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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ATTN: General Graves B. Erskine, USMC (Ret.)

Subject: NSA Personnel Problems

Reference: OSO/OSD Memo for Director, NSA, Subject as above, ~~OSO/OSD~~ A 20470,
16 Apr 54

1. I welcome the opportunity afforded by your memorandum of 16 April to review our progress and to discuss some of the personnel problems confronting this Agency in carrying out its assigned missions. These problems are not exclusive to the Communications Intelligence field. They also occur to a considerable degree in Communications Security. My comments in answer to your memorandum will apply with equal force to both segments of the cryptologic activities.

2. As you point out, one of the most important of these problems is that of strengthening the career aspects of the cryptologic effort, as regards both civilian and military personnel, and within the Agency as well as outside it in the important area of field support. I am convinced that professionalism is essential to our maximum success in the cryptologic effort. Professionalism is essentially a matter of developing and retaining individuals who are professionals. The non-existence of an industrial, commercial, or academic counterpart in cryptologic technology as it has developed in government service makes it impossible to obtain professionals except by establishing attractive and satisfying careers for personnel within the government agencies contributing to cryptologic production. The necessity for this is forcefully pointed out in the ^{Brownell Committee report,} Robertson ^{as well} Report, entitled "Potentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warning," sponsored by ^{as in} the NSA Scientific Advisory Board, and provided to you with CIB 000199, 6 November 1953. Because of my conviction in this respect I have devoted much effort during the past three years in promoting a spirit of professionalism in NSA.

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Deputy Associate Director for Policy and Records

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on
12-02-2014 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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3. With this in mind, I should like to comment on the specific aspects which you mentioned in paragraph 2 of your memorandum (your subparagraph lettering applies):

a. NSA Civilian employees should be placed in ^{a more} relatively ~~as~~ favorable position as ~~CIA or State Department Foreign Service employees~~ insofar as overseas duty is concerned. The ability to make commitments for concurrent travel of dependents, free and adequate medical service, free life insurance where hazards exist, transportation by commercial carrier, movement of household goods and automobiles, payment of station allowances, reimbursement for expenses (storage, etc.) resulting from overseas movement, availability of commissary, PX, liquor mess, and club privileges, and the like, would go far toward solving our existing problems. Specific legislation

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may be necessary to assure some of these privileges; administrative action by the Department of Defense could probably obtain others. It is appreciated that employee commitments to accept overseas assignments on request may be necessary and no major difficulties are anticipated in this respect.

b. The use of civilian intercept operators has been given serious thought with a view to overcoming some of the current handicaps caused by rapid turnover in military intercept operators and the increasing technical difficulties in intercepting complex types of transmission. But civilian intercept clearly cannot be regarded as a universal panacea for our COMINT collection ailments. Even the UK, which has a well established civilian collection program, has encountered serious difficulties, although their situation is much more favorable than that of this country in at least two major respects: the enormously greater percentage of their intercept positions which can be, and are, located at home; and the relatively greater stature and advantages of civil service as a profession in the U.K. I am however taking two exploratory actions:

- (1) I am ^{discussing} preparing (with the Director of Central Intelligence) a proposal for increased CIA participation in the national collection effort, ~~for early presentation to USCIB and the Secretary of Defense.~~
As I discussed with you,
- (2) I am making plans for the experimental conversion of a service-operated intercept station to civilian operation by NSA.

c. The restrictions imposed by government security regulations which affect the recruitment of otherwise highly qualified personnel generally fall into two main categories:

- (1) Many qualified applicants, particularly in the linguistic

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field, are aliens or recently naturalized U.S. citizens, or have intimate foreign connections. This is true particularly for linguists familiar with the more critical oriental and middle-eastern languages. These standards can be waived at my discretion, ^{but} ~~and~~ each case must be judged on its individual merits, comparing the operational need with the results of all investigative material and information available.

- (b) Occasionally it is found that top-level scientists in fields in which NSA is vitally interested have records of affiliation in varying degrees with questionable, Communist-inspired or infiltrated, and even cited organizations.

The selection and investigative standards of USCIB Directive No. 5 in some respects are more restrictive than the provisions of E.O. 10450. The restrictions of neither are considered unreasonable and I do not recommend that they be relaxed or that authority be granted to make exceptions other than that now in existence. CIA has a somewhat different problem, in that certain assignments can be fulfilled only by specific individuals with definite backgrounds and qualifications which in themselves would disqualify an individual from COMINT employment.

- d. The problem of civilian career policies may be subdivided into four subcategories: (1) overseas duty (discussed in subparagraph a, above); (2) the status of the civil servant in the U.S. vis-a-vis other occupations (this is less favorable than I would desire but I consider the problem goes beyond this discussion); (3) relationships between military and civilian elements of NSA (discussed in subparagraph g, below); and (4) the betterment ^{situation of the} of the civilian employee of NSA headquarters within established civil service

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policies. In this latter field, great strides have been made in the past three years as indicated by the charts and summaries attached as inclosure 1. In addition, action will be taken to reach an agreement with the military cryptologic agencies whereby a free exchange of civilian employees is possible in an integrated career development program. Each agency would be guaranteed the return of its employee on the completion of a tour of duty with another agency. Much, of course, remains to be done, and I feel that one of the major problems which you can help in solving is the establishment of additional super-grades.

e. I do not believe that NSA should operate under rules for the release of "deadwood" personnel differing in any material respect from those set up by the Civil Service Commission for the government services as a whole. ~~Existing regulations are adequate.~~ Although the application of existing regulations by supervisory personnel may not yet be perfect, I expect a continuing improvement in the quality and performance of ~~my~~ supervisors as a result of the well-advanced management improvement and executive development programs of NSA. Better usage of available procedures for release of "deadwood" personnel is expected as a result.

f. (1) The second major recommendation of the Majority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor was that the military services proceed forthwith to provide that (p. 253):

(2) The foregoing recommendation was repeated and amplified later on (p. 257) in the same Report, as follows:

~~In the light of the foregoing recommendation, I do not consider that the military cryptologic career programs of the Armed Services are developing. On the~~

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(3) In the light of the foregoing recommendations, I do not consider that the military cryptologic career programs of the Armed Services are developing. On the

contrary, the Army program seems to be atrophying and the Navy program retreating. The fault does not lie primarily with the service cryptologic agencies, which appear to be well aware of deficiencies and the action to be taken to correct them. They form, however, a very small segment of the entire military establishment, which is dominated by "line-mindedness" to such an extent that specialization is professionally penalized. This is self-perpetuating: not only does the specialist in uniform rarely rise to general or flag rank, but those who do are rarely assigned to positions where they can exercise a corrective influence on this state of mind. One major contribution to solution of this problem would be the establishment of six general (flag) officer billets for cryptologic careerists, two for each service, of which one each would be in the Service cryptologic activity and one in NSA. It will be desirable on occasion to fill some of these billets by non-careerists, in which case the cryptologic general (flag) officers so displaced should be assigned temporarily to related fields such as intelligence and communications. Along with this, selection procedures should be so established that cryptologic career officers will not be penalized by choice of this career field in promotions through the grade of O-6. In addition to the establishment of an officer cryptologic career program, the designation of the Army Security Agency and the Navy Security Group as major service commands would be advantageous. I feel that the AFSS which is so designated has a considerable advantage over the other two service cryptologic agencies. I am concerned, also, over the attitude which I have sensed, at least as regards one service, that NSA is outside of and foreign to the military community, and that officers who have completed a loyally-performed tour of duty with the Agency must demonstrate their "de-NSAization" prior to full acceptance back into their parent military service. The direct effect within NSA of the failure of the military services to establish and promote cryptologic professionalism as a military career is that

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not only

I do not have a sufficient number of qualified and experienced officers, ~~to~~

~~fill certain key positions which is my opinion,~~ but I am

handicapped by the necessity of utilizing
~~some military~~ unqualified and inexperienced
military personnel.

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should be occupied by technically-qualified military personnel. When an ~~it is manifestly unfair to him for me to~~ officer of field grade is made available to me, ~~assign him to~~ tasks which are not commensurate with his rank and other military capabilities.

(4) Another vitally important aspect of this military career problem is that of the enlisted technician. I am firmly convinced that the major contribution to the solution of our field collection and analysis problem lies in the development and retention of professional COMINT enlisted personnel, in the same way and to the same degree that professional civilians are required to solve the technical COMINT problems of the headquarters establishment. Although data as to the rate of COMINT re-enlistments are not available, the over-all is probably below 20 percent for all three Services. It is a calamitous fact that the re-enlistment rate of Army intercept operators at present is less than one percent. In my opinion, the single major step most likely to contribute materially to the solution of this problem is the establishment of ^{specific cryptologic career ladders and of} an advancement program beginning with the E 1 grade and progressing through E 7 and W 1 to the rank of W 4 for service technicians. The technician grade structure of each service cryptologic agency should resemble an inverted pyramid of enlisted grades, on top of which stands a smaller pyramid of warrant officer grades, similarly inverted and balanced. Ideally, the number of E 7 and E 6 technicians in the COMINT field should vastly exceed the number of E 1's and E 2's. Advancement should depend entirely on individual ability, not on vacancies. From the E 7 ranks, outstanding individuals would be made warrant officers. Here again, advancement through the WO grades would depend solely on demonstrated competence, not vacancies. The ideal result would be many more E 7's than E 1's, over a period of time. If in addition to this grade structure, the living accommodations and recreational facilities accorded COMINT technicians were improved as an inverse function of the undesirability

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of the location to which they are assigned, and travel of families were facilitated to the greatest possible degree, it is felt that a much greater degree of professionalism could be obtained over a period of years. I plan to take this matter up through the Service cryptologic agencies at an early date, and my request your assistance in establishing inverted pyramid grade structures. I believe that such a program can be carried out without derogation to other arms, in which T/D or TO & E type organizations, with hazardous duty pay where appropriate, can equitably continue.

g. I do not feel that your statement of my general policy is accurate, or that it is possible to segregate agency positions into "command positions" and "essentially consultant" positions.

- (1) I believe it ^{clear} ~~clear~~ that the National Security Council intended, regardless of how the recommendations of the Brownell Committee might be interpreted, that NSA be under military control. I also feel that it would be difficult to achieve this were the Director the only military person in the Agency. In fact, I have been guided by the following recommendation of the Brownell Committee:

"Below the directorate level, senior positions should be filled by individuals, where officer or civilian, who have a career interest in the field of communications intelligence. We do not believe that these positions should be limited to civilians, because we are impressed by the testimony given by many witnesses as to the importance of familiarizing the Service organizations in the field with AFSA organization and operations by rotating officers from AFSA into field positions and then back again. Also, the long experience of several Navy officers is one of the great asset of the activity today. On the otherhand, it would be a major mistake to limit the senior positions to officers, because it is of the greatest importance to encourage civilians to make careers in the COMINT field by clear demonstration that senior positions will be available to them if their talents merit promotions."

You will note that they use the term "senior positions," rather than "command positions."

(2) It has been, and will continue to be, my policy, that civilian and military personnel share alike in the responsibility for the successful accomplishment of the mission of the National Security Agency. Employees, both civilian and military, are assigned to positions for which they are best fitted and in which they may make a maximum contribution to the mission of the Agency. I cannot and do not tolerate any discrimination because of civilian or military status, race, sex, or religious affiliation. Personnel assignments are made after consideration has been given to job requirements for continuity of experience, knowledge of the current military picture, and career requirements of the individual. Rotation programs, technical and managerial training programs, and self-development and appraisal programs are utilized in preparing all personnel to assume wider and more important responsibilities. In short, every attempt is made to make maximum use of each worker's experience and skills in a position which will not only be conducive to maximum efficiency in the execution of the NSA mission but will also provide the job satisfactions necessary to a satisfied and highly professional workforce.

③ I have further followed up vigorously a continuing program for promoting, to the highest civil service grades, outstanding technicians having skills of vital importance to NSA, but without necessarily assigning them to senior executive or policy-making decisions. Further, for high-level civilians both those in purely technical positions and those who are qualified for and assignable to policy making and executive positions, I have recently been able to secure quotas for one civilian in each class at the National War College and at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. I propose to continue my efforts to familiarize high-grade civil service employees with the problems and functioning of military operations by endeavoring to secure civilian quotas in both senior and junior courses at the various service war colleges and command and staff schools. This familiarization and orientation program could be augmented by a vigorous, healthy, and realistic Reserve program in the cryptologic branches of the military services; it is to be hoped that current efforts by the Secretary of Defense to vitalize our Reserves will enable the services to plan and carry out such a program; this would not only make it possible for the Services to retain their Reservists, which are being lost at a rapid rate by resignations, but also to attract many of our younger civilians to become reserve officers.

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(4) Currently, of the 34 most senior positions in the Agency, 18 are filled by military officers and 16 by civilians. Rotational and other changes which have been in prospect for several months will soon alter this proportion to 15 military and 19 civilian. In fact, my primary concern vis a vis military-civilian relationships is not in the direction you imply, but quite the reverse. Unless an improvement in the situation cited in subparagraph f above soon occurs, ~~the military control of NSA will become even more tenuous, and~~ an overwhelming preponderance of the Agency's senior positions will have to be filled by civilians. I cannot but feel that this ^{might} ~~will~~ reduce to ~~a dangerous degree~~ the responsiveness of the COMINT and COMSEC production to the requirements of the military, ~~and would eventually lead to loss of military control of two functions vital to the ability of the military to wage a successful war.~~

(5) I feel, therefore, that changes in military-civilian relationship in NSA are not desirable, and do not recommend a change in my policies as hereinbefore expressed. I do feel that these policies could be better implemented, and be more conducive to improved military-civilian relationships within the Agency, were the services to improve their cryptologic career policies to the extent that the Agency could be furnished with ^{military personnel} ~~senior officers~~ with sufficient technical background to carry out ^{the duties} ~~the~~ need for a technical consultant, ~~the command functions~~ to which they should be assigned. Specific steps which could, and in my opinion should, be taken to accomplish this end are:

(a) Outstanding young officers of O-5 and O-6 rank

particularly the latter, who are likely candidates for general or flag rank, should be brought in in small numbers for three year tours. They will be broadened by the assignment, will bring NSA an awareness of service operational problems and concepts, and in their later careers can assist in keeping the Services aware of the value and importance of NSA's mission.

- (b) Outstanding cryptologic officers of all grades should serve regular tours of duty with operational commands, as well as in service intelligence and COMSEC duties, and at COMINT field stations.
- (c) Competent junior officers of the several services, experienced in ordnance, tactics, communications-electronics, intelligence, counter-intelligence, etc., should be assigned to NSA for the benefit to be gained by their employment as technical advisors in reverse, i.e., technical experts in a phase of military endeavor advisory to cryptologic technicians attacking operational problems.

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- (d) In the case of officers who are assigned for their first tour of duty in NSA and whose seniority would normally dictate their assignment to ~~key technical~~ positions for which their previous training and experience have not prepared them effectively, ~~and~~ ^{prolonged Training and indoctrination Tours} officers should first qualify themselves for such positions by completing an NSA training program specifically assigned for ~~this~~ purpose. This would permit the utilization by NSA of such officers without detriment to their service careers or to the effectiveness of NSA operations.
- (e) ~~Continued provision must be made for promotion to the highest civilian grades of outstanding technicians having skills of vital importance to NSA, without necessarily assigning them to senior policy or management positions.~~

4. One further item of importance in achieving cryptologic professionalism which was not mentioned in your memorandum relates to the severe loss faced by the cryptologic agencies in coming years of regular military officers, both temporary and permanent. Many of these, especially in the Navy, have an invaluable background of up to twenty years experience in cryptologic operations. Especially in the case of those Navy Captains who must retire for non-^{Promotion} ~~selection~~ after 30 or 31 years of active commissioned service, they represent a potential which should be usable, and of great value, to this Agency for a number of years to come. I cannot employ them at all. Even under the proposed legislation which liberalizes public laws _____ and _____, which, if enacted, would permit them to

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waive retired pay and accept full civil service pay, the total compensation thus afforded would not be sufficiently greater than their retired pay alone to attract them. Any solution to this problem, which already exists, and will loom larger in the future, would be of welcome help.

5. The foregoing, although lengthy, is only a superficial treatment of those items which you raised. I shall keep you informed of developments along this line. I greatly appreciate your interest in these problems and your offer of assistance. I shall ask your assistance from time to time on specific problems which are beyond my power to solve.

RALPH J. CANINE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

ATTN: General Graves B. Brakine, USMC (Ret.)

Subject: NSA Personnel Problems

Reference: OSO/OSD Memo for Director, NSA, Subject as above, Serial A 20470,
16 Apr 54

1. I welcome the opportunity afforded by your memorandum of 16 April to review our progress and to discuss some of the personnel problems confronting this Agency in carrying out its assigned missions. These problems are not exclusive to the Communications Intelligence field. They also occur to a considerable degree in Communications Security. My comments in answer to your memorandum will apply with equal force to both segments of the cryptologic activities.

2. As you point out, one of the most important of these problems is that of strengthening the career aspects of the cryptologic effort, as regards both civilian and military personnel, and within the Agency as well as outside it in the important area of field support. I am convinced that professionalism is essential to our maximum success in the cryptologic effort. Professionalism is essentially a matter of developing and retaining individuals who are professionals. The non-existence of an industrial, commercial, or academic counterpart in cryptologic technology as it has developed in government service makes it impossible to obtain professionals except by establishing attractive and satisfying careers for personnel within the government agencies contributing to cryptologic production. The necessity for this is forcefully pointed out in the Robertson Report, entitled "Potentialities of COMINT for Strategic Warning," sponsored by the NSA Scientific Advisory Board, and provided to you with CIB 000199, 6 November 1953. Because of my conviction in this respect I have devoted much effort during the past three years in promoting a spirit of professionalism in NSA.

Declassified by NSA/CSS

Deputy Associate Director for Policy and Records

On 20130423 by RLV

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3. With this in mind, I should like to comment on the specific aspects which you mentioned in paragraph 2 of your memorandum. ~~The preceding paragraphs of this memorandum are lettered to conform to those of your second paragraph. ~~Second~~~~ In the introductory portion of that paragraph, ~~in some~~ ~~statements~~ some statements are made on which you should have my views. I agree that it is essential that cryptologic activities reflect the intent of the current Directives [NSCID No. 9 (Revised) and NSC 168], as well as the intent of the studies from which they were developed, in particular, the Brownell Committee Report. However, I do not feel that it is within the province of either the Director, NSA, The Secretary of Defense, or the USCIB to endeavor to reflect or implement those recommendations contained in the Brownell Committee Report which were not embodied in the Directives. Their omission or alteration clearly imply disapproval by the NSC. This is particularly pertinent in considering military-civilian relationships within the Agency. The question of employing "a sizeable staff of civilians in positions of responsibility" hinges primarily upon a definition of "positions of responsibility." I shall cover this more fully in subparagraph g below. Meanwhile, here are my comments on the other items listed in your paragraph 2 (your subparagraph lettering applies):

a. NSA Civilian employees should be placed in relatively as favorable a position as CIA or State Department Foreign Service employees insofar as overseas duty is concerned. The ability to make commitments for concurrent travel of dependents, free and adequate medical service, free life insurance where hazards exist, transportation by commercial carrier, movement of household goods and automobiles, payment of station allowances, reimbursement for expenses (storage, etc.) resulting from overseas movement, availability of commissary, PX, liquor mess, and club privileges, ~~etc.~~ ^{And The Like}, would go far toward solving our existing problems. Specific legislation

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may be necessary to assure some of these privileges; administrative action by the Department of Defense could probably obtain others. It is appreciated that employee commitments to accept overseas assignments on request may be necessary and no major difficulties are anticipated in this respect.

b. The use of civilian intercept operators has been given serious thought with a view to overcoming some of the current handicaps caused by rapid turnover in military intercept operators and the increasing technical difficulties in intercepting complex types of transmission. But civilian intercept clearly cannot be regarded as a universal panacea for our COMINT collection ailments. Even the UK, which has a well established civilian collection program, has encountered serious difficulties, although their situation is much more favorable than that of this country in at least two major respects: the enormously greater percentage of their intercept positions which can be, and are, located at home; and the relatively greater stature and advantages of civil service as a profession in the U.K. I am however taking two exploratory actions:

- (1) I am preparing with the Director of Central Intelligence a proposal for increased CIA participation in the national collection effort, for early presentation to USCIB and the Secretary of Defense.
- (2) I am making plans for the experimental conversion of a service-operated intercept station to civilian operation by NSA.

c. The restrictions imposed by government security regulations which affect the recruitment of otherwise highly qualified personnel generally fall into two main categories:

- (1) Many qualified applicants, particularly in the linguistic

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field, are aliens or recently naturalized U.S. citizens, or have intimate foreign connections. This is true particularly for linguists familiar with the more critical oriental and middle-eastern languages. These standards can be waived at my discretion, ^{but} ~~and~~ each case must be judged on its individual merits, comparing the operational need with the results of all investigative material and information available.

- (b) Occasionally it is found that top-level scientists in fields in which NSA is vitally interested have records of affiliation in varying degrees with questionable, Communist-inspired or infiltrated, and even cited organizations.

The selection and investigative standards of USCIB Directive No. 5 in some respects are more restrictive than the provisions of E.O. 10450. The restrictions of neither are considered unreasonable and I do not recommend that they be relaxed or that authority be granted to make exceptions other than ^{those} that now in existence. CIA has a somewhat different problem, in that certain assignments can be fulfilled only by specific individuals with definite backgrounds and qualifications which in themselves would disqualify an individual from COMINT employment.

- d. The problem of civilian career policies may be subdivided into four subcategories: (1) overseas duty (discussed in subparagraph a, above); (2) the status of the civil servant in the U.S. vis-a-vis other occupations (this is less favorable than I would desire but I consider the problem goes beyond this discussion); (3) relationships between military and civilian elements of NSA (discussed in subparagraph g, below); and (4) the betterment ^{situation of the} of the civilian employee of NSA headquarters within established civil service

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policies. In this latter field, great strides have been made in the past three years as indicated by the charts and summaries attached as inclosure 1. In addition, action will be taken to reach an agreement with the military cryptologic agencies whereby a free exchange of civilian employees is possible in an integrated career development program. Each agency would be guaranteed the return of its employee on the completion of a tour of duty with another agency. Much, of course, remains to be done, and I feel that one of the major problems which you can help in solving is the establishment of additional super-grades.

e. I do not believe that NSA should operate under rules for the release of "deadwood" personnel differing in any material respect from those set up by the Civil Service Commission for the government services as a whole. ~~Existing regulations are adequate,~~ Although the application of existing regulations by supervisory personnel may not yet be perfect, I expect a continuing improvement in the quality and performance of ~~the~~ supervisors as a result of the well-advanced management improvement and executive development programs of NSA. Better usage of available procedures for release of "deadwood" personnel is expected as a result.

f. (1) The second major recommendation of the Majority Report of the Joint Congressional Committee on the Investigation of the Attack on Pearl Harbor was that the military services proceed forthwith to provide that (p. 253):

"... officers be selected for intelligence work who possess the background, penchant, and capacity for such work; and that they be maintained in the work for an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field Efficient intelligence services are just as essential in time of peace as in war, and this branch of our armed services must always be accorded the important role which it deserves."

~~In the light of the foregoing recommendation, I do not consider that the military cryptologic career programs of the Armed Services are developing. On the~~

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(2) The foregoing recommendation was repeated and amplified later on (p. 257) in the same Report, as follows:

* * *

- "8. The coordination and proper evaluation of intelligence in times of stress must be insured by continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in competent officials (Emphasis in original.)

... Nevertheless, there is substantial basis, from a review of the Pearl Harbor investigation in its entirety, to conclude that the system of handling intelligence was seriously at fault and that the security of the Nation can be insured only through continuity of service and centralization of responsibility in those charged with handling intelligence. And the assignment of an officer having an aptitude for such work over an extended period of time should not impede his progress nor affect his promotions. (Emphasis in original.)

The professional character of intelligence work does not appear to have been properly appreciated in either the War or Navy Departments. It seems to have been regarded as just another tour of duty, as reflected by limitations imposed on the period of assignment to such work, among other things. The committee has received the distinct impression that there was a tendency, whether realized or not, to relegate intelligence to a role of secondary importance.

As an integrated picture, the Pearl Harbor investigations graphically portray the imperative necessity, in the War and Navy Departments, (1) for selection of men for intelligence work who possess the background, capacity, and penchant for such work; (2) for maintaining them in the work over an extended period of time in order that they may become steeped in the ramifications and refinements of their field and employ this reservoir of knowledge in evaluating data received; and (3) for the centralization of responsibility for handling intelligence to avoid all of the pitfalls of divided responsibility which experience has made so abundantly apparent."

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contrary, the Army program seems to be atrophying and the Navy program retrogressing. The fault does not lie primarily with the service cryptologic agencies, which appear to be well aware of deficiencies and the action to be taken to correct them. They form, however, a very small segment of the entire military establishment, which is dominated by "line-mindedness" to such an extent that specialization is professionally penalized. This is self-perpetuating: not only does the specialist in uniform rarely rise to general or flag rank, but those who do are rarely assigned to positions where they can exercise a corrective influence on this state of mind. One major contribution to solution of this problem would be the establishment of six general (flag) officer billets for cryptologic careerists, two for each service, of which one each would be in the Service cryptologic activity and one in NSA. It will be desirable on occasion to fill some of these billets by non-careerists, in which case the cryptologic general (flag) officers so displaced should be assigned temporarily to related fields such as intelligence and communications. Along with this, selection procedures should be so established that cryptologic career officers will not be penalized by choice of this career field in promotions through the grade of O-6. In addition to the establishment of an officer cryptologic career program, the designation of the Army Security Agency and the Navy Security Group as major service commands would be advantageous. I feel that the AFSS which is so designated has a considerable advantage over the other two service cryptologic agencies. I am concerned, also, over the attitude which I have sensed, at least as regards one service, that NSA is outside of and foreign to the military community, and that officers who have completed a loyally-performed tour of duty with the Agency must demonstrate their "de-NSAization" prior to full acceptance back into their parent military service. The direct effect within NSA of the failure of the military services to establish and promote cryptologic professionalism as a military career is that

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should be occupied by technically-qualified military personnel. When an officer of field grade is made available to me, ^{it is manifestly unfair to him for me to} ~~assign~~ assign him to tasks which are not commensurate with his rank and other military capabilities.

(2) Another vitally important aspect of this military career problem is that of the enlisted technician. I am firmly convinced that the major contribution to the solution of our field collection and analysis problem lies in the development and retention of professional COMINT enlisted personnel, in the same way and to the same degree that professional civilians are required to solve the technical COMINT problems of the headquarters establishment. Although data as to the rate of COMINT re-enlistments are not available, the over-all is probably below 20 percent for all three Services. It is a calamitous fact that the re-enlistment rate of Army intercept operators at present is less than one percent. In my opinion, the single major step most likely to contribute materially to the solution of this problem is the establishment of ^{specific cryptologic career ladders and of} an advancement program beginning with the E 1 grade and progressing through E 7 and W 1 to the rank of W 4 for service technicians. The technician grade structure of each service cryptologic agency should resemble an inverted pyramid of enlisted grades, on top of which stands a smaller pyramid of warrant officer grades, similarly inverted and balanced. Ideally, the number of E 7 and E 6 technicians in the COMINT field should vastly exceed the number of E 1's and E 2's. Advancement should depend entirely on individual ability, not on vacancies. From the E 7 ranks, outstanding individuals would be made warrant officers. Here again, advancement through the WO grades would depend solely on demonstrated competence, not vacancies. The ideal result would be many more E 7's than E 1's, over a period of time. If in addition to this grade structure, the living accommodations and recreational facilities accorded

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of the location to which they are assigned, and travel of families were facilitated to the greatest possible degree, it is felt that a much greater degree of professionalism could be obtained over a period of years. I plan to take this matter up through the Service cryptologic agencies at an early date, and may request your assistance in establishing inverted pyramid grade structures. I believe that such a program can be carried out without derogation to other arms, in which T/D or TO & E type organizations, with hazardous duty pay where appropriate, can equitably continue.

g. Your questions under this category are symptomatic of basic questions of policy which have plagued the cryptologic services since before World War II.

- (1) Neither in the charter of AFSA nor in NSCID-9, Revised, has explicit policy guidance been provided. I feel that some implicit guidance can be obtained by contrasting one Brownell Committee recommendation with the NSCID-9 implementation. The Committee recommended:

"(f) Within AFSA itself, the Director should serve for a longer term than the two-year rotational term provided for at present. He must be a man of the highest competence. Although qualified witnesses have recommended to the Committee that he be a civilian, we believe that, on balance, the position should be held for the first term of at least four years by a career military officer on active or reactivated duty status, and that he should enjoy at least 3-star rank while he occupies the office. He should have a civilian deputy; and in other respects (particularly in the field of research) the development of civilian careers should be encouraged to a much greater extent than at present. If, as things develop, it should later appear that a civilian could better qualify for the position of Director, we recommend that no sense of tradition or vested military interest be allowed to stand in the way of his appointment."

The Directive stated:

"c. NSA shall be administered by a Director, designated by the Secretary of Defense after consultation with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who shall serve for a minimum term of 4 years and who shall be eligible for reappointment. The Director shall be a career commissioned officer of the armed services

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on active or reactivated status, and shall enjoy at least 3-star rank during the period of his incumbency."

* * * * *

"1. The Director shall have a civilian deputy whose primary responsibility shall be to ensure the mobilization and effective employment of the best available human and scientific resources in the field of cryptologic research and development."

- (2) No where else in the Directive was the question of military versus civilian control of COMINT production answered, even by implication. The Committee, however, in Part V of its report, on pages 111-113 incl.; ~~top of p. 120~~, pp. 125-126; p. 129, and in the paragraph commencing at the bottom of p. 138, apparently agrees against "civilian control" -- even though it does not recommend military control. (See Inclosure 1.)
- (3) I feel that, since the Directive provided for a military Director of NSA, it was intended by the NSC that the COMINT (and COMSEC) activities of the government be under military control. This is analogous to the intentions of Congress that the Department of Defense be under civilian control, expressed by providing that the Secretary of Defense be not only a civilian but one who had not been for at least ten years a military man.
- (4) In this analogy, Inclosure 2 becomes of interest and importance. It consists of several paragraphs from the report by the Honorable H. Struve Hensel (published in the Harvard Business Review) on the recent reorganization of the DOD; they have been modified as clearly indicated in Inclosure 2 in order to express my concept of the situation relative to military control of the Agency. The two military cryptologic agencies which were combined in 1949 to form AFSA, were each partially, if not completely, oriented to opposite forms of the philosophy of military control. The Hq., Army Security Agency tended

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more toward the passive concept; the (Navy) Communications Supplementary Activity, Washington, was operated under the active concept of military control. An ideal merging of the two was, for reasons similar to those which Mr. Hensel points out, impossible. Reconciliation of proponents of the passive concept to ~~the~~ active military control has been a long and not wholly completed task.

- (5) The question at issue seems to be not "should the Agency be under military control," but, "should the Agency operate under passive military control or active military control." I do not feel that passive military control, wherein a military Director and his staff approve the policies formulated for them by a permanent civilian operating staff, would be a tenable situation. It might work in a static peace-time condition. It would not and could not work in wartime. The vital part which both COMINT and COMSEC play in wartime military operations, especially during the early, defensive stages of a war, are too well known by you to need amplification. For the cryptologic effort to fulfill its wartime value to the military, it must be, and remain, responsive to military requirements and situations. It cannot do this unless its executives are persons who are thoroughly familiar with the uses of our cryptologic products in the combat areas.
- (6) Further, optimum co-ordination of Agency production with field support and supplementary effort cannot be maintained unless our management personnel have periodic experience in actual field operations. And even our technical personnel find their work on foreign

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communication systems, strategy, tactics, order of battle, and operations greatly facilitated if they have either personal knowledge or military consultants with personal experience in those subjects. It is clear that only by the rotation of military personnel to, from, and between the Agency, the supporting military cryptologic agencies, and command and staff billets in military operating forces, can this requirement be met.

- (7) It has been my policy, therefore, to maintain military personnel in the majority of the key line and staff executive billets within except in the Office of Research and Development. the Agency. The conditions mentioned in subparagraph f above have made this difficult, especially in those executive positions in which a comprehensive technical background is desirable. For this reason, I have found it necessary to place civilians in some positions which I believe should be filled by senior military officers, but for which the services have not provided personnel with the requisite experience and background. In other instances, I have provided civilian technical assistants or consultants to military officers who lack only technical background but who are otherwise well qualified for executive positions.
- (8) In filling management and technical positions, I have endeavored to appoint persons with the requisite professional qualifications, regardless of military or civilian status, insuring technical continuity where that is desirable by favoring civilians for those posts, and furnishing them with military assistants to compensate for their unfamiliarity with details of service procedures and practices.

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- (9) I have further followed up vigorously an continuing program for promoting, to the highest civil service grades, outstanding technicians having skills of vital importance to NSA, but without necessarily assigning them to senior executive or policy-making decisions. Further, for high-level civilians both those in purely technical positions and those who are qualified for and assignable to policy making and executive positions, I have recently been able to secure quotas for one civilian in each class at the National War College and at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. I propose to continue my efforts to familiarize high-grade civil service employees with the problems and functioning of military operations by endeavoring to secure civilian quotas in both senior and junior courses at the various service war colleges and command and staff schools. This familiarization and orientation program could be augmented by a vigorous, healthy, and realistic Reserve program in the cryptologic branches of the military services; it is to be hoped that current efforts by the Secretary of Defense to vitalize our Reserves will enable the services to plan and carry out such a program; this would not only make it possible for the Services to retain their reservists, which are being lost at a rapid rate by resignations, but also to attract many of our younger civilians to become reserve officers.

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(10)

To summarize my philosophy in the premises, I am operating on the principle that civilian and military personnel share alike in the responsibility for the successful accomplishment of the mission of the National Security Agency. Employees, both civilian and military, are assigned to positions for which they are best fitted and in which they may make a maximum contribution to the mission of the Agency. I cannot and do not tolerate any discrimination because of civilian or military status, race, sex, or religious affiliation. Personnel assignments are made after consideration has been given to job requirements for continuity of experience, knowledge of the current military picture, and career requirements of the individual. Rotation programs, technical and managerial training programs, and self-development and appraisal programs are utilized in preparing all personnel to assume wider and more important responsibilities. In short, every attempt is made to make maximum use of each worker's experience and skills in a position which will not only be conducive to maximum efficiency in the execution of the NSA mission but will also provide the job satisfactions necessary to a satisfied and highly professional workforce.

(11) I feel, therefore, that changes in military-civilian relationship in NSA are not desirable, and do not recommend a change in my policies as hereinbefore expressed. I do feel that these policies could be better implemented, and be more conducive to improved military-civilian relationships within the agency, were the services to improve their cryptologic

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career policies to the extent that the Agency could be furnished with senior officers with sufficient technical background to carry out, without the need for a technical consultant, the command functions to which they should be assigned. Specific steps which could, and in my opinion should, be taken to accomplish this end are:

- (a) Outstanding young officers of O-5 and O-6 rank, particularly the latter, who are likely candidates for general or flag rank, should be brought in in small numbers for three year tours. They will be broadened by the assignment, will bring NSA an awareness of service operational problems and concepts, in their later careers and can assist in keeping the Services aware of the value and importance of NSA's mission, in their careers.
- (b) Outstanding cryptologic officers of all grades should serve regular tours of duty with operational commands, as well as in service intelligence and COMSEC duties, at and COMINT field stations.
- (c) Competent junior officers of the several services, experienced in ordnance, tactics, communications-electronics, intelligence, counter-intelligence, etc., should be assigned to NSA for the benefit to be gained by their employment as technical advisors in reverse, i.e., technical experts in a phase of military endeavor advisory to cryptologic technicians attacking ~~managing~~ operational problems.

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- (d) In the case of officers who are assigned for their first tour of duty in NSA and whose seniority would normally dictate their assignment to key technical positions for which their previous training and experience have not prepared them effectively, such officers should first qualify themselves for such positions by completing an NSA training program specifically assigned for this purpose. This would permit the utilization by NSA of such officers without detriment to their service career or to the effectiveness of NSA operations.
- (e) Continued provision must be made for promotion to the highest civilian grades of outstanding technicians having skills of vital importance to NSA, without necessarily assigning them to senior policy or management positions.

4. One further item of importance in achieving cryptologic professionalism which was not mentioned in your memorandum relates to the severe loss faced by the cryptologic agencies in coming years of regular military officers, both temporary and permanent. Many of these, especially in the Navy, have an invaluable background of up to twenty years experience in cryptologic operations. Especially in the case of those Navy Captains who must retire for non-^{Promotion} reasons after 30 or 31 years of active commissioned service, they represent a potential which should be usable, and of great value, to this Agency for a number of years to come. I cannot employ them at all. Even under the proposed legislation which liberalizes public laws _____ and _____, which, if enacted, would permit them to

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waive retired pay and accept full civil service pay, the total compensation thus afforded would not be sufficiently greater than their retired pay alone to attract them. Any solution to this problem, which already exists, and will loom larger in the future, would be of welcome help.

5. The foregoing, although lengthy, is only a superficial treatment of those items which you raised. I shall keep you informed of developments along this line. I greatly appreciate your interest in these problems and your offer of assistance. I shall ask your assistance from time to time on specific problems which are beyond my power to solve.

RALPH J. CANINE
Lieutenant General, U. S. Army
Director

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