OPTIONAL FORM NO. 10
MAY 1962 EDITION
GSA FPMR (41 CFR) 101-11.6

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

TO : BØ4 DATE: 17 July 1969

FROM : BØ5 In reply refer to: BØ5/233/69

SUBJECT: Lessons of the Pueblo and EC-121 Incidents Your Reference: BØ4/386/69

1. The first lesson of these crises was that we cannot precisely predict the nature, scope, or timing of a crisis and be completely prepared for it. We are mainly dependent on the thoroughness and thoughtfullness with which we do our jobs from day to day.

2. The faster we can take the measure of the problem, the better off we are. Getting all available information on the critical event is the first problem. Lack of OPSCOMM facilities was a problem. (This situation has improved.)

3. Faster decision making would improve our reaction to crises. Training watch officers to recognize the need for immediate call-in of executives as well as intelligence analysts would mitigate this problem.

4. All regulations and instructions for handling crises should be readily available. This would reduce problems arising from questions of proper procedure. (This situation has been improved.)

5. A major flap generates an immediate and substantial increase in workload. The sooner the appropriate work force adjustments are made, the better off we are.

6. The problems can be dealt with better if a division of labor is worked out early. This should include assignment of major aspects of the problem to different individuals. This should involve at least

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three key prople, one each to handle:

a. Intelligence reporting

b. Operational reporting

c. Operational adjustments

7. Special demands will include:

a. Reconstruction of the actions of all units involved, with emphasis on a detailed study of the flow of information. (Operational reporting). The sooner these records are set up to facilitate this, the better.

b. Support to reacting U.S. forces or planning for such on a contingency basis. (Operational adjustments).

c. Round the clock manning.

8. A "flap center", or some separate working space to be used exclusively for any special operations related to a crisis would make for better handling of the added work.

(b)(3)-P.L. 86-36

[redacted]
Chief, B05

Incident

Getting information

Decision making

Procedural problems

Post incident

Reconstructing actions of ~~US facili~~ Sigint units.

Flow of information.

Reactions of US forces

OPSCOM

Extra help.

Division of labor

Intelligence reporting

Operational reporting.

Operational adjustments.

[redacted]

Round the clock manning.

Working space.

Lesson 1.

It is not likely that we can precisely predict the nature, ~~and~~ scope, ~~of~~ ~~these~~ or timing of a crisis, and be completely prepared for the ~~a~~ specific situation. ~~[illegible]~~ ~~[illegible]~~ ~~do not~~ We are mainly dependent on the thoroughness and thoughtfulness with which we do our job from day to day. ~~[illegible]~~ There are ~~[illegible]~~ however, several ~~[illegible]~~ things we can do in advance specifically to improve our ~~[illegible]~~ proficiency at dealing with crises. ~~[illegible]~~

intelligence reporting.
operational reporting.
operational adjustments.

1. The ~~earlier~~ faster we can ~~[illegible]~~ take the measure of the problem the better off we are.

2. ~~Any~~ major flow will generate an immediate and substantial increase in workload. The ~~sooner~~ the appropriate workforces are augmented and scheduled ~~the~~ better.

4. The flow ~~of~~ of information into and out of this building is never fast enough to satisfy the demand.

#3. The ~~workload~~ problem can be dealt with better if a division of labor is worked out early. ~~[illegible]~~ This should include assignment of major aspects of the problem to different individuals. This would involve at least three, one each to ~~[illegible]~~ supervise