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Cincpac File
Pac-33-jcr
A8/S67
Serial: 000469 C O P Y June 29, 1944

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From: Commander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet and Pacific Ocean Areas.
To: Commanding General, U. S. Army Forces, Central Pacific Area.

Subject: Radio Intelligence Unit.

Reference: (a) ComGenUSAFICPA ltr. AG676.3/295 of 8 June 1944.

1. Please refer to reference (a) which sets forth a proposed method of employing a Radio Squadron (Mobile) in the forward area of the Pacific Ocean Areas and requests my concurrence therein.

2. I agree in general with the concept that, if there are potential capabilities in all or portions of this unit in the form of particular types of intelligence which will directly contribute to our war efforts and which are currently not provided for in the forward areas, the unit or portions thereof should be utilized.

3. That the training of the personnel and their administration remain your responsibility is quite satisfactory, and to assist you in this function it is desirable that you be kept apprised of their results.

4. Your proposal that the operational control of the radio squadron should be vested in CinCPOA is concurred in. In effecting this control, which I know you will understand must be cautious and rigid due to the extreme importance of the subject to national interests, it is my plan to designate an experienced officer to function in the Forward Area, whose orders will place him in charge of radio intelligence activities in the Forward Area as a representative of CinCPOA with additional orders to Commander Forward Area. It would then be my desire that all forms of radio intelligence activities in the Forward Area operate under the guidance and control of this officer. Under existing plans this officer will initially be stationed at STEVEDORE. Dissemination of final intelligence must remain the responsibility of CinCPOA, but it is planned to delegate the responsibility of dissemination of certain types of intelligence of an immediate nature to Commander Forward Area. This contemplates flexibility and the passing of such information on the spot to all operational commanders who have the need for it.

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5. The best method of integration of new intelligence activities into planned organizations for the Forward Area is not one which is clearly apparent until more information on the technical capabilities of such new activities and the nature of material to be processed is at hand. It is felt that the many highly technical and intricate aspects of the subject require minute discussion and planning by qualified officers. As an example, the advanced location of planned radio intelligence activities will be at STEVEDORE. If the entire unit is required in the Forward Area and must be kept intact, its location at STEVEDORE, where the termination of special radio circuits for intelligence material and special cryptographic aids will be available, is indicated. Although immediate tactical intelligence would be then available to operational commanders on the spot, it must be passed back to the CinCPOA agency responsible for integration of all intelligence. On the other hand, it may develop that the major portion of the unit will best be located at STEVEDORE with certain subordinate groups such as voice plain language interception and VHF direction finding to serve operational commanders, at TRARAY and possibly TATTENHALL. Experience and circumstances will have to determine this. Your nomination of two or three officers to assist officers of my staff in such planning will be welcomed. The attendance of the officer in command of the Radio Intelligence Unit in question might be helpful and if you concur it is suggested that he be brought to this area as soon as practicable.

6. For your further consideration at this time is the fact that, based upon available shipping and the necessity for advanced planning, all material and personnel have been echeloned well beyond September, 1944, and to care for the shipment of the unit will necessitate the elimination or deferment of other personnel and material to compensate therefor. Your tentative recommendations in this regard are requested. It is believed that consideration should be given to lifting the unit in whole or in part from the coast to its ultimate destination.

C. W. NIMITZ