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THE JOINT STAFF

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM-1369-69  
3 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice Admiral Blouin, USN  
Lieutenant General Clay, Jr., USAF  
Lieutenant General Stilwell, USA  
Lieutenant General Tharin, USMC

Subject: NSA Authorities and Relationships (U)

1. (U) Reference is made to JCS 2031/531, dated 31 July 1969, subject as above, which is a report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff concerning problems of providing adequate COMINT support to military forces and operations.

2. ~~(S)~~ Consideration of the reference by the Joint Chiefs of Staff has been deferred pending receipt of comment from Director, NSA. In conversation with the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Director, NSA has expressed his belief that the basic directives governing SIGINT operations are sound and appropriate, and that any difficulties have been occasioned by the attitudes of personnel involved. It is his belief that most effective employment of SIGINT resources, in support of both national and military requirements, can be achieved within the present framework if only the people involved, both within NSA and in the military, really want to make the system effective, and work toward that goal.

3. ~~(C)~~ Accordingly, the Director, NSA has asked that the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide him with a "bill of particulars" setting forth areas in which NSA relationships with the military have been less than satisfactory. He feels that such information will permit him to take specific corrective measures within his agency, thereby expediting improved relations and operations. A copy of the Joint Staff reply to this request is attached.

NSA TS CONTL. NO. 69/00985 ATTACHED

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-26-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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4. (C) In view of the above, I suggest that you may wish to furnish directly to Director, NSA information of any areas of difficulty between your Service and NSA, in the hope that such information will be helpful to him in his evaluation of policies and operational procedures within his agency.

*Nels C. Johnson*

NELS C. JOHNSON  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director, Joint Staff

CC:  
Director, NSA

NSA TS CONTL. NO. 69/00985 ATTACHED

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THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

DJSM-1368-69  
3 September 1969

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY

Subject: NSA Authorities and Relationships (U)

1. (U) References:

a. JCS 2031/531, dated 31 July 1969, subject as above.

b. Directorate for Inspection Services, National Security Agency Inspection Report, 4-27 November 1968.

2. ~~(S)~~ The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff has mentioned to me the general thrust of his conversation with you regarding your new responsibilities as Director of the National Security Agency, and the subject matter of the report cited in reference 1a above. He conveyed that it had been agreed that your efforts to improve understanding and coordination between the NSA and the Services would be assisted by a general description of areas in which such improvements might be sought. The enclosure hereto, based largely on points made by Service representatives in the course of developing reference 1a, describes such areas.

3. ~~(S)~~ I believe you will find widespread sympathy for your expectation that many of the problems of the past can be resolved through improved mutual understanding and renewed determination in coordinated and cordial efforts toward common objectives. It remains to be seen whether success in these endeavors will completely obviate the need for further attention to National Security Council Intelligence Directive Number 6 (NSCID 6). There have been many developments since the directive was published, including the experience and lessons of the current conflict in Vietnam, which people in the community believe to warrant an updating. The Joint Staff looks forward to your judgments on this point after you have had sufficient time to complete your initial assessments.

NSA IS CONTL. NO. 69/00985 ATTACHED

4. (U) I am advising the Operations Deputies of the military services of this memorandum to you, and am suggesting that they make any further submissions to you, along the same lines, which may be appropriate. If the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff can be of any further assistance, please let me know.

5. (U) Without enclosure, this memorandum is downgraded to CONFIDENTIAL.

SIGNED

NELS C. JOHNSON  
Vice Admiral, USN  
Director, Joint Staff

ENCLOSURE

1. Studies and Plans. There is a general feeling in the unified and specified commands and in the Services that the National Security Agency had prepared studies and plans which have not been coordinated with them to the extent warranted by the impact of those efforts upon military commands. This problem is discussed in Part Two, Section II, Tab A-6, pages 53-57 of reference lb. Investigation revealed that for the majority of 16 major studies and plans on COMINT produced by NSA, there was no military department participation, and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not have the opportunity to review and comment on all of the COMINT plans submitted by NSA which affected resources planning of concern to the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. Civilian/Military personnel ratio in key management positions at NSA. The view is widely held that it would be desirable to have more military influence in key middle and upper level management positions within NSA. The increasing importance of all types of COMINT and ELINT in support of military operations makes it advisable that senior military officers, experienced in SIGINT, participate in policy development and operational planning in this area. As pointed out in Part Two, Section II, Tab E-1, pages 148-153 of reference lb, the lack of specific identification of positions within NSA to which military personnel should be assigned by means of a manning table, such as a Joint Table of Distribution, has hindered long-range programming by the Services and their development of the required technically skilled and experienced personnel.

3. Employment of COMINT and ELINT resources in support of military forces. The conflict in Southeast Asia has highlighted the importance of COMINT and ELINT resources in modern military operations and has resulted in the demand for their integrated and timely use in a direct support role by unified and specified commanders worldwide. Coordination between the commanders being supported and NSA personnel providing support, in matters of planning, allocation, mission orientation, and tasking of these resources, is essential for maximum effectiveness. An example which points up the need for close cooperation in planning and tasking is discussed in Part Two, Section II, Tab A-7, pages 58-59, of reference lb.

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4. Cryptologic Support. NSA participated in the preparation of MJCS 506-67, "Concept of SIGINT Support to Military Commanders" which establishes procedures for delegation of operational control over SIGINT units to military commanders.

a. On 30 January 1968, as a result of the force buildup in South Korea, CINCPAC requested that the Joint Chiefs of Staff authorize the deployment of an Emergency Reaction Unit to Osan, Korea, with operational control delegated to the senior US Air Force commander in the Republic of Korea. The Joint Chiefs of Staff responded on the same date by requesting the Chief of Staff, US Air Force, to order the deployment of the unit and, under the provision of MJCS 506-67, requested the Director, NSA to delegate operational control of the unit to CINCPAC for his redelegation as he deemed appropriate. It was not until 19 February 1968 that the NSA (DIR-65, 192315Z Feb 68) agreed to delegate SIGINT operational control of the deployed unit to the senior US Air Force commander in Korea.

b. Admittedly, more recent requests for cryptologic support have received more prompt NSA concurrence. However, this is pointed up as a potential problem area which might benefit from further scrutiny.

c. In the area of support to the unified and specified commands, there has been significant progress in providing a channel by which these commands can forward their comments and recommendations for consideration during the development of the annual CCP. The commands have been complimentary in recognizing the fine efforts of the NSA staff in bringing about this improvement.