Copy of an undated report of Meredith Gardner

The early history of compartmentalization of the [redacted] problem can be summarized as a gradual tightening up. In the beginning no special treatment was given [redacted]. Achievements in it could become known to any worker in the [redacted] branch, working as a unit in a single area, with all systems in an [redacted] inseparable cryptographic relation to each other. Besides, achievements were reported to personnel and associates, both those who had a right to know of them and mere busybodies who perhaps considered themselves consultants at large for all [redacted]

The fact that the G-2 liaison man Howard Barkey heard that there was something interesting going on in [redacted] without having been officially informed shows that this sort of knowledge might have been picked up almost anywhere in the [redacted]

On the other hand, Gardner realized from near the beginning that the contents of [redacted] text would be so sensational that it would be hard to control talk about them, and Dr. Dubberstein directed that unusual discretion be exercised. Barkey's interest was recognized as proper, though thought (perhaps incorrectly) to be premature and disruptive of the technical work; he took some material to Col. Carter Clarke.

From here on, in general, each tightening up followed upon disclosures or leaks that were proper or inevitable enough at the stage of compartmentation in effect when they occurred. It is, unfortunately, all but impossible to recover the names of all persons who in the course of normal procedure were given some kind of insight into the nature of [redacted] texts.

Collateral intelligence had to be secured, and thus such persons as John J. Larkin (later formally indoctrinated), Major Pratt (of G-2) who found invaluable documents, and a man doing liaison with ASA and the Department of State (name not remembered) got a clue to the material.

The Navy at one point would have been the regular recipient of reports on all [redacted] progress, and thus, for example, a Navy officer named Carl looked the work over and even took notes back on one or two texts. ASA had no control over such information once it was imparted; no understanding was reached until September 1948.

On 30 August 1947 WDGAS-93 issued what was called "I.D. Special ANALYSIS Report #1: Covernames in Diplomatic Traffic ([redacted])" (dittoed with the following distibution.

| | |
|---|---|
| 2 copies | ID |
| 1 copy | Chief, ASA |
| 1 copy | Chief OP-20-2 |
| 1 copy | LSIC (thru Col. Marr-Johnson) |
| 1 copy | WDGAS-93-B |
| 1 copy | OP-32-Y (thru OP-20-2) |

However, after the appearance of this report, it was decided on a high level that security could b e better served by not issuing dittoed reports, but rather by communicating interesting leads to Col. Hayes for transmittal to Col Fornay or others who could advantageously exploit them. Such leads were communicated from time to time over the following year, and collateral in return was routed through Col Hayes to Mr. Gardner. Some from the FBI came in as early as September 1947, and in May, July and August 1948. By this time it was amply plain that the FBI was the logical recipient of [redacted] material of the type until then chiefly exploited; hence direct liaison with that agency through Robert Joseph Lamphere was established on 19 October 1948 at a meeting between Col Hayes, Mr. Rowlett, Mr. Kirby and Mr. Gardner of ASA and Mr. Reynolds and Mr. Lamphere of the FBI.

Just previously, on 6 October 1948, copies of eleven reports on [redacted] (including the I.D. Special Analysis Report #1) had been handed to Commander Richard H. Tenney of the U. S. Navy (OP-32Y14). The handling of this material was to be governed by a memorandum of OP-32Y1 of 13 September 1948, listing the persons to whom the material was to be made available; to these two more names were added by memoranda of Op-322Y1 of 5 October

1948 and 14 February 1949.

It was obvious that a considerable part of the [redacted] material would interest the CIA, and as has been seen, members of CIA had access to certain early reports from at least October 1948. No satisfactory way to channel later specific information to the proper place in CIA existed, however, until 1952, when with the help of Mr. [redacted], by now with CIA, direct liaison between Gardner and [redacted] of CIA was arranged for and the security of [redacted] material at CIA was taken care of.

Complete lists of FBI and CIA personnel indoctrinated in [redacted] are not available at AFSA, nor is a list available of British subjects who are. It is known that the British surround the handling of [redacted] material with rigid safeguards. Individuals in these three categories who have come to AFSA on [redacted] business are given in our list.