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Op-20-G/ir

June 25, 1942

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MEMORANDUM TO THE VICE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS.

Via: The Director of Naval Communications.

Subject: Cryptanalytical and Decryption Operations on Diplomatic Traffic.

1. The Army and Navy have for some time shared responsibility for handling diplomatic traffic. There is now close daily collaboration between the two organizations for this purpose. Daily folders in the War and Navy Departments are now identical. Externally, the Army serves the State Department; the Navy serves the President.

2. The question of division of this work came up when General Mauborgne was the Chief Signal Officer, and when Rear Admiral Noyes was the Director of Naval Communications. The services were at that time on a competitive basis and were exploiting material produced by themselves. A satisfactory division of the work on a continuous basis could not be arrived at so a suggestion by General Mauborgne that the Army and Navy alternate daily in certain functions, mostly decryption and translation, was adopted. This procedure has been followed since that time and is not conducive to efficiency.

3. In peace time it was the desire of each agency to produce as much of this material as possible because successes were used as a means of obtaining appropriations when times were poor.

4. The following considerations impel me to recommend that the Army be permitted to take over all of the diplomatic work:

(a) The Army Signal Intelligence Service is planning on moving to a location remote from the city, understood to be near Frederick, Maryland. This will make daily collaboration difficult.

(b) The present arrangement is inefficient and is not desired by either unit, and we would like to allocate the work more efficiently.

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(c) The Army has practically no Orange military systems of immediate importance to occupy their efforts.

(d) The Navy has more Orange Naval than it can handle with present available personnel.

(e) In addition to Orange Naval the Navy is now going into air systems and weather systems, (We recently made arrangements with BuAer to borrow an officer and a man experienced in aerology who are assisting us in attacking Orange weather systems.) and we are having some success and plan to train additional personnel in this work and send the system and personnel to field units as soon as possible.

(f) The Navy is assisting and exercising guidance over the Coast Guard clandestine operations.

(g) The Navy employs the following personnel for diplomatic operations: in decryption - 5 officers, 20 yeomen, and 3 women clerks; in translation - 1 language officer, 4 civilian translators, and 1 yeoman; in machine operations - 4 men -- a total of 38 people. Also, one tabulator of our three machines is occupied. Most of the above personnel are experienced and could be readily used and are needed in our primary problem of Orange Naval.

5. I have discussed this with the Army, and they are willing to take over the diplomatic work but will still give us material as heretofore for delivery in the Navy Department and to the President.

6. If my proposal is approved, it is requested that the following methods of arrangement be considered and I be advised of your desires in the matter:

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(a) A purely verbal arrangement between myself and the Officer-in-Charge of the SIS Section in the War Department.

(b) A written agreement between myself and the Officer-in-Charge of the SIS Section which would incorporate that Navy may return to present arrangements at any time and particularly upon

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the cessation of hostilities. Also, that the Navy will, in the event that the Army becomes more occupied with enemy military systems, take up this work again.

(c) An arrangement, either verbal or written, on a higher level than the Officer-in-Charge of the SIS Section and myself.

7. I hesitate to make these arrangements without your knowledge of the background and because of the possible political aspects involved.

8. Although the arrangements will not affect the final intelligence as prepared daily in the Navy Department, I suggest the possibility that the Director of Naval Intelligence might also be interested in these proposed arrangements.

Respectfully,

John R. Redman

John R. Redman,
Op-20-G.

Adm. Wilkinson has seen and agrees. He thinks it should be incorporated in "Allocation Committee" (FBI-NAVY-WAR.) This committee meets tomorrow and we would like to be able to say that in order to avoid duplication Navy has given up diplomatic and turned it over to War Dept.

JRR.

Op 10 I fully concur

Joseph R. Redman