

U.S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY
APO 63, BOX 24
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

GDM:ds
SER 0003
23 AUG 1964

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FROM: OFFICER IN CHARGE, USN 467 NOVEMBER
TO: CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS (OP-94G)
VIA: COMMANDING OFFICER, USS MADDOX (DD 731)
OFFICER IN CHARGE, U.S. NAVAL SECURITY GROUP ACTIVITY [REDACTED]
COMMANDER, TASK FORCE 72
COMMANDER, SEVENTH FLEET
COMMANDER IN CHIEF, U.S. PACIFIC FLEET

SUBJ: JULY-AUGUST 1964 DESOTO PATROL SIGINT OPERATIONS REPORT; SUBMISSION OF

REF: (A) [REDACTED] 250800Z OF JULY 1964 (NOTAL) (OPORD 2-64 TO OIC USN 467H)

ENCL: (1) GAZETTEER
(2) CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF INTERCEPT

1. BACKGROUND:

A. USN 467 NOVEMBER WAS A SIGINT TEAM EMBARKED IN USS MADDOX (DD 731) DURING THE PERIOD 28 JULY TO 23 AUGUST 1964. THE MISSION OF THE DETACHMENT WAS: (1) TO PROVIDE SIGINT DIRECT SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER DURING A DESOTO PATROL ALONG THE COAST OF NORTH VIETNAM (HEREAFTER ABBREVIATED AS DRV); AND (2) CONDUCT SIGINT COLLECTION OPERATIONS AGAINST SELECTED DRV [REDACTED] OPERATIONS WERE CONDUCTED IN A COMMUNICATIONS VAN PLACED ON THE O1 LEVEL BETWEEN THE STACKS. POSITIONS INSTALLED WERE: ONE MANUAL MORSE, ONE MANUAL MORSE/RADIO-TELEPHONE, ONE RADIO-TELEPHONE/[REDACTED] AND ONE KWR-37 COMMUNICATIONS POSITION.

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B. THE SHIP DEPARTED KEELUNG ON 28 JULY AND BEGAN THE PATROL IN THE GULF OF TONKIN ON 31 JULY AT A POSITION OF 17-05N 107-18E. THE SHIP PROCEEDED ALONG THE PROPOSED TRACK TO 19-47N 106-31E WHERE IT WAS ATTACKED BY THREE DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AT 0808Z ON 2 AUGUST. THE PATROL RESUMED ALONG A REVISED TRACK (BETWEEN 19-47N 106-08E AND 17-15N 107-20E) ON 3 AUGUST WITH USS C. TURNER JOY (DD 951) IN COMPANY. THE TWO SHIPS WERE AGAIN ATTACKED BY AN UNDETERMINED NUMBER OF DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS ON THE NIGHT OF 4 AUGUST IN THE VICINITY OF 18-17N 107-32E. THE PATROL WAS OFFICIALLY CONCLUDED ON 8 AUGUST, AND THE SHIP ARRIVED IN SUBIC BAY ON 23 AUGUST, FOLLOWING THIRTEEN DAYS OF OPERATIONS AS AN ELEMENT OF TASK FORCE 77.

C. THE TEAM WAS COMPOSED OF THE FOLLOWING MEMBERS:

LT GERRELL D. MOORE
ATCHINSON, RONALD S.
BAHM, JACK C.

[REDACTED]


USNR
T3, USN
T3, USN

OIC [REDACTED]

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(b) (6)

BURDETTE, HARVEY N.
 ZIMBELMAN, LYLE (HMN)
 MITCHELL, DENNIS E.*
 DE COURLEY, CHARLES D.*
 DIXON, THOMAS L.*
 O'ROURKE, RICHARD J.
 DELANEY, SAMUEL W.*
 PROUTY, DAVID A.
 BOLTON, VICTOR J.
 ALLAIRE, MATTHEW B.*
 GAUGHAN, THOMAS A.*
 MCMAHAN, ARTHUR B., II*
 STANTON, JAMES H.



, CT3, USN COMMUNICATIONS
 , CT2, USN COMMUNICATIONS
 , CT2, USN VIETNAMESE C/A
 , CT2, USN VIETNAMESE T/A
 , CT3, USN MANUAL MORSE
 , CT3, USN MANUAL MORSE
 , LCPL, USMC MANUAL MORSE
 , LCPL, USMC MANUAL MORSE
 , CT3, USN MAINTENANCE
 , SGT, USMC VIETNAMESE R/T
 , CPL, USMC VIETNAMESE R/T
 , LCPL, USMC ELINT
 , LCPL, USMC ELINT

* TRANSFERRED TO USS TICONDEROGA (CVA 14) ON 17 AUGUST FOR FURTHER TRANSFER BY COD TO CUBI POINT TO RELIEVE PERSONNEL SHORTAGES AT PARENT COMMANDS.

D. THIS REPORT IS A SUMMARY OF SIGINT OPERATIONS CARRIED OUT BY USN 467 NOVEMBER, AND IS SUBMITTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH REFERENCE (A).

2. HIGHLIGHTS OF INTERCEPT:

A. DURING THE EARLY MORNING HOURS OF 31 JULY THE USS MADDOX, WHILE ENROUTE TO THE GULF OF TONKIN FROM KEELUNG, PASSED WITHIN 42 MILES OF HAINAN ISLAND. THIS WAS THE CLOSEST POINT OF APPROACH TO CHICOM TERRITORY DURING THE PATROL. COMMUNICATIONS NETS SERVING THE COMMUNICATIONS AND OBSERVATION POSTS IN THE AREA WERE MONITORED TO DETECT ANY REFLECTION OF THE MADDOX. NONE WAS NOTED, AND IT IS BELIEVED THAT THE MADDOX WAS UNDETECTED UNTIL SHE REACHED THE DRV COAST.

B. ON 31 JULY THE MADDOX OPERATED IN THE VICINITY OF 17-05N 107-18E. ALTHOUGH, WHAT APPEARED TO BE, A RADAR TRACKING SITE WAS VISUALLY SIGHTED ON ISLE DU TIGRE, NO TRACKING THAT COULD BE ASSOCIATED WITH THE SHIP'S MOVEMENTS WAS NOTED ON THE DRV COASTAL TRACKING NET. HOWEVER, BEGINNING AT 0136Z ON 1 AUGUST, A TRACKING STATION LOCATED AT VINH SON BEGAN PASSING SIGHTINGS REFLECTING THE PRESENCE OF THE MADDOX. TRACKING BY VARIOUS STATIONS CONTINUED THROUGHOUT THE TIME THE MADDOX WAS IN THE GULF OF TONKIN, AND WAS ESPECIALLY HEAVY BETWEEN 1 AND 4 AUGUST. SATURATION PLOTTING OF REVERSE AZIMUTH AND RANGE ENABLED THE DETACHMENT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING TENTATIVE LOCATIONS:

LOCATION	COORDINATES	AI GROUP
VINH SON	17-56N 106-28E	0424
VINH	18-40N 105-40E	4824
HON NGU	18-48N 105-47E	0406, 0424
THANH HOA AREA	19-49N 105-57E	9224
HON ME	19-23N 105-56E	9324
HON EN	18-18N 106-09E	5524

A DEFINITE PATTERN APPEARED IN THE AI GROUP OF THE MESSAGES, PROBABLY

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REPRESENTING THE STATION NUMBER OF THE STATION SENDING THE SIGHTING. THE ONLY ABNORMALITY APPEARED IN THE TRAFFIC FROM HON NGU, WHICH WAS NOTED USING TWO DIFFERENT AI GROUPS. ON 1 AUGUST VINH WAS NOTED RELAYING SIGHTINGS FROM HON NGU (USING AI GROUP 0406) IN ADDITION TO SENDING SIGHTINGS FROM THE VINH SITE. LATER, HON NGU WAS NOTED SENDING SIGHTINGS DIRECTLY TO HAIPHONG (USING AI GROUP 0424). THE EXACT STATUS OF THE STATION AT HON NGU THEREFORE COULD NOT BE RESOLVED. IT WAS ALSO SUSPECTED THAT HON NGU WAS POSSIBLY USING RADIO-TELEPHONE COMMUNICATIONS TO PASS SIGHTINGS TO VINH. A CONSIDERABLE AMOUNT OF VIETNAMESE VOICE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON 125.0E MCS DURING THE PERIOD VINH WAS NOTED RELAYING SIGHTINGS FROM HON NGU.

C. RANGES OF UP TO 73 MILES WERE NOTED IN THE TRACKING MESSAGES, BUT THE NORMAL RANGE WAS CONSIDERABLY SHORTER. IN GENERAL, THE TRACKING APPEARED TO BE RELATIVELY ACCURATE AND APPARENTLY WAS BASED ON BOTH VISUAL AND RADAR SIGHTINGS. IT WAS NOT POSSIBLE TO DETERMINE THE TYPE OF RADAR BEING USED BY THE TRACKING STATIONS AS THE SHIP WAS UNABLE TO DF ELINT SIGNALS [REDACTED]

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D. AVAILABLE SIGINT EVIDENCE INDICATES THAT THE MADDOX (AND LATER THE C. TURNER JOY) WERE SHADOWED BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS ALMOST CONTINUOUSLY WHILE OPERATING IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. SWATOW CLASS PGM'S WERE USED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY IN THIS ACTIVITY. THERE IS TENUOUS EVIDENCE THAT THIS ACTIVITY MAY HAVE BEGUN AS EARLY AS THE NIGHT OF 31 JULY. AT 1553Z A MESSAGE PASSED BETWEEN TWO UNIDENTIFIED STATIONS REVEALED THAT VESSEL T23 (UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE) WAS GOING OUT TO OPERATE. THE STATION RECEIVING THE MESSAGE WAS TOLD TO COMMUNICATE WITH THE VESSEL. THERE IS NO ELINT OR FURTHER COMINT EVIDENCE TO CONFIRM THAT T23 ACTUALLY SHADOWED THE MADDOX. ON 2 AUGUST VESSELS, T377 (SWATOW CLASS PGM), T146 (SWATOW CLASS PGM), AND T142 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) WERE ENGAGED IN SHADOW ACTIVITY (SEE SUBPARAGRAPH F. BELOW). ON 3 AUGUST "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACTS WERE NOTED AT 0620Z AND 1320Z. AT THE LATTER TIME THE MADDOX HELD A RADAR CONTACT THAT WAS APPARENTLY PARALLELING THE COURSE OF THE DESOTO SHIPS. MESSAGES INTERCEPTED BY USN 27 INDICATE THAT T142 WAS THE VESSEL INVOLVED DURING AT LEAST PART OF THE DAY. IT IS INTERESTING TO NOTE THAT BEGINNING AT 1200Z 2 HOURS AND 9 MINUTES OF PROBABLE DRV VOICE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON 131.0E MCS (SEE PARAGRAPH 3.B BELOW). AT 1439Z BEN THUY ORDERED VESSEL T379 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) TO GO TO HON NGU, BUT TO STAY CLOSE TO THE COASTLINE ENROUTE. AT 1550Z THE VESSEL REPORTED ITS ARRIVAL AT HON NGU AND ADDED THAT THE SITUATION AT SEA WAS PEACEFUL. ON BOTH 4 AND 5 AUGUST THE SHIP AGAIN HELD "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACTS, INDICATING FURTHER SHADOWING BY SWATOW CLASS PGM'S. COMINT INDICATES THAT T142 WAS INVOLVED ON BOTH DATES. ON 6 AUGUST THE DESOTO PATROL WAS TEMPORARILY SUSPENDED AND THE SHIPS REMAINED OUTSIDE THE GULF OF TONKIN. ON 7 AUGUST THE MADDOX AND C. TURNER JOY HELD A "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACT. AT 0309Z AN UNIDENTIFIED DRV NAVAL VESSEL BEGAN PASSING SIGHTINGS ON TWO ENEMY SHIPS (IDENTIFIED ONCE AS LIGHT CRUISERS). AT 0408Z THE VESSEL REPORTED THREE SHIPS AND TWO ENEMY PLANES AND SAID, "I AM FOLLOWING". (AT THIS TIME THE USS SAMUEL E. MOORE HAD TEMPORARILY JOINED THE DESOTO SHIPS FOR TRANSFER OF MATERIALS RELATING TO THE 2 AND 4 AUGUST ATTACKS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS.) SHADOW ACTIVITY WAS

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AGAIN NOTED ON 8 AUGUST WHEN THE C. TURNER JOY HELD A "SKINHEAD" RADAR CONTACT BETWEEN 0016Z AND 0106Z. THERE IS NO COMINT AVAILABLE TO IDENTIFY THE UNIT INVOLVED, BUT IT WAS PROBABLY A SWATOW CLASS PGM. AT 0314Z THE FINAL ACTIVITY THAT COULD BE RELATED TO THE SHADOWING OF THE DESOTO PATROL WAS NOTED WHEN A MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED THAT STATED AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL WOULD MAKE A PATROL FROM PORT GIANH TO VINH THAT NIGHT AND RETURN THE FOLLOWING DAY. AT THE TIME OF INTERCEPT THE DESOTO SHIPS WERE IN THE VICINITY OF 17-05N 107-18E, AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER CONCLUDED THE PATROL AND LEFT THE GULF OF TONKIN.

E. At 1626Z ON 1 AUGUST A PORTION OF A MESSAGE WAS INTERCEPTED WHICH MENTIONED THE "CHANGE OF THE ENEMY", ALERTING THE DETACHMENT FOR POSSIBLE HOSTILE ACTION. THE FULL TEXT OF THE MESSAGE, AS RECEIVED SHORTLY THEREAFTER FROM USN 27, INCLUDED THE STATEMENT, "IT HAS BEEN DECIDED TO FIGHT THE ENEMY TONIGHT". A MESSAGE PASSED TO T146 AT 1652Z GAVE THE POSITION OF THE "ENEMY ATTACK VESSEL" AS ELEVEN NAUTICAL MILES SOUTHEAST OF HON ME ON A BEARING OF 168 DEGREES. THIS WAS CLOSE TO THE ACTUAL POSITION OF THE MADDOX AT THAT TIME. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 1838Z FROM BEN THUY TO T377 STATED, "DRIFT NEAR HON NGU AND AWAIT ORDERS. WITH THE 520 BLOCKED ENEMY'S (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE). NUMBER ONE; DESTROY AND REDUCE ALL 40 KILO PARCELS TO MAKE ONE PARCEL; LASH THEM INTO THE BOW OF THE 377. PREPARE THE 23 SO THAT WHEN IT IS PUT IN USE IT KNOWS THE NATURE OF THE DECISION." AT 2011Z T377 NOTIFIED BEN THUY, "AT 020230 (G) AUGUST UNIT DRIFTING FIVE LIEN NORTHWEST OF POSITION." A LATER MESSAGE INTERCEPTED BY USN 27 REVEALED THAT THREE VESSELS OF 135 (MOTOR TORPEDO BOAT FLOTILLA 135) WERE BEING MOVED FROM PORT WALLUT TO HON ME. (IT IS BELIEVED THAT THESE WERE THE THREE PROBABLE P'4'S SIGHTED BY THE MADDOX ON 2 AUGUST.) WITH EVIDENCE OF POSSIBLE HOSTILE ACTION AT BOTH HON ME AND HON NGU THE MADDOX MOVED AWAY FROM THE COAST FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE NIGHT AND NO ENGAGEMENT TOOK PLACE.

F. ON 2 AUGUST A HEAVY FLOW OF TRAFFIC WAS NOTED ON DRV NAVAL NETS. VESSEL T377 CONTINUED ACTIVE AND AT 0336Z PASSED A SIGHTING THAT STATED, "AT 0800 TARGET THREE NAUTICAL MILES EAST OF HON ME." AT 0400Z THE MADDOX VISUALLY SIGHTED THREE PROBABLE P-4 CLASS MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AND TWO POSSIBLE SWATOW CLASS PGM'S. A MESSAGE FROM T146 INTERCEPTED AT 0634Z CONTAINED A SIGHTING OF THE "ENEMY SHIP". IT ALSO INDICATED THAT 135 WAS IN THE VICINITY OF HON ME. TWO OTHER MESSAGES FROM T146 TO HAIPHONG DURING THE NEXT HALF HOUR CONTAINED FURTHER INFORMATION CONCERNING THE COURSE, SPEED, AND MANEUVERS OF THE MADDOX. THEY ALSO STATED THAT THE "DIRECTORATE" WOULD COMMAND THE 135 AND CONTAINED INFORMATION CONCERNING THE TACTICS BEING EMPLOYED BY THE DRV VESSELS, INCLUDING THE MENTION OF LAUNCHING TORPEDOES. A MESSAGE FROM T142 TO PORT WALLUT INTERCEPTED BY USN 414T STATED, "RECEIVED ORDERS. T146, T142 DID (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE) USE HIGH SPEED TO GO TOGETHER WITH (ENEMY) FOLLOWING TO LAUNCH TORPEDOES." THE MADDOX WAS ATTACKED BY THREE DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS AT 0808Z. COMINT LATER INDICATED THAT THESE WERE T333, T336, AND T339. T339 WAS SUNK AND THE OTHER TWO VESSELS DAMAGED, T336 VERY HEAVILY.

G. IN A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 022341Z HAIPHONG INSTRUCTED T146 TO

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REPORT THE POSITION OF T135, T142, AND T146, TO SEND ONE VESSEL TO ASSIST "COMRADE GIANG'S SHIP", HAVE ONE VESSEL REMAIN TO ASSIST BOATS OF 135 AS TO THE NECESSITIES OF LIFE, AND TO ORGANIZE DEFENSES AT THE ANCHORAGE. T146 WAS FURTHER ORDERED TO MAINTAIN CONSTANT COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS AND NOT TO GO ANY PLACE WITHOUT ORDERS FROM HEADQUARTERS.

H. ON 4 AUGUST INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM USN 414T AND USM 626J INDICATED A POSSIBLE ATTACK ON THE DESOTO SHIPS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS THAT NIGHT.

I. FOLLOWING THE ATTACK BY CARRIER-BASED PLANES ON DRV NAVAL VESSELS AND INSTALLATIONS ON 5 AUGUST, DRV OFFICIALS APPEARED TO BE QUITE CONCERNED OVER THE SAFETY OF BOTH NAVAL AND MERCHANT VESSELS, AND TOOK ACTION TO LESSEN THE DANGER FROM ATTACKS OF ANY NATURE. AT 051614Z A MESSAGE FROM HAIPHONG TO ALL SHIPS ON A FISHING FLEET COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK STATED, "SITUATION INTRICATE TONIGHT; TEMPORARILY STAY AT (UNREADABLE PROBABLE PLACE NAME). ABSOLUTELY CANNOT NEGLECT THESE ORDERS (WHICH ARE) EFFECTIVELY UNTIL NEW ORDERS ARRIVE." A BADLY GARBLED MESSAGE INTERCEPTED LATER THAT DAY TO AN UNIDENTIFIED NAVAL VESSEL ORDERED IT TO HIRE FISHERMEN AND TO GO INTO SHORE AND MOBILIZE THE PEOPLE'S ARMY. IT ALSO DEALT WITH THE ASSIGNING OF VESSELS FOR ASSURANCE. VESSELS 495 AND 497 (UNIDENTIFIED AS TO TYPE) WERE MENTIONED SPECIFICALLY. AT 1928Z HAIPHONG INSTRUCTED VESSEL T142 TO "RETURN TO THE COAST IMMEDIATELY. ENROUTE SEARCH FOR A PLACE TO HIDE FROM PLANES BEFORE MORNING. REPORT YOUR POSITION AND ATTEMPT COMMUNICATIONS WITH HEADQUARTERS. THE MINE AREAS THAT THE ENEMY CANNOT ENTER ARE: A. 20-51-25N 107-04E, B. 20-53-20N 107-04E, C. 20-51-25N 105-09E, D. 20-53-25N 107-09E." AT 072032Z A MESSAGE FROM HAIPHONG REVEALED THAT, "THE FISHERMEN REQUEST OUR SHIPS TO MEET THEM AND GUARD THEM." A PROBABLE DISPERSAL PLAN WAS REVEALED WHEN IT CONTINUED, "ON 8 AUGUST THREE VESSELS ENTER (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE), TWO VESSELS GO INTO HAIPHONG, THREE SHIPS LEAVE THE RIVER MOUTH BETWEEN THEM."

J. AT 061548Z PORT WALLUT INFORMED AN UNIDENTIFIED VESSEL THAT, "FROM NOW ON WE WILL PRODUCE OUR INSIGNIA AS FOLLOWS: A YELLOW STAR; A RED BACKGROUND WITH A CIRCLE WITH A YELLOW EDGE. THERE WILL BE TWO RED LINES PASSING THROUGH THE YELLOW EDGE. THIS INSIGNIA WILL BE ON THE FUSELAGE, THE BELLY, THE WING, AND BEHIND THE TAIL OF THE PLANE. WHEN YOU OBSERVE AIRPLANES WITH THIS INSIGNIA ON IT, IT IS OUR PLANE. YOU MUST WAIT UNTIL YOU CAN DISTINGUISH IT."

K. AT 062312Z HAIPHONG INSTRUCTED VESSEL T120 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) TO TOW TWO OF 135'S BOATS BACK IMMEDIATELY. (THESE WERE LATER IDENTIFIED AS T333 AND T336, THE VESSELS DAMAGED IN THE 2 AUGUST ATTACK ON THE MADDOX. IT ALSO REVEALED THAT THE SALVAGE TUG BACH DANG WAS TOWING T132 (SWATOW CLASS PGM) AND THAT FURTHER DISCUSSIONS WOULD BE HELD CONCERNING THE TWO VESSELS THAT WERE SUNK (PROBABLY DURING THE AIR STRIKES OF 5 AUGUST.

L. BETWEEN 6 AND 8 AUGUST SEVERAL PROPAGANDA TYPE MESSAGES WERE INTERCEPTED ON DRV NAVAL NETS. A MESSAGE FROM PORT WALLUT INTERCEPTED AT 061615Z CLAIMED THAT ON 2 AUGUST, "WE CHASED OFF THE AMERICAN WARSHIP

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AND THAT ON 5 AUGUST FIVE ENEMY PLANES WERE SHOT DOWN AND THREE DAMAGED, AND ONE AMERICAN PILOT CAPTURED ALIVE. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 071720Z STATED, "WISH YOU VICTORY; IT IS THE BEGINNING OF THE FEELING OF HOSTILITY; PUSH STRONGLY THE DECISION (ONE GROUP UNREADABLE) ENEMY AND CARRY OUT EACH MISSION." OTHER MESSAGES DEALT WITH ALERT CONDITIONS AT BASES AND THE AWARDING OF MEDALS ON 8 AUGUST.

M. A MESSAGE INTERCEPTED AT 090320Z FROM FORT WALLUT TO AN UNIDENTIFIED STATION REVEALED THAT THE BODY OF ONE AMERICAN PILOT HAD BEEN PULLED OUT OF THE WATER ALONG THE COAST.

3. QUANTITY AND QUALITY OF INTERCEPT:

A. A TOTAL OF 135 HOURS AND 14 MINUTES OF MANUAL MORSE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED. THIS INCLUDED 96 HOURS AND 41 MINUTES OF DRV NAVAL TRAFFIC AND 17 HOURS AND 27 MINUTES OF [] NAVAL TRAFFIC. SIGNALS WERE GOOD TO EXCELLENT DURING THE PATROL, EXCEPT WHEN THE TRANSMITTERS OF THE MADDOX BLOCKED ALL FREQUENCIES.

B. A TOTAL OF 7 HOURS AND 49 MINUTES OF PROBABLE DRV RADIO-TELEPHONE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED. INCLUDED IN THIS WAS 7 HOURS AND 25 MINUTES OF POSSIBLE NAVAL TRAFFIC INTERCEPTED ON 125.0E AND 131.0E MCS. THE GREAT MAJORITY OF THIS TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED WHILE IN THE VICINITY OF 19-00N 105-53E. HOWEVER, ON 3 AUGUST STRONG SIGNALS WERE INTERCEPTED ON 131.0E MCS WHILE OPERATING APPROXIMATELY SEVENTY-FIVE MILES FROM THE DRV COAST. WHETHER THIS WAS THE RESULT OF DRV NAVAL VESSELS KNOWN TO BE SHADOWING THE MADDOX, OR DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS IS NOT KNOWN. DURING THE SAME PERIOD, THE SHIP'S SURFACE SEARCH RADAR WAS TRACKING CONTACTS AT UNUSUALLY LONG DISTANCES BECAUSE OF DUCTING. SPECIAL EFFORTS WERE MADE DURING BOTH ATTACKS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS TO ISOLATE THE ATTACKING VESSELS IN VOICE COMMUNICATIONS. HOWEVER, ON BOTH OCCASSIONS ALL FREQUENCIES BETWEEN 100 AND 200 MCS WERE BLOCKED BY THE SHIP AND SUPPORTING AIRCRAFT.

C. ON 5 AUGUST, 36 MINUTES OF UNIDENTIFIED [] RADIO-TELEPHONE TRAFFIC WAS INTERCEPTED ON [] SIGNALS WERE FAIR TO GOOD DURING THE PERIOD OF THE INTERCEPT, BUT BECAUSE OF THE DISTANCE OF THE SHIP FROM THE [] COAST IT IS BELIEVED THE INTERCEPT WAS DUE TO ATMOSPHERIC CONDITIONS.

D. A SUMMARY OF ELINT INTERCEPT WILL BE INCLUDED IN THE DESOTO REPORT SUBMITTED BY USS MADDOX.

4. DIRECT SUPPORT SIGINT PROVIDED USS MADDOX:

A. WHILE ENROUTE TO THE GULF OF TONKIN ON 30 JULY, AND AT OTHER TIMES DURING THE PATROL WHEN THE MADDOX WAS OPERATING NEAR [] TERRITORY, [] AIR DEFENSE NETS (EITHER MANUAL MORSE OR VOICE AS CAPABILITIES PERMITTED) WERE MONITORED TO PROVIDE EARLY WARNING SUPPORT TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER. ON 30 JULY NINE RAIDS, CONSISTING OF AT LEAST TWELVE PROBABLE [] JET FIGHTERS, WERE TRACKED OVER THE []

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[] HOWEVER, NO REACTION TO THE DESOTO SHIP WAS NOTED AT ANY TIME ON THESE NETS.

B. THE INFORMATION CONCERNING SHADOW ACTIVITY AND THE IMPENDING ATTACKS BY DRV NAVAL VESSELS CONTAINED IN PARAGRAPH 2 ABOVE WAS PASSED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER, USS MADDOX AND COMMANDER, DESTROYER DIVISION 192 IMMEDIATELY AFTER DECODING OR RECEIPT OVER THE GRI BROADCAST. IN ADDITION, A DAILY MEETING OF ALL COMINT CLEARED OFFICERS WAS HELD TO DISCUSS SIGNIFICANT EVENTS OF THE PREVIOUS DAY.

C. THE DETACHMENT'S TWO ELINT PERSONNEL WERE ASSIGNED DIRECTLY TO THE OPERATIONS OFFICER OF THE MADDOX TO ASSIST IN THE COMBAT INFORMATION CENTER. THEY PROVIDED ADVICE AND INSTRUCTION TO AID THE SHIP'S COMPANY ECM OPERATORS IN THE COLLECTION AND EVALUATION OF ELECTRONIC INTELLIGENCE, AND ALSO STOOD NORMAL ECM WATCHES.

5. PERFORMANCE OF EQUIPMENT:

A. THE PERFORMANCE OF ALL INTERCEPT EQUIPMENT WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE PATROL. THE SHIP'S LONG WIRE ANTENNA WAS USED FOR HIGH FREQUENCY INTERCEPT AND THE GRI BROADCAST. IT GAVE EXCELLENT RESULTS, AS DID THE VHF ANTENNAS INSTALLED ON THE VAN.

B. THE PERFORMANCE OF THE KWR-37 AND ALL ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT WAS OUTSTANDING. THE ONLY PROBLEM ENCOUNTERED WITH THIS SYSTEM OCCURRED FOLLOWING THE SECOND ATTACK BY DRV MOTOR TORPEDO BOATS WHEN JARRING CAUSED BY THE FIRING OF THE SHIP'S GUNS NECESSITATED MINOR ADJUSTMENTS TO THE KWR-37 AND THE BOEHME FREQUENCY SHIFT CONVERTER.

C. ON 7 AUGUST ONE OF THE VAN'S AIR CONDITIONERS BROKE AND COULD NOT BE REPAIRED ABOARD SHIP DUE TO THE LACK OF SPARE PARTS. A "RED DEVIL" BLOWER WAS OBTAINED FROM THE SHIP, AND ALTHOUGH THE TEMPERATURE IN THE VAN ROSE SLIGHTLY, THE DETACHMENT WAS ABLE TO CONTINUE FULL OPERATIONS WITHOUT ILL EFFECTS TO EITHER EQUIPMENT OR PERSONNEL.

D. IN ADDITION TO NEEDED AIR CONDITIONING REPAIRS, THE VAN, AFTER ALMOST SIX WEEKS OF SOLID PATROL TIME, IS IN NEED OF A GENERAL OVERHAUL.

6. COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS:

A. EXCELLENT COOPERATION WAS RECEIVED FROM PERSONNEL OF THE USS MADDOX IN ALL RESPECTS. THE SHIP MADE EVERY EFFORT TO INSURE THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE DETACHMENT'S MISSION AND TO PROVIDE COMFORTABLE LIVING AND WORKING SPACES FOR THE DETACHMENT. THE ONLY DIFFICULTY ENCOUNTERED WAS THE BLOCKING OF INTERCEPT AT TIMES BY THE SHIP'S TRANSMITTERS (SEE PARAGRAPH 3 ABOVE), AND THIS WAS HELD TO A MINIMUM BY SENDING ROUTINE TRAFFIC WHEN IT WOULD LEAST INTERFERE WITH PRODUCTIVE INTERCEPT BY THE DETACHMENT.

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B. THE SUPPORT PROVIDED TO THE DETACHMENT BY THE COMINT STATIONS TASKED WITH DESOTO SUPPORT WAS EXCELLENT THROUGHOUT THE PATROL. ESPECIALLY OUTSTANDING WAS THE SUPPORT PROVIDED BY USN 27 AND USN 4147/ USN 626J WHEN THE PATROL WAS BEING SUBJECTED TO ENEMY ATTACK BETWEEN 2 AND 4 AUGUST. THE ONLY RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPROVEMENT WOULD BE TO INCLUDE BRIEF TECHNICAL DETAILS WITH THE INFORMATION PROVIDED SO THAT THE DETACHMENT COULD CONCENTRATE ITS EFFORTS ON THOSE CASES WHICH APPEAR TO BE MOST PRODUCTIVE AT ANY PARTICULAR TIME.

C. ONE OF THE OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THIS PATROL WAS THE PROOF (IF ANY WAS REQUIRED) OF THE VALUE AND RELIABILITY OF THE GRI BROADCAST. AT THE BEGINNING OF THE PATROL THERE WAS SOME APPREHENSION THAT IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE TO COPY THE GRI BROADCAST WHILE IN THE GULF OF TONKIN. HOWEVER, THESE FEARS PROVED TO BE GROUNDLESS. AFTER SOME DIFFICULTY IN FINDING A SATISFACTORY NIGHT FREQUENCY THE FIRST TWO NIGHTS AFTER LEAVING KEELUNG, THE BROADCAST WAS COPIED WITH A CIRCUIT AVAILABILITY OF ALMOST 90 PER CENT FOR THE REMAINDER OF THE PATROL. (CIRCUIT AVAILABILITY FOR THE ENTIRE PATROL WAS 82.5 PER CENT.) USE OF THE ADONIS BACK-UP SYSTEM WAS NOT REQUIRED. THE VALUE OF ON-LINE COMMUNICATIONS TO THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THIS DESOTO PATROL CANNOT BE OVEREMPHASIZED.

D. IT IS BELIEVED THAT THIS WAS ONE OF THE FIRST DESOTO PATROLS TO HAVE PERSONNEL ASSIGNED WHOSE PRIMARY FUNCTION WAS ANALYSIS OF INTERCEPTED TRAFFIC. THIS PROVED TO BE EXTREMELY VALUABLE. EVEN THOUGH MUCH OF THE INFORMATION WAS RECEIVED FROM OTHER SOURCES LATER, IN SEVERAL INSTANCES HIGHLY SIGNIFICANT INFORMATION WAS PASSED TO THE COMMANDING OFFICER MUCH EARLIER THAN WOULD HAVE BEEN POSSIBLE WITHOUT TRAINED ANALYSTS ABOARD. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT FUTURE DESOTO PATROL TEAMS INCLUDE TWO ANALYSTS WHO ARE THOROUGHLY FAMILIAR WITH THE PRIMARY COMINT TARGET OF THE PATROL.

E. THE COMMUNICATIONS VAN PROVIDED AN EXCELLENT WORKING SPACE FOR THE DETACHMENT'S OPERATIONS, AND PLACING THE VAN BETWEEN THE STACKS DID NOT APPEAR TO HAMPER OPERATIONS IN ANY RESPECT. HOWEVER, THE PRESENT VAN IS HARDLY ADEQUATE IN SIZE FOR EVEN AN ORDINARY PATROL, AND WHEN EMERGENCY CONDITIONS PREVAIL (AS THEY DID ON MUCH OF THE PRESENT PATROL), IT BECOMES INADEQUATE. IT IS RECOMMENDED THAT A LARGER VAN BE PROCURED FOR FUTURE PATROLS, AND THAT THE INSTALLATION PROVIDE FOR A MINIMUM OF FOUR (PREFERABLY FIVE) INTERCEPT POSITIONS, ONE COMMUNICATIONS POSITION, AND ADEQUATE SPACE FOR PROCESSING AND ANALYSIS. THE NUMBER OF POSITIONS USED FOR MANUAL MORSE AND RADIO-TELEPHONE COLLECTION COULD BE VARIED FROM PATROL TO PATROL, DEPENDING ON THE TARGET COUNTRY'S COMMUNICATIONS.

Gerrell D. Moore
GERRELL D. MOORE

COPY TO:

CHO (OP-94G/654) (ADVANCE)

CHO (OP-922Y) (ADVANCE)

COMNAVFORJAPAN

DIRNSA (3 COPIES-C11, (822) 826) ←

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NSAPACREP VIETNAM (C)

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~~TOP SECRET DINAR~~

~~SECRET KIMBO~~

GAZETTEER:

BEN THUAT	18-39N	105-42E
HAIPHONG	20-52N	106-41E
HON EN	18-18N	105-09E
HON HE	19-23N	105-56E
HON HE	19-54N	105-01E
HON NGU	18-48N	105-47E
ISLE DU TIGRE	17-10N	107-20E
PORT BLANCH	17-42N	105-29E
PORT WALLOT	21-13N	107-34E
THANH HOA	20-00N	105-30E
VINH	18-40N	105-40E
VINH SON	17-56N	108-23E

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ENCLOSURE (1)

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF INTERCEPT

I. RADIO-TELEPHONE:

<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
01 AUG 64	VHXS SRCH	3.861E	1000	1012	12
	VHXS SRCH	125.00E	1126	1220	54
	VHXS SRCH	131.00E	1505	1553	48
	VHXS SRCH	125.00E	1723	1858	95
	VHXS SRCH	125.00E	1916	2002	46
	VHXS SRCH	125.00E	2350	0030	34
02 AUG 64	VHXS SRCH	125.00E	0857	0905	08
	VHSX SRCH	5.780E	0904	0907	03
03 AUG 64	VHXS SRCH	131.00E	0807	0831	24
	VHXS SRCH	131.00E	1200	1245	45
	VHXS SRCH	131.00E	1249	1414	85
04 AUG 64	VHXS SRCH	131.00E	0900	0906	06
	VHXS SRCH	3.135E	1345	1354	09

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2. MANUAL MORSE:

DATE CASE FREQ T/U T/D TOTAL MIN

29 JUL 64

[REDACTED]

VHXB 6386 0140 0151 11

[REDACTED]

VHXB 6673 0420 0423 03

VHXB 5814 0448 0452 04

[REDACTED]

VHXB 6358 0723 0730 04

[REDACTED]

VHXB 6273 0943 0951 03

[REDACTED]

VHXB 6239 1109 1111 02

VHXB 6582 1144 1149 05

[REDACTED]

VHXB 6507 1227 1232 05

VHNB 6407 1240 1258 18


[REDACTED]

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
29 JUL 64	VHNB	3510	1604	1605	02
	VHNB	3497	1612	1630	08



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VHXB	2690	2102	2114	12
VHXB	3467	1710	1711	01



30 JUL 64	VHSB 50203	6315	0040	0045	05
	VHNB 50109	6565	0105	0116	11



VHXB	6341	0329	0347	18
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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/S</u>
30 JUL 64	XXXB	6646	041
	XXXB	6646	050

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[Redacted]

VHNB 6917 050

[Redacted]

VHNB 50109 6543 034

VHNB 50109 6543 071


VHNB J0060 6349 071

VHNB 50204 6532 071

[Redacted]

VHNB 6310 101

[Redacted]



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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
31 JUL 64	VHNB	4103	1722	1727	05
	VHXB	3374	1920	1935	15
	VHNB 50106	3542	1945	1957	12
	VHNB	3833	2010	2017	07
	VHNB 50108	3722	2019	2020	01
	VHNB 30105	3044	1950	1958	08
	VHNB 50109	2993	2032	2045	13
	VHNB	4155	2105	2120	12
	VHNB 50401	3800	2049	2053	04
	VHNB 50105	3048	2150	2210	20
	VHXB	3466	1522	1527	05
	VHNB	4103	1722	1727	05
	VHXB	3374	1920	1935	15
	VHNB 50106	3542	1945	1957	12
	VHNB	3833	2010	2017	07
	VHNB 50108	3722	2019	2020	01
	VHNB 30105	3044	1950	1958	08
	VHNB 50109	2993	2032	2045	13
	VHNB	4155	2108	2120	12
	VHNB 50401	3800	2049	2053	04
	VHNB 50106	3048	2150	2210	20
	VHNB	3542	2228	2237	09
	VHXB	3543	2245	2305	20
	VHXB	4558	2305	2314	09
	VHNB 50106	3058	2332	2353	21

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>I/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
01 AUG 64	VHNB 50106	5904	0032	0124	52
	VHNB 50109	5851	0132	0140	08
	VHNB 50106	5895	0142	0143	01
	VHXB	6497	0020	0022	02
	VHNB 50109	5815	0058	0102	04
	VHNB 50106	5902	0108	0119	11
	VHNB 50109	5830	0125	0211	46
	VHNB 50109	5832	0250	0258	08
	VHNB 50106	5900	0310	0312	02
	VHXB	5858	0343	0354	11
	VHNB 50109	5832	0317	0359	42
	VHNB 50109	5831	0403	0415	07
	VHNB 50106	5900	0420	0437	17
	VHXB	5856	0437	0505	03
	VHNB 50109	5833	0507	0503	01
	XXXB	5909	0500	0503	03
	VHXB	5385	0545	0558	13
	VHNB 50109	5833	0548	0505	17
	VHXB	5818	0715	0725	10
	VHNB 50109	5835	0736	0748	12
	VHNB 50106	5892	0750	0801	11
	VHNB 50109	5811	0831	0847	16
	VHNB 50109	5803	0916	0937	21
	VHXB	5797	0957	1000	03
	VHNB 50109	5812	1003	1045	42

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
01 AUG 64	VHSD 50101	8480	1030	1040	10
	VHNB 50109	5816	1020	1045	25
	VHNB 50109	5816	1100	1105	05
	VHNB 50109	5816	1115	1118	03
	VHNB 50109	5816	1130	1135	05
	VHNB 50109	5816	1145	1148	03
	VHNB 50109	5816	1151	1155	04
	VHNB 50109	5816	1200	1205	05
	VHNB	6303	1203	1216	13
	VHNB 50501	6297	1145	1200	15
	VHNB 50109	5819	1216	1235	19
	VHNB 50109	7815	1156	1300	64
	VHNB 50109	3000	1300	1455	115
	VHNB 50108	3834	1403	1435	32
	VHNB 50108	3834	1437	1445	08
	VHNB 50108	3860/3835	1504	1545	41
	VHNB 50108	3834/3860	1622	1639	17
	VHNB 50109	3000/3258	1605	1715	70
	VHNB	3704	1728	1755	27
	VHNB 50109	3834/3860	1704	1735	31
	VHNB 50109	3860/3834	1803	1848	45
	VHNB 50109	2951	1815	1818	03
	VHNB 50108	3834	1918	1926	08
	VHNB 50108	3834	1940	1942	02

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
01 AUG 64	VHNB 50109	2972	1930	2002	32
	VHNB 50109	2972	2010	2022	12
	VHNB 50108	3834	2005	2025	19
	VHNB 50109	2986	2038	2133	55
	VHNB 50108	3834	2104	2111	07



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	VHNB 50109	2986	2142	2153	11
	VHNB 50109	2972	2209	2219	10
	VHNB 50109	2986	2218	2219	01
	VHNB 50109	2986	2228	2312	44
	VHNB 50108	3834	2202	2223	21
	VHNB 50109	2975	2232	2257	25
	VHNB 50109	3834	2302	2315	13
	VHNB 50109	2987	2316	2321	05
	VHNB 50109	3009	2326	2336	10
02 AUG 64	VHNB 50109	5823	0012	0032	20
	VHNB 50108	3834	0001	0012	11
	VHNB 50108	3834	0100	0124	24
	VHNB 50109	5824	0105	0112	07
	VHNB 50109	5825	0138	0340	122
	VHNB 50108	3834	0200	0229	29
	VHNB 50108	3834	0300	0336	36
	VHNB 50108	3834	0400	0414	14
	VHNB 50108	3834	0500	0529	29

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
02 AUG 64	VHNB 50108	3834	0600	0610	10
	VHNB 50205	5210	0535	0553	18
	VHNB 50109	5819	0352	0416	24
	VHNB 50109	5814	0425	0442	17
	VHNB 50109	5819	0443	0458	15
	VHNB 50109	5802	0546	0515	29
	VHNB 50109	5795	0525	0715	50
	VHNB 50109	5005	1332	1348	16
	VHNB 50109	2998	1410	1420	10
	VHNB 50109	3010	1519	1543	24
	VHNB 50203	3356	1530	1554	24
	VHNB 50106	3099	1708	1721	13
	VHNB 50109	3010	1750	1805	15
	VHNB 50109	2997	1836	1839	03
	VHNB 50109	3010	1856	1903	07
	VHNB 50109	2997	1903	1905	02
	VHNB 50109	3010	2023	2035	12
	VHNB 50108	3698	2100	2146	46
	VHNB 50108	3698	2200	2241	41
03 AUG 64	VHNB 50109	5864	0351	0359	08
	VHNB 50106	5866	0405	0412	07
	VHNB 50109	5858	0521	0526	05
	VHNB 50109	3239	0023	0033	10
	VHNB 30109	5810	0057	0120	23

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>Y/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
03 AUG 64	VHXB	5799	0129	0146	17
	VHNB 50109	5862	0202	0215	13
<div style="border: 1px solid black; height: 20px; width: 500px; margin: 10px 0;"></div>					
	VHNB 50109	5848	0235	0253	18
	VHNB 50109	5836	0254	0255	01
	VHNB 50109	5517	0314	0317	03
	VHNB 50109	5817	0318	1322	04
	VHNB 50109	5792	0334	0350	16
	VHXB	5764	0426	0432	06
	VHXB	5826	0613	0615	02
	VHNB 50109	5822	0622	0650	28
	VHNB	3738	0605	0640	35
	VHNB 50109	5819	0658	0713	15
	VHNB 50109	1618	0724	0747	23
	VHNB 50109	5824	0800	0807	07
	VHNB	3738	0700	0759	59
	VHNB	3738	0800	0810	10
	VHNB 50109	5820	0816	0830	14
	VHNB 50109	5810	0842	0848	06
	VHNB 50109	5822	0829	0850	21
	VHNB 50109	5810	0908	0924	16
	VHNB 50109	5810	0930	1014	44
	VHNB 50109	5858	0902	0937	35
	VHNB 50109	5858	0940	0958	18

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIU</u>
03 AUG 64	VHNB 50109	5802	1009	1012	04
	VHNB 50109	5904	1153	1202	09
	XXXS	6565	1211	1221	10
	VHNB 50109	5904	1218	1228	10
	VHNB 50109	3692	1310	1321	11
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1335	1403	33
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1425	1432	07
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1440	1441	01
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1459	1504	05
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1548	1555	07
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1610	1613	03
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1630	1633	03
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1700	1709	03
	VHNB 50109	3692/3710	1755	1805	11
	VHNB 50109	3692/3700	1900	1903	03
	VHNB 50109	3692	2000	2006	06
	VHNB 50109	2982	2155	2213	18
	VHNB 50109	2985	2225	2226	01
	VHNB	3790	2232	2249	17
	VHNB 50109	3245	2332	2340	08
	VHNB	3238	2345	2347	02

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
04 AUG 64	VHNB	5827	0049	0053	04
[REDACTED]					
	VHNB 50108	3710	0102	0116	14
[REDACTED]					
	VHNB	5559	0155	0202	07
	VHNB 50108	3710	0102	0205	53
	VHNB 50109	3819	0219	0220	01
	VHNB 50108	3707	0222	0245	24
	VHNB 50106	5900	0251	0254	03
	VHNB 50108	3707	0313	0329	16
	VHNB 50108	3707	0330	0350	20
	VHNB 50109	5862	0328	0338	10
	XXNB	5815	0352	0413	21
	VHNB 50108	3707	0407	0431	24
	VHNB 50109	5832	0500	0505	05
	VHNB	5852	0745	0805	20
	VHNB 50109	5814	0808	0822	14
	VHNB 50109	5814	0853	0857	04
	VHNB 50108	3693	0504	0515	11
	VHNB 50108	3693	0557	0503	06
	VHNB 50108	3707	0603	0633	30
	VHNB 50108	3723	0700	0704	04
	VHNB 50108	3693	0704	0706	02

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
04 AUG 64	VHNB 50108	3724	0714	0723	09
	VHNB 50108	3726	0733	0803	30
	VHNB 50108	3719	0805	0810	05
	VHNB 50108	3693	0904	0909	05
	VHNB 50108	3733	0919	0930	11
	VHNB	3608	0940	0959	19
	VHNB 50108	3723	1004	1012	08
	VHNB 50109	5800	0915	0917	02
	VHNB 50109	5800	0925	1020	55
	XXXB	3082	1316	1323	07
	VHNB 50108	3753	1328	1334	06
	VHNB 50109	2989	1328	1359	31
	VHXB	3400	1420	1430	10
	XXXB	3057	1726	1745	19
	VHNB 50109	2984	1748	1753	05
	VHNB 50109	2998	1800	1842	42
	XXXB	3753	1902	1908	06
	VHNB 50109	2984	1935	2055	20
	VHNB 50109	3000	2053	2057	04
	VHNB 50109	3018	2344	2352	08
	VHNB	3815	2315	2345	30
	VHNB 50109	5800	0105	0124	19
	VHNB 50109	5800	0132	0136	04
	VHNB 50106	5804	0145	0152	07

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/O</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
05 AUG 64	VHNB	6598	0200	0207	07
	VHNB 50108	3707/3696	0226	0311	45
	VHNB 50108	3696	0314	0354	40
	VHNB 50109	5825	0522	0525	03
	VHNB 50109	5810	0545	0616	31
	VHXB	3757	0602	0515	13
	VHNB 50103	3756	0619	0620	01
	VHNB	6912	0620	0632	12
	VHXB	5597	0700	0712	12
	VHNB 50108	3693	0705	0718	13
	VHNB 50108	3711	0637	0640	03
	VHNB 50109	5836	0804	0844	40
	XXXB	5801	0852	0902	10
	VHNB 50109	5826	0909	1016	67
	VHNB 50101	8472	1026	1056	30
	VHXB	5826	1102	1104	2
	VHNB 50109	5814	1110	1124	14
	VHNB 50109	5881	1135	1139	04
	XXXB	5806	1218	1224	06
	VHNB 50109	5817	1231	1232	01
	VHNB 50109	5836	1241	1242	01
	VHNB	3546	1313	1352	39
	VHNB	3546	1410	1438	28
	VHNB	3546	1520	1522	02

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>
05 AUG 64	VHNB 50109	3247	1520
	VHSB 50103	3724	1600
	VHNB 50116	3570	1655
	VHSB 50103	3125	1840
	VHSB 50103	3125	1900
	VHNB 50119	3586	1920
	VHNB 50119	3586	2100
	VHNB 50118	3594	2220
	VHNB 50118	3594	2300
	VHNB 50119	3597	2320
	VHNB 50109	3248	2340
	VHXB	3602	2360
	VHXB	2899	2380
06 AUG 64	VHNB	3549	0000
	XXXB	6456	0000
	VHXB	6194	0000
	VHNB 50109	5840	0000
	XXXB	5863	0000
	VHNB 50106	5906	0000
	VHNB	3591	0000
	VHNB 50106	5904	0000
	VHNB	5851	0000
	VHNB 50109	5837	0000

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
07 AUG 64	VHNB 50108	3698	0254	0257	03
	VHNB	3708	0259	0314	15
	VHNB	3710	0400	0408	06
	VHNB 50109	3247	0039	0012	03
	VHNB 50109	5793	0044	0105	21
	VHNB 50109	5605	0204	0226	22
	VHNB 50109	5816	0225	0229	03
	VHNB 50109	5814	0324	0350	26
	VHNB	5841	0432	0437	05
	VHNB	3547	0457	0514	17
	VKXB	3752	0534	0538	04
	VHNB 50108	3697	0540	0552	12
	VHNB	6272	0547	0550	03
	VHNB	3548	0555	0605	10
	VHNB 50109	6561	0612	0651	39
	VHNB	3548	0700	0704	04
	VHNB 50108	3707	0704	0707	03
	VHNB 50109	6561	0734	0832	58
	VHNB 50108	3707	0800	0811	11
	VHNB	3700	0831	0837	06
	VHNB 50109	5848	0845	0900	15
	VHNB 50108	3707	0900	0910	10
	VHNB	6541	0900	0915	15
	VHNB 50108	3699	1100	1125	25

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DATE CASE FREQ T/U T/D TOTAL MIN

07 AUG 64

[REDACTED]

NSA25X3

VHNB 50109	5839	1140	1143	03	
VHNB 50106	3704	1412	1430	18	
VHNB 50108	3704	1500	1518	18	
VHNB 50203	3392	1539	1555	16	
VHXB	3483	1633	1634	01	
VHNB	3592	1715	1720	05	
VHNB	3704	1903	1903	03	
VHNB	3707	1909	1911	02	
VHXB	4122	1923	1925	02	
VHNB 50108	3700	1948	2043	55	
VHXB	3009	2134	2141	07	
VHXB	3700	2125	2158	33	
VHXB	4456	2203	2203	03	
VHXB	4435	2203	2212	06	
VHNB 50205	4456	2212	2222	10	
VHXB	3433	2328	2333	05	
VHXB	3668	2337	2347	10	
VHNB 50108	3700	2300	2316	16	
08 AUG 64	VHXB	6679	0004	0010	06

[REDACTED]

NSA25X3

VHNB 50109	5823	0034	0052	18
VHNB 50108	3700	0100	0143	43
VHNB 50109	3707	0300	0315	15

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
08 AUG 64	VHXB	6284	0250	0254	04
	VHNB	5799	0328	0354	28
	VHNB 50108	3727	0406	0412	04
	VHNB 50109	5795	0450	0454	04
	VHNB 50109	5813	0530	0541	11
	VHXB	6300	0715	0718	03
	VHXB	6514	0810	0815	05
	VHNB	6528	0722	0735	13
	VHXB	6550	1000	1003	03
	VHNB 50106	3700	0519	0526	07
	VHNB 50109	3700	0505	0511	05
	VHNB	5799	0630	0551	21
	VHNB 50109	3701	0704	0715	11
	VHNB 50204	6501	0720	0758	38



NSA25X3

	VHNB 50108	3738	1110	1130	20
09 AUG 64	VHNB 50119	6710	0010	0035	25
	VHXB	6279	0045	0050	05
	VHXB	6389	0103	0105	02
	VHNB	3709	0110	0123	13
	VHNB	3700	0134	0140	06
	VHNB 50109	6540	0300	0305	05
	VHXB	6545	0325	0328	03
	VHXB	6584	0338	0340	02

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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>	<u>ASE</u>
09 AUG 64	XXXB	6743	0355	0358	03	HNB .
	VHNB 50108	3707	0403	0417	14	HNB 5
	VHNB 50106	5868	0425	0430	05	HXB .
	VHNB 50106	5868	0452	0507	15	HNB 5
	VHNB 50109	5832/6551	0530	0548	18	HNB 5
	VHXB	6366	0525	0528	03	HNB 5
	VHNB 50108	3710	0703	0734	31	HNB 5
	VHXB	6306	0745	0752	07	HNB 5
	VHNB 50108	3700	0800	0810	10	HNB 5
	VHNB 50106	5828	0848	0902	14	HNB 5
	VHNB 50108	3700	0902	0910	08	HNB 5
	XXXB	3717	1128	1132	04	HNB .
	VHNB 50108	3702	1206	1225	19	<input type="checkbox"/> 31
	XXXB	3594	1319	1333	14	HNB 50
	VHNB 50109	3023	1550	1630	40	HNB 50
	VHXB	4354	2025	2036	11	HXB .
	VHNB 50108	3702	2302	2347	45	HNB 50
10 AUG 64	VHNB 50109	5856	0018	0030	12	HXB .
	XXXB	5845	0031	0040	09	HNB 50
	VHNB 50108	3700	0200	0205	05	HNB 50
	VHNB 50108	3700	0300	0310	10	HNB 50
	VHNB 50108	3714	0314	0330	16	HNB .

NSA25X3

DATE CASE FREQ T/U T/D TOTAL MIN

10 AUG 64

[REDACTED]

NSA25X3

VHNB 50108	3703	1358	1411	13
VHNB 50108	3590	1411	1426	15
VHXB	3400	1540	1557	17
VHNB 50108	3697	1602	1603	01
VHXB	3530	1653	1659	06
VHNB 50108	3700	1700	1710	10

11 AUG 64

[REDACTED]

VHNB	7480	0428	0542	74
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[REDACTED]

VHNB 50108	3694	0602	0620	18
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12 AUG 64

[REDACTED]

14 AUG 64

DATE CASE FREQ T/U F/T TOTAL MIN

14 AUG 64




NSA25X3

VHXB 3704 1602 1615 13

VHXB 3707 1617 1620 03

15 AUG 64



DATE CASE FREQ T/U T/D TOTAL MIN

16 AUG 54

[REDACTED]					
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NSA25X3

LATE ENTRIES FROM 05 AUG 64

VHNB	3546	1359	1547	108
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<u>DATE</u>	<u>CASE</u>	<u>FREQ</u>	<u>T/U</u>	<u>T/D</u>	<u>TOTAL MIN</u>
05 AUG 64	VN1B	3450	1504	1512	08
	VN1C	3542	1547	1516	31
	VN1D	3530	1630	1608	05
	VN1E	3546	1600	1614	44
	VN1F	3548	1932	1935	03

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