these ciphers came into use it was not the practice to misspell certain words intentionally; but as the members of the U.S.M.T.C (who, as I've told you, not only served as telegraph operators but also as cipher clerks) developed expertness, the practice of using non-standard orthography was frequently employed to make solution of messages more difficult. Thus, "meet" became "met" or even "flsh", "wood" is used in place of "would", etc. In an actual case involving a message sent to General Grant at Vicksburg the word "Arkansad" is spelled in these words: "Art--sas--sas," and one finds hundreds of examples of this sort of artifice. Then, further to increase security, more and more "arbitrariness":

*The series was then put out in book form under the same title by the D. Appleton-Century Company, New York, 1907, reprinted in 1939.
code equivalents were added to represent such things as ordinal and cardinal numbers, months of the year, days of the week, hours of the day, geographical names of places and rivers, punctuation, etc. As a last additional step, code equivalents for frequently-used words and phrases were introduced. One good example of two typical pages from one of these books will characterize them all.

You will notice that the code equivalents are printed but their meanings are written in by hand. This was usually the case, and the reason is obvious: for economy in printing costs, because the printed code equivalents of plain-text items in cipher books belonging to the same series are identical; only their meanings change from one book to another, and of course, the transposition routes, their indicators, and other variables change from one book to another. As already indicated, I am fortunate in having six of these cipher books in my private collection, so that comparisons among them are readily made. The first feature to be noted is that the code equivalents are all good English dictionary words (or proper nouns), of not less than three nor more than seven (rarely eight) letters. A careful scrutiny shows that in the early editions the code
equivalents are such as are not likely to appear as words in the plain-text messages; but in the later editions, beginning with No. 12, more than 50% of the words used as code equivalents are such as might well appear in the plain-text of messages. For example, words such as AID, ALL, ARMY, ARTILLERY, JUNCTION, CONFEDERATE, etc., baptismal names of persons, and names of cities, rivers, bays, etc., appear as code equivalents. Among names used as code equivalents are SHERMAN, LINCOLN, THOMAS, STANTON, and those of many other prominent officers and officials of the Federal and the Confederate Army and Government; and, even more intriguing, such names were employed as indicators for the number of columns and the routes used—the so-called "Commencement Words." It would seem that names and words such as those I've mentioned might occasionally have brought about instances where difficulty in deciphering messages arose from this source of confusion, but the literature doesn't mention them. A bit later we shall see why such commonly-used proper names and words were not excluded. There was, indeed, method in this madness.

But what is indeed astonishing to note is that in the later editions of
these cipher books, in great majority of cases the words used as

"arbitraries," differ from one another by at least two letters (for example, LADY and LAMB, LARK, and LAWN, ALBA and ASIA, LOCK and WICK, MILK and MINT), or by more than two (for example, MYRTLE and MYSTIC, CARBON and CANCER, ANDRE and ATLAS). One has to search for cases in which two words differ by only one letter, but they can be found if you search long enough for them, as, for example, QUINCY and QUINCE, PINE and PIKE, NOSE and ROSE. Often there are words with the same initial trigraph or tetragraph, but then the rest of the letters are such that errors in transmission or reception would easily manifest themselves, as, for example, in the cases of MONSTER and MONARCH, MAGNET and MAGNOLIA. All in all, it is important to note that the compiler or compilers of cipher books had adopted a principle known today as the "two-letter differential," a feature found only in codebooks of a much later date. In brief, the principle involves the use, in a given codebook, of code groups differing from one another by at least two letters. This principle is employed by knowledgeable code compilers to this very day, not only because it enables the recipient of a
message to detect errors in transmission or reception, but also because
the permutation tables used in constructing the code words facilitate their
errors can be corrected of the transmission.
errors in transmission without calling for a repetition. It is clear, therefore, that
the compilers of these cipher books took into consideration the fact that
errors are to be expected in Morse telegraphy, and by incorporating, but
only to a limited extent, the principle of the two-letter differential,
they tried to guard against the possibility that errors might go undetected. Had artificial 5-letter groups been used as code equivalents instead of dictionary words, possibly the cipher books would also have contained the permutation tables. But

There is, however, another feature about the words the compilers
of these books chose as code equivalents. It is a feature that manifests
and you probably already have divined it,
real perspicacity on their part. A few moments ago I said that I would
explain why, in the later and improved editions of these books, words which
might well be words in plain-text messages were not excluded from the lists
of code equivalents: it involves the fact that the basic nature of the
cryptosystem in which these code equivalents were to be used was clearly
recognized by those who compiled the books. Since the cryptosystem was
based upon word transposition, what could be more confusing to a would-be
cryptanalyst, working with messages in such a system, than to find himself
of a message he is trying to solve
unable to decide whether a word in the cipher text is actually in the
original plain-text message and has its normal meaning, or is a code word with a secret significance—or even a null, a non-significant word, a "blind" or a "check word," as those elements were called in those days? That, no doubt, is why there are, in these books, so many code equivalents which might well be "good" words in the plain-text messages. And in this connection I have already noted an additional interesting feature: at the top of each page devoted to indicators for signaling the number of columns in the specific matrix for a message, these appear in several of these books—the or which we now call "indicators." Now there are none such so-called "commencement words," the words, in sets of three, any one of which could actually be a real word or name in the plain-text message, when used as

Such indicators could be very confusing to enemy cryptanalysts, especially after the transposition operation. Here are the "commencement words" on page 5 of Cipher Book No. 9: Army, Anson, Action, Astor, Advance, Artillery, Anderson, Ambush, Agree; on page 7 of No. 10: Cairo, Curtin, Cavalry, Congress, Childs, Calhoun, Church, Cobb, etc. Moreover, in Nos. 1, 3, 4, 5, and 10 the "line indicators," that is, the words indicating the number of horizontal rows in the matrix, are also words such as could easily be
words in the plain-text messages. For example, in No. 1, page 3, the
line indicators are as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Address</th>
<th>1</th>
<th>Faith</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Adjust</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Favor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Answer</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Confine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appear</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Bed</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Appeal</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Beef</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assume</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>Bend</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Awake</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>Avail</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Encamp</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enroll</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Absent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enough</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Accept</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note two things in the foregoing list: first, there are variants—there
are two indicators for each case; and second, the indicators are not in
strict alphabetic sequence. This departure from strict alphabeticity is
even more obvious in the pages devoted to vocabulary, a fact of much
importance cryptanalytically. Note this feature, for example, in Fig. 26,
showing pages 14 and 15 of Cipher Book No. 12.e

In this respect, therefore, these books partake somewhat of the nature
of two-part codes, or, in British terminology, "hatted" codes. In the
second lecture of this series the physical difference between one-part and
two-part codes was explained, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat
briefly that explanation here, but an indication of the technical difference
between these two types of codes from the point of view of cryptanalysis—
may be useful at this point. Two-part codes are much more difficult to
solve than one-part codes, in which both the plain-text elements and
their code equivalents progress in parallel sequences. In the latter type
of determination of the meaning of one code group quickly and rather easily
leads to the determination of the meanings of other code groups above or
below the one that has been solved. For example, in the following 

example, if the code group 1729 has been determined to be "then," the

meaning of

1728---the
1729---then
1730---there

code group 1728 could well be "the," that of the code group 1730, "there".

But in a two-part code, determining the meaning of the code group 0972 to be

7621---the
0972---then
1548---there

as being the word "then," gives no clue whatever as to the meaning of
the groups 7621 or 1548. For ease in decoding messages in such a code
there must be a section in which the code groups are listed in numerical
and are accompanied by the sequence, their meanings in a random sequence. The compilers of
the U.S.M.T.C. cipher books must have had a very clear idea of what I
have just explained, but, simply, matters, they made a compromise
of a practical nature between a strictly one-part and a strictly two-part
code, because they realized that a code of the latter sort is twice as bulky as one of the former sort. The arrangement they chose wasn't as good as one of the former sort, but it wasn't too bad, so far as crypto-security was concerned. As a matter of fact, and speaking from personal experience in decoding a rather long message addressed to General Grant, I had a trying time in locating many of the code words in the book, because of the departure from strict alphabeticity.

I came across that message in a work-book in my collection, the work-book of one of the important members of the U.S.M.T.C.--none other than our friend Plum, from whose book, The Military Telegraph during the Civil War, comes much of the data I've presented in this lecture. On the last fly-leaf of Plum's work-book there appears, presumably in his own handwriting, the legend "W. R. Plum Chf Opr with Gen. G. H. Thomas". Here's one of the messages he enciphered in Cipher Book No. 1, the book in which, he says, more important telegrams were sent than in any other:

Note how many "arbitraries," or "words with secret meanings," appear in the plain-text message, that is before transposition. After transposition
the melange of plain-text and code words must have been quite mystifying.*
As to whether it was apparently thought?
And yet, was the system so very inescrutable after all? I don't think so.

Even in the case of the foregoing message there are enough unencoded words in sequence in the plain-text version so that with a bit of patience, working on the cipher version, I think the transposition could be removed without too much difficulty and the general tenor of the message could be determined. There would remain, of course, the business of finding the specific meanings of the code words. In the case of cipher book No. 1, which, according to Plum, the one that had the longest and widest use, an accumulation of messages would probably have given enough data for determining the specific meanings of the code words. But it is to be remembered that these messages were transmitted by wire telegraphy, and not by radio, so that opportunities for intercepting "tapping" telegraph or capturing couriers or headquarters with their files intact. Opportunities for these lines were not frequent, but they did occur from time to time, and in one case a Confederate signalsman hid in a swamp for several weeks and tapped a Federal telegraph line, obtaining a good many messages. What success, if any, did Confederate cryptanalysts have in their attempts to solve such cases?

*In searching for a good example my eye caught the words "Lincoln shot" at the left of the matrix and I immediately thought that the message had to do with Booth's assassination of the President. But after hurriedly translating the message and finding nothing in it having anything to do with the shooting it occurred to me to look up the indicators for a matrix of six rows and eight columns. They turned out to be LINCOLN (message of 8 columns), SHOT (6 rows). The word SMALL beneath the "Lincoln shot" is a variant for SHOT, also meaning "6 rows".
U.S.M.T.C. cryptograms, they did intercept? We shall try to answer this
to the question in due time, but now we must hasten to a consideration of the
cryptosystems employed by the Confederate States Army.

As indicated earlier, in the Confederacy there were no competing
signal organizations as there were on the Union side. There was nothing
at the center of government in Richmond or in the combat zone comparable
to the extensive and tightly-controlled civilian military telegraph
organization which Secretary Stanton ruled with an iron hand from
Washington. Almost as a concomitant it would seem, there was in the
Confederacy, save for two exceptional cases, one and only one cryptosystem
to serve the need for protecting tactical as well as strategic communications,
and that was the so-called Vigenere Cipher, which apparently was the cipher
authorized in an official manual prepared by Capt. Alexander as the partial
officially established equivalent of Myer's Manual of Signals. You won't find the name Vigenere
in any of the writings of contemporary signal officers of either the North
or the South. The signalmen of those days called it the "Court Cipher,"
for this term referring to the system in common use in diplomatic or "court" Secret
communications about this period in history. It is hardly necessary for me
to tell you desultarily about that cipher which employs the so-called Vigenere
Square with a repeating key. Here is the square which Plum presents in his
which is followed by his description of its manner of employment:
description, and for reasons that will soon become quite clear, I will
present his description exactly as he gives it:

A keyword is employed to change the alphabets cyclically, thus making the
cipher, what is called today a periodic or multiple-alphabet cipher controlled
by the individual letters of a key, which may consist of a word, a phrase, or
even of a sentence, repeated as many times as necessary.
To put into cipher the first message, which is put up by using "Manchester Bluff" as the key, and the second by the key term, "Complete Victory," find at the left-hand side of the table the first letter of the first word to be ciphered, and at the top of the table, the first letter of the term. At the junction of the columns in which these letters are so found, will be seen the arbitrary letter which is to be used in lieu of the real one at the left. Continue in this way with each successive letter of the message and key term, repeating on the latter till finished. Thus, "Sherman is victorious," put in cipher by using the first key, would read, as shown by the capitals, C-O-M-P-L-E-T-E-V-I-C-T-O-R-Y. C-O-M-P- Of course, any change in the key word, term or phrase changes the arbitreries, and if neither the real message nor the key is known, it would be somewhat venial in Davis's message above, which indicate the ciphered words very clearly; e.g., "By which you may effect" o tpggyxk a crossing "above that part" hj opg kurt. This meaning occurred to the author, of the river.

at first sight, and doubtless would be to any one familiar with military affairs in that section. Having guessed real words, it is very easy to work out the letters of the key. The following two important ciphers were transmitted as divided below; i.e., each word was sent separately, not all mixed, as in the Pemberton cipher. This division does not facilitate translation by the key at all, but materially assists without it, and was, therefore, bad practice. We give below, each message, with its translation, because these telegrams were very important. The curious reader may, at his leisure, by using the key board, study out the key terms, one of which will be found entirely new and quite apropos, in the light of what speedily followed.
CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA, MILITARY TELEGRAPH, Dated
Head-quarters, February 25, 1865. Received at Richmond,
Va., 12:25 minutes, A.M.

TO HON. J.C. BRECKENRIDGE, Sec'y of War:--I recommend
that the telegrams, ftqotwvmp utvagqtiu exvtyj and is-
vajuru ktmj are not of immediate necessity, uv kpghbpg
mpc thnrf should be imghtsp. (Signed) R.E. LEE

TRANSLATION.--I recommend that the removal of public
property, machinery, stores and archives which are not of
immediate necessity, be commenced. All powder should
be secured.

HEAD-QUARTERS C.S. ARMIES, March 29, 1865.

GEN. E. KIRBY SMITH, comdg. Trans-Miss. Dept., Gen:--
Vvg ecilmympu yvcog ui lhhnnides kfh kbf vsevtf us tjcfto
ahox bjb ajxskjmsgeisindvbeq gb ndl usiu ht kfg asuh egh
opum m's uwevkh xrymend ci yu ddatrmpd in icjpmpp as evvja
mwrw twhtc abx: ii ecig o rdxg en ucyr py ntlkypnec
xqvariyb yqg repx rksjcpj ptax rep ekz raceddtrpt
mmsb acgg nsfymax no kfg amhe tflv wv mvv kksr pyh fefm
ckfrilinyx xj jhbx rq html vvhs awvv fd acgg avnsvv
yciq ce nzyft lgx scuh.

I am most respectfully your obdt. servt.,
(Signed) R.E. LEE

TRANSLATION.--Gen: The president deems it advisable
that you should be charged with the military operations on
both banks of the Miss., and that you should endeavor as
promptly as possible to cross that river with as large a
force as may be prudently withdrawn from your present Dept.
You will accordingly extend your command to the east bank
of the Miss., and make arrangements to bring to this-side
such of your present force as you may deem best.

I am most respectfully your obedient servant.

There are certain comments to be made on the foregoing, which is:

right as far as it goes, but it just doesn't go far enough, unfortunately. See

the procedure. This scheme has two fatal defects.

In the first place, note that in the first message certain words are

left unenciphered; in the second place, in both the first and the second

message, the ciphers retain and clearly show the lengths of the words which

have been enciphered. Both of these faulty practices weaken the security of ciphers

because they leave good clues to the contexts and can easily result in confusion.

messages should leave nothing in the clear. Even the address and the signature,

messages should leave nothing in the clear. Even the address and the signature,
the date, time and place of origin etc., should if possible be hidden; and
the cipher text should be in completely regular groupings so as not to disclose
the lengths of the plain-text words, and so to promote accuracy in
transmission and reception.

So far as my studies have gone, I have not found a single example of
a Confederate Vigenere cipher which shows neither of these two fatal
weaknesses. And the second of the two suggested examples is the only case
I have found which there are no unenciphered words in the text of the message.

And the only example I have been able to find in which word lengths are not
shown (save for one word) is in the case of the following message:

Vicksburg, Dec. 26, 1862.

GEN. J.E. JOHNSON, JACKSON:
I prefer cassava, it has reference to xhvkjquffrzbpxekrmqawvky
to prevent anmuyznwtpjw at that point, raeelphaseultafaltlalalt
lihnmgxtmflfgcajd.  
(Signed) J.C. FEBERTON,

Even in this case there are unenciphered words which afford a clue which enables

In the various accounts of these ciphers I have encountered, one and only

A certain Dr. Charles E. Taylor, a Confederate veteran (in an article entitled

"The Signal and Secret Service of the Confederate States," published in the
Confederate Veteran, Vol. XL, Aug-Sept 1932), after giving an example of
encipherment according to the "court cipher" says:
According to Plum, the foregoing cipher message was the very first one captured by USMTC operators, and it was obtained during the siege of Vicksburg, which surrendered on 4 July 1863. But note the date of the message: 26 December 1862. What was done with the captured message during the months from the end of December 1862 to July 1863? There is what Plum reports:

What efforts General Grant caused to be made to unravel this message, we know not. It was not until October, 1864, that it and others came into the hands of the telegraph ciphers at New Orleans for translation. ...

The New Orleans operators who worked out this key [Manchester Bluffs] were aided by the Pemberton cipher and the original telegrams, which were found among General's papers, after the surrender of Vicksburg, also by the following cipher dispatch, and one other:

Plum gives the messages involved, and their solution, and the keys, the latter being the three cited above. It would seem that General Grant had been brought to General Grant's attention and he did nothing.
about it, he was not impressed in intelligence. Secondly, the solution of the message and the others apparently took some time, even though there was one message with its plain text (the Pemberton message) and two messages not only with interspersed plain-text words but also with spaces showing word lengths. But Plum does not indicate how long it took for solution. Note that he merely says that the messages came into the hands of the telegraph clerks in October 1864; he does not tell when solution was reached.
It hardly needs to be said that the division between the words of the original message as given above was not retained in the cipher. Either the letters were run together continuously or breaks, as if for words, were made at random. Until the folly of the method was revealed by experience, only a few special words in a message were put into cipher, while the rest was sent in plain language. This afforded opportunity for adroit and sometimes successful guessing. . . . I think it may be said that it was impossible for well prepared cipher to be correctly read by any one who did not know the key-word. Sometimes, in fact, we could not decipher our own messages when they came over telegraph wires. As the operators had no meaning to guide them, letters easily became changed and portions, at least, of messages rendered unmeaningly /sic/ thereby.

Frankly, I don't believe Dr. Taylor's comments are to be taken as characterizing the practices that were usually followed. No other ex-signalman who has written about the ciphers used by the Confederate Signal Corps makes such observations and I think we must simply discount what Dr. Taylor says in this regard.

It would certainly be an unwarranted exaggeration to say that the two weaknesses in the Confederate cryptosystem cost the Confederacy the victory for which it fought so mightily, but I do feel warranted at this moment in saying that further research may well show that certain battles and insecure crypto-communications campaigns were lost because of faulty cryptography leading to communications insecurity.

A few moments ago I said that, save for an exception or two, there was in the Confederacy one and only one cryptosystem to serve the need for secure tactical as well as strategic communications. One of these exceptions concerned the cipher used by General Beauregard after the battle of Shiloh (8 April 1862). This cipher was purely monoalphabetic in nature, i.e., one example - a reciprocal-cipher alphabet was used:

```
  A B C D E F G H I J K L M
  N O P Q R S T U V
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---
This simple cipher was discarded as soon as the official cipher was prescribed in Alexander's manual. It was just as well that Scourreg's cipher was discarded because the deciphered message came to the attention of Confederate authorities in Richmond via a northern newspaper! It is curious to note that the Federal War Department had begun using cryptosystems for the messages very promptly after the outbreak of war, whereas not until 1862 did the Confederate States War Department prepare an official cryptosystem, and then it adopted the "court cipher".

The other exception involved a system used at least once before the official system was adopted and it should be mentioned. On 26 March 1862, the Confederate States President, Jefferson Davis, sent General Johnston by special messenger a dictionary, with the following accompanying instruction:*

I send you a dictionary of which I have the duplicate, so that you may communicate with me by cipher, telegraphic or written, as follows: First give the page by its number; second the column by the letter L, M or R, as it may be, in the left-hand, middle, or right-hand columns; third, the number of the word in the column, counting from the top. Thus, the word junction would be designated by 146, L, 20.

This, you will see, is not a very complicated system. It was one of the types of cryptosystems used by both sides during the American Revolutionary Period almost a century before, except that in this case the dictionary had three columns to the page instead of two. I haven't tried to find what dictionary was used—but it shouldn't take long to locate it, since the code equivalent of the word "junction" was given: 146, L, 20. Moreover, there is extant one fairly long message with its decryption. How many other messages there may be in National Archives I don't know.

Coming back now to the "court cipher," you will probably find it just as hard to believe, as I find it, that according to all accounts, four and three only were used by the Confederates during those years of mid-warfare from 1862 to 1865. It is true that Southern signalmen make mention of frequent changes in key but in all-the-literature-only the following three are specifically cited:

1) COMPLETE VICTORY
2) MANCHESTER BLUFF
3) COME DISTRIBUTION

It seems that all were used concurrently. The first three were used but I have seen it only once, and that was in a book explaining the "court cipher," many times, the last...well, I just don't know because only one example has turned up. Note that in the case of the first three, the key consists of exactly 15 letters, but why this should be so is not clear...had the rule been to make the cipher messages fit 5-letter groups, the explanation would be easy: 15 is a multiple of 5 and this would be of practical value in checking the cryptographic work. But, as has been clearly stated, the design of word lengths wasn't even contemplated, let alone prescribed, so that there seems to be no advantage in choosing the keys which contain exactly 15 letters. And, by the way, doesn't the key COME DISTRIBUTION sound rather ominous to you these days?

An example-or two-of authentic Confederate messages which were intercepted and deciphered by members of the Union...
Sooner or later a Confederate signal officer was bound to come up with a device to simplify ciphering operations, and a gadget devised by a Captain William N. Barker seemed to meet the need. In Myer's Manual there is a picture of one form of the device, shown here in Fig. 13. I don't think it necessary to explain how it worked, for it is almost self-evident. Several were captured during the war, one of them being among the items in the NSA Museum. But here's a photograph of the one found in the office of Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin after the capture of Richmond.

How many of these devices were in existence or use is unknown, for their construction was an individual matter—it was not an item of regular issue to members of the corps. Here's a picture of one captured at Vicksburg, and you can see that it was a do-it-yourself job, a rough piece of work.

In practically every account of the codes and ciphers of the Civil War you will find references, some in much detail, to ciphers used by Confederate secret service agents engaged in espionage in the North as well as in Canada.
In particular much attention is given to a set of letters in cipher which were intercepted by the New York City Postmaster and which were involved in a plot to print Confederate currency and bonds. Much ado was made about the solution of these ciphers by cipher operators of the U.S. Post Office in Washington and the consequent breaking up of the plot. But I won't go into these ciphers for two reasons. First, the alphabets were all of the simple monalphabetic type, a total of six altogether being used. Since they were composed of symbols, a different series for each alphabet, it was possible to compose a cipher word by jumping from one series to another without any external indication of the shift, but good eyesight and a bit of patience were all that was required for solution in this case because of the inept manner in which the system was used: whole words, sometimes several successive words were enciphered by the same alphabet. But the second reason for my not going into the story is that my colleague Edwin C. Fishel, whom I've mentioned before, has done some research among the records in our National Archives dealing with this case and he has found something which is of great interest and which I feel bound to leave for him to tell at some future time, as it is his story, not mine.

So very fragmentary was the amount of cryptologic information known to the general public in those days that when on John Wilkes Booth's body and in his room in the National Hotel in Washington there were found copies of what was previously a cipher-square, since the Federal authorities in Washington had copies of a similar square captured or taken from prisoners at Antietam.
times during the war, an attempt was made to implicate leaders of the Confederate in the plot to assassinate Lincoln. They offered as evidence, was almost identical with an substantiation of the charge, the cipher square which had been mounted on the cipher reel found by Union Agent Secretary of War, Charles A. Dana in Confederate Secretary of State Judah P. Benjamin's office in Richmond, the Confederate authority.

In Washington, they attempted to prove that this necessarily meant that the Confederate were implicated in the plot to assassinate Lincoln and leaders had been giving Booth instructions in cipher. In regard to the cipher square found on Booth, and also in a trunk in his hotel room in Washington, assassination, but the attempt was not successful. The following is quoted from Philip Van Doren Stern's book entitled Secret Missions of the Civil War (Rand McNally and Co., New York, 1959, p. 320):

Everyone in the War Department who was familiar with cryptography knew that the Vigenere was the customary Confederate cipher and that for a Confederate agent (which Booth is known to have been) to possess a copy of a variation of it meant no more than if a telegraph operator was caught with a copy of the Morse Code. Hundreds—and perhaps thousands of people were using the Vigenere. But the Government was desperately seeking evidence against the Confederate leaders so they took advantage of the atmosphere of mystery which has always surrounded cryptography and used it to confuse the public and the press. This shabby trick gained nothing, for the leaders of the Confederate eventually had to be let go for lack of evidence.

It is only stating that what was probably the last official cipher message of the Confederacy was written in the Vigenere. This was a brief note from Jefferson Davis dated April 24, 1865, at Charlotte, North Carolina, and sent to his secretary, Buron B. Harlan, at Chester, South Carolina. It read: "The hostile government reject the proposed settlement, and order active operations resumed in forty-eight hours from now today." By a curious coincidence, the key-words needed to decipher this communication were "One-Hundred." To the foregoing I will comment that I doubt very much whether "everyone in the War Department who was familiar with cryptography knew that the Vigenere was the customary Confederate cipher." From what not one of them had even heard the name Vigenere or had even seen a copy of the table, those except in such cases as were captured in operations. I doubt whether anyone on either side even knew that the cipher used by the Confederacy had a name; or,
least of all, that a German Army reservist named Kasiski, in a book published in 1863, showed how the Vigenere cipher could be solved by a straightforward mathematical method. Moreover, I believe that ignorance of cryptography and of its history was so abysmal that the Union authorities sincerely believed that the cipher square used by the Confederates was actually invented by them and that possession of such a square was prima facie evidence of membership in or association with Confederate conspiracies.

I have devoted a good deal more attention to the methods and means for crypto-communications in the Civil War than they deserve, because professional cryptologists of 1961 can hardly be impressed either by their efficacy from the point of view of ease and rapidity in the cryptographic processing, or by the degree of the technical security they imparted to the messages they were intended to protect. Not much can be said for the security of the visual signaling systems used in the combat zone by the Federal Signal Corps for tactical purposes, because they were practically all based upon simple monoalphabetic ciphers, or variations thereof, as for instance, when whole words were enciphered by the same alphabet. There is plenty of evidence indicating that Confederate signalmen were more or less regularly reading and solving those signals. What can be said about the security of the route ciphers used by the U.S.N.T.C. for strategic or high command communications in the zone of the interior? It has already been indicated that, according to accounts by ex-such ciphers U.S.N.T.C. men, apparently they were beyond the cryptanalytic capabilities of Confederate cryptanalysts, but can we really believe that this was true?
Considering the simplicity of these route ciphers and the undoubted intellectual capacities of Confederate officers and soldiers, why should messages in these systems have resisted cryptanalytic attack? In many cases the general subject matter of a message and perhaps a number of specific items of information could be detected by quick inspection of the message. Certainly, if it were not for the so-called "arbitraries" ex-cadet-words the general sense of the message could be found by a few minutes work, since the basic system must have been known through the capture of cipher books, a fact mentioned several times in the literature. It seems almost-certain that capture of but one book (they were all generally alike) would have told Confederate signalmen exactly how the system worked and this would naturally give away the basic secret of the superseding book. So we must see that whatever degree of security these route ciphers had depended almost entirely upon the number of "arbitraries" ex-cadet-words actually used in practice. A review of such messages as are available shows wide divergencies in the use of the "arbitraries." In any event the number actually present in these books must have fallen far short of the number needed to give the real protection that a well-constructed code can give, so that it seems to me that the application of native intelligence, should, with some patience, be sufficient to solve them—or so it would be quite logical to assume. That such as assumption is well warranted is readily demonstrable.

During the course of preparing this lecture, my friend and colleague,
It was curiously enough, at this point in preparing this lecture that my friend and colleague of my NSA days, Mr. Edwin C. Fishel, a long-time member of NSA, gave me just the right material for such a demonstration. In June of 1960, Mr. Fishel had given Mr. Phillip Bridges, who is also a member of NSA and who knew nothing about the route ciphers of the U.S./F, the following authentic message sent on 1 July 1863 from General George C. Meade, at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, to General Couch at Washington:

(Message to be furnished) Fig. 17

It took Mr. Bridges only a few hours, five or six, to solve the cryptogram, and he handed the following plain-text to Mr. Fishel:

Thomas been it −−−−"Nulls"
For Parson. I shall try and get to you by tomorrow morning a reliable gentleman and some scouts who are acquainted with a country you wish to know of. Rebels this way have all concentrated in direction of Gettysburg and Chambersburg. I occupy Carlisle.
Signed Optic. Great battle very soon. tree much deal −−−−"Nulls"

The foregoing solution is correct, save for one pardonable error:

"Thomas" is not a "null" but an indicator for the dimensions of the matrix and the route. "Parson" and "Optic" are code names and I imagine that Mr. Bridges recognized them as such but, of course, he had no way of interpreting them, except perhaps by making a careful study of the events and commanders involved in the impending action, a study he wasn't called upon to undertake.

The foregoing message was enciphered by Cipher Book No. 12, in which the indicator THOMAS specifies a "Message of 10 lines and 5 columns". The route was quite simple and straightforward: "Down the 1st (column), up the 3rd; down the 2nd; up the 5th, down the 4th."
It is obvious that in this example the absence of many "arbitraries," that is, code words with specific plain-text meanings as assigned in the

ominously made solution a relatively easy matter. What Mr. Bridges would

have been able to do with the cryptogram had there been many of them is

his

It seemed to me that

problematical. Judging by the worksheets, Mr. Bridges submitted, it seems

when he was solving the message

that he did not realize that a transposition matrix was involved; and on

questioning him as to whether he knew or suspected this when he commenced

work, his answer was in the negative. He realized this only later.

A minor drama in the fortunes of Major General D. C. Buell, one of

the high commanders of the Federal Army, is quietly and tersely outlined

in two cipher telegrams. The first one, sent on 29 Sept. 1862, from Louisville,

one to the USMTC

Kentucky, was in a cipher bookwire I won't tell you, and was externally

USMTC

addressed to Colonel Anson Stager, head of the Military-Telegraph-Corps,

in Washington, but the internal addressee was Major General H. W. Halleck,

"General-in-Chief" in our present day "Chief of Staff". This message was

externally signed by William H. Drake, Buell's cipher operator, but the real name of the

sender was indicated internally. For some years, most messages for Washington

were externally addressed to Stager; on receipt they were deciphered by

chiefs of the Military-Telegraph-Corps and the plain-text forwarded to the

addresses whose name was enciphered. Here's the telegram:

COlONEL ANSON STAGER, Washington:

Austria await I is over to requiring orders rapture blissful for your instant command turned and instructions and rough looking further shall further the Camden me of ocean September poker twenty I the to I command obedience repair orders quickly pretty. Indianapolis your him accordingly my fourth received 1862 wounded nine have twenty turn have to to to alvord hasty.

WILLIAM H. DRAKE
Rather than give you the plain-text of this message, perhaps you
would like to work it out for yourselves, for with the information you've
already received the solution should not be difficult. The message contains
one error, which was made in its original preparation: one word was omitted.
The second telegram, only one day later, was also from Major General Buell,
to Major General Halleck, but it was in another cipher book—apparently the two
books involved were used concurrently. Here it is:

GEORGE C. MAYNARD, Washington:
Regulars ordered of my to public out suspending received 1862
spoiled thirty I dispatch command of continue of best otherwise worst
Arabia my command discharge duty of my last for Lincoln September
period your from sense shall duties the until Seward ability to the
I a removal evening Adam herald tribune.∗

PHILIP BRUNER

As before, I will give you the opportunity to solve this message for
yourselves. (At the beginning of the next lecture I shall present the plain-
text of both messages.)

To return to J. W. Brown, whom I've mentioned before and who gives us most
of what little sound information there is about the cryptanalytic successes of both sides,
First, let's see what the Union signalmen could do with rebel ciphers. Here are
the Federals, here are some which he presents:
some statements he makes [P. 214]:

The first deciphering of a rebel signal code of which I
find any record was that made by Capt. J. S. Ball and Capt. P. A.
Taylor, reported Nov. 25, 1862. Four days later, Maj. Nyer wrote
to Capt. Cushing, Chief Signal Officer, Army of the Potomac,
not to permit it to become public "that we translate the signal
messages of the rebel army".

April 9, 1863, Capt. Fisher, near Falmouth, reported that one
of his officers had read a rebel message which proved that the
rebels were in possession of our code. The next day he was
informed that the rebel code taken (from) a rebel signal officer
was identical with one taken previously at Yorktown.

He received from Maj. Nyer the following orders:

∗A curious coincidence—or was it a fortuitous foreshadowing of an event far in
the future?—can be seen in the sequence of the last two words of the cipher
text. The message is dated September 30, 1862; the New York Herald and the
New York Tribune combined to make the New York Herald-Tribune on March 19, 1924—
62 years later!
Next you see a photograph of an important message which you may wish to solve yourself. It was sent by President Jefferson Davis to General Johnston, on a very significant date, 11 April 1865. For ease in working on it I give also a transcription, since the photograph is very old and in poor shape. I believe that this message does not appear in any of the accounts I've read.

Fig. 15
"Send over your lines, from time to time, messages which, if it is in the power of the enemy to decipher them, will lead them to believe that we cannot get any clue to their signals."

"Send also occasionally messages untrue, in reference to imaginary military movements, as for instance,—'The Sixth Corps is ordered to reinforce Keyes at Yorktown.'"

Undoubtedly, what we have here are references to the general cipher system used by the Confederates in their electric-telegraph communications, for

Note the expression "Send over your lines". This could hardly refer to visual communications. Here we also have very early instances, in telegraphic communications, of what we call over and deception, i.e., employing certain ruses to try to hide the fact that enemy signals could be read, and to try to deceive him by sending messages for him to read, which are matched by undetected, spurious messages.

Brown's account continues [p. 215]:

In October, 1863, Capt. Merrill's party deciphered a code, and in November of the same year Capt. Thicksten and Capt. Marston deciphered another in Virginia. Lieut. Howgate and Lieut. Flood, in March, 1864, deciphered a code in the Western Army, and at the same time Lieut. Benner found one at Alexandria, Virginia.

Capt. Paul Biscoe, Jr., then Chief Signal Officer, Department of the Cumberland, in a letter dated Chattanooga, Tennessee, April 26, 1864, transmitting a copy of the rebel signal code, says:

Capt. Cole and Lieut. Howgate, acting Signal Officers, occupy a station of communication and observation on White Oak Ridge at Ringgold, Ga. . . . On the 22nd inst. the rebels changed their code to the one enclosed, and on the same day the above-mentioned officers by untiring zeal and energy succeeded in translating the new code, and these officers have been ever since reading every message sent over the rebel lines. Many of these messages have furnished valuable information to the general commanding department.

With regard to Confederate reading of Union visual signals, Brown makes Brown's account continues with the following observations of considerable interest [p. 274]:

The absolute necessity of using a cipher when signalling in the presence of the enemy was demonstrated during these autumn months by the ease with which the rebels read our messages. This led to the issuing of an order that all important messages should be sent in cipher. Among the multitude of messages intercepted by the enemy, the following were some of the more important:—

Brown thereupon cites 25 such messages but he gives no indication whatever as to the source from which he obtained these examples or how he knew they had been intercepted. They all appear to be tactical messages sent by visual signals.

The following is also from Brown (p. 279):

About the first of June (1864), Sergt. Colvin was stationed at Fort Strode, on Morris Island, with the several codes heretofore
Ref ID:A62851

The following is also from Brown [p. 279]:

About the first of June (1864), Sergt. Colvin was stationed at Fort Strong on Morris Island, until the naval forces there used by the rebels, for the purpose of reading the enemy's signals if possible. For nearly two weeks nothing could be made out of their signals, but by persevering he finally succeeded in learning their codes. Messages were read by him from Beach Inlet, Battery Bee, and Fort Johnson. Gen. J. G. Foster, who had assumed command of the Department of the South, May 25th, was so much pleased with Sergt. Colvin's work, that in a letter addressed to Gen. Halleck, he recommended "that he be rewarded by promotion to Lieutenant in the Signal Corps, or by a brevet or medal of honor." This recommendation was subsequently acted upon, but, through congressional and official wrangling over appointments in the Corps, he was not commissioned until May 13, 1865, his commission dating from Feb. 14, 1865.

(p. 281) During the month, Sergt. Colvin added additional laurels to the fame he had earned as a successful interpreter of rebel signals. The enemy had adopted a new cipher for the transmission of important messages; and the labor of deciphering it devolved upon the sergeant. Continued watchfulness at last secured the desired result, and he was again able to translate the important dispatches of the enemy for the benefit of our commandants. The information thus gained was frequently of special value in our operations, and the peculiar ability exhibited by the sergeant led Gen. Foster once more to recommend his promotion.

(p. 286) About the same time an expedition under Gen. Potter was organized to act in conjunction with the navy in the vicinity of Bull's Bay. Lt. Fisher was sent with this command, and by maintaining communications between the land and naval forces facilitated greatly the conjoined action of the command. Meanwhile every means was employed to intercept rebel messages. Sergt. Colvin, assigned to this particular duty, read all the messages within sight, and when the evacuation of Charleston was determined upon by the enemy, the first notification of the fact came in this way before the retreat had actually commenced. As a reward for conspicuous services rendered in this capacity, Capt. Merrill recommended that the sergeant be allowed a medal, his zeal, energy and labors fully warranting the honor.

After the occupation of Charleston, communications was established by signals with Fort Strong, on Morris Island, Fort Johnson and James Island, Mount Pleasant, and Stemyeyer's Mills. A line was also opened with the position occupied by the troops on the south side of the Ashley river.

In many of the cases cited by Brown it is difficult to tell whether

wig-wag or electric telegraph messages were involved. But in one case,

[evacuation of Charleston] it is perfectly clear that visual messages were

involved, when Brown says that Sgt. Colvin "read all the messages within sight."

Once before in this lecture it was mentioned that the visual signalmen

of each side were reading the visual signals of the other side. This led to

the use, by both sides, of ciphers to protect the signals transmitted by the

visual method. But in addition, discovery that Confederate operators were
Further with regard to rebel cryptanalytic success with Union messages, Brown has this to say [p. 213]:

The reports of late, Frank Markoe, Signal Officer at Charleston, show that during the siege thousands of messages were sent from one post to another, and from outposts to headquarters, most if which could have been sent in no other way, and many were of great importance to the Confederate authorities.

Markoe says that he read nearly every message we sent. He was forewarned of our attack on the 18th of July, 1863. He adds regretfully, however, that through carelessness of the staff officers at headquarters it leaked out that he was reading our messages. Our officers then began to use the cipher desk. In August he intercepted the following message: “Send me a copy of rebel code immediately, if you have one in your possession.” He therefore changed his code. A little later our officers used a cipher which Markoe says he was utterly unable to unravel.

It is unfortunate that neither Frank Markoe, the Confederate cryptanalyst, nor Brown, the Union signalman, tells us what part of cipher thus was that could not be unravelled. I assume that it was the Myer method, with a key phrase of some length and with
successive letters, not whole words, being enciphered by successive letters of the key. But this is only an assumption and may be wholly erroneous.

In the foregoing citations of cryptanalytic successes it is significant that visual messages were intercepted and read by both sides. That Confederate telegraphic messages protected by the Vigenère cipher were read by Union personnel whenever such messages were intercepted; that USMTC telegraphic messages protected by the Route cipher were apparently intercepted occasionally but never solved.

Later I shall make some comments on this last statement, but at the moment let us note that technically the Vigenère cipher is theoretically much stronger than the Route cipher, so that we have here an interesting situation: the users of a technically inferior cryptosystem were able to read enemy messages protected by technically superior one, but the users of a technically superior cryptosystem were not able to read enemy messages protected by a technically inferior one—a curious situation indeed.