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INAME: HARVEY, Richard **Text w/Tape:**

IPLACE: NSA, HQs, Ft. Meade, MD

IVIEWER: GERHARD, W.M.; MILLINGTON, H.; FARLEY, R.D.

[Tape 1, Side 1]

Farley: Today is the sixteenth of July, 1980. Our interviewee: Mr. Richard Harvey. Mr. Harvey was involved in the scheduling in the operational activity at NSA during the deployment of the *Liberty* into the Mediterranean in June of 1967. The interview is taking place in the N conference room, Headquarters Building, NSA. Interviewers: Mr. Bill Gerhard, Mr. Henry Millington, and Bob Farley. Mr. Harvey will try to recall what happened during the critical days prior to and during the assault on the *Liberty* by Israeli military forces. Classification of the discussion will be TOP SECRET CODEWORD [TOP SECRET//COMINT]. As I said, what we want to try to do is get all the information we can, all information possible, to flesh out the SIGINT history which Mr. Gerhard and Mr. Millington are working on. We have talked to quite a few people, but we haven't talked to the people who were involved back at NSA. So let's start off with the first question. What was your job in the summer of 1967? What position did you hold?

Harvey: I was Chief of K12 which was the Mobile Collection Division, which had both the airborne and seaborne collection responsibilities and as it related to the *Liberty,* we had the tasking responsibility and also the responsibly for scheduling. Dealing with the Navy, the JCS and others were involved in the scheduling and also to provide the... to gather the tasking provided to the ship.

Farley: What was the status of the collection against specific Middle East targets before June of 1967, would you have recall?

Harvey: Well, my recollection is the standard tasking [redacted]

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Farley: I think you've probably answered one question already, because I was going to ask: Why couldn't [redacted] have collected what you wanted to collect on the *Liberty*, by the *Liberty*?

Harvey: Well, I think the problem was twofold or threefold. [redacted]

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EO 1.4.(c)

Farley: Dick, what were the factors that influenced the decision to use a TRS to collect intelligence data in the Med[iterranean]? I guess you've answered that.

Harvey: Well, most of the factors were the hearability and the need for additional sources. That's the primary reasons. It had a capability already overseas and could respond in a relatively short period of time.

Farley: Was there much discussion in NSA regarding the proposed deployment of the *Liberty*?

Harvey: Well, yes because I think when the SIGINT alert and the tensions started, there was an examination of how... what were the possibilities, the options of increasing the collection in the area. And this was one of the very obvious possibilities. And we followed the situation until there had to be a decision because the ship was already off the Ivory Coast at the time and had prepared for a western African deployment. So there was a need, if we wanted to use the ship, to get tech material together to get people additional augmentation of people and to arrange to have it enter the Med as quickly as possible and to provide the tech material during this stop at Rota.

Farley: Dick, who made the final decision in NSA to deploy the *Liberty*?

Harvey: I don't recall exactly, but normally it would be ADP which in those days was General Morrison. Now whether he referred it to the Director in that instance, I just don't recall.

Farley: Were there any dissenters, anybody who objected?

Harvey: Not that I remember.

Farley: Was Raven involved at all, do you recall?

Harvey: He would have been as Chief of G. He would have had to vote in that because he not only had the target that the *Liberty* was covering at the time, but also the Middle East target. I don't recall that he had any problem with it, but I just don't remember it.

Farley: Did you perchance read the book, "The Assault on the *Liberty*" by Ennes?

Harvey: No, I did not.

Farley: There was a reference in there that Raven was one of the prime dissenters. Dick, what was the mission of the *Liberty* when it departed Rota?

Harvey: When it departed Rota to go into the Mediterranean it was primarily targeted against Middle East targets.

Farley: Was there any effort against Israeli targets?

Harvey: I don't think so and I don't know why. [redacted]

Farley: I'll ask you the next question, but you've already answered it. Why was there no tasking against Israeli military comms targets? Also, there seemed to be an absence of Israeli linguists aboard the *Liberty* when it left Rota, any thoughts on that?

Harvey: There wouldn't have been any need for it. We had no tasking, because in those days, we certainly wouldn't have had on board for, what we now term the warning.

Farley: Bill, do you have any questions?

Gerhard: Before the *Liberty* entered the Med, had there been any increase in the airborne collection?

Harvey: I believe there had been, I just don't recall the details of how much it increased. It had gone from something like one mission every three days to probably a mission every other day, something on that order.

Gerhard: Would you have been involved there in the setting up of the traffic processing center out east?

Harvey: Yes, (TR NOTE: Their interviewer talks indistinctly over him) Yes, Yes.

Gerhard: There was, I recall, a [redacted] linguist went up from NSA to join that processing unit.

Harvey: Because there was some collection from the airborne after the collection of that target.

Gerhard: Could you tell me Dick, [redacted]

Harvey: Yes, the [redacted] area. The airbase is part of the, there's a section of the commercial terminal, commercial airfield.

Farley: How do you spell [redacted]

Harvey: [redacted] (mumbling and laughter). How is [redacted] Marylou?

Farley: Marylou's here to insist that we spell out certain words that she doesn't really know. (Laughing) [redacted] Dick, how closely was the *Liberty's* journey from Rota, until it's on-station location, monitored by NSA?

Harvey: Well, I don't know what you mean by monitored, but (TR NOTE: Interrupted) No, we did not. As a matter of fact, my recollection is that when it left Rota, and I believe it left Rota somewhere around the first of June, it took almost a week to get across the Med. I believe we probably got daily tech reports and that was the normal way that we knew where the ships were, by their tech reports that they would put their position in. There was no, at least from the NSA perspective, no need for periodic positioning.

EO 1.4.(c)

Gerhard: I have a tired old memorandum written by somebody, there was daily plotting of the ships position.

Harvey: Yes, but I think we got it from the tech reports.

Gerhard: (interrupts) From the technical reports that you've mentioned

Harvey: And we in K12 plotted it just so we would know where these ships were. The sensitivity over mobile collection had not developed after the *Liberty* incident and the Pueblo and others, the need for keeping better track of them was much more obvious than there was insistence that it be done.

Farley: Dick, was the fact that the *Liberty* was entering the hazardous location or war zone ever considered in the early discussions of its deployment?

Harvey: I think discussed, yes. But in those days again, because there hadn't been any incidents of this sort, it was believed that as long as the CPA was maintained, that there was relatively little danger. There was no anticipation that anybody would make a direct assault against the ship. Once the fighting broke out, we did inquire as to whether or not there was going to be any change in the position of the ship and as you found out, the JCS did ask the ship to move out, move further out. And that was the famous message that got there, I think, during the period they were under attack.

Gerhard: You and Gene Sheck apparently called down to JRC's – Connel, Jay Connel.

Harvey: John Connel.

Gerhard: Is it John? And you asked, whether or not, there were to be any changes in the ship's schedule because of the outbreak of the war. And you learned according to the memorandums we have, that the JCS didn't plan any change at the time. Did John Connel pass any other information to you at the time that might not have been recorded? Such as, "We're) considering it," or...

Harvey: Not that I recall, there was no other information passed then.

Gerhard: Just a flat, "No, we're not considering any changes?"

Harvey: "No, we're not,." That was normally was the way...

Gerhard: I think that was the fifth of June, same day as the war broke out, that you made your query.

Harvey: Which was normal, because any time the ships were in the area and there was something unusual going on, we wanted to be sure; first of all, that the ACS was aware of what was going on and secondly, that they were the ones who are for the safety, and we wanted to be sure that we understood what they were thinking about. Again, because there was no previous incidents on a ship or airplanes, I don't think they really seriously thought about it until the hostilities broke out.

Gerhard: So the purpose of your query was to prompt a JRC reconsideration?

Harvey: Well, yeah the conscious thought about it anyway. Yes.

Farley: Dick, what type of support was NSA providing to the *Liberty*?

Harvey: During its on-station period?

Farley: Yes.

Harvey: Well, there were tech messages going out of G group. I believe they were probably on distribution for the tech material from other collectors, such as the airborne effort, that sort of thing. I believe they were probably plugged into the system and those were normal... just tech support things that we would do for any collector. Plus, we had provided them at the stop in Rota with a package of tech material on targets that they would be tasked against as well as some people that went aboard. So we had equipped them reasonably well at Rota. The provision while they were on-station was just to update them technically.

Gerhard: There was supposed to have been some technical equipment put on board at Rota. Do you know what that was?

Harvey: There was something hand-carried over by some of the people and I just don't remember what it was.

Gerhard: It could not have been big?

Harvey: No, it was something small, I just don't remember what it was.

Farley: Dick, did we have a direct satellite communication with the ship?

EO 1.4.(c)

Harvey: If you mean an OPSCOM like the terminal, no. There was the regular CRITICOM circuit that was used for the SIGINT communications. We were able to establish OPSCOM, as a matter of fact, while they were stopped in Rota. There was a long OPSCOM with them. They were using their CRITICOM channel and plugged in and it was live conversations. It was part of the pumping up before they went into the Med. But otherwise, it was just another CRITICOM terminal they used. The ship had its own communications for non-SIGINT purposes.

Farley: Would you remember the route or the channels they had to follow?

Harvey: No, that was gone in pretty carefully not the SIGINT channels so much but all their communications channels were looked at pretty carefully as a result of the non-receipt of the other message. The CRITICOM routing I believe, was through Rota but I'm not real sure. They had the (B% Tristam) on board and I just don't remember the comm pad it took. It might have been [redacted] I'm just don't remember who it was.

Gerhard: Was it this comm system or the one after?

Harvey: As far as I know it was. It was on board just two of the ships as I recall at that time.

Farley: I think you made a reference to this earlier. What was the liaison channel with JRC and JCS, NSA's liaison?

Harvey: Well our liaison was through the NSA representative to the JRC. At that

time was John Connel, and it was by secure telephone. It was a normal method of dealing either through him or directly with the action officers in JRC, with John's knowledge.

Farley: So there was pretty frequent exchange?

Harvey: Yes.

Farley: During this period?

Harvey: Yes. In fact, our first information on the attack was from John Connel by secure phone. That's how we got the information.

Farley: Again, I think you alluded to this, do you have any comments I call it on the "fiasco of the missent message" which contained the orders and directions to move the *Liberty*?

Harvey: No, I think it's unfortunate but, I don't have any comments that haven't already been made. They could have avoided an awful lot of problems for a lot of people had it gotten there, but it didn't. And part of our concern, one more point I want to cover in connection with the phone call you talked about and the movement of the ship: we had determined that in order to get certain of the targets, [redacted] if they were to move out of the area, they would lose that. So, in addition to the safety factors, we were interested in also knowing if they had move them... we knew that they would lose the signal and that was another reason why we wanted to know who moved and only collection would be primarily against the HF targets and some VHF, the air for example. EO 1.4.(c)

Farley: You answered this one too. Would you know when NSA became aware of the attack, you said that John Connelly called? Do you know what actions were taken by NSA following the attack?

Harvey: Well, it was mass confusion and panic. I'm not sure I can piece together all the actions that were taken, but John called me on the gray phone and he couldn't get through to anybody else. He'd tried to call General Morrison, so I called him and had to get him out of a meeting. And I guess there was kind of a 'wait and watch' for a while in regard to the *Liberty*. I think all the other collectors were advised so if there was anything related to that incident, that they would report it. I honestly don't recall whether any of the collectors got anything because we were so absorbed with trying to follow the *Liberty* incident that we didn't have time to monitor anyone else's collection.

Gerhard: There was supposed to have been a CRITIC which General Morrison took upstairs to Lou Tordella about 9 o'clock that morning. Would that have been after you had heard it from... ?

Harvey: Yes, it was somewhere after 8 o'clock and I don't remember the exact time that John called me, but it was probably around 8:30.

Gerhard: Johnny Morrison had your information plus the CRITIC and probably at that time...

Harvey: I don't remember who issued the CRITIC either. Technically it should have been issued by the *Liberty* had they followed proper instructions but again, I'm not sure that they did.

Farley: Henry, do you have anything, or Bill, before we go into the damage assessment?

Millington: Were there any other, apart from the airborne and the *Liberty* itself, were there any other mobile collectors in the area? Perhaps [redacted]

Harvey: None that I remember. [redacted]

Gerhard: Dick, would you have been in a position to have been aware [redacted]

Harvey: Yeah, 'cuz that was also in our shop.

Gerhard: One reason we ask is this other book that was written by Harrison, did you read that?

Harvey: No.

EO 1.4.(c)

Gerhard: He alludes to the fact that there was a [redacted] in the area. But not only was that according to his account, but visually witnessed real time.

Harvey: Well that's very possible that there could have been one in the area, in fact, it would have been a very logical thing for any country who had the capability would have had it in the area because of the tension in the area. It doesn't mean [redacted] one however, and it could have been any nationality. I would be mighty surprised if there weren't more than one in the area.

Gerhard: Dick, your an old collection man and I have a collection question. When the war broke out on 5 June, the Israelis literally took out UAR's airfields, good part of Syria's, a good part of Jordan's, one of the chief reasons for the *Liberty* going as close as it did, was to collect [redacted] Was there any consideration in your shop to change the assignment at that point, re-evaluate it, or were you... ?

Harvey: Not really, because the decision was made several, about two weeks prior to its getting (B% equipped with a ship then). In terms of the destruction of the target, one of the things that we had to establish was what could they cover in a technical sense, so it would have been consideration. They had just arrived in the area and quite honestly, we hadn't had a good profile of what they were able to collect when the incident occurred. And had this target not been there, I think we would have retargeted, yes. But we had no way of knowing that in advance to let them know.

Farley: Dick, did you have any knowledge or did you participate in the damage assessment in, you said not in Malta but in Norfolk?

Harvey: No, I didn't personally. My Deputy, Gene Sheck, went to Malta with the navy team and met the ship, and he participated in the on-site damage assessment there and he participated in all of the other activities later on; the inquiry here, the Deeley report, and all those things, Gene did it all.

Farley: We should talk to him then for sure. Were you questioned at all by Deeley or did Gene handle all of that?

Harvey: I don't believe I did, I think Gene did it all.

Farley: Were you pleased with the Deeley report?

Harvey: Yeah, I thought it was pretty accurate.

Farley: I don't know whether you can answer this or not, but while on-station, in an operational status, do you believe that the *Liberty* contributed some useful intelligence or was it too short a time?

Harvey: I honestly think it was too short a time. I don't recall any particular contribution that it made. Other people might be able to but I don't remember any because it was just arrived on scene.

Farley: What lessons do you think we should have learned from the incident and what recommendations would you have made prior to the Pueblo incident, or did you?

Harvey: Well, there were a lot of recommendations made and I honestly don't remember what they all were, but in hindsight, I guess we learned then that from a safety standpoint, not to depend on the CPA. Because if anybody wants to get you, they will. We learned that in Pueblo with what we did. We violated the CPA in that incident. Also to be better equipped to know what's going on around you, for the non-targets as well as the targets.

Farley: Think they should have military escorts or be armed?

Harvey: At the time, no because again, no U.S. ship had been violated like that. In the case of later on, the combatant in the case of Pueblo was a combatant and there hadn't been an incident in U.S. history of a combatant being attacked, of being boarded and well the military refused to accept that as an assumption in the period of time that we dealt with them on mobile collection. The military seemed to have the view that they were gonna exercise the right to be there and at the proper distance, and operating in a mode that was accepted internationally and that was the premise of which they went and I suspect that was, to some degree, why they had not considered moving that ship. On the day we called down there, it was operating in a proper fashion in the military view.

Farley: Do you think we should have discontinued the use of the TRS's?

Harvey: No.

Farley: Do you think they contributed something?

Harvey: Yes, and I'll be very specific because again, Gene and I had to go and

EO 1.4.(c)

speak to [redacted] as he was scratching them one by one and our comment to him was that we thought that we didn't need the number of TRS's that were in inventory at the time of (B% great dissent). We thought that there were areas where they did indeed contribute and we cited the Muller off of Cuba, [redacted] Anybody could look and determine that that was a very useful ship. There were contributions being made by the *Liberty* and by the Belmonte, [redacted] primarily just to keep us alive technically because we had not devoted a lot of coverage. And that was one of the prime missions of the TRS's was to keep us alive technically in those areas by aperiodic missions. The production of intelligence information was a mission but that wasn't a primary mission. So yes, there was definitely a place for the TRS. There were some that we did not defend.

Gerhard: Was the *Liberty* one of the newest of the TRS's?

Harvey: Yes, the *Liberty* and the Belmonte were the two Victory class, newer ships and those were very well equipped ships. Gene and I enlisted the *Liberty* in Norfolk just before it left and the one and only time I was on it was in Norfolk. I had a chat with Commander McGonagle who was an unusual skipper of the TRS's because, in many of them, the skipper's were just driving the boat and they really didn't care what went on back there in "that room". McGonagle did care. He was one of the ones who wanted to know what he could do to be helpful in the ship-driving sense.

Gerhard: Did McGonagle have a cryptologic clearance?

Harvey: Yes. I believe all the CO's did and maybe the Executive did but there weren't very many of the ship's complement who were fully cleared.

Farley: Dick, what sort of an orientation did these people go through? That is, the operations officer...

Farley: The Operations Officer and the SIGINT people who were to go aboard the *Liberty* at NSA?

Harvey: In the SIGINT compartment?

Farley: Yes.

Harvey: Normally, the pre-deployment actions normally entailed: once we had decided where we wanted them to go, the team or most of it would come up here and there would be sessions with the analytic people, they would go over the target, and go over what we're trying to get out of it. And they would actually help put together the tech material for the deployment and then the material would be delivered to them before deploying. But there were extensive briefings here in the building. Occasionally the analysts from here would go down to Norfolk or where ever, and update some them on material for example, prior to their actually deploying.

Farley: Did you meet the Operations Officer Lewis, (B% Commander), Lieutenant Lewis - I forget his first name.

Harvey: Yes. I've forgotten too.

Gerhard: David.

Farley: David? Dave Lewis.

Harvey: Yes.

Farley: So that was the routine for most of the expeditions?

Harvey: Well, for the ones that left from the CONUS yes, for the ones that were deployed overseas like from Southeast Asia, there wasn't the opportunity.

Millington: When the attack occurred, was there immediate thought given to replacing the *Liberty* with another ship?

Harvey: I just don't recall whether we thought about that or not. I think though, that in a practical sense it would have been very difficult to do because there wasn't another ship that could've responded in a relatively short period.

Farley: Was the Valdez in Rota or was it? It was out in there somewhere.

Harvey: The Valdez operated in South Africa it was on her way by and I don't remember exactly where she was at the time.

Gerhard: I have a paper...

Harvey: It was a slow boat, it would have taken forever to have gotten there and they weren't equipped technically to do the job.

Gerhard: Lou Tordella wrote a paper about this time. They were considering the Belmont, which was due in Norfolk about 9 or 10 June. Do you recall considering sending that thing back out at the time?

Harvey: Yes, I do.

Millington: But they decided against it because her refittings were too numerous to really consider forgoing.

Harvey: There were just so many problems that argued against it that they decided not to pursue that.

Gerhard: I've got a number of points here...

Farley: I don't want to get to the Russ Report yet.

Gerhard: Was *Liberty* the first TRS to really make [redacted] I'm aware that the Valdez...

Harvey: I believe there had been one earlier, had gone through there [redacted] it might have been the Valdez. I don't remember when it was deploying to Africa or somewhere earlier on.

EO 1.4.(c)

Gerhard: It was part of a trip on the way back.

Harvey: I think it came through the Canal [redacted]

Gerhard: We have a few records that show that the Valdez could hear VHF and UHF, some of the communications of interest, and I was wondering

whether or not that triggered interest in the part of the K organization.

Harvey: Well, it showed us the feasibility of the collection by ship. That's really what it showed us. And we certainly weren't advocating, we weren't beating a drum to send a ship to the Mediterranean. But what we had determined long before this incident occurred, is that if it there was ever a need, because there were a lot of thoughts about what do you do if the Mid East blows up? That was a periodic exercise to go through and the use of the ship was considered as contingency. We had seen it demonstrated. [redacted]

EO 1.4.(c)

Gerhard: One of the documents I looked at, claimed that the ship was the equivalent [redacted] Would that document have come out of your shop?

Harvey: I don't know, it could have. Don't ask me how to arrive at that, because I don't know.

Gerhard: I'm not gonna press hard on that one.

Farley: Was that the intercept capability, is that what they are saying?

Gerhard: I do want to ask, whether you were involved in any consideration of increasing the airborne collection program as an alternative to a ship?

Harvey: Yes. That would be one of the considerations. Or as a complement to it, but the airborne effort was one of the only other feasible ways of increasing the collection to the area.

Gerhard: It's my understanding that you did bring one aircraft back from the Far East to supplement that collection. Were there any reasons not to have increased it even more or was it the Viet Nam situation at that time?

Harvey: Well there was two, there were a couple circumstances that we had no control over. [redacted] That wasn't just flying, that was

also processing on the ground, was also a limiting factor.

Gerhard: After the *Liberty* incident, there was a JCS fact finding team really examined all the communications, to and from the *Liberty*, all the communications that went to all the major commands. The fact finding team under General Russ, prepared a large report which you probably have seen. General Carter at the time was asking some of these office chiefs to examine the recommendations in that report for application within NSA. Would you have been involved in any of that?

Harvey: Probably, and I personally don't ever remember going through it. I suspect that we were asked to comment and I suspect that Gene Scheck did it.

Gerhard: It would have been primarily a communications matter then?

Harvey: Yes, but we probably would've been asked to look at it from our perspective. I just was not personally involved in that. Most of the follow-up activities; the Deeley Report, the Russ Report and all the others were done by Gene exclusively and I turned my attention to keeping our shop operating.

Gerhard: I've got a gut kind of question to ask. Did NSA change any procedure that you are aware of, as a result of the *Liberty* incident? Did we change anything at all? I've yet to come across anything that was changed. Even to the point of reduction of papers on board the TRS's.

Harvey: I don't remember any substantive change that came from the *Liberty* incident, I really don't. I think that we probably consciously went through and said, "What would we have done differently," and I don't know that we ever consciously came to any decision that we would have done anything too differently.

Gerhard: You mentioned earlier, that you had somewhat less faith in the CPA's, and I certainly understand.

Harvey: But still, that was not an overriding concern, even then. It was kind of viewed and kind of judged to be an unfortunate event. The other incidents later on brought the dramatic changes. I believe there was changes outside of NSA that resulted. The JCS and the Command Control Post tightened up their procedures much more. I don't remember any dramatic changes that we made.

Gerhard: When you and Gene Scheck called the JRC on the 5th of June, and said to them in effect, 'What are you doing there about the war, are you gonna change the ship's schedule?" that sort of thing. This was just a verbal reminder to them again, but perhaps the schedule might be changed in view of the events there. In the Pueblo incident, NSA seemed to have escalated somewhat the triggering mechanism for the JCS, the JRC. As you probably remember in that case, Mr. (B% Botham) went to the JCS with a message and said that we have information that the North Koreans are not above taking dastardly actions with regard to the schedule of the

Pueblo and he forcefully tried to make them reconsider the schedule of the Pueblo. The two together, historically are interesting to us and we're wondering if there's any connection between the two?

Harvey: No.

Gerhard: Were you involved in the second?

Harvey: Yes.

Gerhard: In the (B% Botham) message later on?

Harvey: Yes. They were really not related, the 5 June call was, there was no,

Gerhard: (interrupts) As an NSA employee, I'm rather proud to see...

Harvey: (interrupts) Well yeah, it was really an inquiry to see in light of the circumstances, are you all planning to make any changes? It was not really to try to prod them to make changes, and all that, there was nothing evil about the call. There was no deep rooted problem that we were trying... or to cover ourselves in any way.

Gerhard: I'm very proud to see that in the records.

Harvey: But the Pueblo was an entirely different situation, because the message that was sent did point out the sensitivity the North Koreans had to ship... a record of sensitivity that we had seen about ships being in that particular part of the world and it didn't really ask them to change, but it was pointing out a sensitivity. Because the decision on whether to change the root was a command and control decision, based on safety and we were asking them, "Do you want to make any changes because of this sensitivity."

Gerhard: Were there any essential differences between the voyage of the Pueblo and the voyage of the *Liberty* that come to your mind? We, at NSA, did specify the mission to the Pueblo as we did for the *Liberty*, or were there differences there?

Harvey: Well the *Liberty* was totally an NSA sponsored mission. I'm trying to recall whether this was an NSA mission that the Pueblo was on or not. I believe it was not. I just don't remember the details of who was sponsoring that particular mission. Same question did come up by the way in connection with the 121 incident; who was... how come that mission was being flown? Who sponsored that mission? It was not NSA.

Gerhard: It occurred to historical minds around here that if NSA specified a mission for a mobile collector, and NSA felt the safety factors did not warrant the continuance of the reconnaissance, then NSA would be in a position to state that the mission was no longer required

Harvey: Except that NSA is not in the safety business and the safety is a command responsibility. NSA had a responsibility to provide SIGINT information on which they could base a judgement, and in the case of the Pueblo, that message was going out, passing along the SIGINT facts so that they could make a conscious decision on the safety. Did they think that was reason enough to take any action?

Gerhard: You've worked with [redacted] (TR NOTE: the tape drops for about a minute) EO 1.4.(c)

[End of Tape 1, Side 1?]

[Tape 1, Side 2?]

Gerhard? NSA's job is to, as I understand it, to take what measures we can to protect SIGINT materials and SIGINT sources and methods, and the military's responsibility is to protect the vessel or make the determination as to the safety of the particular mission. Somewhere between the two, there has to be a mutual, it would seem to me, concern for the safe conduct of all recognitions on the part of not only the military, but also the National Security Agency. Certainly NSA could derive from the DCI's authority the right to make statements to protect SIGINT personnel and SIGINT materials. So, in the historical kind of thinking, you wonder sometimes why NSA could not have come out more strongly than it did?

Harvey: Well, let me go forward a bit, and say that as a result of the incident that point was addressed and there is now a provision for assessing the military risk and the intelligence gain. There is now in the process, in the recce{?] world, an assessment made and there is actually little numbers that are associated with each mission to tell you the military risk, the intelligence gain, the political risk and that's part of the assessment process every month so that all people who get a vote, all organizations in the Washington area get a vote, know what that is so that any of them who says that our gain, our intelligence gain for this mission does not warrant that much risk, can say so. That's why that the system was developed to take into account all of those factors.

Gerhard: So, in effect, this is one of the major lessons that has been learned.

Harvey: Absolutely, and NSA has participated in building that system to make that determination.

Gerhard: That's encouraging though it was definitely a lesson learned from our review here.

Farley: Dick, do you have anything that you want to put on tape that we haven't discussed? I handed you a batch of questions.

Harvey: Yeah, I looked through the questions and I had made a few notes. Let me just run through them to see if there's anything in my notes that we haven't covered that I think is important.

Gerhard: It's kind of hard to recall, it's been quite a while.

Harvey: It's been thirteen years and I haven't had to recall this in all that time.

Gerhard: I think you're doing remarkably well.

Farley: I think it might be interesting, if you do get a chance to read "The Assault on the *Liberty*" it's what happened aboard, but there's also some reference to the guidance from NSA and the discussions there.

Harvey: Now, for a long time after the incident I naturally was very curious about

what people were writing but, over the years, I've kind of not wanted to keep reading and rereading the same thing. So I've just kind of consciously avoided reading about it. There's been so many, there was three incidents and I'd just as soon forget.

Farley: Rather not remember that you were there?

Harvey: Yeah.

Gerhard: We really should get you on tape about the EC-121.

Farley: What we're really trying to get all the crises down on tape.

Harvey: Well, if you get Scheck, get him on all three of them 'cuz Gene and I lived through all three incidents and those were about five or six years that were very traumatic.

Farley: Henry, do you have any other questions?

Millington: I have a question. It's not, it's one of, I guess, asking for personal opinion, and I don't know that it has any significant application to the SIGINT story. At that time, was there a distinct feeling amongst the NSA people involved, that this attack may have been deliberate?

Harvey: There was speculation but, I don't know that anybody had really any substance to base it on.

Millington: No good reason that they could figure. It seems that we have run across amongst the documentation that Bill and I have collected, we did run across a report that the Israelis did eventually turn over to the Department of State, in which, they frankly admit that their reconnaissance forces did know, before the attack, that that was a U.S. ship. Specifically, that it was the *Liberty*. But they, like our own command channels, the word never got down to the operating forces. As a result, the attack did occur. They admit that they knew it, that as some element of their plot...

Harvey: Yes, I've heard that and I think that's the speculation I've heard is been based primarily on the peoples' gut feel that the Israeli's were good enough at their intelligence business not to have known that that was the *Liberty*, to not know that it was there, and what it was there for and the second part of the speculation was that even though the air craft that attacked it could have made better ID of the ship than they did before the attack.

Farley: Marylou, do you have any questions?

Gerhard: I've got one more. Dick, would you like to comment at all with regard to the quality of the safety assessments as you saw them developing in the JRC in the period of time that we're talking about?

Harvey: Do you mean around the time of the *Liberty* incident?

Gerhard: During these considerations that went on in the Pentagon, it's not the JRC that developed the notion that we should pull this ship back. This came from the Chief of Naval Operations. Raised questions with the JCS and

actively urged the 100 mile CPA on the JRC.

Harvey: My only recollection, a comment I'll pass on based on my recollection, was that as I stated earlier, the military had no reason to believe that there was any danger to any of these recce platforms because they were operating in it and normally in an internationally accepted mode. Secondly, the JRC, again my recollection is, normally looked to the operating forces in the Theater to worry about the day-to-day threat to any of these and they deferred to any of the operating forces commanders and would never try to interfere in any way with their assessment of the on-scene activities. That's the reason that they welcomed or invited or accepted the fact that CINCEUR and Sixth Fleet and others could at any time, based on factors best known to them, make changes.

Gerhard: In the case of the *Liberty*, the Commander of the Sixth Fleet had directed all of his ships and planes not to go anywhere near that coast but he ignored this one ship, the *Liberty*, which was right up against that hostile shoreline. That's a matter of record that we have. But, another question if you don't mind, would concern these TRS's. Was this the first case, or the only case, in which you had a ship going right up to a coastline where there was a war going on? Can you think of another one?

Harvey: I can't think of another one where there was actually hostilities going on. We had them very close, as you know.

Gerhard: In Vietnam, I guess?

Harvey: In Vietnam there were hostilities going on in the general vicinity. We were very mindful of the fact that the VC, if they were determined, could've caused trouble for the TRS's there, just by launching a small boat against them. But, in terms of the kinds of hostilities in the Mid East I don't recall any others. There is another point that you jiggled my mind on and it's an observation I'll pass on, up until the incidents occurred, many of the military commanders didn't really view the TRS's as part of their command and I believe that somewhere in the record you'll find that stated. They chopped in and out of their commands and they really never watched them and never considered them as part of their command until they found out that they were responsible for them and their safety. I think that's one of the things that the *Liberty* incident brought out.

Gerhard: That's very informative.

Harvey: Well, I hope my recollections are reasonably accurate.

Farley: That's certainly helped us Dick, and we want to thank you very graciously for taking your time to sit in for a couple of hours, hour and a half?

Harvey: No problem.

Farley: What classification do you think we should put on this?

Harvey: I think most of it's SECRET CODEWORD.

Farley: Nothing higher?

Harvey: I don't believe so. There might have been a couple things I said might have gone into a higher classification, might be TOP SECRET.

Farley: If you wish, we can make the whole thing TOP SECRET CODEWORD.

Harvey: Probably better. A couple of comments on the Israeli side I think might be TOP SECRET CODEWORD.

Farley: Bill, any final questions?

Gerhard: Just one.

Farley: Why did I know that he had one final question. (laughing)

EO 1.4.(c)

Gerhard:

Harvey:

Gerhard:

Harvey:

Gerhard:

Harvey:

Gerhard:

Harvey: Yes.

Farley: Thank you again Richard, appreciate your time.

[End of Interview]