This draft is very satisfactory and should bring forth adequate comments. Please prepare for my signature. I don't see why a copy should go to Travis.
Mrs. H. Please prepare your sights.
See MBEF 7/20 Nov 42, 1562225 get file copy of letter to D and send 10.
Col C addresses 8.
Stamps to Denver.

1
Date 6 Jan 44

TO

Commanding Officer
Asst. Commandant
Dir. of Com. Research
Executive Officer
Asst. Executive Officer
Adjutant
Asst. Adjutant
Chief, Headquarters Branch
Coordination Section
Inf. and Liaison Section
Chief, A Branch
Chief, B Branch
Chief, C Branch
Chief, D Branch
Chief, E Branch
Chief, F Branch
Dir. of Training
2d Sig. Serv. Bn.
Property Officer
Personnel Officer
Provost Marshal
Post Engineer
Classified Mail Room
Secretary to C. O.
General Files
201 Files

Comments and Return

Recommendations

Information

Information and Return

Inf. and Forwarding

Your Information and File

Signature, if approved

See Note on Back

As Requested

As Discussed

Your Action

1. Hazardous draft is proposed
   Note: The word it to
   Denmark rather than to
   France because former has
   diplomatic. Though did
   suggest sending a copy
   to France.

2. OC B for disposal
   this draft to concern.
8 January 1944

Dear Cmdr. Denniston:

Friedman has suggested a type of study which might be highly useful even though it would have to be recognized that it would obviously involve a good deal of guesswork. Maybe you have already made such a study and if so, we would be very appreciative of receiving a copy. If you haven't we would be very glad to collaborate with you. The study he proposes is as follows:

The importance of having definite information as to what the Germans and Japanese are reading of the diplomatic systems used by presently neutral governments such as Turkey, Portugal and Spain, is obvious because of the effect it would have on our own diplomatic negotiations with those neutrals. Assuming that the Germans and Japanese are satisfied that we are not reading their high-grade systems, which seems a very reasonable hypothesis, and using this assumption as a guide or a measure of the technical prowess of their cryptanalytic staffs, which of the cryptographic systems used by the foreign offices of the currently neutral governments could they be expected to read? Which are they certainly reading? Which are they probably reading? And so on. Such a study would, of course, have to be correlated with data as to the extent and sources of raw material available to them; for example, it would be clear that traffic sent by land lines or cable and not within their physical reach would not constitute source material for them.

Of course, we do have a small amount of information on this subject, gleaned from reading certain German and Japanese messages. If the data were all assembled and evaluated they might make a good basis for elaborating on the subject which Friedman suggests. I would be very glad to have your comments on the foregoing.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

NPC