

~~TOP SECRET~~

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-12-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526

AFSA-008/jaw

6 July 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~MEMORANDUM FOR DIRAFSA

SUBJECT: Division of Responsibilities between AFSA and the Services.

1. In general, I am in accord with Captain Goodwin's view that the problem falls basically into 3 parts, as he has indicated in the attached memorandum. I am not convinced, however, that three JCS papers are necessarily required to remedy the situation. As I have stated before, it is my firm belief that our first step before proceeding any further toward a solution of the control problem is to place a definite and specific requirement upon the Services as we have been directed to do in JCS 2010/6. Based upon this statement of our needs, which will be great, we will then be in a stronger position to recommend that the most efficient and economical way of meeting these requirements will be for AFSA to employ, to the maximum practicable extent under the conditions stated in our paper on "Principles", the existing mobile intercept facilities operated by the Services.

2. In this connection, one of the things which gives me concern about the existing arrangement under 2010 for control of intercept activities is that it leaves AFSA with no assurance that it will have certain of its most vital coverage when hostilities break out. The fact that most of the important military coverage must be carried out by the mobile facilities, in advanced locations, coupled with the additional fact that these facilities are controlled by the Services for the support of their field commanders, makes it not unlikely that AFSA will lose some of its most vital coverage when it is most needed.

3. In the Stone Board Report, certain views were expressed to which all three Services agreed. As you will recall, under both the Navy-Air Force plan, and the Army plan, a Director of Joint Operations was proposed. In the case of the former plan, this Director was, in effect, a coordinator with increased powers. In the case of the Army plan, he was what we now have in the person of DIRAFSA. Regardless of which he might be, all three Services agreed that he should have certain specific powers or responsibilities. Among these are the following:

"6. In exercising the above control and direction, be guided by the principles of (1) obtaining maximum intelligence in the minimum time in accordance with requirements established by USCIB and/or AFUCIB, (2) maintaining necessary technical continuity, (3) making optimum use of available personnel and facilities, and (4) providing continued training, both individual and organizational, of personnel of each operating agency on all types of Communications Intelligence problems, in order that each Service can maintain a maximum readiness to meet its operational needs in war.

~~TOP SECRET~~DAM
(P-26)

~~TOP SECRET~~

AFSA-OOB/jow

8 July 1960

~~TOP SECRET~~

SUBJECT: Division of Responsibilities between AFSA and the Services.
.....

"7. Direct the specific employment of intercept activities under joint control, and coordinate the employment of intercept activities under Service control.

"9. Make decisions and issue directives within his authority, such directives to be implemented by the heads of the Service COMINT agencies. The head of a Service COMINT agency could request review of such a directive by AFICB or USCIB as appropriate. However, such action would not affect interim implementation of the directive until final decision has been reached in those cases where the DJO considers interim implementation to be necessary."

4. Paragraph 3 quoted above contains a provision (which as I recall was proposed by Gen. Cabell) for interim implementation, which, if now in effect, would be a useful safeguard against some of the dangers pointed out in paragraph 2, above. In effect, it would give DIRAFSA the power to act on urgent matters until he is explicitly deprived of it by AFSAAC action.

5. In view of the fact that the three Services previously agreed to this provision, it might be worth while trying to revive it, especially if our current position with respect to AFSA's employment of mobile facilities is not upheld. As it stands now, you have been vested with authority as stated in paragraph 7 quoted above, but this control is considerably weakened through not being supported by the sort of authority contained in paragraph 9.

J.N. JENNER
AFSA-OOB

Inclosure - 1

AFSA-11G Top Secret memo to OOB
dtd 8 July 1960

Copy furnished:
AFSA-02
AFSA-11G

~~TOP SECRET~~