


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# ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY

FISCAL YEAR 1962



U.S. ARMY SECURITY AGENCY

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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
ARLINGTON HALL STATION  
ARLINGTON, VIRGINIA 22212

US ARMY SECURITY AGENCY  
ANNUAL HISTORICAL SUMMARY

FISCAL YEAR 1962

Prepared by  
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G2  
(Reports Control Symbol CSHIS-6(R2))

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EO 3.3(h)(2)INTRODUCTION

(U) This is the seventeenth year of the US Army Security Agency. To those concerned with day-to-day operations, this report of progress and major accomplishment is submitted.

~~(S)~~ Noteworthy during this period (1 July 1961 - 30 June 1962) is augmentation of the Agency's signal intelligence effort in South Vietnam and the introduction of a USASA element in Thailand to train the Thai Army

With world attention focused on missile technology in the Soviet Union, and developments in Cuba, the Agency's units had a remarkably active year. Many important technical achievements were realized of value to the national cryptologic community.

~~(S)~~ If any one thing is to be remembered for this fiscal year, it is the technical experiment in airborne direction finding which produced such excellent results. This COMINT technique, developed by Agency personnel, was instrumental in providing highly accurate fixes on positions controlled by the Communist Viet Cong. It was just prior to this improvement in tactical DF capability that an ASA man became the first US Army casualty of the war in South Vietnam.

(U) This historical summary highlights the principal developments of import to continuous coverage of the Agency's progress in fulfilling its mission.

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## ADMINISTRATIVE HIGHLIGHTS

COMMAND

Chief, USASA - Maj Gen William M. Breckinridge, USA, 017210  
 (1 Jul 60-30 May 62)  
 Brig Gen Orman G. Charles, USA, 029954 (Acting)  
 (1 Jun 62-30 Jun 62)

Deputy Chief, USASA - Brig Gen Orman G. Charles, USA, 029954

Chief of Staff, USASA - Lt Col Keene N. Wilson, GS, 01290864 (Acting)  
 (1 Jul 61-25 Sep 61)  
 Col Robert T. Walker, GS, 031368  
 (25 Sep 61-30 Jun 62)

Chief, USASAEUR - Col Robert E. Schukraft, SigC, 018744  
 (1 Jul 61-30 Nov 61)  
 Col James H. Keller, Inf, 021871 (1 Dec 61-30 Jun 62)

Chief, USASAPAC - Col George A. Godding, Inf, 040790

Chief, USASAAL - Lt Col Ben B. McKibben, Jr., AS(Inf), 01319304  
 (1 Jul 61-11 Jul 61)  
 Lt Col Norman B. Rolle, Inf, 079715

Chief, USASACARIB - Lt Col Chester W. Tuckerman, AS(Armon), 01825992

ORGANIZATION

Headquarters, USASA remained located at Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Va during the period under review. Organization of headquarters along vertical command structure lines continued; however, among headquarters components, the following changes occurred:

1. Office of the ELSEC Officer (Communications and ELSEC Division) was discontinued effective 31 Jul 61. Functions were transferred to ACofS, G3 and designated as Signal Security Division, 1 Aug 61.

2. Machine Processing Division (Data Processing) was transferred from ACofS, Developments to ACofS, G3, 1 Feb 62.

3. USASA Support Element, NSA was redesignated USASA, Fort Meade, 1 Sep 61.

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4. USASA Liaison Group, Fort Meade was organized, 1 Jul 61; discontinued, 1 Sep 61.
5. GENS-1 was redesignated A-1, 15 Dec 61; discontinued, 1 Apr 62.
6. Office of the Assistant to the Chief, USASA Fort Meade was discontinued, 1 Jul 61. Operational Control Officer discontinued, 1 Jul 61.
7. USASA Manpower Control Board, ACoFS, GI was discontinued, 1 Feb 62.

PERSONNEL

(S) As of 1 Jul 61, actual strength of the Agency (world-wide) was 1400 Officers, 253 WO, and 18,265 EM. DA Civilians to include graded, ungraded and local nationals stood at 1365. Aggregate total: 21,283. By 30 Jun 62, assigned strength had adjusted to 1735 Officers, 248 WO, and 21,605 EM. DA Civilian strength, all categories, totaled 1403. Aggregate total: 24,991. Due to the sensitivity of duties involved, a total of 21,964 personnel investigations were initiated; 33,395 security clearances were granted. Clearances denied or revoked totaled 699.

UNITS

(C) As of 1 Jul 61, there was a total of 63 TD units. On 30 Jun 62, there were 80 TD units (exclusive of STRAF). In the Continental United States, three Agency TD units were redesignated, seven were organized, and three were discontinued. In addition, four TO&E units were activated.

(U) Seriousness of the Berlin situation, in the summer of 1961, prompted the call to active duty of the following AS-USAR units:

325th USASA Battalion  
 324th USASA Battalion  
 197th USASA Company (Op A)

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ELECTRONIC POSITIONS - WORLD-WIDE

		<u>1st Qtr, FY 62</u>	<u>4th Qtr, FY 62</u>
<del>(SIVCOO)</del>	COMINT - Installed Manned		
<del>(SIVCOO)</del>	ELINT - Installed Manned		
<del>(S)</del>	SIGSEC - Installed Manned	154 145	173 161
<del>(S)</del>	COMCM - Installed Manned	43 6	37 7

TARGET EXPLOITATION

~~(S)~~ TAREX activities continued to provide valuable information to the US SIGINT, SIGSEC and EW efforts. This information was obtained primarily through clandestine collection techniques not employed by other elements of USASA. Aware of the valuable contribution made by TAREX and its future needs, Chief of Staff, USASA authorized an increase in personnel of 23 spaces.

~~(SIVCOO)~~ In February 1962, the US intelligence community under the direction of CIA, established the Caribbean Admissions Center at Opalocka, Florida. The mission of the center was to screen and interrogate all Cuban refugees and defectors arriving in the United States. USASA TAREX participation in the center commenced in March 1962, as Operation DIM VIEW.

~~(SIVCOO)~~ A TAREX detachment was established in Saigon, South Vietnam in December 1961 to support USASA operations in Southeast Asia. Arrangements were made with the 500th Intelligence Corps Group Headquarters in Japan to assign a TAREX officer to the 500th's detachment in Saigon. Major


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accomplishment of this unit was detailed interrogation of a Viet Cong signal officer and resulting reports which were appraised as being most valuable by NSA.



(S) Erection of the Berlin Wall in August 1961 had pronounced effect upon TAREX collection of intelligence information through clandestine means; however, it produced a refinement in covert collection techniques. Prior to the wall, many exploitable operational leads and projects were neglected by collateral agencies, including TAREX, due to heavy reliance on the wealth of information obtained from defectors and refugees. After the wall, projects were coordinated between DCSI USAREUR, USASAE, and the 513th Intelligence Corps Group to obtain data from sources heretofore neglected. Despite the erection of the wall, TAREX, Europe collected 5,969 more reports during FY 1962 than FY 1961.

TRAINING

(S) A total of 4450 personnel graduated from the USASA Training Center and School. In effect, 118% of programmed active Army input and 104% of programmed active Army output were obtained. At the US Army Language School, Monterey, California, the actual input was 775 students which exceeded the programmed input by 62. A breakdown follows:

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<u>Language</u>	<u>Input (Programmed)</u>	<u>Input (Actual)</u>
Chinese-Korean	154	166
Russian	344	358
Satellite	83	99
Others	132	152
Total	<u>713</u>	<u>775</u>

(N) USASA CONUS units participated in 12 field training DA/USCONARC-directed exercises. Additionally, USASA units supported various types of exercises in overseas US Army commands. Exercises participated in were as follows:

<u>EXERCISE</u>	<u>TYPE</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>SUPPORT UNIT</u>
SWIFT STRIKE	FTX	5-25 Aug 61	North & South Carolina Areas	317th USASA Bn
SEA WALL	FTX	10-24 Sep 61	Puget Sound, Wash	317th USASA Bn
DEVIL SPREAD	FTX	6-27 Oct 61	Germany, Norway, Sardinia	507th USASA Gp 320th USASA Bn 102d USASA Det
TRAIL BREAK	FTX	3-17 Dec 61	Camp Drum, NY	317th USASA Bn
RED HILLS	FTX	24 Jan-4 Feb 62	Fort Bragg, NC	317th USASA Bn
GREAT BEAR	FTX	12-21 Feb 62	Alaska	USASAAL
BANYAN TREE III	FTX	17 Feb-4 Mar 62	Panama	USASACARIB 317th USASA Bn
BRISTLE CONE	FTX	7-13 Mar 62	Camp Irwin, Calif	317th USASA Bn
TRACK DOWN	FTX	1-15 Apr 62	Fort Hood, Tex	317th USASA Bn
QUICK KICK	CPX	19 Apr-11 May 62	Camp Lejeune, NC	317th USASA Bn
LOGEX 62	LOGEX	26 Apr-12 May 62	Fort Lee, Va	317th USASA Bn
IRON DRAGON	FTX	1-15 May 62	Fort Polk, La	317th USASA Bn
MESA DRIVE	FTX	7-21 May 62	Yakima Firing Center, Wash	317th USASA Bn
CLEAR LAKE	FTX	25 May-10 Jul 62	Eglin AB, Fla	313th ASA Bn

(U) USASA participation in exercises during the year continued to provide excellent training for USASA personnel and units. Reaction of unit commanders to USASA support was very favorable and in each case, the support rendered was well accepted and requested for future exercises.

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USASA exercise objectives for the year were successfully attained.

(U) The Chief of Staff approved the establishment of a language laboratory program within USASA to provide a means for linguistic personnel to maintain language proficiency. Laboratories were scheduled to be set up at USASA Training Center and School; Arlington Hall Station; Two Rock Ranch Station; USASA, Europe (2); and USASA, Pacific.

(U) Annual active duty training for AS-USAR was conducted at the following places: Camp Drum, NY; Fort Bragg, NC; and Fort George G. Meade, Md.

BUDGET - FY 1962

(U) At the start of the year, the Annual Funding Program (AFP) was established at \$32,105,000. On the basis of considerable increases in mission tasking and of unprogrammed requirements for mobilization of Reserve units, the establishment of Special Forces units, and support of Southeast Asia operations, the Agency requested and obtained funding increases of over \$12,000,000. The revised AFP amounted to \$44,317,982 with an obligation rate of 99.85%. There were no major FY 1962 unfinanced requirements at the end of the year.

(U) Total procurement in the amount of \$12,153,846 was effected during the fiscal year. This included contractual services and equipment, programmed and unprogrammed. Unprogrammed procurements amounted to \$5,806,184. Of this amount, \$5,016,610 was for USASA equipment; \$33,069 for contractual services; and \$756,505 was for Signal Corps support. Programmed procurement of \$6,347,662 consisted of \$3,389,593 for USASA equipment and \$2,958,069 for contractual services.

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(C) Equipment in the amount of \$612,373 was furnished contractors, principally to the Electronic Defense Laboratories for Project PROFERF; to the American Electronic Laboratories for Project SILVER LANCE; and to Northeastern Engineers for installation kits for MCT-88 positions.

(C) USASA construction was budgeted \$3,500,000 for the year. \$2,600,000 was programmed for execution during FY 1962. Funded Military Construction-Army (MCA) for USASA requirements completed during the year was \$4,800,000. At the end of the year, MCA projects under construction totaled \$11,600,000.

(C) During the 2d quarter, three USASA Reserve units were ordered to active duty, necessitating redistribution of equipment from the 317th USASA Battalion and other CONUS units. Equipment requirements for these units were also met from assets available from USASA controlled Signal accounts. Funds made available to these units included: \$3,385,000 for the 325th USASA Battalion and the 197th USASA Company, and \$3,411,000 for the 324th and 317th USASA Battalions.

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## FIELD ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS

CONTINENTAL UNITED STATES

(c) A recapitulation of USASA units in CONUS during period 1 Jul 61 - 30 Jun 62, follows:

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TOE UNITS</u> <u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
303d ASA Battalion (Corps)	Camp Wolters, Tex	Act eff 15 Jun 62.
Company A (Div Spt)(Armd)	Fort Carson, Colo	Act eff 25 Jun 62.
Company B (Div Spt)(Inf)	Fort Benning, Ga	Act 25 Jun 62.
313th ASA Battalion (Corps)	Fort Bragg, NC	Act eff 25 May 62.
Company A (Div Spt)(Abn)	Fort Bragg, NC	Act eff 25 May 62.
Company B (Div Spt)(Abn)	Fort Bragg, NC	Act eff 25 May 62.
Company C (Div Spt)(Inf)	TRRS, Petaluma, Calif	Act eff 25 May 62.
Company D (Div Spt)(Armd)	Fort Hood, Tex	Act eff 25 May 62.
326th ASA Company (Op A)	Fort Bragg, NC	Act eff 25 May 62.
330th ASA Company (Op A)	Camp Wolters, Tex	Act eff 25 Jun 62.
	<u>TD UNITS</u>	
Headquarters, USASA	AHS, Arlington, Va	
USASA Board	AHS, Arlington, Va	
US Army Garrison, AHS	Arlington, Va	
USASA, Fort Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Md	Redesig from USASA Support Element, NSA eff 1 Sep 61.
USASA Liaison Group, Fort Meade	Fort George G. Meade, Md	Disc eff 1 Sep 61.

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TD UNITS</u> <u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USA Element, NSA	Fort George G. Meade, Md	
1st USASA Field Station	Vint Hill Farms Station, Warrenton, Va	
USASA Special Projects Unit	VHFS, Warrenton, Va	
USASA Supply and Maintenance Center	VHFS, Warrenton, Va	
80th USASA Special Operations Unit	VHFS, Warrenton, Va Fort Bragg, NC	Org eff 15 Aug 61. Moved to Ft Bragg on 19 Oct 61. Disc eff 1 Feb 62.
1st Operations Det	Fort Buckner, Okinawa	( ( (Org eff 15 Aug 61. (Disc eff 1 Feb 62.
2d Operations Det	Fort Bragg, NC	( (
3d Operations Det	Bad Tolz, Germany	( (
4th Operations Det	Fort Bragg, NC	(
400th USASA Special Operations Det (Abn)	Fort Buckner, Okinawa	Org eff 1 Feb 62.
401st USASA Special Operations Det (Abn)	Fort Bragg, NC	Org eff 1 Feb 62.
402d USASA Special Operations Det (Abn)	Bad Tolz, Germany	Org eff 1 Feb 62.
403d USASA Special Operations Det (Abn)	Fort Bragg, NC	Org eff 1 Feb 62.
410th USASA Special Operations Unit	Fort George G. Meade, Md	Org eff 20 Jan 62, composed of Hq; 1st Det; & 2d Det.
2d USASA Field Station	TRRS, Petaluma, Calif	

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>TD UNITS</u> <u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
USASA Training Center and School	Fort Devens, Mass	
317th USASA Battalion (Corps)	Fort Bragg, NC	Disc eff 24 May 62; pers asgd to 313th ASA Bn (Corps).
Company A (Op A)	Fort Bragg, NC	Disc eff 24 May 62.
Operations Platoon (Special)	TRRS, Petaluma, Calif	Disc eff 24 May 62.
Company B (Div Spt)(Abn)	Fort Bragg, NC	Disc eff 24 May 62.
Company C (Div Spt)(Abn)	Fort Bragg, NC	Disc eff 24 May 62.
Company D (Div Spt)(Inf)	TRRS, Petaluma, Calif	Disc eff 24 May 62.
Company E (Div Spt)(Inf)	Fort Huachuca, Ariz	Disc eff 24 May 62.
324th USASA Battalion	Fort Devens, Mass	AS-USAR unit called to active duty. Mobilized 1 Oct 61.
325th USASA Battalion	Fort Devens, Mass	AS-USAR unit called to active duty. Mobilized 15 Oct 61.
197th USASA Company	Fort Devens, Mass	AS-USAR unit called to active duty. Mobilized 15 Oct 61.
52d USASA Special Operations Command	Fort Huachuca, Ariz	Redesig from USASA Operational Center eff 23 May 62.
Det A, 52d USASA Sp Op Comd	Fort Huachuca, Ariz	Org eff 23 Mar 62.
100th USASA Security Det	White Sands Missile Range, NMex	Disc eff 23 Mar 62. Para reasgd to Det A, 52d USASA Sp Op Comd.

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<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>	<u>REMARKS</u>
31st USASA Ln Det	Governors Island, NY	
32d USASA Ln Det	Fort George G. Meade, Md	
33d USASA Ln Det	Fort McPherson, Ga	
34th USASA Ln Det	Fort Sam Houston, Tex	
35th USASA Ln Det	Chicago, Ill	
36th USASA Ln Det	Presidio of San Francisco, Calif	
USASA Personnel Procurement & Processing Detachments:		
	Fort Dix, NJ	
	Fort Jackson, SC	
	Fort Leonard Wood, Mo	
	Fort Ord, Calif	

(C) Actual strengths for CONUS at the beginning of the fiscal year were 779 Off, 112 WO, and 6042 EM for a total of 6933. By 30 Jun 62, these figures had adjusted to 873 Off, 119 WO, and 8821 EM, a total of 9813.

(U) US Army Garrison, Arlington Hall Station, Arlington, Virginia provided support to Headquarters, USASA and other assigned or attached units located on post. Tenant units included the following:

- US Army Signal Communications Security Agency
- US Army Signal Intelligence Agency
- US Army Strategic Communications Command
- US Army Transportation Intelligence Agency
- 126th Transportation Det

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US Army Ordnance Intelligence Agency  
 95th Ordnance Det  
 US Army Chemical Corps Intelligence Agency  
 US Army Medical Information and Intelligence Agency  
 Elements of USAF ACoFS Intelligence  
 Armed Forces Technical Information Agency  
 Technical Intelligence Field Agency

#### 1st USASA Field Station

~~(S)~~ To accomplish the operational mission, the 1st USASA Field Station's primary target area, assigned to its three intercept units (Automatic Morse, Manual Morse, Radio Printer), was Latin America. Particular emphasis was placed on Cuba. Europe, Asia, and the Middle East comprised a secondary and very limited area.

~~(S)~~ The station assumed an added responsibility during the year for WATERSPOUT, a special shipborne project whose mission was to collect intelligence on Soviet space activities. Units were also tasked with special hearability tests against targets not assigned coverage.

(U) One of the more important functions of the 1st USASA Operations Company was to conduct indoctrination tours and present briefings on the operations to various high level Army and Department of Defense personnel and certain foreign dignitaries. Forty-two such tours and briefings were conducted during the report period.

#### 2d USASA Field Station

~~(S)~~ During the fiscal year, the 2d USASA Field Station continued teleconferences with NSA during periods of activity on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range (TTMTR). Nature of this activity was the testing of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM) for research and development.

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purposes and the launching of Earth Satellite Vehicles (ESV) by the Soviet Union. The station participated in [redacted] missions and also continued furnishing NSA with TIP-OFFS and [redacted] transmissions

[redacted]

Operational traffic, [redacted] was also passed by TELECOM while the Soviet Missile Range Instrumentation Ships (SMRIS) were deployed in the Pacific Ocean in support of extended range ICBM tests. Results from SMRIS activity have been excellent in most cases.

(TSCM) The station's Manual Morse Section had three operational positions throughout the year with missions assigned to Chinese SIGINT targets, Mexican Military Forces, San Salvador, Russian Illicit, and Russian Naval communications.

52d USASA Special Operations Command

(S) The 52d USASA Special Operations Command field tested and evaluated systems to determine capabilities and limitations, and recommended employment in USASA operations or for adoption by other elements of the US Army. The command's FY 1962 operating program consisted of 30 projects continued from FY 1961, and 33 new projects, FY 1962. In addition to ELSEC monitoring and analysis activity at Fort Huachuca, the command furnished transmission security monitoring, analysis, reporting and advisory services to White Sands Missile Range (WSMR) as requested. Sixteen COMSEC monitoring positions were in operation at WSMR during the year.

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317th USASA Battalion

~~(S)~~ The 317th USASA Battalion was tasked with the intercept, processing and preliminary analysis of Cuban Ground Forces, and selected Central and South American targets. In the 3d Qtr, FY 1961, a complete Cuban Ground Forces communications change occurred and, from that time, locating individual units became extremely difficult. In the latter part of FY 1961, and particularly during the first six months of FY 1962, Cuban Ground Forces were in a constant state of reorganization, resubordination and relocation. Identification of units became increasingly difficult when the Cubans reverted to landline and microwave communications.


~~(S)~~ The communications change in February and March in the Fifth Army Corps (formerly Second Military District), and Camaguey Province of Central Army, brought forth other nets and groups which remained unlocated at end of report period. Intercept effort was further curtailed by shortage of adequately trained personnel and a high turnover rate.

(U) On 24 May 62 the 317th USASA Battalion was discontinued and, effective 25 May 62, the 313th ASA Battalion, a TOE unit, was activated. The mission continued to be support of the XVIII Airborne Corps and attached units, and maintaining a state of operational readiness in support of any STRAC force.

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EUROPE



(S) Colonel Robert E. Schukraft, SigC, 018744, was Chief, USASA, Europe from 1 Jul 61 to 30 Nov 61. Colonel James H. Keller, Inf, 021871, assumed command, 1 Dec 61, and remained as Chief, USASA, Europe through the end of the fiscal year. The mission was to supervise and coordinate all COMINT, COMJAM, COMSEC, ELINT, ELSEC, SIGSEC, SIGINT collection and SIT and TAREX activities within US Army, Europe. Hq USASA, Europe provided technical assistance and supervision to theater collection facilities; provided USASA, Fort Meade and DIPNSA with position reports of actions taken by USASA, Europe units to improve the effectiveness of collection efforts; supported US Army,

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Europe organizations by monitoring and analyzing radiotelegraph, radiotelephone, teletypewriter, and conventional telephone communications to detect violations of transmission security and information that was vulnerable to interception.

(C) Hq USASA, Europe provided direct support to US Army, Europe. Subordinate elements provided support as follows:

<u>USASA Unit</u>	<u>Supported Unit</u>
507th USASA Gp (Fld Army)	Seventh US Army
319th USASA Bn (Corps)	V US Army Corps
318th USASA Bn (Corps)	VII US Army Corps
600th USASA Co (COMSEC & COMCM)	USA Southern European Task Force
102d USASA Scty Det (COMSEC)	Hq USAREUR & USASA Sp Forces (less USACOMZEUR)
103d USASA Scty Det (SIGSEC)	Hq USACOMZEUR Hq US European Command

(S) Organizational changes during the year were as follows:

1. Effective 10 Jan 62, Hq USASA, Turkey relieved from assignment to Hq USASA and assigned Hq USASA, Europe; discontinued effective 1 Mar 62.
2. 180th and 181st USASA Company's discontinued effective 11 Sep 61; Company's A and B, 320th USASA Bn organized concurrently.
3. Effective 15 Sep 61, 276th USASA Company redesignated 5th USASA Fld Sta.
4. Organized effective 15 Sep 61:
  - 15th USASA Operations Co
  - USAG, Manzarali Station (Disc eff 26 Mar 62)
  - 5th USASA Operations Co
  - USAG, Diogenes Station (Disc eff 26 Mar 62)
  - USAG, Kagnev Station (Disc eff 15 Jun 62)
5. 402d USASA Special Operations Detachment (Abn) organized effective 1 Feb 62.
6. Hq, 15th USASA Fld Sta redesignated Hq, USASA Turkey/15th USASA Fld Sta, effective 1 Mar 62.
7. USAG, Menwith Hill Station discontinued effective 15 May 62.

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(S) Assigned strength figures for USASA, Europe, FY 1962, follows:

	<u>Officers</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>DA Civ</u>	<u>Indigenous</u>
1 Jul 61	263	54	4860	32	430
30 Jun 62	303	70	6240	34	433

(S) Personnel problems, predominantly operational, were- shortage of German and Russian linguists, and analytical personnel; critical shortage of radio operators, MOS 053; lack of qualified maintenance personnel for SIGSEC equipment under field conditions. Personnel problems, general in nature, were the revocation of 312 security clearances and the shortage of clerical personnel.

(S) USASA, Europe Funding and Obligations:

<u>Annual Funding Program</u>	<u>Obligated</u>	<u>Unobligated</u>	<u>Percent Obligated</u>
\$3,557,000	\$3,557,000	0	100%

TRAINING

(S) The USASA, Europe training program was conducted in accordance with directives from Hq USASA and Hq USASA, Europe. In addition to unit training, courses at USAREUR and Seventh US Army Schools were utilized to meet local training requirements. All emergency and contingency plans of USASA, Europe units were reviewed and revised as necessary during FY 1962, and all major units had up-to-date emergency plans that were regularly rehearsed. The concept of conducting field and command post exercises was changed from large scale exercises such as WINTERSHIELD II to battle group or smaller unit exercises called at irregular intervals.

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(C) The 319th USASA Battalion (Corps) improved its operating coverage with installation of seven antennas, four sloping V's, two corner reflectors and a rhombic. Also, all sites manned by the battalion were surveyed for the purpose of installing permanent antennas. A new position was installed at Bahrdorf, consisting of an AN/ALR-8 receiving set, an AN/APA-9 antenna system, and a Log Periodic Antenna (100-1000 mc). The 319th's ELINT Section had difficulty in obtaining parts for the following equipment:

AN/APA; 74 resistors, 390K 1/2w 1% and 600K 1/2w 1%.  
 PU-33 A/C; brushes, belts, and bearings.

(S) ELINT production at the 78th USASA SOU was increased with the installation of a PROFERF system. The system replaced obsolete equipment which was often inaccurate and frequently deadlined. However, the new type camera and display unit, component of the new equipment, did not stand up under operating conditions and further tests had to be made at the manufacturers.

(S) The 78th's CommCen had problems with excessive radiation from lines linking the main CommCen with the 6912th Radio Squadron Mobile, until repositioning reduced the radiation to a minimum. New equipment installed during the year included a Granger Log Periodic antenna to replace the low frequency antenna system.

(S) Experimental equipment was installed by NSA engineers in an MHBV position for field testing by the 13th USASA Field Station. This consisted of a digitizer unit, a demultiplex unit and associated monitor equipment, designed to provide acceptable intercept of a new Russian synchronous

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scrambler system and other fully synchronous systems that may be used in the future, in addition to more conventional systems currently in use. An additional piece of newly installed equipment was used to obtain perforated tape copy of computer data transmissions. With the addition of this equipment (XR25-6), the 13th USASA Field Station was able to double its capabilities of printing computer data transmissions.

OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

COMINT:

(~~TSCM~~) During the year, USASA, Europe's COMINT Section was tasked with providing tip-off to the US Intelligence Community of missile-related activity on the Kapustin Yar (KYMTR) and Tyura Tam Missile Test Ranges (TYMTR) and the Sary Shagan Anti-missile Test Range Complex (SSATC).

(~~TSCM~~) A probable launch of at least five Russian Earth Satellite Vehicles (ESV's) involving all three of the above ranges occurred, 21 Oct 61. Although all of these activities could not definitely be correlated as one inter-range operation, they were tentatively determined as two ballistic missile launchings from a downrange launch pad, and at least one anti-missile from SSATC.

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
(~~TSCM~~) On 16 Mar 62, Sputnik XIII was launched from KYMTR, followed by the launchings of Sputnik's XIV and XV on 6 and 24 Apr 62, respectively. On 26 Apr 62, Sputnik XVI was launched from TYMTR and recovered three days

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later approximately 15 kilometers south of Kievka located in the Karagandinskaya Oblast of the Kazakhstan SSR, in the Soviet Union.

~~(TSU)~~ The successful launch of Sputnik XVII from KYMTR occurred 28 May 62. This represented the fourth in a series of Russian ESV launches from KYMTR since 16 Mar 62 successfully monitored by USASA, Europe units.




~~(TSU)~~ A fifth ESV (Sputnik XVIII/Cosmos VI) was launched from KYMTR on 30 Jun 62. Impending ESV activity was indicated by activation of the



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EO 3.3(h)(2)

~~(TSU)~~ A major Soviet communications change was effected 27 Mar 62. It consisted of introduction of new callsigns and new frequency rotas on the Russian Mainline Network. All nets assigned to this station were



~~(TSU)~~ COMINT activities were directed against Group of Soviet Forces, Germany; Soviet Northern Group of Forces, Poland; Soviet Independent Special Purpose Radio Regiments in East Germany; Polish, Czech and East German entities; and the Russian Illicit entity.

~~(TSU)~~ USASA, Europe units participated in airborne platform operations.

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Tests were made to determine if the radio horizon could be extended to permit intercept of Soviet tactical maneuver communications. Use of the airborne platform provided valuable COMINT not heretofore available from border intercept sites.

(TSW) Mission of the Manual Morse Section was to collect, analyze, and report all morse, voice and radioprinter transmissions originated by Russian, Romanian and Bulgarian targets. Prime targets were Russian Military nets including the [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

The section contributed a great deal to the [redacted] portion of the National Intelligence effort.

(TSW) Studies made to improve Mercury Grass collection facilities prompted recommendations for new equipment configurations.

ELINT:

(TSW) During the year there was an increase in the number of transmitted telemetry intercepts from orbital vehicles. Due to increased sensitivity of general search equipment, the number of radar intercepts in the developmental and unidentified classes increased over past years. The highlight of the year for ELINT was the successful intercept of [redacted]

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

(TS) Emphasis was placed on the development of mobile ELINT operations, capable of delivering intelligence information of immediate value to the

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Seventh US Army. An ELINT team participated in the Seventh US Army CPX CHECKMATE. Its mission was to supply players from Seventh US Army, V Corps, and VII Corps with ELINT information pertaining to the deployment of "aggressor" radar equipment.

(S) Results of ELINT operations were as follows:

1. New surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites were located at Ludwigslust, Schwerin and Perleberg. These areas were carried as suspected SAM sites for several weeks by ELINT analysts before visual sightings confirmed their existence.
2. The SAM site at Weimar was located by ELINT fixes on 11 kilometers from its actual location.
3. A new operational SAM site at Gotha was located by the use of ELINT DF fixes.
4. Fire Wheel (AAA associated radar) signals were intercepted emanating from Czechoslovakia during the Warsaw Pact exercise in the Fall of 1961. These intercepts were the first indication that Soviet troops were sent to Czechoslovakia during the exercise. The presence of Soviet troops was later confirmed by visual observations.
5. During the Warsaw Pact exercise, ELINT intercepts, in conjunction with visual sightings, indicated a mobility exercise involving an SA-2 Guideline missile facility.
6. The USASA ELINT intercept team at Mt Meissner obtained the first  radar intercept from East Germany.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

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~~SECRET~~COMSEC:

COMSEC support was furnished Seventh US Army during the following exercises:

1. ~~(S)~~ Communications Exercise HIGHPOLE - Support furnished included intercept of 10th Special Forces Group's transmissions.
2. ~~(S)~~ Unconventional warfare communications Exercise SPARK-PLUG - Tested communications of Special Forces operational detachments. Difficulty was experienced in receiving signals from distant Special Forces teams.
3. ~~(S)~~ CPX CHECKMATE - Tested the fragmented command post concept.
4. ~~(S)~~ Operation EYEBALL - Tested Seventh US Army air-ground communications and air request nets.
5. ~~(S)~~ CPX GRAND SLAM I - Tested fragmented command post concept.
6. ~~(S)~~ FTX EVEREADY II - A Berlin Battle Group exercise, conducted in Grunwald Forest, Berlin from 18-20 Oct 61. Monitoring coverage used mobile equipment assigned the unit.
7. ~~(S)~~ DEVILSPREAD - A 10th Special Forces Group communications exercise, conducted at Bremerhaven, Germany from 2-22 Oct 61, using mobile radio and teletype positions.
8. ~~(S)~~ ROADBOUND XII - A non-combatant evacuation order and relocation of non-tactical units exercise, conducted from 2-9 Apr 62. Monitoring of MP units was provided by an MRGZ-3 position at Pirmasens, Germany.
9. ~~(S)~~ FIERY CROSS - A 10th Special Forces Group communications exercise conducted from 29 May-2 Jun 62. Monitoring coverage used fixed radio positions and mobile RLBZ positions located at Mannheim, Germany.

ELSEC:

~~(S)~~ ELSEC support was furnished two battalions of the 1st US Army Missile Command, Southern European Task Force during FTX KING NEPTUNE II. The objectives of the mission were to determine signal strength of spurious

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radiations emanating from non-communications electronics emitters; and to test terrain conditions similar to those which normally exist between firing batteries and possible foreign electronic intercept sites.

~~(S)~~ Results of the mission were:

1. Frequencies of the missile guidance radars and transponders had to be considered compromised.
2. Non-communications emitters associated with the weapons system provided targeting data.
3. Control of missiles by firing elements could be rendered useless by hostile communications countermeasures.
4. Various phases of the operations could be determined by hostile intercept agencies.
5. Specific types of emitters could be identified by analysis of signals intercepted.

TAREX:

~~(S)~~ TAREX derived extensive and valuable collateral intelligence through technical debriefings of knowledgeable refugees and defectors. Reports published by TAREX as a result of these debriefings contained detailed information, such as radio operations, signal operating instructions, and net structure of the Georgian Border Guard District of the USSR. In another case, TAREX was able to provide technical assistance in the debriefing of a clandestine source who had sensitive current information pertaining to recent developments in advanced cryptographic and transmission systems, allegedly being incorporated in an Iron Curtain country. The information was highly significant to NSA and resulted in SIGINT targeting in an attempt to intercept and exploit this system.

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(S) During the year four double agent cases--Hasen, Manload, Stub and Trainload--were neutralized or otherwise deactivated, while two new cases--Drainboard and Shoeshine--were acquired. Through its coordination in these cases, TAREX gained access to several pieces of operational equipment employed by these double agents, including the transceiver utilized by Pink Lady subsequent to his being furnished with new equipment by his opposition handlers.

(S) [Redacted]

TAREX continued coverage of fairs, exhibits and symposiums with the dual purpose of, (1) insuring that brochures and other technical information concerning the latest developments in the telecommunications, cryptographic and electronic fields were brought to the attention of appropriate consumers; and (2) establishing new personal contacts in these fields for possible future exploitation. In addition, TAREX established and continued overt contact with European industrialists, businessmen and engineers to provide information on research and development, production, engineering, testing and utilization of all types of electronic equipment manufactured by many of Western Europe's leading firms. TAREX developed and maintained facilities for complying with a wide range of specific requests for information as levied by NSA-ASA elements. These facilities provided timely support when immediate information, such as the hurried laying of new pipe by GSPG, was needed by USASA, Europe units in their operations.

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~~TOP SECRET~~SPECIAL MISSIONS

(TS) HUBCAP - An airborne ELINT platform located at [redacted] until May 1962, when it was moved to [redacted]. HUBCAP's mission was to conduct directed and general search against targets suspected of being associated with Soviet guided missile programs, with operational priority against their anti-missile missile program. Secondary missions were directed against-

1. Soviet guided missile R&D programs conducted on the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.
2. Special ELINT collection.
3. ELINT on Soviet Electronic OB.

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[redacted]

(TS) LANDBOOM SPECIAL - An airborne ELINT platform located at [redacted]

[redacted] Its primary mission was to act as backup for HUBCAP. Secondary missions were against-

1. Unusual Soviet guided missile R&D programs conducted at Kapustin Yar Missile Test Range (KYMTR), to include second generation solid fuel and cruise type missiles.
2. [redacted] KYMTR R-13 and R-14 series missiles (300-400 nautical miles).
3. [redacted] reentry phenomena of Soviet non-ICBM missiles.

(S) Project FRISCO - Started 1 Dec 60 as an NSA R&D project at [redacted]

[redacted] Its purpose was to intercept and record signals from Russian missiles and space vehicles. With an on-site analyst available to determine missile characteristics from intercept telemetry data, FRISCO provided

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
(~~TSCM~~) Project MOORHEAD - A system designed to detect and determine the parameters for radars associated with anti-ballistic missile weapon systems developed and tested in the Sary Shagan area of the Soviet Union.

(~~TSCM~~) Project BACKBONE - A program designed by EDL to develop a missile detection system



(~~TSMVCCO~~) BAMBOO TREE - For the past several years the SIGINT collection effort in Berlin has produced a tremendous amount of otherwise unavailable intelligence. However, based upon the possibility of a Soviet blockade of Berlin, the Joint Chiefs of Staff directed the USAF to install a non-jammable navigational aid system and associated tropospheric scatter communications net at Templehof for use in the event an airlift becomes necessary. It was expected that this equipment would cause considerable interference to the USASA collection equipment located at Templehof. Should an airlift become necessary, the USASA facility at Templehof would be relocated. Surveys of possible alternate sites were made and evaluated. Results indicated that the rubble pile at Gruenwald or Marienfelde offered the best possible sites.

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~~SECRET~~PACIFIC

(S) Col George A. Godding, 040790, Inf, commanded USASA, Pacific during FY 1962. The mission was to collect, process and control COMINT, ELINT, ELSEC, COMSEC, TAREX and SIT facilities. This information was disseminated to designated consumers and higher USASA headquarters and NSA. Hq USASA, Pacific exercised staff supervision over processing and reporting within the command and furnished guidance to subordinate field units in the accomplishment of missions relative targets located in Communist China, North Korea, Russia and Southeast Asia, especially Vietnam.

(S) Organizational changes during the year were as follows:

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1. US Army Element, Joint SIGINT Processing Center, Okinawa organized, eff 7 Aug 61; redesignated US Army Element, Joint Sobe Processing Center, eff 25 Sep 61; discontinued, eff 1 Feb 62.
2. Organized effective 20 Sep 61:
  - 14th USASA Operations Company
  - Hq & Svc Co, 14th USASAFS (Disc eff 1 Jun 62)
  - 9th USASA Operations Company
  - Hq & Svc Co, 9th USASAFS (Disc eff 1 Jun 62)
  - 82d USASA Special Operations Unit
3. Organized effective 24 Sep 61:
  - 11th USASA Operations Company
  - 12th USASA Operations Company
  - USAG, Kuma Station
  - 3d USASA Operations Company
  - USAG, Torii Station (Redesig as Hq & Svc Co, 51st USASA SOC, eff 1 Jun 62)
4. Organized:
  - 51st USASA Special Operations Command (14 Jul 61)
  - 400th USASA Special Operations Detachment (1 Feb 62)
  - 83d USASA Special Operations Unit (15 May 62)
5. Discontinued:
  - 400th USASA Operations Unit (Prov)(20 Sep 61)
  - 3d USASA Field Station (24 Sep 61)

MANPOWER AND FINANCES

(X) Strength figures for USASA, Pacific, FY 1962, follow:

1 July 1961					30 June 1962				
<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Total</u>

Auth Actual

(X) USASA, Pacific Funding and Obligations:

<u>Annual Funding Program</u>	<u>Obligations</u>	<u>Percent Obligated</u>

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~~SECRET KIMBO~~TRAINING

(U) Training was conducted in accordance with directives from Hq, USASA and USASAPAC. Testing of all emergency plans was included in the training program. In addition, exercises were developed to measure unit combat effectiveness in certain situations. Special courses were given in theater schools to increase capabilities in the various fields of activity. Instructors and instructions were constantly supervised to insure the highest degree of training possible.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTSCOMINT:

[ ] continued to be a valuable source of intelligence information on North Korean Order of Battle and an early warning source of possible North Korean movements. The problem of identifying [ ] stations was minimized this year as the Communists made no call sign or frequency changes. During the period June-August 1961, sporadic intercepts of Chinese Communist [ ] signals were made. The signals emanated from the eastern coast of China as far south as Amoy, opposite Formosa. This intercept was the free world's only source of Chinese [ ] communications from that area. During the year, the entire [ ] collection and processing effort was hampered by the inability of US school-trained linguists to cope with the idioms and dialects of languages used. This made it necessary for USASAPAC to rely on Critical Military Specialists to translate and transcribe the tapes. Since a continued increase in Communist utilization of [ ] communications is expected, it will be necessary to increase the training

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of US personnel in the methods of intercept, transcription and translation if USASAPAC COMINT effort is to reach the desired operational level.

~~(SCL)~~ Mercury Fork - On 1 Jul 61, this communications entity underwent a communications change resulting in previous fixed morse callsigns being replaced with daily changing callsigns, different fixed printer callwords being employed, daily changing frequencies and daily changing voice callwords. Intercept of Mercury Fork remained high from July through the end of September, at which time, links became inactive and were not heard except for sporadic intercept through February. However, activity of the network increased on 20 Feb 62 and by 1 April, four links were maintaining daily communications. Activity remained at a high level through 5 June.

~~(SCL)~~ Other COMINT intercept was directed against tactical voice communications nets serving North Korean tactical units deployed along the DMZ. Particular areas of interest were callsign usage, frequencies, and schedules for basic continuity studies.

ELINT:

~~(C)~~ Tactical ELINT Collection-Improvement in the direction of the collection effort, collection sites, and operational capability of field units resulted in marked progress in the tactical ELINT field. Tasking of tactical units was improved and standardized with the implementation of TECHINS 1056, "Intercept Tasking Instructions." DIRNSA retained control over one position at the 226th USASA Operations Company and used it for a general search effort with a controlled frequency and time coverage plan. The 508th USASA Group was designated as an intermediate tasking authority

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over the remaining seven ELINT positions in Korea. Hq USASAPAC monitored the tasking of the group's resources and established a requirement for a monthly ELINT Tasking and Effectiveness Report (METER).


(S) A staff visit by personnel from Control Division, Hq USASAPAC revealed that the 508th USASA Group had no effective means of communicating between intercept sites, thus making simultaneous intercept at two or more sites a coincidence rather than a planned or normal occurrence, and DF cuts were seldom taken. The group began operations of an ELINT tip-off net late in the year designed to provide a simultaneous intercept and DF capability.

(S) Coverage of North Korean non-communications emissions by ELINT units of 508th Group was limited because of locations of intercept sites. The 226th USASA Operations Company maintained coverage of targets in the west and as far east as central Korea. Intercept of signals from the northcentral area and from Northeast Korea was accomplished by the 921st USASA Battalion; however, a gap existed in coverage on the east coast. An attempt to improve coverage was made by placing a site on a peak in central Korea. Intercept was good, but the mountain top operation could only be supported by helicopter and was deemed to be too expensive and risky. Therefore, the site was abandoned as a permanent location.

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According to the plan, USASAPAC was to be responsible for providing equipment and instructors.




SIT:

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

(S) The primary mission of SIT was to provide target location and transmitter identification by means of DF [redacted] In addition, USASAPAC DF facilities were used to assist in searches for lost friendly aircraft and ships.

(S) At the beginning of the year, USASAPAC maintained a North DF Net which stretched from Shemya, Alaska to Kyushu, Japan; participated in the



and established the WHITE BIRCH DF Net to exploit targets in South Vietnam.


(S) The North DF Net was faced with two weaknesses. First, the site located at Shemya was substandard in its accuracy and response levels. Results of tests conducted to determine the best available site indicated that Adak, Alaska was superior in both hearability and accuracy. As a result, effective 1 Jun 62, the Shemya DF site was inactivated and Adak was

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activated. The second problem was that the site located on Kyushu, Japan did not provide adequate coverage of targets assigned to the 14th USASA Field Station. Tests were conducted to determine a DF site which would provide the required coverage. Results indicated that the net's fix potential would be greatly improved by establishing a permanent site on Okinawa. As the year ended, plans called for reserving one position in the US Navy CDAA (Wullenweber) DF installation at Sobe, Okinawa for use by the North DF Net.

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EO 3.3(h)(2)



(SIVCOO) The WHITE BIRCH DF Net was designed to exploit targets within South Vietnam and had little capability for adequately fixing transmitters outside that country. In order to improve the overall SIT capabilities in Southeast Asia, a plan was developed to form two interlocking DF nets in the area involving PEDAL PUSHER and WHITE BIRCH. The plan called for extending the base line of the WHITE BIRCH DF Net by adding sites at [redacted] and [redacted] and establishing a [redacted] controlled DF net. Permission

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EO 3.3(h)(2)

was granted and, by the end of the year, WHITE BIRCH DF Net was receiving line bearing support from

COMSEC:

~~(S)~~ The COMSEC mission of USASAPAC was to assist the supported commands in achieving the maximum degree of transmission, cryptographic, and physical security. Mission was accomplished through monitoring and analysis.

~~(S)~~ The three main types of support missions were:

1. General - Routine monitoring of all units in supported command.
2. Special - Special purpose requested by supported G2, S2, Signal Officer, higher USASA headquarters, or within supported USASA unit itself.
3. Search - A continuous monitoring on certain bands to discover new target frequencies.

~~(S)~~ Throughout Korea, COMSEC monitor personnel performed daily support missions on all types of communications systems. Although only a small percentage of all transmissions were monitored, this support enabled analysts to evaluate the status of transmission security for each command supported.

~~(S)~~ The final transmission security analysis report, on COMSEC support provided the USASAPAC North DF Net during April 1962, showed no significant discrepancies. However, on a requested vulnerability study of the JOC-AGL Kangaroo Net, it was found that operators were continually giving information in the clear. This net was designed to provide close air support during times of Korean hostilities, and unless protected by encryption devices, it would give enemy analysts little trouble determining what type, when, and where, strike missions would occur. Use of OPCODES or cryptographic devices were recommended.

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~~SECRET~~ELSEC:

(S) ELSEC Branch, Hq USASAPAC devoted most of its effort to development of ELSEC policies, procedures, and doctrine. During the year, a new operational directive was published to provide a flexible and realistic tasking requirement. However, because of shortages in programmed personnel and equipment, subordinate units could not provide effective ELSEC support.

(S) Three ELSEC missions were conducted in Korea utilizing ELINT equipment on a time-sharing basis. Results proved inconclusive since only a limited time was diverted from ELINT to ELSEC. In addition, no realistic electromagnetic radiation studies could be made without proper equipment.

(S) While working on ways to provide the supported commands and USASA units with realistic and worthwhile ELSEC support, the ELSEC Branch gained insight into the problem by performing map locator projects, through the use of emitter listings and by developing a card file registry system, which would provide the ELSEC neophyte with immediate and useful information on the different types of non-communications emitters.

TAREX:

(S) TAREX was tasked with the following responsibilities: the collection of collateral information concerning foreign cryptologic communications and electronic activities in the Pacific theater; the monitoring of current collateral intelligence reports and requirements to insure that all pertinent available information was provided field processing units for use in the execution of their SIGINT mission; providing EEI's or statements of USASA/USASAPAC areas of interest concerning communications and electronics

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pertinent to command intelligence agencies; the maintenance of liaison with the supported commands and allied intelligence producers; and finally, the providing of photographic support to the USASAPAC Command.

SPECIAL PROJECTS

WHITE BIRCH

~~(S) (U) (E) (C) (S)~~ In order to provide information that was suitable for tactical exploitation, it was necessary to fix target transmitter locations to very small areas. In Vietnam, standard US Army short range equipment (AN/PRD-1) was utilized on a number of mobile DF missions with limited accuracy. For the most part, results of these missions were negative. In order to obtain a usable DF bearing with this equipment, it was necessary to approach the target transmitters so closely that the low level DF teams were constantly in jeopardy.

~~(S) (U) (E) (C) (S)~~ This problem of obtaining small area fixes remained unresolved until the arrival in March 1962 of prototype airborne DF equipment. This was mounted in an L-20 aircraft and was an immediate success. Small area fixes of one kilometer radius or less were consistently obtained. These locations were used by Commander, US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) to select targets for tactical exploitation by South Vietnamese Armed Forces. Several large scale combat operations were based on locations supplied by WHITE BIRCH airborne DF. In June, two additional L-20's with DF equipment arrived at the 3d RRU to augment the expanding DF operation.

~~(S) (U) (E) (C) (S)~~ Before the end of the fiscal year, modification of the AN/PRD-1 was underway to improve its effectiveness against the type of target encountered in South Vietnam. The use of a space-loop antenna system was

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found to greatly improve results. The modification was tested against known Viet Cong targets and was found to produce usable bearings from a range of 8-12 kilometers. This was a notable improvement over the standard AN/PRD-1. Modification kits were prepared for installation that would provide WHITE BIRCH with a ground based mobile DF effort capable of producing short range, small area fixes. Although the airborne DF program satisfied all current needs for small area fixes, a ground based capability was still considered a requirement.

### SABERTOOTH I

(S) SABERTOOTH I was organized as an instructional team to provide training for the Army Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) personnel in the techniques of radio intercept, direction finding, and traffic analysis (T/A).

(S) Regular courses of instruction began on 4 Sep 61. Thirty students enrolled in the Intercept-DF course and 15 in the T/A course. Due to operational requirements within the ARVN Signal Command, it was necessary to release several students prior to graduation. The first classes, 21 in Intercept-DF and 10 in T/A, were graduated 10 Nov 61.

(S) The second formal course of instruction began 4 December with an enrollment of 41 students in the Intercept-DF course and 17 in the T/A course. Again, because of operational necessity, ARVN requested an early graduation of the Intercept-DF class. Students of the T/A course were graduated 3 Feb 62. At the request of ARVN Signal Command, 75 students attended additional courses concerning DF and equipment familiarization.

(S) The major problem which directly affected the input of ARVN

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personnel for SABERTOOTH I training was the difficulty in obtaining security clearances for proposed students. This was due to sensitivity of COMINT operations and infiltration of the Viet Cong into South Vietnam. Although ARVN selected 120 men, none were cleared during the period, 4 Feb-30 Jun 62.

SABERTOOTH II

(S) The mission of SABERTOOTH II was to configure within the structure of the [redacted] an organization capable of providing division tactical COMINT support and sufficiently flexible to allow independent operation against clandestine transmitters suspected of operating within the geographical limits of [redacted]

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(S) From November 1961 through January 1962, an orientation course was conducted for the supervisory personnel of the [redacted] Security Center. Primary emphasis was placed on Traffic Analysis but it also served to introduce intercept equipment and procedures. Approximately 17 officers and men attended the daily two hour sessions. Not only did this course serve as a training vehicle, but it provided the instructor personnel with advance knowledge of problems that would be encountered during the course.

(S) Regular classes began 1 Mar 62 in Traffic Intercept and Analysis, with students graduating 14 Jun 62. The Analysis Course basically followed that conducted at USASA Training Center and School for similar job specialty, but modified to include subjects considered mandatory in the education of [redacted] personnel, and excluding prohibited subjects. The course provided an introduction to Traffic Analysis and produced analysts

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with limited abilities far inferior to those of immediate graduates of the USASATC&S. It was necessary to devise absolute rules and orders of succession to provide a logical approach to the solution of practical exercises. [redacted] had an inherent lack of imagination and exercised little initiative. They learned only by rote. None of the students had any knowledge of military echelon or command relationship; the majority had never seen a map or compass; none had any experience or background in electronics or communications. Any subject that depended on an association with, or an elementary knowledge of these subjects had to be thoroughly explained and a basic association developed before the programmed material could be presented. In many instances, the presentation of the prerequisites required as much time as did the course material.

(S) The Intercept Course followed basically the format of that given at USASATC&S with some adjustments for the local situation. The course produced intercept operators with intermediate skill and ability. It was necessary to saturate the students with morse code training in the first portion of the course since no other facilities were available for the conduct of their equipment annexes. The students were handicapped in developing their skill because no experienced operators were available for additional on-the-job training.

FIREBOX (S) 1961

(~~SECRET~~) This was a mobile SIGINT spectrum search covering the communications and non-communications frequency range from 50 to 10,750

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megacycles. The 508th USASA Group (FA) was charged with the responsibility for conducting the operation which began 16 Aug 61 and terminated 22 Nov 61. It was conducted at three sites along the west coast of  Feedback from DIRNSA was in the form of guidance and confirmation or denial of the field findings. Feedback was poor, and the results of intercept were unconfirmed at the end of the test.

#### FIREBOX (S) 1962

~~(S)~~ It was considered imperative by NSA to resume the FIREBOX ~~(S)~~ spectrum search operation in 1962 in light of the greatly increased capability of the Chinese Communists to employ a more sophisticated means of communication. NSAPAC and USASAPAC were charged with joint responsibility for the 1962 operation. They planned the methods of collection and analysis and selected three intercept sites located on Cheju-do Island, at Kunim-Ni (mainland), and on Pyaengyang Do Island on the west coast of Korea. Operations began 15 May 62. Operations at the first site selected, Cheju-do, appeared to be successful, and the feedback was very carefully compared with that received during the previous year's operation.

#### WHEELBASE (S) 1961


~~(S)~~ This was a mobile limited spectrum search from Hokkaido, started 11 Aug 61 and terminated 14 Oct 61. The project was executed by the 12th USASA Field Station. As with FIREBOX ~~(S)~~ searches, the problem of timely feedback was encountered with no real indication from DIRNSA as to the desirability of the intercept.

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


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## ALASKA



(S) Lt Col Ben B. McKibben, Jr., 01319304, AS(Inf), commanded USASA, Alaska from 1 Jul 61 through 11 Jul 61. Lt Col Norman B. Rolle, 079715, Inf, assumed command, 12 Jul 61.

(U) Hq Co, USASA, Alaska was organized effective 19 Jan 62.

### MANPOWER

(S) Assigned strength figures for USASA, Alaska, FY 1962, follow:

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	1 Jul 61			30 Jun 62		
	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>	<u>OFF</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EN</u>
Hq USASA, Alaska	[REDACTED]					
79th USASA SOU						

(S) The operational mission of USASA, Alaska was to conduct COMINT, COMSEC, ELINT, CCM to include COMJAM and ICD, ELSEC and the cryptologic phases of CCD activities in support of US Army, Alaska.

(TS) The primary mission was a directed effort for the intercept, processing, and reporting of intelligence derived from the intercept of communications and non-communications type emissions from or in support of the Soviet Guided Missile and Space Exploration Program directed against the Soviet Pacific Ocean Border Guard District communications.

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OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

COMINT:



(TSCM) On 6 Feb 62, two traffic analysts participated in Exercise GREAT BEAR, the annual US Army, Alaska winter maneuver. Analysis of intercepted traffic of the Friendly Force and the Aggressor Force was performed. COMINT play was not a success because of the distance between the two forces and the short duration of the exercise. However, it was successful in providing the two analysts with valuable practical experience in analysis of tactical voice traffic.

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
ELINT:

(TSCM) ELINT was conducted against the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.



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(TSCN) There were two ELINT special searches conducted during the reporting period. The first of these was in progress at the beginning of the year and continued through the end of the year. This was a joint USASA/AFSS COMINT and ELINT mission, with USASA participating in the ELINT portion. Because of the geographical location of the site, negative ELINT results were obtained. The second search was conducted from 14 May 62 to 24 May 62. Reconnaissance teams were sent out to determine possible future locations for COMINT/ELINT teams to be deployed from USASA, Alaska. Unalakleet, Nome, Kotzebue and Point Barrow were visited and operational sites tentatively selected for possible future electromagnetic surveys.

COMSEC:

(T) COMSEC support was provided to the 37th Artillery Battalion, 1st Battle Group, 23d Infantry. The support indicated that COMSEC of the supported unit was good.

(C) Exercise KING CRAB II was primarily an air transportability

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operation designed to test the movement efficiency of a reinforced rifle company by the USAF. USASAAL personnel were deployed with both the US Force and the Aggressor Force. Results indicated COMSEC monitoring and intelligence collection activities were located too far from the participating units for the support to be totally effective.

(S) COMSEC support was also provided units of the Alaska National Guard. Intelligence information revealed information about the mission, capabilities, limitations and current activities of the units.

SPECIAL ASSIGNMENTS

(S) Special assignments participated in by USASA, Alaska included the following:

Operation NEWCOMER (S) - [redacted]

Operation GRAYSHOE (S) - [redacted]

Operation FLYCATCHER (S) - [redacted]

Operation DISCOVERER - [redacted]

Operation PARTAN (S) - [redacted]

Operation FISHBOWL - [redacted]

Operation OAK LEAF - [redacted]

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(TOP SECRET) Other assignments included Project ASHPIT, an ELINT facility which conducted spectrum search operations against COMINT type signals; and Project SOFTSHOE, an airborne ELINT platform which collected re-entry data from Soviet ICBM's impacting at the Kamchatka impact area of the Tyura Tam Missile Test Range.

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(SCL) Due to anticipated pro-Castro Communist inspired anti-government activities in Costa Rica, El Salvador, Nicaragua and Panama, intercept coverage of these areas was increased. However, with the exception of a small disturbance in Panama City, the anticipated activity did not materialize.

(SCL) On 6 and 7 Aug 61, intercept facilities were diverted from their normal assignments to participate in a special mission "Blast Furnace/Duster," which was the interception of signals emanated from the Soviet launched, manned space vehicle, SPUTNIK XII. [REDACTED]

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(SCL) On 15 Mar 62, at the request of the [REDACTED] Government and upon orders from Chief, USASA, a DF team began operations to assist the government in locating a clandestine radio station making anti-government broadcasts. The project was terminated 29 Mar 62 as a result of target station non-activity.

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## AFRICA

### 4TH USASA FIELD STATION, ASMARA, ETHIOPIA

(U) Colonel William C. Newman, 0354474, AIS, commanded the station during FY 1962, and was directly responsible to the Chief, USASA.

(U) The station was organized to include a Headquarters Company, 4th USASA Operations Company, 4th USASA Guard Company and Medical Detachment, US Army Hospital.

### Manpower

(U) Assigned strength figures for FY 1962 follow:

	<u>1 Jul 61</u>					<u>30 Jun 62</u>				
	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Indig</u>	<u>Off</u>	<u>WO</u>	<u>EM</u>	<u>Civ</u>	<u>Indig</u>
4th USASAFS	[Redacted Table Content]									
Attached Units:										
USAF Ln Det										
USN Comm Unit, Asmara										
USA Middle East Regional Comm Comd										
USA Sig Research No. 9										

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
(U) The operational mission was to provide, operate and control assigned intercept facilities and SIGINT production resources, and to conduct such processing as may be directed by the Chief, USASA in support of the National SIGINT effort and supported US military commands.

(S) The station was charged with developing and maintaining continuity on all assigned cases within the Congo, United Arab Republic (UAR), [Redacted] Yemen, Sudan and Somalia.

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OPERATIONAL HIGHLIGHTS

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~~(TSC)~~ The Somali problem centered around Somali-Ethiopian border clashes, usually between tribes and Somali police. The ill-defined border separating the two countries lent itself to mutual incursion and further strained relations. SIGINT revealed an attempted coup d'etat organized by a group of low-ranking officers in the Northern Somali region, and its subsequent failure.

~~(SIVCO)~~ On 15 Jul 61, following the installation of the new CRITICOM equipment, the station went over to the CRITICOM system. On 28 May 62, an

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acceptance test of the equipment was made. Recommendations were made to the US Army Strategic Communications Command that the site be accepted without exception.

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RECAPITULATION  
USASA, EUROPE TD UNITS

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Hq USASA, Europe	Frankfurt, Germany
507th USASA Group (Field Army)	Baumholder, Germany
318th USASA Battalion (Corps)	Herzogenaurach, Germany
319th USASA Battalion (Corps)	Rothwesten, Germany
320th USASA Battalion (Operations)	Bad Aibling, Germany
Company A	Bad Aibling, Germany
Company B	Bad Aibling, Germany
182d USASA Operations Company (A)	Herzogenaurach, Germany
183d USASA Operations Company (A)	Herzogenaurach, Germany
184th USASA Operations Company (A)	Rothwesten, Germany
251st USASA Processing Company	Frankfurt, Germany (Moved from Baumholder, Germany 6 Mar 52)
600th USASA Company	Vicenza, Italy
77th USASA Special Operations Unit	Frankfurt, Germany
78th USASA Special Operations Unit	Berlin, Germany
2d Detachment, 410th USASA Special Operations Unit	Frankfurt, Germany
102d USASA Security Detachment	Heidelberg, Germany
103d USASA Security Detachment	Orleans, France
402d USASA Special Operations Detachment (Airborne)	Bad Tolz, Germany

UNIT DESIGNATION

LOCATION

5th USASA Field Station	Sinop, Turkey
5th USASA Operations Company	Sinop, Turkey
13th USASA Field Station	Harrogate, England
13th USASA Operations Company	Harrogate, England
Hq USASA, Turkey/15th USASA Field Station	Ankara, Turkey
15th USASA Operations Company	Ankara, Turkey

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RECAPITULATION  
USASA, PACIFIC TD UNITS

<u>UNIT DESIGNATION</u>	<u>LOCATION</u>
Hq USASA, Pacific	Camp Zama, Tokyo, Japan
508th USASA Group (Field Army)	Yongdong-po, Korea
51st USASA Special Operations Command	Sobe, Okinawa
3d USASA Operations Company	Sobe, Okinawa
321st USASA Battalion (Corps)	Uijongbu, Korea
Company A	Munsan, Korea
Company B	Tongduchon, Korea
177th USASA Operations Company (A)	Pyong Taek, Korea
226th USASA Operations Company (C)	Kanghwa-do, Korea
76th USASA Special Operations Unit	Taipei, Taiwan
81st USASA Special Operations Unit	Helemano, Hawaii
82d USASA Special Operations Unit	Saigon, South Vietnam
83d USASA Special Operations Unit	Bangkok, Thailand
USASA Communications Unit, Japan	Tokyo, Japan
104th USASA Security Detachment	Sobe, Okinawa
400th USASA Special Operations Detachment	Fort Buckner, Okinawa
9th USASA Field Station	Clark AFB, Philippine Islands
9th USASA Operations Company	Clark AFB, Philippine Islands
12th USASA Field Station	Chitose, Japan
11th USASA Operations Company	Chitose, Japan
12th USASA Operations Company	Chitose, Japan
14th USASA Field Station	Hakata, Japan
14th USASA Operations Company	Hakata, Japan