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From: Justin R. Smith <jsmith_at_mcs.drexel.edu>
subject: Vanilla unix policy
Date: 10 Oct 2001 12:50:44 -0400
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  • Reply: Stephen Smalley: "Re: Vanilla unix policy"


Some thoughts:

  1. SeLinux implements a very nice GENERAL scripting language for security policies.
  2. Is there a simple policy that merely duplicates the one that implicitly exists in Linux already (i.e., user, group ownership and permissions)?

My thoughts are that one could begin with this and tighten it up one step at a time. This might be easier than trying to create a very fine-grained security policy from the outset.
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From: Stephen Smalley <sds_at_tislabs.com>
subject: Re: Vanilla unix policy
Date: Wed, 10 Oct 2001 15:25:52 -0400 (EDT)
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  • In reply to: Justin R. Smith: "Vanilla unix policy"

On 10 Oct 2001, Justin R. Smith wrote:

> 2. Is there a simple policy that merely duplicates the one that
> implicitly exists in Linux already (i.e., user, group ownership and
> permissions)?

The SELinux access controls are orthogonal to the existing Linux access controls, so there isn't any reason to try to emulate the Linux access controls in the SELinux policy. The SELinux access controls can be used to further restrict access based on the system security policy, but they do not replace the existing controls. With the example security server, you can provide the "simple policy" that you describe by only using a single role, domain, and type for all subjects and objects and granting all permissions. Or you can use the trivial security server, although we haven't been maintaining it lately.

--
Stephen D. Smalley, NAI Labs
ssmalley@nai.com




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