For 4 Autust it may be generally said theat FALSH msgs sent frm the west Pac w re taking about an hour to reach the NMCC. Half of all msgs concerning the DS pat incident that day were recved anhour and a half oafter origin. IMMED prec msgs took about an additional hour and half in tranmisn over FLASH.

V-48 Apparnelty nothing was gained tie wise by addressing msgs directly to the JCS for action rather than sending them as INFO copies. It is not known how much time was taken in bringing msgs addressed to CNO but not to JCS to the attention of NMCC pers/. Altho all of the messages sent by Maddox, except one, were of FLASH prece. they were not necessary relayed in that prec.

Alto the mediam time for smmn of FLASH msgs were receiv wto the NMCC was 57 minutes, ¼ of these 43 whil ¼ took one hour 21 minutes or longer. These times were all considerably lessened in recept at theNavy COMCTR in the Pen as compared with the Army Crypto Center in the Pen which passed them on to the NMCC. The mediam diff for FLASH msgs was 9 minutes faster to NAVCOMMCTR.

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In sum, from mid-March until early August 1;964, thehighest echelons on U.S. national decision-making authority had been deliberating ways andmeans to stop continud NVN covert assistance to the comm rebels operating in SVN and L. 2 by-products of these deliberations were available to aid the decision makers when it became necessary to formulate a resp nse to the PT attacks on ht eUSS mMADDox in intl waters. These by-products were CINCPAC OPLAN 37-74 and the so-called "94 target list." The latter was a detailed assessment of targeting options in NVN from which decision-makers could choose among a wide range of retaliatory options.

NSC ;25 July

JCS 27 July - 30 July