On Thu, Sep 02, 2004 at 10:15:20PM +1000, Russell Coker was heard to remark:
> On Wed, 1 Sep 2004 08:44, Linas Vepstas <linas@austin.ibm.com> wrote:
> > Every now and then, I look at SELinux, and I get scared away by its
> > complexity. This complexity makes it very hard to audit, and assure
>
> What auditing are you referring to? Kernel code, application code, or policy?

policy.  

> > oneself that its actually providing any real security, as opposed to
> > the illusion of security. During this email thread, there are
> > references to mysterious rules that neither party in the conversation
> > fully understands; this scares me.
>
> Which mysterious rules are you referring to?

I wasn't refering to them, the posters to the thread were. Unfortunately, I've already deleted those emails.

> labelled as device_t. This means that there is no window of opportunity for
> an attacker to access a device before it is correctly labelled.

OK.

Well, here's another idle question, again off-topic: Does SELinux provide any sort of assurances that storage media weren't tampered with between reboots?

For example, with BIOS/firmware getting more sophisticated over time, there's potential for an attacker to break in, remotely, into bios/firmware, shortly before booting into the OS, and then alter disk contents. Yes, I know this is far-fetched, but was just curious.

What got me going on that thread was thinking about udev/hotplug again: with devices coming and going, disappearing and re-appearing, it isn't obvious that there wasn't tampering while the device was gone.

Again, excuse me if this sounds naive, un-informed or far-fetched, or terribly off-topic, but: In ye olden days, viruses spread through diskettes. These days, we're plugging-n-playing usb keychains, cameras, ipods, bluetooth this-n-that; although I haven't heard of attacks carried out through these media, its not obivious that these couldn't be carriers for an attack.

--linas

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