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UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

**SECRET**

*Setup for  
Mon 13/1/69  
1400*

P.L.  
86-36

# Memorandum

TO : DI

Serial: P2/023

DATE: 10 January 1969

FROM : P2

SUBJECT: Interview with DIRNSA Re. Gulf of Tonkin Incidents

Here are a few questions for General Carter's consideration during the projected interview for the Southeast Asia cryptologic history project:

1. How great was the concern of USIB over the general situation in SEA just before the Gulf of Tonkin? Did the intelligence agencies and USIB anticipate any action on the part of North Vietnam? On the part of Communist China? Was there, instead, a general climate of expectation?
2. How did SIGINT influence national-level decision making during the Gulf of Tonkin incidents?
3. In your view did 34A play any significant part in the North Vietnamese action?
4. Was SIGINT of prime importance to McNamara in his congressional appearances on the subject?
5. Was there any feeling in the intelligence community that the SIGINT provided had been misleading in any way?
6. Do you have any guidance to offer relevant to controversial aspects of this subject?

*Info*  
*13/1/69*  
*Project to B. Gerhard*  
*13/1/69*

*DIR will give only acct of info re. McN.*

*Bill*  
Mr. W. Gerhard



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*Mic*