OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA GEN. REG. NO. 27
5010-106

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

SERIAL: B/639/64
DATE: 21 Aug 1964

TO : D/DIR

NSA25X1
NSA25X3

FROM : Chief, B

SUBJECT: Potential Damage as Result of Anderson Article

1. As of 21 August no change has occurred which can be attributed to the Anderson Article.

2. Naval communications have reached the pre-MADDOX volume level; with no change in cipher system.

3. Assuming that the article will inspire the DRV to effect changes, they have the following choices, listed in descending order of likelihood:

a. Continue the use of the current type of cipher but institute frequent change of key. The reduced volume per key that this would result in could limit us to partial exploitation. I say "could" instead of "would" because, [redacted] it is not possible to really equate solution to volume. In case of partial exploitation, however, the outcome would be delayed and incomplete order of battle data and inability to report operational information on a timely basis (perhaps inability to report it at all).

b. Change the basic code card frequently. Under normal, non-flap usage, it takes about [redacted] worth of traffic to permit recovery of the code cards. Thus, weekly or more frequent change would probably make full recovery unlikely, and exploitation incomplete as in "a" above.

c. Restrict the use of the current type to routine "low classification" and introduce a high grade hand system for the more important, more highly classified traffic. The effect of restricted use of the current type is much the same as in "a"; depending on how much the volume in any given key is reduced. The effect of introduction of a hypothetical high grade system cannot, of course, be gauged. The chances are, however, that the "high grade" quality would be somewhat suspect since operational needs for speed and simplicity of operation argue against the complications which almost always must be added to hand ciphers to give them high grade security. In fact, DRV operators have trouble using the simple system now in effect.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 12-20-2005 pursuant to E.O. 12958, as amended

Brief Memo to USIB

1) Damage actual

potential Assessment

2) Release aspect

Unable to tie article
back + specific comment
rptg that
identify for release

NSA25X1
NSA25X3

SERIAL: B/639/64

SUBJECT: Potential Damage as Result of Anderson Article (Cont'd)

d. Completely change to a high grade hand cipher. This could put us [redacted], but see "c" above.

e. Change to a high grade machine cipher. This is very unlikely.

Frank C. Austin
FRANK C. AUSTIN
Chief, Group B

In addition this comment is ~~applicable~~ pertinent:
The choices enumerated above apply equally to any inspiration toward change which might come from revelations inherent in a public trial. The only difference is in likelihood of action. My belief is that the DRV would be far more certainly inspired by public hearings etc than by Anderson's article.

JH