Stephen Smalley wrote:

>On Sun, 9 Dec 2001, Shaun Savage wrote:
>
>>sysdm_r this for root to admin the system but can't change security
>>of "system" types
>>secoff_r The is for security officer to set up the security for the
>>system
>>dataoff_r this is the only person that can "see" users personal
>>files/directories
>>
>
>You are likely to encounter difficulty in truly enforcing separation among
>these roles. Obviously, you can't let sysadm_r update the kernel or
>its modules if you want to separate secoff_r, but even this is not
>sufficient. For example, if you let sysadm_r update /bin/login or
>/etc/shadow, what prevents him from entering any role he wants? Or if you
>let sysadm_r update system libraries or programs executed by the other
>roles, what prevents him from inserting arbitrary code of his choosing to
>be executed by the other roles? I'm not sure about dataoff_r - what
>constitutes "personal" files/directories. Obviously, if dataoff_r can
>read a user's private keys, then he can obtain access to the user's
>account and thus may be able to enter the other roles.
>

The sysadm_r is see as the every day admin. checking logs, add/del users,accounts using system-tools.
But the secoff_r locks down system. if the secoff_r unlocks the system then sysadm_r can then a administrator the whole system. The reason I like this is that an unknow root exploit can't comprimise the whole system.

The dataoff_r is a trusted user that is allowed to move user data from one domain to another, reclassify data. This is a violation of the rules, but that is the role.

>
>>I have compiled some of the selinux utils for RH7.2, I hope to do the
>>rest this week.
>>
>
>As I've mentioned previously on the list
>(http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=selinux&m=100687390219347&w=2), we've
>been working on updating the utility patches to RH7.2 and have updated
>several of them already, so it seems that there is some duplication of
>work here.
>

Where can I get the work that has been done already?

Shaun Savage

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