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Precis of Hoover Commission Study

Name of Report

Intelligence Activities, A Report to the Congress by the U.S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, June 1955.

Auspices and Purpose of the Report

The report was prepared in accordance with Public Law 108, Eighty-third Congress, approved July 10, 1953.

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities, under the chairmanship of General Mark W. Clark, was initially tasked to study and recommend on the structure and administration of CIA. These instructions were later changed by the Commission to embrace all intelligence operations of the Federal Government, and recommendations were to be made on changes necessary to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service in this field.

Declassified and approved for release by NSA on 07-26-2012 pursuant to E.O. 13526

Results Attributed to the Report

USIB Guidance

While there is nothing specific in the record to do indicate, it is reasonable to conclude that formation of the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee (IGS), in 1966 was an evolutionary step in meeting the requirement stated in item 3, Main Findings. It should be pointed out, however, that the difficulty of providing operational guidance "so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, NSA, of what is required and its degree of importance" has led the IGS to concern itself more with the "how" of producing the required information than with developing a clear statement of the requirement itself.

ELINT

The recommendation of the Commission on the integration of COMINT and ELINT was not acted upon until reiterated by the Baker Report (Scientific Judgements on Foreign Communications Intelligence) in 1958.

Main Findings

1. That the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also give such information to the public as the President may direct. The committee should function on a part-time and per diem basis.

2. That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees, one presidential and the other congressional, could collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security.

3. recom 1
4. recom 2
5. recom 3
6. recom 6
7. recom 7
8. recom 8
9. recom 10
10. recom 2

Unresolved Issues Left for Later Work

none

Key Passages and Ideas in Report Cooley

p 46 - General Organization

p 47 - USIB Guidance

p 48 - Allocation of Tasks to COMINT

p 49 - ELINT

p 52 - Position of SCA 12

p 53 - Military Career Specialists and loss of Cowden in field

p 56 - Improve R&D

Number paragraphs & list Page # after each.

(Gen Mark Clark)
Hoover Commission
Task Force May 1955
Append I, Part 1, Gen. Quinshine +
Robert J Foley

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: That the National Security Council direct USCIB to establish COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, NSA, of what is required and its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily concerned with end products and the Director, NSA, should determine the best way of producing the end product. If USCIB fails after a reasonable length of time to provide more adequate guidance to the Director, NSA, then the latter should be made a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2: That the Director, NSA, be given clearcut directives which will enable him to make much greater and continuing effort to produce high-level communications intelligence. This is of such great importance that monetary considerations should be waived and an effort at least equal to the Manhattan Project should be exerted at once.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3: That ELINT and COMINT be integrated to the extent of placing ELINT under NSA for analysis of the product and guidance and coordination in the collection and dissemination of ELINT. The authority of operational commanders over their integral ELINT resources, however, should not be abridged. USCIB or the Combined Board which is recommended in this report to replace it should exercise only policy control over ELINT matters.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4: That the Military Services and NSA continue to strive for ahigher degree of cryptographic security; that the problem of communications security, including plain text messages and traffic analysis of encrypted messages, be restudied by USCSB (or the Combined Board as recommended in this report) with a view toward reducing to the lowest practicable level the quantity of information released through telecommunications; and that NSC 168 be reexamined to ascertain

respect to all communications and electronics proposals from intelligence activities which call for facilities, equipments, or additional personnel which cannot be obtained from existing resources; and to supply technical advice to the Combined Intelligence Board on such matters as they may request. Proposed composition and terms of reference are shown in Annex 1 attached hereto. (This assumes that USCIB and USCSB have been combined into a single Board, as proposed elsewhere in this report.)

RECOMMENDATION NO. 2: That more effective use be made within the Department of Defense of the high potential value and know-how available in the Joint Communications-Electronics Committee of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to deal with communications and electronics problems related to the broad intelligence field. Responsibility should be placed on that group for reviewing and commenting on communications and electronics requirements that the National Security Agency considers necessary to meet the intelligence objectives, and the demands being placed by NSA on the special communications and eletronics groups in the military services under NSA operational control; and for submitting recommendations to the Secretary of Defense on ways and means to insure maximum coordination and effectiveness in the overall communications and electronics effort in support of intelligence.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 3: That more effective technical advice be injected into the USCIB deliberations to permit development of more appropriate statements of the intelligence objectives to be accomplished by communications or electronics means. (See Recommendation No. 1).

RECOMMENDATION NO. 4: That the present basic policy for the provision of point-to-point communications services to intelligence community activities from existing governmental or civil communications services be continued. That any attempt

if the Director, NSA, has sufficient authority to carry out his COMSEC responsibilities.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5: That a single Board with appropriate technical subcommittees have policy cognizance over communications intelligence and communications security. If the recommendation to place the evaluation and analysis of ELINT under NSA is adopted, then policy gidance for ELINT as well as COMINT and COMSEC should be exercised by the proposed single Board.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6: That the Department of Defense carefully study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective Services of the three cryptologic Agencies - AFSS, ASA, and NSG -- with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personnel assignment policies and logistical support.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 7: That the Military Services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or 'career' Reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures should be improved. The feasibility of using civilian intercept operators should be thoroughly examined. It is also recommended that the Congress enact legislation to authorize the National Security Agency to employ specially qualified retired military personnel as presently authorized the Central Intelligence Agency and with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also permit the Secretary of Defense to recall retired officers to active duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA but not of the respective military Services.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8: That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of supergrades and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9: That USCIB or its successor Board clarify the objectives and functions of Intelligence Liaison Detachments with NSA, establish uniform procedures to be followed by such detachments in their relationship with that Agency, and specify maximum numbers of personnel to be assigned for liaison duties after examining the extent of interest of such department or Agency concerned. Intelligence personnel assigned to liaison duty with NSA should be required to attend an indoctrination course conducted by NSA.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 10: That NSA and the three Cryptologic Services give greater emphasis to, and continue to develop mutual cooperation in, improving the technical features of intercept stations.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 11: That more thorough periodic reinvestigations of personnel be made. Particular effort should be concentrated on persons occupying the more sensitive positions.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 12: That the Director, NSA, be given authority to inspect the Service cryptologic schools and make appropriate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is affected.

Append I, Part 2, Gen. Terence Tully

RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: That an Intelligence Communications and Electronics subcommittee (ICES) to the Combined Intelligence Board be established to review and produce recommendations to the Combined Intelligence Board with

to set up separate, duplicate, or paralleling point-to-point communications facilities be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation No. 1 above.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 5: That a basic policy of utilizing existing facilities, services, and equipment to the maximum degree be applied wherever it is determined to be technically feasible in the COMINT, ELINT, and COMSEC operations. This applies particularly to certain aspects of the technical training phases, operational procedures, and logistics. That exceptions to this policy be authorized only when the necessity therefor has been fully reviewed and agreed to by the Intelligence Communications and Electronics Subcommittee recommended in Recommendation No. 1 above.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 6: That any arrangements with respect to centralized control of ELINT give adequate consideration to the immediate and vital interest of the military in this field and the need to keep electronic countermeasures (ECM) - a tactical weapon - clearly under military operational control.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 7: That all planning and operation of communications and electronics efforts in support of intelligence activities include full consideration of the following to meet national emergency conditions:

a. Day-to-day operation and training be based on realism in light of the situation and facilities expected to be available in time of war or national emergency. This applies in a special manner to planning operations to be effective in case of heavy jamming operations.

b. Key intelligence installations, served by costly, hard-to-replace electronics equipment and associated records be located outside established target areas. That these installations have integrated plans for national emergency or disaster operations. That all agencies involved in planning

new, alternate, or emergency locations for Federal agencies expedite action to assist NSA in its current efforts to obtain a suitable site.

c. Pending accomplishment of b., that effective interim disaster plans be developed promptly for each key intelligence installation to include as a minimum (1) alternate site, (2) installed and tested minimum equipment with necessary basic records at the alternate site, and (3) adequate knowledge of disaster plans by key personnel.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 8: That the present basic communications (cryptographic) security plan, providing for centralized control with effective decentralization of operations, be continued; that each agency and service maintain effective inspection and vigorous training programs to reduce to the minimum cryptographic operational security violations.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 9: That NSC determine ways and means to control more effectively release of valuable intelligence to potential enemies via clear text messages being transmitted over government and civil communication networks.

RECOMMENDATION NO. 10: That the general tendency within the communications intelligence and communications security agencies to overemphasize the special security facets of their operations with respect to basic communications and electronics features be examined objectively and comprehensively by competent, technically qualified authority to insure that such overemphasis is not producing unnecessary duplication of facilities and operations in peacetime which will grow to completely unrealistic figures in wartime, and producing a system which may Fail in an emergency because it will require considerable readjustment of basic operational practices at a critical time.

(This service could be accomplished by the subcommittee (ICES) proposed in Recommendation No. 1 above).

SPECIAL RECOMMENDATION: That the President set up a special commission composed of technically qualified civil and military communications and electronics representatives, to survey and produce recommendations as to ways and means to insure the more effective utilization of all communications and eletronics resources of the United States in the national interests in case of war or national emergency.

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HOOVER COMMISSION STUDY

Name of Report:

Appendix I, Part 1 (Report of Survey of National Security Agency) of Report on Intelligence Activities in the Federal Government prepared for the U. S. Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government, May 1955.

Auspices and Purpose of the Report:

The Report was prepared in accordance with Public Law 108, Eighty-third Congress, approved July 10, 1953.

The Task Force on Intelligence Activities, under the chairmanship of General Mark W. Clark,[1] was initially tasked to study and recommend on the structure and administration of CIA. These instructions were later changed by the

1 Other members of the Task Force included: Admiral Richard L. Conolly (Ret.); then Lieutenant Governor of South Carolina Ernest F. Hollings; Henry Keanns; Edward V. Rickenbacker; and Donald S. Russell. The staff Director was Maj General James G. Christiansen (U. S. Army, Ret.)

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Commission to embrace all intelligence operations of the Federal Government, and recommendations were to be made on changes necessary to promote economy, efficiency, and improved service in this field.

Appendix I, Part 1, the section of the Report described in the instant paper, was prepared by Richard P. Ovenshine, Brig. General, U. S. Army, Retired, and by Mr. Robert J. Foley, consultants to the Task Force.

The Task Force prepared two reports-"an unclassified one bearing on the administration and the coordination of the intelligence services of the Central Intelligence Agency and the services of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and State Department. the other report . . . was sent directly to the President and was not considered by the Commission because of its extremely sensitive content." President Hoover sent the unclassified report[2] to the President of the Senate and

2 No mention of SIGINT is made in the unclassified report. In the Introduction (pg. 13), however, there is a reference to NSA: "The machinery for accomplishing our intelligence objectives hereafter called the intelligence community when referred to as a whole, includes the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Council, the National Security Agency, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the Intelligence sections of the Department of State, of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force, and of the Atomic Energy Commission."

the Speaker of the House in June 1955. The "other report" included Appendix I, Part 1.

Main Findings:[3]

"1. That the National Security Council direct the United States Communications Intelligence Board (USCIB) to establish COMINT requirements in the light of COMINT realities and consideration of capabilities of other intelligence sources. This operational guidance to NSA should be so clear and succinct as to require minimum interpretation by the Director, NSA, of what is required and its degree of importance. USCIB should be primarily

3 In the unclassified report, the Task Force made nine recommendations to the Hoover Commission. The Commission, in turn, made two recommendations to the Congress:

"(a) That the President appoint a committee of experienced private citizens, who shall have the responsibility to examine and report to him periodically on the work of Government foreign intelligence activities. This committee should also give such information to the public as the President may direct. The committee should function on a part-time and per diem basis.

(b) That the Congress consider creating a Joint Congressional Committee on Foreign Intelligence, similar to the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. In such case, the two committees, one presidential and the other congressional, could collaborate on matters of special importance to the national security.

"6. That the Department of Defense carefully study the organizational structure and proper positioning within its respective Services of the three cryptologic Agencies - AFSS, ASA, and NSG - with a view toward improving their prestige and effectiveness, thereby strengthening their personnel assignment policies and logistical support."

"7. That the Military Services give greater attention to selecting officers for COMINT duties, assign regular or "career" Reserve officers to the maximum extent possible, indoctrinate officers in COMINT prior to sending them to command field stations, and establish career opportunities for specialists equal to those of the line or general service officers. Rotation and replacement procedures should be examined. It is also recommended that the Congress enact legislation to authorize the National Security Agency to employ specially qualified retired military personnel as presently authorized the Central Intelligence Agency and with no restriction on the number so employed. Such legislation should also permit the Secretary of Defense to recall

4 Recommendation No. 4 pertained to Communications Security. In recommendation No. 5, the amalgamation of the U. S. Communications Intelligence Board and the U. S. Communications Security Board was proposed.

retired officers to active duty with NSA and have those officers counted against the authorized strength of NSA but not of the respective military Services."

"8. That the Secretary of Defense give further consideration to the allocation of an appropriate number of supergrades and positions under Public Law 313 to NSA; to the possibility of further inducements or higher pay to selected consultants; and to privileges extended to civilians overseas.

"10.[5] That NSA and the three Cryptologic Services give greater emphasis to, and continue to develop mutual cooperation in, improving the technical features of intercept stations.

"12.[6] That the Director, NSA, be given authority to inspect the service cryptologic schools and make appropriate recommendations for improvement where COMINT is affected.

5 Recommendation No. 9 called for a clarification of the objectives and functions of liaison detachments of the other intelligence agencies at NSA.

6 Recommendation No. 11 pertained to personnel security.

Key Passages and Ideas:

Organization

"The National Security Agency is basically well-conceived, well-organized, and efficiently operated." (pg. 46)

"There is need for further expansion of the COMINT effort and economy motives alone should not result in curtailing this means of insurance during an era when not only our national security but our national survival so well may depend on adequate intelligence." (pg. 46)

"The positions of the three cryptologic services in the Armed Forces ar all different . . . The importance of the organizational structure extends far beyond the position on a chart" (pg. 14)

"Currently, the organizational structure of the Air Force Security Service seems most nearly to meet /proper/ qualifications, while the status of the Naval Security Group, with a divided subordination, appears least conducive to effective operation." (pg. 52)

"The matter of operational control over intercept units appears to be the only serious point of disagreement between members of the intelligence community - specifically the Navy and the Air Force on the one hand and NSA on the other. The Chiefs of intelligence of the Navy and the Air Force have expressed a desire that NSA issue only mission - type orders to the Chiefs of the three cryptologic services and that operational control of the intercept units (with certain positions reserved to NSA control) remain with those services. It was, however, such a relationship in the Armed Forces Security Agency (AFSA) that demonstrated the need for the reorganization resulting in the creation of NSA. The change in operational control proposed by officers of the Navy and the Air Force ignores the confluence of service interest in intercept frequencies . . ." (pg. 12)

"The Director of NSA is not a member of the Intelligence Advisory Committee. He is strongly of the opinion, however, that the should be at least a non-voting member in order that he might understand the motives and reasons back of the directives he receives from USCIB, to assist in his exercise of judgment in the day-to-day decisions which must

be made in implementing the broad directives and priorities received from USCIB."

Requirements for SIGINT

"In practice, NSA receives a statement of objectives and priorities from USCIB which compares in bulk with the Washington telephone directory. The basic guidance which NSA then receives from USCIB is a Master Requirements List which requires NSA to provide exhaustive information on every conceivable subject. It takes no cognizance of the capabilities and limitations of NSA and requests information for beyond the capability of that Agency." (pg. 7)

"NSA is a collector of intelligence and in some respects a producer as well. The Director of NSA has not received the guidance which he must have from USCIB to make his product most useful. USCIB has not identified intelligence requirements which can be best filled by COMINT and has taken little notice of the capabilities or limitations of NSA. The Director, NSA, needs to know what is important and what is less important, but the comprehensive lists of requirements established by USCIB fail to make sufficient differentiation. Thus, the Director, NSA is required to weigh one commitment against another, decide on a priority, and program accordingly. He has not sought this responsibility, but rather, lacking adequate guidance, has been forced to assume it." (pg. 47)

"An increased effort in one problem area, therefore, usually demands some diminution of effort in another, and the Director, NSA, has experienced difficulty in properly allocating his top-flight personnel because of the exhaustive requirements levied on NSA by the intelligence agencies." (pg. 18)

SIGINT Product

"The National Security Agency is primarily a producer of information as distinguished from evaluated, integrated intelligence. Its position, therefore, is that of a service agency to, and not a member of, the intelligence community. The Director derives his missions from the

intelligence community . . . It is a fact, however, that NSA does produce for the intelligence community more than unevaluated raw material. / Several reasons are then set forth to show the necessity for NSA's engaging in evaluation /." (pg. 9)

"The reports rendered by NSA fall into two groups - intelligence reports which are intended for the intelligence community and technical reports / for/ . . . the cryptologic services." (pg. 17)

Value of SIGINT

"Estimates of intelligence agencies as to the portion of finished intelligence which is derived from COMINT vary from 10 percent to 95 percent. Although these estimates indicate that an important element of some fields of intelligence is dependent upon COMINT, the most significant fact appears to be that the intelligence community, without exception, was emphatic that the COMINT product should not be deminished, but, on the contrary, should be increased, if practicable . . . It / COMINT / consitutes a form of insurance for the United States whereby it is hoped and expected that some advance warning will be obtained concerning hostile acts and intentions, on a large scale, of the Soviet orbit" (pg. 3, 4)

"The Cryptanalytic field is not static and the United States must keep constantly ahead of its adversaries lest it gradually lose its ability to glean intelligence, which is of inestimable value, from the field of telecommunications." (pg. 26)

Administrative Considerations

"COMINT starts with the intercept operator, and he is the weakest link in the production chain. This weak can be traced to conditions /which/ are especially serious because of the sensitivity and importance of COMINT to the national security. The Uiited States is attempting to maintain a tremendous COMINT effort, with the base of the pyramid comprised largely of relatively inexperienced, semi-skilled operators enlisted or drafted for too short a term really to expect maximum or even acceptable efficiency." (pg. 27) "The relatively more stable period of service of civilians as compared with military personnel has led the Director, NSA, to replace the latter with civilians where practicable. One station, manned only by civilians,

has been in operation several months and is considered one of the better and more successful intercept stations." (pg. 29)

"Unless this last step be taken / a flow of high quality, experienced officers to the senior positions within the cryptologic organization/, civilians will inevitably become the only individuals qualified to fill the top positions." (pg. 31)

"Because of the large number of very competent and highly educated individuals required by NSA, and in order to retain a high percentage of them in the face of attractive opportunities to transfer to private industry, NSA needs a relatively large number of super grades or similar pay grades." (pg. 32)

"Another situation which affects the civilian personnel relates to foreign service. . . .The Director, NSA, cannot order a civilian overseas unless he volunteers for such assignment . . . NSA civilians should be extended the same privileges as CIA personnel under similar circumstances . . . . Both the AEC and CIA are exempted by law from civil service regulations which are applicable to NSA, although the three agencies are faced with similar personnel problems . . . . Although NSA doubtless would benefit from a statutory charter, the seeking of legislation for this purpose does not appear to be necessary at this time." (pg. 33, 34)

". . . intercepts are made in approximately forty-three languages . . . It is obvious that the COMINT effort of NSA and the three cryptologic services suffers from the general, overall shortage of linguists both in the military services and in civil life." (pg. 37, 38)

Operations

"In order to attain maximum efficiency in communications intercept, greater consideration should be given to engineering and technical aspects of stations. Although the problem is recognized by NSA and the cryptologic services, unilateral actions to influence both station locations and layouts have

evidently been handicapped by insufficient appreciation or understanding of some requirements by headquarters and field commands, especially in the earlier years of development. NSA has only comparatively recently given consideration to these phases of COMINT. NSA should step up its efforts in this field, in cooperation with the cryptologic services." (pg. 56)

"NSA now has nine general-purpose and sixteen special-purpose machines, which is by far the largest and most comprehensive collection of electronic computers in this country and, therefore, presumably in the world. Our cryptanalytic effort would collapse without them." (pg. 24, 25)

ELINT

"The present separation of ELINT from COMINT and the division of operations between the Army-Navy Electronics Evaluation Group (ANEEG) and the Air Force in the ELINT field cannot be justifiedwhere national intelligence is concerned. The inherent relationship between COMINT and ELINT has been recognized by every non-Communist country engaged in the collection of ELINT except the United States.

"NSA has now been in operation long enough so that the multitudinous problems of a new organization have begun to deminish in number and magnitude . . . the experience of NSA in the creation of that national agency would be of inestimable value in bringing a related member of the electronics community into a coordinated national effort." (pg. 45)

Results Attributable to the Report

No specific results are attributed soley to this Report. There can be little doubt, however, that the Report added to the body of official opinion on certain prominent SIGINT issues. For example, Recommendation #3, in which a partial amalgamation of U. S. COMINT and ELINT activities was proposed, must have reflected at least some of the same views subsequently expressed in both the Robertson and Baker Reports of 1958; these two reports, in turn, immediately preceded and seemed to have palpably influenced the transformation of NSCID #9 into NSCID #6 in October 1958.

The SIGINT requirements issue raised in the Clark Report, in which the intelligence community is taken to task for its failure to submit realistic and useable requirements to the Director NSA, has been re-stated repeatedly in the intervening years. Some progress has been made, as illustrated by the establishment in 1966 of the Intelligence Guidance Subcommittee. But the requirements problem continues to be an elusive one and the fact of its importance in 1967 is implicit in its eminent position in the present Terms of Reference.

It is noteworthy that the Clark Report offered an option to the requirements dilemma by proposing IAC membership for the Director NSA in the event that the community failed to provide more adequate guidance to NSA. When the USCIB and IAC were merged in 1958, the Director NSA was made a full member of the resultant USIB.

The emphasis in the Clark Report on the need for improved organizational positioning of the SCA's within their parent services seems to have had little, if any effect at the time. For it was not until 1964 that the Army Security Agency was re-designated a major field command of the Department of the Army. It now occupies a departmental position commensurate with that of the Air Force Security Service. The departmental position of the Naval Security Group, singled out in the Clark Report as being the SCA most in need of increased organization status, has not been improved.

In its second recommendation pertaining to the great importance of the effort against Soviet high-level crypt systems, the Clark Task Force proposed that money considerations be waived and that an effort, at least equal to the Manhattan Project, be exerted immediately. Money considerations were not, of course, waived nor was an effort of the scope suggested instituted. However, resources were increased substantially [redacted] EO 3.3b(3) have been achieved (Analogy to the nuclear effort of the U. S. was again made in the 1958 Baker Report, although in that case the proposal pertained more to form, i.e., establishment of a contract - managed research institute, than to magnitude).

It is difficult to say whether improvements in the technical features of intercept stations during the past twelve years are directly attributable to the Clark Report or whether they have come about simply as part of a normal evolutionary process. The important fact is that they have been made; the Clark Task Force may have been a catalytic agent. Notable technical advances in the period include introduction of circularly-disposed (Wullenweber-type) antenna arrays, wideband intercept receivers which provide broad spectrum coverage, and automated intercept positions.

In Recommendation No. 8 of the Clark Report, which dealt with the civilian personnel situation at NSA, the proposal was made that NSA be allocated an "appropriate" number of supergrades (Civil Service pay levels GS-16, GS-17, and GS-18).

Although the number of supergrades has been increased since 1955, the percentage of the total work force in that Agency holding these grades (approximately .86 percent in FY66) is still very low among government agencies.

In that same section, the Task Force recommended that NSA civilian personnel stationed overseas should enjoy the same benefits as CIA personnel in the same area. Whereas NSA personnel now have the same privileges, e.g. PX, commissary, rental allowance, etc., as Department of the Army and similar departmental civilian personnel, their overseas service is not specially creditable for early retirement, as in the case of CIA and Foreign Service personnel.