

PFIAB Recommendations re
NSA Authority and Responsibility

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 06-13-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526

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ATTN : Mr. Donahue

21 September 1967

D32
R. H. Darby, D321, 5825s

Material for Special Study Group Staff

The inclosed summaries of PFIAB recommendations relative to NSA's authority and responsibility are forwarded in accordance with your discussion with Miss Green on this subject. Also inclosed are two copies of the relevant PFIAB recommendation.

FOR THE ADN:

(Signed) D. D. Croskery

D. D. CROSKERY
Acting Chief, D32

Incls:
a/s

cc: D3 Reading File (*less Incl 2*)
D32 Daily File (" ")
D321 Reading File
D321 Subject File (" ")

M/R: Self-explanatory.

R. H. DARBY, D321, 5825s, 27 Sep 67, amp

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R. H. DARBY/D321/27Sep67

NAME OF REPORT

PFIAB Recommendations Relative to NSA's Authority and Responsibility.

DATE

PFIAB recommendations on this subject were made to the President in 1961, 1962 and 1964.

AUSPICES AND PURPOSES OF REPORT

The recommendations summarized herein were arrived at by PFIAB in the normal course of their continuing study of the intelligence activities of the Government, rather than in response to any special charge.

MAIN FINDINGS

In 1961 and 1962 the PFIAB made certain specific recommendations toward strengthening the national capability for the collection and processing of SIGINT under leadership supplied by the Department of Defense through the National Security Agency. In 1964 it reaffirmed the validity of the objectives underlying these recommendations. As summarized in PFIAB memorandum, Subject: The National Signals Intelligence Program (SC-01431/64), dated 30 January 1964, its recommendations were made in recognition of the following factors which in the Board's judgment warranted continuing priority attention:

1. The mounting role of SIGINT in estimation of complex international security intentions and maneuvers.
2. The corresponding increase in size, cost, and difficulty of global and even space-borne SIGINT collection and analysis, and the accompanying demands on all national resources, particularly those of the Department of Defense.

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3. The correspondingly high selectivity which must be exercised in order to economize on cost and use of scarce technical talent.

4. The opportunities for organizational improvement in the National Security Agency (NSA) which must be the centralized and prime source for the capabilities noted above.

5. The unprecedented demands for insight and wisdom within the intelligence community in prescribing priority intelligence objectives which can often be fulfilled only by SIGINT elements operating in land, sea, atmosphere and space environments.

RECOMMENDATION No. 5 - 2 JULY 1961

This six-part recommendation, based on a paper prepared by the Baker Panel of the PFIAB, aimed at strengthening NSA as follows:

1. New legislation authorizing DOD to summarily deny or revoke employment at NSA of any person unless it is established such employment is found to be consistent with National Security interests. (This was disapproved by the President on 5 September 1961, but was subsequently accomplished by PL 88-290, approved 26 March 1964.)

2. New legislation exempting NSA from Civil Service requirements (Veteran's preference) which tend to adversely affect accomplishment of NSA mission. (This was disapproved by the President on 5 September 1961, but was subsequently accomplished by PL 88-290, approved 26 March 1964.)

3. Requirement for full management and budgetary control of NSA by OSD. (DOD is exercising same.)

4. All Defense ELINT collection and processing be centered in and supervised by the NSA, as directed in 1958 (NSCID No. 6). (SecDef approved National ELINT Plan (NEP) on 22 September 1964 for implementation within DOD, subject to certain modifications.)

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5. A realistic re-examination of the USIB system for levying collection requirements on NSA. (This is a continuing project now assigned the USIB SIGINT Committee.)

6. There be support of NSA's vital collection needs in order to meet national as distinct from purely military requirements. (USIB supports this.)

RECOMMENDATIONS NO. 34-^a - 26 JUNE 1962

On the basis of further studies by its Baker Panel, the PFIAB recommended (and President Kennedy approved) the following six-part recommendation to strengthen the national SIGINT effort under authoritative control of NSA:

1. The establishment of strong control and management by NSA over its vast SIGINT resources. (NSA and DOD have effected this.)

2. The exercise of strong leadership within NSA in meeting national intelligence requirements rising beyond particular military needs and responsibilities. (Continuing NSA action, as required.)

3. The supervision by NSA of all types of SIGINT collection and processing as a long-term principle, and the exercise of that supervision in such a manner that national needs will best be served without undue expansion of effort and costs. (Continuing NSA actions as required.)

4. The exercise by the Department of Defense of more extensive leadership of NSA activities now that an Assistant Secretary of Defense has been designated for this purpose. (Maximum practicable exercise long since effected.)

5. The completion of long-pending efforts to formulate a National ELINT Plan (NEP) for improved collection and processing of ELINT. (Action completed with SecDef approval of NEP on 22 September 1964.)

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6. A refinement by the U.S. Intelligence Board of its issuance of intelligence priorities which form the basis for specific SIGINT collection tasks. (For COMINT, action essentially completed with development of USIB "Intelligence Guidance for COMINT Programming," beginning in 1966. For BLINT, a similar tool may result from the evaluation program with which the SIGINT Committee is charged.)

CONTINUING VALIDITY OF OBJECTIVES

On 30 January the PFIAB noted with approval certain efforts which has been pursued within the Department of Defense and the National Security Agency in response to the recommendations which had been made (they emphasized development of the Consolidated Cryptologic Program (CCP) and progress toward formulation of the NEP). Then they re-affirmed the validity of the objectives underlying these recommendations, and stated that their accomplishment would continue to serve our national security interests.

UNRESOLVED ISSUES

None.

KEY PASSAGES

As stated above.

RESULTS ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE REPORT

As stated above.

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