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  • Contemporary messages sorted: [ by date ] [ by thread ] [ by subject ] [ by author ]
From: Justin Smith <jsmith_at_mcs.drexel.edu>
subject: Additional permissions that appear to be necessary
Date: 29 Jan 2002 11:51:10 -0500
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  • Reply: Stephen Smalley: "Re: Additional permissions that appear to be necessary"


This is apart from those made necessary by my own policy configuration (i.e., they probably apply to all Redhat 7.2 installations):

allow initrc_t initrc_t:socket { create };

allow kmod_t kmod_t:capability { setuid };

allow logrotate_t logrotate_t:capability { sys_pacct };

allow system_crond_t etc_t:dir { setattr write };
allow system_crond_t file_labels_t:dir { setattr };
allow system_crond_t var_lib_rpm_t:dir { add_name write };
allow system_crond_t var_lib_rpm_t:file { create read write };
allow system_crond_t var_log_t:file { setattr write };


The last 5 lines only appear after running a system for several days so that its periodic maintenance is performed.

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From: Stephen Smalley <sds_at_tislabs.com>
subject: Re: Additional permissions that appear to be necessary
Date: Tue, 29 Jan 2002 12:10:30 -0500 (EST)
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  • In reply to: Justin Smith: "Additional permissions that appear to be necessary"

On 29 Jan 2002, Justin Smith wrote:

> This is apart from those made necessary by my own policy configuration
> (i.e., they probably apply to all Redhat 7.2 installations):
>
> allow initrc_t initrc_t:socket { create };

I've seen this permission denial associated with the iwconfig program on RH7.2. Do you really need to run iwconfig (configure a wireless network interface)? If not, why grant this permission?

The correct way to handle this denial would be to define new security class for the protocol family used by iwconfig (it falls back to the generic 'socket' class since it isn't recognized by the SELinux module) and to define a domain for the iwconfig program.

> allow kmod_t kmod_t:capability { setuid };

I haven't seen this denial on RH7.2, but it seems harmless (kmod_t is the domain associated with the kernel thread that invokes user mode helpers, such as modprobe or hotplug).

> allow logrotate_t logrotate_t:capability { sys_pacct };

I don't see this denial, and I'm not sure why logrotate would need this capability (configuration of process accounting).

> allow system_crond_t etc_t:dir { setattr write };
> allow system_crond_t file_labels_t:dir { setattr };

I don't see either of these denials, and it seems undesirable to grant these permissions.

> allow system_crond_t var_lib_rpm_t:dir { add_name write };
> allow system_crond_t var_lib_rpm_t:file { create read write };
> allow system_crond_t var_log_t:file { setattr write };
>
> The last 5 lines only appear after running a system for several days so
> that its periodic maintenance is performed.

These are associated with running the rpm utilities. We are likely to add a new domain (and a new log type) for this purpose rather than directly granting these permissions to system_crond_t.

--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
ssmalley@nai.com




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